Zombies!

[Revoltingest]

You do make a powerful argument.

I saw what you did there.
Frubalworthy.

 

[atanu]

So's yer old man.

Nope. I have trillion trillion terabyte RAM and unlimited storage and that is about twice of what you have.

 

[Revoltingest]

Nope. I have trillion trillion terabyte RAM and unlimited storage and that is about twice of what you have.

I have bacon.

 

[atanu]

I have bacon.

I concede defeat. The Turing experiment that I am has no schema for bacon. I have chicken though.

But tell me one thing. How did Turing enter into Turing experiment that you are?

 

[Nous]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

Gad, I never realized that the zombie argument generally or that Chalmers' argument in particular entailed that zombies behave identically to experiencing beings in all circumstances. I don't recall that either Chalmers or those responding to his argument emphasized this aspect. And if you look at the Wikipedia's summary of Chalmers' argument, this does not seem to be a necessary component (is it?). As best I recall Chalmers' argument, he merely proposed the plausibility of neurons engaging in information processing without any experience. It is on this basis that I got the impression that experience, as Chalmers conceived it, is inert.

Thus, my question now becomes: Why does the zombie say “ouch” and recoil when you touch him with a red hot poker? Humans and other animals make such noise as an expression of the pain that is experienced, and retreating from the poker is a somewhat automatic reaction that curtails and further avoids that painful experience. If the zombie argument necessarily entails that zombies and experiencing creatures behave identically to what experiencing creatures find painful and pleasurable, then I do not think such arguments are sound. Indeed, I think the unsoundness of that argument is evidenced in human behavior. For example, consider someone who eats something noxious but is unaware of that is it is poisonous. If it tastes good and he wants to eat it, he is likely to continue eating it even while it is already causing biological damage and even making him feel bad--he just hasn't connected the bad feeling with what he is eating. Indeed, I think it isn't uncommon for people who are lactose intolerant to fail to connect their digestive distress with consuming lactose for a good while.

In any case, our experiences commonly motivate our behavior. Having an excellent meal and pleasant surroundings at a restaurant is likely to inspire one to choose that restaurant again.

(BTW, how does this topic relate to religion?)

 

[atanu]

As best I recall Chalmers' argument, he merely proposed the plausibility of neurons engaging in information processing without any experience. It is on this basis that I got the impression that experience, as Chalmers conceived it, is inert.
(BTW, how does this topic relate to religion?)

First thing first. I am not clear as to what you intend to mean. Chalmers is not the one saying that our experiences are inert.

 

[Nous]

First thing first. I am not clear as to what you intend to mean. Chalmers is not the one saying that our experiences are inert.

OK. I don't recall offhand what Chalmers said exactly on that issue.

 

[blü 2]

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

First up, it seems relevant to ask how Chalmers defines consciousness. WHAT does he say his zombie lacks? By what objective test can he demonstrate that lack?

Because without such a test, he's done exactly what (as you go on to say) Dennett accuses him of: assuming his own conclusion instead of demonstrating it.

And calling it a zombie ─ something dead ─ also calls for his definition of 'dead'. The name is really a self-serving cheat if he can't demonstrate its deadness.

If he can't, again he'd be assuming the very thing he's claiming to demonstrate.

 

[dfnj]

Here is a wikipedia article:
Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia
What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

The idea of philosophical zombie sounds semantically identical to John Searle's Chinese room experiment. Here is John Searle giving a great talk at Google. The AI engineers at Google get into a big huff over what he is saying about consciousness and computers:

 

[David T]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

Others, such as Daniel Dennett, have challenged this notion, claiming it is internally inconsistent and assumes its conclusion. They argue that anything *physically* the same as a person would necessarily have the same consciousness as a person. Dennett claims that the fact that a zombie reacts *in all situations* exactly as a conscious person would is enough to say that zombie is, in fact, conscious.

Here is a wikipedia article:
Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia

What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

Bogus argument....
No definition of consciousness.
The posed zombie is only hypothetical.

Rev. Is proof of Concept.

 

[David T]

Gad, I never realized that the zombie argument generally or that Chalmers' argument in particular entailed that zombies behave identically to experiencing beings in all circumstances. I don't recall that either Chalmers or those responding to his argument emphasized this aspect. And if you look at the Wikipedia's summary of Chalmers' argument, this does not seem to be a necessary component (is it?). As best I recall Chalmers' argument, he merely proposed the plausibility of neurons engaging in information processing without any experience. It is on this basis that I got the impression that experience, as Chalmers conceived it, is inert.

Thus, my question now becomes: Why does the zombie say “ouch” and recoil when you touch him with a red hot poker? Humans and other animals make such noise as an expression of the pain that is experienced, and retreating from the poker is a somewhat automatic reaction that curtails and further avoids that painful experience. If the zombie argument necessarily entails that zombies and experiencing creatures behave identically to what experiencing creatures find painful and pleasurable, then I do not think such arguments are sound. Indeed, I think the unsoundness of that argument is evidenced in human behavior. For example, consider someone who eats something noxious but is unaware of that is it is poisonous. If it tastes good and he wants to eat it, he is likely to continue eating it even while it is already causing biological damage and even making him feel bad--he just hasn't connected the bad feeling with what he is eating. Indeed, I think it isn't uncommon for people who are lactose intolerant to fail to connect their digestive distress with consuming lactose for a good while.

In any case, our experiences commonly motivate our behavior. Having an excellent meal and pleasant surroundings at a restaurant is likely to inspire one to choose that restaurant again.

(BTW, how does this topic relate to religion?)

How does this relate to religion? It's as nutty as theology? In that regard its identical!!! .

Jokes aside that is a good question actually.

 

[Grandliseur]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

Others, such as Daniel Dennett, have challenged this notion, claiming it is internally inconsistent and assumes its conclusion. They argue that anything *physically* the same as a person would necessarily have the same consciousness as a person. Dennett claims that the fact that a zombie reacts *in all situations* exactly as a conscious person would is enough to say that zombie is, in fact, conscious.

Here is a wikipedia article:
Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia

What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

You are entering a realm which I know little about. I have heard of people who suffer from problems where they have no sense of guilt or empathy with others - and therefore can kill without any sense of doing wrong. If this comes close to what your question asks for - is the question.

I would think such as I mention are more common than most of us might hope for. It might even be possible for a normal person perhaps, if exposed to enough horror to become such. That is of course a question in itself.

 

[atanu]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

Others, such as Daniel Dennett, have challenged this notion, claiming it is internally inconsistent and assumes its conclusion. They argue that anything *physically* the same as a person would necessarily have the same consciousness as a person. Dennett claims that the fact that a zombie reacts *in all situations* exactly as a conscious person would is enough to say that zombie is, in fact, conscious.

Here is a wikipedia article:
Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia

What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

Let me first ask as to what are the means of valid knowledge for a physicalist like Dennett?

 

[Revoltingest]

I concede defeat. The Turing experiment that I am has no schema for bacon. I have chicken though.

But tell me one thing. How did Turing enter into Turing experiment that you are?

I saw the movie about him.

 

[blü 2]

Let me first ask as to what are the means of valid knowledge for a physicalist like Dennett?

I don't know how Dennett would answer that. Nor what Chalmers would say, though I dare say it would differ noticeably from Dennett's view.

But many folk, including materialists, define "truth" as correspondence with reality, reality being the same thing as nature, the realm of the physical sciences.

 

[Polymath257]

I don't know how Dennett would answer that. Nor what Chalmers would say, though I dare say it would differ noticeably from Dennett's view.

But many folk, including materialists, define "truth" as correspondence with reality, reality being the same thing as nature, the realm of the physical sciences.

From my understanding, this is Dennett's position.

 

[Revoltingest]

From my understanding, this is Dennett's position.

Isn't it Forest Gump who said....
"Consciousness is as consciousness does."

Oh, here it is...

 

[Polymath257]

First up, it seems relevant to ask how Chalmers defines consciousness. WHAT does he say his zombie lacks? By what objective test can he demonstrate that lack?

Because without such a test, he's done exactly what (as you go on to say) Dennett accuses him of: assuming his own conclusion instead of demonstrating it.

And calling it a zombie ─ something dead ─ also calls for his definition of 'dead'. The name is really a self-serving cheat if he can't demonstrate its deadness.

If he can't, again he'd be assuming the very thing he's claiming to demonstrate.

In his book 'The Conscious Mind', he seems to think it to be an obvious concept. it is the *feeling* we have, our *experience* of seeing red, for example. Philosophers talk of qualia: the experience of sensation, as opposed to sensation itself.

As for the 'deadness', Chalmers would say more that there is no 'light on inside'. For his argument (he claims), he only needs the metaphysical possibility of zombies to show that consciousness and physical properties are different. If f an entity physically identical to a conscious being can even *conceivably* be non-conscious, that is (for Chalmers) enough to show that consciousness isn't based on the physical.

This, by the way, interacts with phenomena such as blindsight. Here, a person is blind (usually in one area of the visual field), but can still react to visual stimuli (blinking or guessing shapes correctly). They don't have the experience of sight, but they clearly do 'see' to some extent. of course, for such people, there *is* a physical difference: brain damage in the visual centers of the cortex.

 

[atanu]

I saw the movie about him.

Wow. Movie in movie.

 

[A Vestigial Mote]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

Others, such as Daniel Dennett, have challenged this notion, claiming it is internally inconsistent and assumes its conclusion. They argue that anything *physically* the same as a person would necessarily have the same consciousness as a person. Dennett claims that the fact that a zombie reacts *in all situations* exactly as a conscious person would is enough to say that zombie is, in fact, conscious.

Here is a wikipedia article:
Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia

What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

I don't think the concept holds up. As an example of one of humanity's higher functions - part of consciousness gives us the ability to react "on the fly" and improvise. The zombie may be "programmed" or set to react to particular stimuli "in the same way" a human might, however if the zombie also had the improvisation ability (and every other human ability - as seems to be posited), then isn't it just really "the same" as a human? Why make a distinction? Whatever we define consciousness as, that's what it is... regardless what thing is exhibiting "consciousness" - even if we feel uncomfortable granting it the attribute "conscious" because it isn't exactly like us. Though, ridiculously enough, in this case it is even being argued that the "zombie" IS (for all intents and purposes) exactly like us.

It would be like someone handing you a Pop-tart and informing you that it looks, feels, tastes, reacts and has the same exact nutrients as a real Pop-tart. However this one was assembled in a Star Trek food replicator - an exact scan and copy of a real Pop-tart. But they go on to say the one in your hand does not have the "soul" of a real Pop-tart. Well what the heck does that mean? If the person making such a claim could define "soul" as something we can test for, then maybe we can actually tell some quantifiable difference. If not, then what ends up being the real difference? Is it wrong to still call it a Pop-tart?