Zombies!

[idav]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

Others, such as Daniel Dennett, have challenged this notion, claiming it is internally inconsistent and assumes its conclusion. They argue that anything *physically* the same as a person would necessarily have the same consciousness as a person. Dennett claims that the fact that a zombie reacts *in all situations* exactly as a conscious person would is enough to say that zombie is, in fact, conscious.

Here is a wikipedia article:
Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia

What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

The idea that “physical information” can’t explain consciousness is classic dualism but there is a huge issue with philosophies that attribute monism as only physical. With monism it would be a lot simpler, either everything is spirit or everything is not, depending how a person defines spirit. Material monism can answer consciousness existing just as easily as the idealism type of monism and becomes a semantics argument about what the one substance really is. In my view philosophical zombies cannot exist and is incoherent. The term is dualism trying to make humans more than we are, humans simply being a product of physics.

 

[james bond]

Here's the Native American prayer ceremony using mescaline or peyote.

"Speer said that the prayer ceremony lasts from dusk to dawn. Songs and chants are sung during the service. Different songs have different meanings. Some pertain to Jesus Christ, some ask God to bless the people."

https://www.peyote.com/peyote/native.html

Dusk to dawn is probably a good time.

 

[A Vestigial Mote]

II. How do we assume that human mind is equipped to unravel the mystery of its creation, if it is a product of causally closed physical processes? If mind-consciousness is a byproduct of physical processes, and if those processes are causally closed (as physicalists claim) then consciousness is irrelevant.

"Consciouness" could be considered irrelevant to all except the individual who gets the full experience of all of their qualia. In fact, don't we see such an opinion at work somewhat in sociopaths, and even more so in psychopaths? They don't seem to care what state another being is in, or how much it may reflect their own functioning and struggles. But then there is the opposing camp... the majority of us, within whom exists innate empathy for fellow-kind. We know what pain feels like to us. Someone else's pain could be slightly different when they feel it, and others very different... however we all do share, at the very least, the understanding that pain is negative, unwanted and often times terrible. Sure, we can't know exactly what the other people experiencing pain are feeling... but most of us can experience pain, and can empathize because that arena of qualia's meta-structure is the same between humans.

For example, somehow I burn less easily than other people. My hands are especially resilient. I can pick things up with relative ease that others would drop instantly in a fit of involuntary reaction. My skin also doesn't blister as easily, and burns tend not to leave lasting scars. Does this mean I discount all others' conscious processing of heat that is only just extreme enough that I am still able to cope? Of course not. I still know what a more extreme burn feels like to myself, and so other people's consciousness processing the sensation of a "burn" is important to me.

This empathy and understanding between humans exists regardless what the ultimate root of our creation is. And this is precisely where the quest to "unravel the mystery" should probably start. In the "meta" realm of such experiences - where we can relate to one another... study one another. Without that, you'd basically be right... there would be no answers forthcoming to a lone individual "consciousness" wondering "how did I get here?", and the fact that they, alone, were conscious in the universe would approach irrelevance.

 

[Dan From Smithville]

So, here's a question. How do I know *I* am not a zombie? Perhaps what I 'experience' isn't *really* experiences and what I *think* is consciousness really isn't.

How would I know?

I don't know. Do I believe I'm real, but only existing as a construct in a little box on the table of some greater being? I believe I exist. I think therefore I am. But this is beyond just existence and into the nature of that existence.

So many questions and lines of thought come to mind. What does it mean to be human? Is it more than the meat that I ride in. Would I be any less human if my intelligence rode in an computer memory? If I don't know that, I surely don't have an answer to a question that seeks to determine whether the intelligence, wherever it resides, is really human and not made up.

What if being created as a zombie has created something new and emergent that is more than it was intended to be? How would I know that?

I don't know.

 

[Dan From Smithville]

So a zombie that is behaviorally identical to me that questions its consciousness must be conscious? In other words, zombies cannot exist and the concept is incoherent?



I have no idea why that would follow.

I'm not sure either. We are in a sense puppets to the physical world. This despite our desires to contradict it or use it to our own ends. When confronted with a challenge that we can't overcome with our own abilities, we find some technical means around it. We have shown a propensity for that over the last 200 years. That too has limits though. I don't think that being a puppet necessarily demands a puppet master.

Assuming the real me exists as a conscious being how do I know that the me writing here and that conscious me are the same individual? What if the "me" here is a program written last week by the real me as part of a class project and the entire body of history and experience that I have is really a very elaborate fiction to make me behave more like the "real" conscious me. An exact replica of the history of an actual person or one tweaked to see how "I" respond to the what if questions we all sometimes pose for ourselves.

My head hurts.

 

[Dan From Smithville]

That's my view. And it is how Dennett argues against the coherence of the zombie concept. And that shows that materialism is a viable option, unlike what Chalmers claims.

That's my view. And it is how Dennett argues against the coherence of the zombie concept. And that shows that materialism is a viable option, unlike what Chalmers claims.

I'm not certain I like the appellation of zombie. It implies mindlessness and clearly the concept outlined in the definition of zombie includes a consciousness even if it is artificial.

Is Data a real person? Does pushing the switch below his shoulder cut his strings or just make him go to sleep?

Take my Worf, please.

 

[Dan From Smithville]

Can you have a physical entity that exactly matches a person, or any other living thing for that matter, that isn't alive? Would making it

This is a new one to me. From my perspective, philosophy does not necessarily relate to the real world. This mental construct to me is just that for the most part although in the case of "dissociative identity disorder" or depersonalization itself people feel not connected to their body and thoughts which is not what the OP asks but is reasonably close to it.

I was thinking of something along the same lines. What about a person that is a sociopath and doesn't recognize others as alive like him or herself, and has no empathy? I may be way off in my understanding of what a sociopath is in coming up with this idea. But even people with that psychological make up would be aware of their surroundings and of their own existence. To have a consciousness.

 

[Dan From Smithville]

Chalmers actually argues for a type of dualism based on materialism (which seems strange to me). His basic argument isn't that zombies are real, but that the mere coherence of the concept means that consciousness *cannot* be a physical process alone. if being physically identical to a conscious thing doesn't make something conscious, then consciousness isn't just physical.

Dennett, on the other hand, argues that the whole notion of philosophical zombies is incoherent: that being physically identical would guarantee equal conscious experiences.

Chalmer's definitely likes to write about the Chinese Room as well as Mary, the blind woman who knows all there is to know about red, but has never experienced it.

I'm having trouble disagreeing with Dennett.

 

[sun rise]

What about a person that is a sociopath and doesn't recognize others as alive like him or herself, and has no empathy?

I think such people are well-connected with themselves but not the world. I'm not sure if that is or is not related but it's a real thing.