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Zombies!

atanu

Member
Premium Member
So, here's a question. How do I know *I* am not a zombie? Perhaps what I 'experience' isn't *really* experiences and what I *think* is consciousness really isn't.

How would I know?

Then I will question competence of all of your knowing and especially the title 'Polymath'.

:D
 

sayak83

Veteran Member
Staff member
Premium Member
To save time I have combined these two posts. Although the former appears to be a much more thoughtful post and I have a few serious points to discuss regarding it, allow me to point out two common issues.

I. Consciousness is a first person subjective experience. I cannot impart to anyone else the knowledge as to how my last orgasm felt. My brain recordings and physical data may be recorded very accurately, but the records will not tell anything about the intense internal experience.

How does a mechanical replica, based on third party observations, be the same as first party subjective qualia? Chalmer has done a common sense job of pointing out the lack of data of internal first person subjective experience in Dennett's model.
This may no longer be the case. It might soon be possible to actually have plural "first persons" experience of minds melded together.
http://www.sciencealert.com/scientists-link-up-monkey-and-rat-brains-in-world-first-experiment

I may finally see how you see red and vice versa. And a blind person can share in my vision.
 

Polymath257

Think & Care
Staff member
Premium Member
Then I will question competence of all of your knowing and especially the title 'Polymath'.

:D


But the point is that a zombie would also report being conscious. And, there is *some* physical process going on that would lead to the zombie declaring its consciousness. So, if zombies are a coherent concept, then not only would they report being conscious, but they would have *reason* to report being conscious. Isn't whatever going on that leads them to report consciousness *actual* consciousness.

And if not, then the simple fat that I *think* I am conscious isn't sufficient reason to conclude that I am since a zombie clearly *thinks* they are conscious.
 

sayak83

Veteran Member
Staff member
Premium Member
But the point is that a zombie would also report being conscious. And, there is *some* physical process going on that would lead to the zombie declaring its consciousness. So, if zombies are a coherent concept, then not only would they report being conscious, but they would have *reason* to report being conscious. Isn't whatever going on that leads them to report consciousness *actual* consciousness.

And if not, then the simple fat that I *think* I am conscious isn't sufficient reason to conclude that I am since a zombie clearly *thinks* they are conscious.
So I can be a zombie?
 

sayak83

Veteran Member
Staff member
Premium Member
We might *all* be zombies! An apocalypse!
Then the argument undermines itself does it not? If I can be a zombie, then zombies have all internal and external properties that I have. So there is only one category of entities like me. Correct?
 

Polymath257

Think & Care
Staff member
Premium Member
Then the argument undermines itself does it not? If I can be a zombie, then zombies have all internal and external properties that I have. So there is only one category of entities like me. Correct?


That's my view. And it is how Dennett argues against the coherence of the zombie concept. And that shows that materialism is a viable option, unlike what Chalmers claims.
 

atanu

Member
Premium Member
But the point is that a zombie would also report being conscious. And, there is *some* physical process going on that would lead to the zombie declaring its consciousness. So, if zombies are a coherent concept, then not only would they report being conscious, but they would have *reason* to report being conscious. Isn't whatever going on that leads them to report consciousness *actual* consciousness.

And if not, then the simple fat that I *think* I am conscious isn't sufficient reason to conclude that I am since a zombie clearly *thinks* they are conscious.

My point is if we question our consciousness, we affirm it.

OTOH, if consciousness is not real in you and me then we are puppets in some stage, being moved by a master.
 

Polymath257

Think & Care
Staff member
Premium Member
My point is if we question our consciousness, we affirm it.

So a zombie that is behaviorally identical to me that questions its consciousness must be conscious? In other words, zombies cannot exist and the concept is incoherent?

OTOH, if consciousness is not real in you and me then we are puppets in some stage, being moved by a master.

I have no idea why that would follow.
 

atanu

Member
Premium Member
So a zombie that is behaviorally identical to me that questions its consciousness must be conscious? In other words, zombies cannot exist and the concept is incoherent?

Yes, IMO. Zombie is postulated, only if eliminative materialism is proposed. It is in response to an awkward philosophy that proposes that we do not have true inner experience and what we have are merely behavioural. Behaviour is a result of our inner experience, they are not same.

Proposing that we do not have true inner experiences (true consciousness) and that our consciousness is mere physical interactions, means that we are denying the being itself. The being is nothing but mechanical interactions. In that case, what about the proposer of such an idea?
 

Polymath257

Think & Care
Staff member
Premium Member
Yes, IMO. Zombie is postulated, only if eliminative materialism is proposed. It is in response to an awkward philosophy that proposes that we do not have true inner experience and what we have are merely behavioural. Behaviour is a result of our inner experience, they are not same.

Proposing that we do not have true inner experiences (true consciousness) and that our consciousness is mere physical interactions, means that we are denying the being itself. The being is nothing but mechanical interactions. In that case, what about the proposer of such an idea?

Exactly the opposite of what the zombie argument is trying to achieve. The whole point for Chalmers is that the *coherence* of zombies shows that consciousness isn't a material phenomenon. But, as we have seen, a p-zombie would also claim to be conscious with reason and so, but *your* logic, would be conscious..Hence, the concept is incoherent, which supports the materialist viewpoint.
 

sayak83

Veteran Member
Staff member
Premium Member
Exactly the opposite of what the zombie argument is trying to achieve. The whole point for Chalmers is that the *coherence* of zombies shows that consciousness isn't a material phenomenon. But, as we have seen, a p-zombie would also claim to be conscious with reason and so, but *your* logic, would be conscious..Hence, the concept is incoherent, which supports the materialist viewpoint.
The failure of the zombie argument is a failure of dualism. No other philosophy is impacted by it imo.
 

atanu

Member
Premium Member
Exactly the opposite of what the zombie argument is trying to achieve. The whole point for Chalmers is that the *coherence* of zombies shows that consciousness isn't a material phenomenon. But, as we have seen, a p-zombie would also claim to be conscious with reason and so, but *your* logic, would be conscious..Hence, the concept is incoherent, which supports the materialist viewpoint.

No.

If you propose that behaviour is same as inner experience and that behaviours can be built in a schema (as primitively done in a thermostat), then a zombie showing all behaviours but lacking inner experiences is possible.
 

sayak83

Veteran Member
Staff member
Premium Member
Exactly the opposite of what the zombie argument is trying to achieve. The whole point for Chalmers is that the *coherence* of zombies shows that consciousness isn't a material phenomenon. But, as we have seen, a p-zombie would also claim to be conscious with reason and so, but *your* logic, would be conscious..Hence, the concept is incoherent, which supports the materialist viewpoint.
But atanu I believe considers matter itself to be a non-material phenomenon. Therefore his argument is not impacted as well.
 

sayak83

Veteran Member
Staff member
Premium Member
No.

If you propose that behaviour is same as inner experience and that behaviours can be built in a schema (as primitively done in a thermostat), then a zombie showing all behaviours but lacking inner experiences is possible.
But thermostats can also have inner experience. :D
 

atanu

Member
Premium Member
The failure of the zombie argument is a failure of dualism. No other philosophy is impacted by it imo.

At the level, when we say "I" and "Universe" or "this" and "that", dualism is given. We are operating within it.

At this phenomenal level, substance monism is fallacious. Is the body seeing the body? At this phenomenal level dual aspect monism or neutral monism can explain most, if not all, facts.
 
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sayak83

Veteran Member
Staff member
Premium Member
At the level, when we say "I" and "Universe" or "this" and "that", dualism is given. We are operating within it.

At this phenomenal level, substance monism is fallacious. Is the body seeing the body?
That looks like simple object pluralism. Dualism supposes that reality is built out of two fundamentally distinct ineliminible essences, matter and spirit, and that consciousness is spirit that acts on the material body. Dualism is not "here is a tree and there is a car" type of thing.
 

atanu

Member
Premium Member
That looks like simple object pluralism. Dualism supposes that reality is built out of two fundamentally distinct ineliminible essences, matter and spirit, and that consciousness is spirit that acts on the material body. Dualism is not "here is a tree and there is a car" type of thing.

Please see post 98. I added bit more.
 
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