Zombies!

[Curious George]

For me, I just think there is something different between, say, my cat, and a bacterium. My cat is conscious-it clearly (to me) has internal experiences and a bacterium doesn't.

Yes, there are borderline cases. For example, I am not at all sure that a frog has internal experiences. I'd be willing to go either way, depending on how we define that notion of consciousness.

And that is one of the problems: we simply don't have a good, working definition of what it means to be conscious. So we simply have no way to determine if the person sitting next to us is a zombie or whether frogs are conscious. Until we have a working definition, the question is rather silly, yes?

Yet this isn't about where consciousness emerges. It is about the difference that exists. Your cat clearly possesses consciousness but does a picture of your cat? Does a 3d copy of your cat? Does a mechanical copy of your cat which can move? How far can we take this progression? And does the point at which it is no longer clear that a difference exists mean that the imitation has consciousness?

The problem is that there is a "clear" conception of something that exists which we call consciousness. While I agree that p zombie doestrogen not entail that consciousness is not the product of something physical, it highlights our inability to point to it as material.

If this is the result of our lack of understanding regarding consciousness, that is fine. But we cannot say that the p zombie does actually lack consciousness because there is no way to test it.

 

[Polymath257]

Yet this isn't about where consciousness emerges. It is about the difference that exists. Your cat clearly possesses consciousness but does a picture of your cat? Does a 3d copy of your cat? Does a mechanical copy of your cat which can move? How far can we take this progression? And does the point at which it is no longer clear that a difference exists mean that the imitation has consciousness?

Um, yes. if you can't tell a difference, it is silly to talk about a difference.

The problem is that there is a "clear" conception of something that exists which we call consciousness. While I agree that p zombie doestrogen not entail that consciousness is not the product of something physical, it highlights our inability to point to it as material.

Really? There is a *clear* conception of it? Then why do some say rocks are conscious and others deny it? Why does Chalmers claim a thermostat might be conscious when I see it as quite clear that it is not? Such fundamental disagreement seems to say that we do NOT have a clear conception of this thing we call consciousness.

If this is the result of our lack of understanding regarding consciousness, that is fine. But we cannot say that the p zombie does actually lack consciousness because there is no way to test it.

Exactly. We don't have a good, working definition. Which means we don't even have a clear conception of it.

I'm inclined to think there are several distinct phenomena at work and that we confuse them and lump them together under the umbrella term 'consciousness'.

 

[Curious George]

Um, yes. if you can't tell a difference, it is silly to talk about a difference.

No it is silly to insist such things.

Really? There is a *clear* conception of it? Then why do some say rocks are conscious and others deny it? Why does Chalmers claim a thermostat might be conscious when I see it as quite clear that it is not? Such fundamental disagreement seems to say that we do NOT have a clear conception of this thing we call consciousness.

"My cat is conscious-it clearly (to me) has internal experiences and a bacterium doesn't." Yep it is clear. I love it when people lack consistency.

Exactly. We don't have a good, working definition. Which means we don't even have a clear conception of it.

I'm inclined to think there are several distinct phenomena at work and that we confuse them and lump them together under the umbrella term 'consciousness'.

This is quite possible. But this is what exactly...the recollection of previous interaction and our meta interpretations of those experiences in conjunction with our current sensory experience in conjunction with whatever else we may add? Obviously consciousness is not material. It may be the byproduct of material but we cannot point to any one thing and say that is consciousness. While at one end you can have people who claim that rocks are conscious and the other end you have people who claim that consciousness is an illusion, everyone agree that consciousness exists, at least in an illusory state. That is, the perception of consciousness does in fact clearly exist.

Within this spectrum of belief regarding consciousness we can create p zombie and remove from it the quality of consciousness, whether p zombie is missing a subjective or objective characteristic is immaterial. We have a clear conception of consciousness in that we recognize it as existing if only subjectively.

 

[Polymath257]

No it is silly to insist such things.

"My cat is conscious-it clearly (to me) has internal experiences and a bacterium doesn't." Yep it is clear. I love it when people lack consistency.

And right after that, I pointed out that I am very unclear about frog having consciousness. That post was more of a preliminary to a definition, giving some examples that I consider to be on one side of a line and some that I consider to be on the other and still others that I consider to be uncertain. This is usually how definitions of vague concepts are approached.

This is quite possible. But this is what exactly...the recollection of previous interaction and our meta interpretations of those experiences in conjunction with our current sensory experience in conjunction with whatever else we may add? Obviously consciousness is not material. It may be the byproduct of material but we cannot point to any one thing and say that is consciousness.

Sorry, that isn't conclusive. You can't point to a particular thing and say it is temperature either. But temperature *is* a physical process.

While at one end you can have people who claim that rocks are conscious and the other end you have people who claim that consciousness is an illusion, everyone agree that consciousness exists, at least in an illusory state. That is, the perception of consciousness does in fact clearly exist.

I'd say we have an intuition that there is something in common going on, but it is so vague as to be useless without more precise definitions.

Within this spectrum of belief regarding consciousness we can create p zombie and remove from it the quality of consciousness, whether p zombie is missing a subjective or objective characteristic is immaterial. We have a clear conception of consciousness in that we recognize it as existing if only subjectively.

On the contrary, I see p-zombies as incoherent: anything physically the same as something conscious ll have to be conscious. There is no way to remove that quality without changing the zombie physically.

 

[Curious George]

And right after that, I pointed out that I am very unclear about frog having consciousness. That post was more of a preliminary to a definition, giving some examples that I consider to be on one side of a line and some that I consider to be on the other and still others that I consider to be uncertain. This is usually how definitions of vague concepts are approached.

That a some line exists is conceding that consciousness, in at least an illusory fashion, exists.

Sorry, that isn't conclusive. You can't point to a particular thing and say it is temperature either. But temperature *is* a physical process.

Yes, it is conclusive that consciousness is not material. Reread what I wrote: "It may be the byproduct of material, but..."

Are you suggesting that temperature is something material and that it is not the byproduct of something material? You are trying to create a disagreement where there is none.

I'd say we have an intuition that there is something in common going on, but it is so vague as to be useless without more precise definitions.

lol, in other words that what we term consciousness, clearly, does exist. But the nature of exactly what consciousness is is fuzzy?
Yes I can agree to that.

On the contrary, I see p-zombies as incoherent: anything physically the same as something conscious ll have to be conscious. There is no way to remove that quality without changing the zombie physically.

That is question begging. It may turn out to be correct, but it is a circular argument. We can however create a mental construct with our current understanding that lacks consciousness. This is because the idea that consciousness is not material or even the byproduct of material not incoherent.

 

[Nous]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all).

I still see no reason to resort to the absurdity that zombies behave identically to experiencing creatures, including reactions to pain and pleasure even though they experience no pain or pleasure; one does not need that premise in order to throw a spotlight on the problem of experience as set out in Chalmers' argument. It is completely plausible for the processing of information to occur without producing experience. The creating of or having experience is not logically entailed by information processing. There is no reason to believe that our computers are having experiences. In contrast, there is every reason to conclude that humans and other animals experience pleasure and pain and have all manner of other experiences. Our experiences commonly motivate our behavior.

What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

Not for the dualism that you have advocated elsewhere, in which some things are "physical" because they exchange force particles with atoms, while acknowledging the reality of phenomena that do not meet such a definition (e.g., information, wave functions). Obviously people propose a variety of different sorts of dualism in order to try to resolve the conundrums created by their metaphysical schema. These days I tend to see such dualisms as just quaint, impoverished forms of pluralism.

 

[atanu]

The chess program was built with specific goals in mind. A human being is built on the shoulders of giants - honed and changed over the course of who knows how many millennia on top of millennia. Of course, I am hinting at evolution here - and if subscribing to the ideas behind evolutionary principles, human being's "goals" have also evolved thusly - and our mind became an object capable of seeking out and meeting any number of those goals using any number of procedural adaptations of which we are capable. Such as learning and information retention. That ability alone blows any man-made computer of this day out of the water... hell... out of the atmosphere. The "qualia" could be no more than the accretion of ability to act and react in the body/mind's best interest using a mountainous slew of tools developed age upon age within our forebears. It could all be an elaborate program, so complex and intricate that it appears (or is) wide-open, and infinitely adaptable.

Consider your example - winning a game of chess resulting in "joy" and losing resulting in "sadness." These two emotions as responses to competitive endeavors could very well be reactions that developed as a way to gauge social acceptance, or course-correct onto the path of becoming alpha or leader. In that light, "joy" at success becomes a programmatic response to encourage the same types of behavior from the organism (human in this case) going forward. "Sadness" felt at the hands of a failure reinforces the exact same desire for behavioral outcome, just from the negative side. The human "program" may just be so open and adaptable that we are able to choose those things we want our successes to be gained in. We can't know for sure. To assume anything I just wrote would be premature... just as to assume "soul" or "eternal mind" or that we humans belong to some other exclusive "club" like that is also entirely premature.

I have never quite understood the difference between qualia and sensations. if I am looking at something red and my brain responds to it, how is that *not* having a qualia for red?

I really don't see a hard problem for consciousness. I see a rather difficult experimental question concerning how the brain produces consciousness, but I also know that isn't the 'hard problem'.

So, a philosophical zombie is physically *identical* to a 'regular' human and yet does not have conscious experiences. The question Chalmers asks is whether such is even a coherent concept (he thinks it is). I really don't see how it is anywhere close to being coherent. I don't see how something physically identical could NOT have consciousness.

To save time I have combined these two posts. Although the former appears to be a much more thoughtful post and I have a few serious points to discuss regarding it, allow me to point out two common issues.

I. Consciousness is a first person subjective experience. I cannot impart to anyone else the knowledge as to how my last orgasm felt. My brain recordings and physical data may be recorded very accurately, but the records will not tell anything about the intense internal experience.

How does a mechanical replica, based on third party observations, be the same as first party subjective qualia? Chalmer has done a common sense job of pointing out the lack of data of internal first person subjective experience in Dennett's model.

II. How do we assume that human mind is equipped to unravel the mystery of its creation, if it is a product of causally closed physical processes? If mind-consciousness is a byproduct of physical processes, and if those processes are causally closed (as physicalists claim) then consciousness is irrelevant.

 

[Polymath257]

That a some line exists is conceding that consciousness, in at least an illusory fashion, exists.

I have no idea what it means to exist in an illusory fashion. I have an intuition concerning consciousness. That intuition may be correct or it may be garbage. Only careful investigation and definitions will tell.

Yes, it is conclusive that consciousness is not material. Reread what I wrote: "It may be the byproduct of material, but..."

Are you suggesting that temperature is something material and that it is not the byproduct of something material? You are trying to create a disagreement where there is none.

I'm saying that temperature isn't a fundamental thing. It comes about in systems large enough that the statistical behavior is important. I see no reason why consciousness can't be the same: something that comes about when the physical system is complex enough in its information processing abilities.

lol, in other words that what we term consciousness, clearly, does exist. But the nature of exactly what consciousness is is fuzzy?
Yes I can agree to that.

It seems to go deeper. There seems to be disagreement about exactly when consciousness happens, even when it is 'clear', the parties disagree.

That is question begging. It may turn out to be correct, but it is a circular argument. We can however create a mental construct with our current understanding that lacks consciousness. This is because the idea that consciousness is not material or even the byproduct of material not incoherent.

Any test we would have for consciousness would be a physical test, so anything physically identical would pass or fail that test equally. So a zombie cannot exist. Anything identical to a conscious human would be conscious.

 

[Polymath257]

To save time I have combined these two posts. Although the former appears to be a much more thoughtful post and I have a few serious points to discuss regarding it, allow me to point out two common issues.

I. Consciousness is a first person subjective experience. I cannot impart to anyone else the knowledge as to how my last orgasm felt. My brain recordings and physical data may be recorded very accurately, but the records will not tell anything about the intense internal experience.

Well, that seems like an assumption to me. I don't see why those recordings *don't* give precise information about exactly how intense your experiences were. A different experience (less intense, for example) would give differences in the scans.

How does a mechanical replica, based on third party observations, be the same as first party subjective qualia? Chalmer has done a common sense job of pointing out the lack of data of internal first person subjective experience in Dennett's model.

It doens't have to be *the same* to be able to *explain* those qualia. If, for example, we can give detailed information about exactly what you experienced by using information from those scans, how is that *not* an explanation? We would know that if such-and-such happens in the brain, you would have this-and-that experience. That *is* an explanation.

II. How do we assume that human mind is equipped to unravel the mystery of its creation, if it is a product of causally closed physical processes? If mind-consciousness is a byproduct of physical processes, and if those processes are causally closed (as physicalists claim) then consciousness is irrelevant.

No more than temperature is irrelevant. It is a convenient way to describe the complex behavior of the system. Yes, it would be determined by lower level phenomena, but it would still be a good, high level descriptor.

 

[Ponder This]

Chalmer does not say that concept of a Zombie holds up. He has highlighted that a mechanical being may mimic a man exactly yet lack the subjective qualia.

For example a machine chess player knows all moves but it has no joy in winning or no sadness after a loss. His main argument is that qualia is the hard problem of consciousness that mechanistic paradigms cannot/do not explain.

"He has highlighted that a mechanical being may mimic a man exactly yet lack the subjective qualia."

Defining a philosophical zombie to be a thing "physiologically indistinguishable from human beings" does not make a philosophical zombie logically possible to exist even though mechanistic paradigms have failed to explain subjective qualia.

I can imagine a consciousness that inhabits a toy doll that very obviously doesn't mimic a man exactly (being clearly not "physiologically indistinguishable from human beings"). My ability to imagine this scenario does not itself demonstrate the scenario is logically possible and thus provides an equally impotent argument for or against physicalism.

However, some people are a fan of the movie.

 

[Rational Agnostic]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

Others, such as Daniel Dennett, have challenged this notion, claiming it is internally inconsistent and assumes its conclusion. They argue that anything *physically* the same as a person would necessarily have the same consciousness as a person. Dennett claims that the fact that a zombie reacts *in all situations* exactly as a conscious person would is enough to say that zombie is, in fact, conscious.

Here is a wikipedia article:
Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia

What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

Philosophical zombies are not logically impossible of course, but I think for all practical purposes they are highly unlikely to exist. Don't know what dualism is, so cannot say whether they are a good argument for it or not.

 

[Curious George]

I have no idea what it means to exist in an illusory fashion. I have an intuition concerning consciousness. That intuition may be correct or it may be garbage. Only careful investigation and definitions will tell.

Don't you subscribe to determinism? Are you suggesting that freewill exists unequivocally because we perceive a degree of control?

It means it is believed but it may not have an objective existence independent of my subjective interpretation. But even if this is the case, the subjective existence, that is even an illusory one, would suffice for the p zombie. Think of an optical illusion. We can say that the appearance of movement is something that exists, when no movement actually exists.

Now for the p zombie, we do not need an actual experiencing to account for what we are subtracting we only need the subjective experiencing. Either way, no one is arguing that we subjectively experience.

I'm saying that temperature isn't a fundamental thing. It comes about in systems large enough that the statistical behavior is important. I see no reason why consciousness can't be the same: something that comes about when the physical system is complex enough in its information processing abilities.

And I agree. There is no reason, of which I am aware, that consciousness cannot be precisely this. But if consciousness is this, is it material or byproduct of material. I suggested the latter, you disagreed. But by all means, show me how it is material. Unless you realize that, as I already told you, there is no argument here and you are creating one where none exist.

It seems to go deeper. There seems to be disagreement about exactly when consciousness happens, even when it is 'clear', the parties disagree.

Nevertheless, no parties disagree that consciousness is at least the subjective experiencing of something.

Any test we would have for consciousness would be a physical test, so anything physically identical would pass or fail that test equally. So a zombie cannot exist. Anything identical to a conscious human would be conscious.

Firstly this begs the question. Again this doesn't mean that it is wrong, but inot this instance it is. If I have two paintings one done by Picasso and one an elaborate forgery that is physically indistinguishable from the original Picasso, does this mean they are not different?
Secondly, I don't think it correct. Let us imagine we hypothetically can network brains. The idea is that one brain experiences through another. If we hook up to another person we see what they see, we smell what they smell, and we think what they think and we create memories in our own mind from this perspective
However if we network to a dead brain it is just nothingness. If we hook up to a p zombie experience the processing, that is we think what it thinks, but there is no subjective experience. No senses just awareness of input and processing output. Given our hypothetical network, we would have good reason to assume that p zombie was not experiencing something. That the human was.

Of course such a thing may be impossible to create, but the point is that since consciousness exists it is possible to test. Normally we would test this by individuals reactions. P zombie proposes that all those reactions are indistinguishable. That doesn't mean any testing is impossible.

 

[atanu]

Well, that seems like an assumption to me. I don't see why those recordings *don't* give precise information about exactly how intense your experiences were. A different experience (less intense, for example) would give differences in the scans.

I feel that there are duplicate bots inhabiting RF playground. You say similar as another member.

Seriously, I am assuming that there is no *first party intense experience of orasm* in third party brain scan? And you are not assuming that *first party intense experience of orasm* in reflected exactly in third party brain scans. Are not assuming that 'Descriptor' is the real thing?

My literary output waxing eloquent about taste of mango is not same as the first person taste of mango. There is no data on actual consciousness.

What you say is wrong, not supported by evidence and also untestable.

No more than temperature is irrelevant. It is a convenient way to describe the complex behavior of the system. Yes, it would be determined by lower level phenomena, but it would still be a good, high level descriptor.

Descriptor is not the real thing. Do you not see your qualia distinct from behaviour?

Suppose fear leads us to exhibit certain behaviour but that does not mean that the fear that I feel is same as behaviour of flight and record of flight in some machine.

A thermostat can be programmed to say "Ouch" and retrieve the sensor when temperature reaches a critical level. But our saying "Ouch" and machine's "Ouch" have no commonality except that we have used our intelligence to direct its behaviour.
...........

 

[atanu]

What are the two elements of the dualism in 'non-dualism'?

By 'not sublatable' you mean undeniable, uncontradictable, I take it? What test tells us whether something is undeniable or uncontradictable?
That's not quite on the point. I dare say (1) to (5) may be sources of true statements (I don't see how (6) could be), but since they can also be sources of errors, tales, jokes, lies and much more, we're going to need a test for truth so we can sort them out. My test is, Are they accurate statements about objective reality? To the extent that they are, they're true.

So I'm still curious as to what test for truth you use.
I reply to that with a definite 'maybe'.

Intuition (at least as I use it) is decision-making by the nonconscious brain, using information and processes of which the conscious brain is not aware. The brain has several processes for deciding, but the basic process appears to be (a) the setting out of options, whether two or two hundred (b) assessment of each option as better or worse / more net reward or less net reward (c) emphasis on only the leading options (d) till all but one are eliminated. This is true of intuition / nonconscious decision-making as well as conscious, eg when you're driving, buying a present for someone you know only vaguely, &c. It's also true of sleeping on a problem, flashes of insight and aha! moments, and so on.

Is that the sort of thing that can be fitted into your 'six sources'? If so, I'm not sure where.

Should a new thread be created with this theme?

 

[Dan From Smithville]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

Others, such as Daniel Dennett, have challenged this notion, claiming it is internally inconsistent and assumes its conclusion. They argue that anything *physically* the same as a person would necessarily have the same consciousness as a person. Dennett claims that the fact that a zombie reacts *in all situations* exactly as a conscious person would is enough to say that zombie is, in fact, conscious.

Here is a wikipedia article:
Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia

What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

And I was just getting ready to sign off and go to bed. An animate replica of a human down to the molecular level, but having none of the criteria for consciousness that a human is supposed to possess. Then I wonder what are the criteria for consciousness that I'm talking about. I don't know. How do I know I have a consciousness? You can answer if you like. I would be interested, but I'm sort of thinking in print and not really posing serious questions.

This concept is intriguing and reminds me of many science fiction stories I have read. Here is a serious question? Can you pretend to be a social character while not really being one. Can a human provide all the external evidence of what we consider normal socialization and not actually be "normally" socialized and actually experience the actions and nuances of social behavior. Does that sound like what is being conceptualized by "philosophical zombie"?

I wonder if it isn't a concept that assumes its own conclusion. I can't wait to read the other replies as soon as I get the chance.

 

[Sleeppy]

Everything has consciousness; to what degree, is the question.

 

[blü 2]

Should a new thread be created with this theme?

I wouldn't have thought so, but that's up to you.

 

[atanu]

I wouldn't have thought so, but that's up to you.

You can, if you wish, give a push to the thread: Consciousness is Neural activities

 

[Polymath257]

And I was just getting ready to sign off and go to bed. An animate replica of a human down to the molecular level, but having none of the criteria for consciousness that a human is supposed to possess. Then I wonder what are the criteria for consciousness that I'm talking about. I don't know. How do I know I have a consciousness? You can answer if you like. I would be interested, but I'm sort of thinking in print and not really posing serious questions.

This concept is intriguing and reminds me of many science fiction stories I have read. Here is a serious question? Can you pretend to be a social character while not really being one. Can a human provide all the external evidence of what we consider normal socialization and not actually be "normally" socialized and actually experience the actions and nuances of social behavior. Does that sound like what is being conceptualized by "philosophical zombie"?

I wonder if it isn't a concept that assumes its own conclusion. I can't wait to read the other replies as soon as I get the chance.

So, here's a question. How do I know *I* am not a zombie? Perhaps what I 'experience' isn't *really* experiences and what I *think* is consciousness really isn't.

How would I know?

 

[Curious George]

So, here's a question. How do I know *I* am not a zombie? Perhaps what I 'experience' isn't *really* experiences and what I *think* is consciousness really isn't.

How would I know?

We do not know that such isn't the case. But all you are doing is removing the concept of experiencing to an illusory one. This would change the zombie as well. Then you would have a zombie that was the same as you but did not have the illusory process of experiencing.

Now, if you are suggesting that we are also supposing that there was some actual consciousness that we do not possess, all is still well. Now you still do not possess consciousness and neither does the zombie, but the zombie also lacks what you think consciousness is whereas you do not lack what you think consciousness is.

It seems that you are adding extra layers. We can add any arbitrary number of layers between the noumenal and the phenomenal for instance, but we are still left with the truth of a noumenal and phenomenal reality.