Zombies!

[Polymath257]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

Others, such as Daniel Dennett, have challenged this notion, claiming it is internally inconsistent and assumes its conclusion. They argue that anything *physically* the same as a person would necessarily have the same consciousness as a person. Dennett claims that the fact that a zombie reacts *in all situations* exactly as a conscious person would is enough to say that zombie is, in fact, conscious.

Here is a wikipedia article:
Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia

What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

 

[Nakosis]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

Others, such as Daniel Dennett, have challenged this notion, claiming it is internally inconsistent and assumes its conclusion. They argue that anything *physically* the same as a person would necessarily have the same consciousness as a person. Dennett claims that the fact that a zombie reacts *in all situations* exactly as a conscious person would is enough to say that zombie is, in fact, conscious.

Here is a wikipedia article:
Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia

What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

Define conscious.

In some concepts of the word a computer system could be conscious of its environment.

 

[sun rise]

Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

This is a new one to me. From my perspective, philosophy does not necessarily relate to the real world. This mental construct to me is just that for the most part although in the case of "dissociative identity disorder" or depersonalization itself people feel not connected to their body and thoughts which is not what the OP asks but is reasonably close to it.

 

[Polymath257]

Define conscious.

In some concepts of the word a computer system could be conscious of its environment.

And, of course, this is aimed at understanding what we mean by the term 'consciousness'.

 

[Nakosis]

And, of course, this is aimed at understanding what we mean by the term 'consciousness'.

I see conscious as having an awareness of the environment. Some folks like to roll into this having an awareness of being aware of the environment. That sounds a little weird. Maybe being aware of a self that's being aware of the environment.

I see "self consciousness" as a degree of consciousness which humans possess and most other animals don't.

Does that make a cockroach a zombie?

 

[Polymath257]

I see conscious as having an awareness of the environment. Some folks like to roll into this having an awareness of being aware of the environment. That sounds a little weird. Maybe being aware of a self that's being aware of the environment.

I see "self consciousness" as a degree of consciousness which humans possess and most other animals don't.

Does that make a cockroach a zombie?

Since zombies are supposed to be physically identical to humans, only if we are talking about Trump.

 

[Nakosis]

Since zombies are supposed to be physically identical to humans, only if we are talking about Trump.

Ah, sorry. For dualism, no since it's more a philosophical idea.

I don't know how you'd prove the reality of a person that was not self conscious. I assume all humans have some degree of self consciousness except maybe in the case of severe brain damage.

Although maybe an argument against dualism since there is no discernable difference then why add to the equation something which is not detectable?

 

[Revoltingest]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

Others, such as Daniel Dennett, have challenged this notion, claiming it is internally inconsistent and assumes its conclusion. They argue that anything *physically* the same as a person would necessarily have the same consciousness as a person. Dennett claims that the fact that a zombie reacts *in all situations* exactly as a conscious person would is enough to say that zombie is, in fact, conscious.

Here is a wikipedia article:
Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia

What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

Bogus argument....
No definition of consciousness.
The posed zombie is only hypothetical.

 

[osgart]

Where is the vitas, or life essence? How can anyone explain it, by means of energy, force, and matter? You may one day prove that the vitas is caused solely by physical means, but you haven't defined it, or grasped it's essence or logic. How do you speak of life essence as it actually is?

Why can't it be detected? No one has instrumentation , nor will they ever, to detect it.

So it remains an undetectable, indescribable cause and effect. And that leads many into the plausibility of an non physical type dimension. Yet remove the hippocampus and certain memory abilities no longer are able. Is the hippocampus a pathway to memory, or is it the memory bank itself? And then the capacity to care about a memory, where resides that?

Maybe analyzing one's own subjective experience, leads to understanding it.

I think it forever remains outside of human grasp.

But subjective experience is worthy of exploring within one's self; such as a peaceful feeling, or the influence of a thought And it's meaning.

 

[atanu]

David Chalmers introduced the notion of a philosophical zombie. This is an entity that is physically identical to a human person, but lacks consciousness. His goal was to refute materialism, by showing that physical information alone isn't enough to explain consciousness.

In this formulation, a zombie looks and acts identical to a regular conscious human: if you talk to it, it replies as a person would. If you poke at it, it will *say* that it feels pain, even though in reality it experiences no pain (because it lacks internal experiences at all). It will look at a painting and exclaim about its beauty while actually having no consciousness or experience of beauty at all.

Others, such as Daniel Dennett, have challenged this notion, claiming it is internally inconsistent and assumes its conclusion. They argue that anything *physically* the same as a person would necessarily have the same consciousness as a person. Dennett claims that the fact that a zombie reacts *in all situations* exactly as a conscious person would is enough to say that zombie is, in fact, conscious.

Here is a wikipedia article:
Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia

What do you think? Are philosophical zombies a coherent concept? Are they a good argument for dualism?

There is something more to it. Without knowing Dennet's and the AI paradigm first, Chalmer's position may not be fully clear.

Chalmer's and (Nagel's) arguments also include refutation of notions of a Turing machine being conscious just because a Turing machine may mimic a human being perfectly. Searle's Chinese room argument is also a refutation of the glamorous idea that machines are conscious. Chalmer is not necessarily holding a dualism position. His position may be akin to Dual aspect monism or Neutral monism, but I am not sure about it.

Dennet's position is that there is no consciousness except the neuronal processes which are the creators of illusion of consciousness.

Science, especially physics, has matured enough that there are many who propose 'Proto consciousness' or 'Conscious universe', etc. There are peer reviewed papers on these subjects in standard science journals. .

 

[atanu]

Ah, sorry. For dualism, no since it's more a philosophical idea.

Chalmer is more likely proposing a dual aspect monism.

I don't know how you'd prove the reality of a person that was not self conscious. I assume all humans have some degree of self consciousness except maybe in the case of severe brain damage.

Although maybe an argument against dualism since there is no discernable difference then why add to the equation something which is not detectable?

Chalmer is not proposing that a zombie is a reality. Chalmer is not adding another layer. He is just highlighting that you can build a machine that mimics humans in actions and understanding (by being provided with very detailed schemata like suppose a chess playing machine), yet such a machine will be unable to feel "I am".

Chalmer is not proposing that a zombie is a reality. He is indicating that if neuronal physical reactions are the only factors for conscious Dennet, then is Dennet not a Zombie?

 

[atanu]

Bogus argument....
No definition of consciousness.
The posed zombie is only hypothetical.

Ha. Ha. No doubt that you will react like that. All know that you are the Zombie bot.

You are reacting because Chalmer's zombie example intends to expose your zombie ness:

Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia

The notion of a philosophical zombie is used mainly in thought experiments intended to support arguments (often called "zombie arguments") against forms of physicalism such as materialism, behaviorism and functionalism.

 

[Polymath257]

Chalmer is more likely proposing a dual aspect monism.



No. Chalmer is not proposing that a zombie is a reality. Chalmer is not adding another layer. He is just highlighting that you can build a machine that mimics humans in actions and understanding (by being provided with very detailed schemata like suppose a chess playing machine), yet such a machine will be unable to feel "I am".

Chalmer is not proposing that a zombie is a reality. He is indicating that if neuronal physical reactions are the only factors for conscious Dennet, then is Dennet not a Zombie?

Chalmers actually argues for a type of dualism based on materialism (which seems strange to me). His basic argument isn't that zombies are real, but that the mere coherence of the concept means that consciousness *cannot* be a physical process alone. if being physically identical to a conscious thing doesn't make something conscious, then consciousness isn't just physical.

Dennett, on the other hand, argues that the whole notion of philosophical zombies is incoherent: that being physically identical would guarantee equal conscious experiences.

Chalmer's definitely likes to write about the Chinese Room as well as Mary, the blind woman who knows all there is to know about red, but has never experienced it.

 

[atanu]

Chalmers actually argues for a type of dualism based on materialism (which seems strange to me). His basic argument isn't that zombies are real, but that the mere coherence of the concept means that consciousness *cannot* be a physical process alone. if being physically identical to a conscious thing doesn't make something conscious, then consciousness isn't just physical.

Dennett, on the other hand, argues that the whole notion of philosophical zombies is incoherent: that being physically identical would guarantee equal conscious experiences.

Chalmer's definitely likes to write about the Chinese Room as well as Mary, the blind woman who knows all there is to know about red, but has never experienced it.

You are correct. But I have seen Chalmer talking on video and he is candid that he does not know the mechanism. Because he apparently supports pan psychism, I think that his idea will be more akin to Dual Aspect Monism. ... eventually. Or I may be wrong.

 

[Revoltingest]

Ha. Ha. No doubt that you will react like that. All know that you are the Zombie bot.

You are reacting because Chalmer's zombie example intends to expose your zombie ness:

I prefer to think of myself as a highly successful Turing test.

 

[lewisnotmiller]

I prefer to think of myself as a highly successful Turing test.

HIGHLY successful might be a stretch...

 

[Revoltingest]

HIGHLY successful might be a stretch...

Know of another one with such an authentic aroma?
Case closed.

 

[atanu]

I prefer to think of myself as a highly successful Turing test.

Is this statement a programmed output then?

 

[Polymath257]

Know of another one with such an authentic aroma?
Case closed.

You do make a powerful argument.

 

[Revoltingest]

Is this statement a programmed output then?

So's yer old man.