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What is the default position in the mind-body problem?

1137

Here until I storm off again
Premium Member
Many claim that physicalism is the default assumption, where some believe it is idealism. I personally believe it to be solipsism, as with absolute certainty we can only be aware we exist in some manner, and nothing further. Not to say I'm a solipsist, I think we can reject the problem even if just on pragmatism, but rejection is exactly what you try to do to a default position. I think physicalism, dualism, emergence, idealism, etc all require a rejection of this default position. At that point, we accept the position which makes the least assumptions.

Do you agree with this default? What is yours? In what way can the position held, if not solipsism, be supported with the least assumptions?
 

bobhikes

Nondetermined
Premium Member
Many claim that physicalism is the default assumption, where some believe it is idealism. I personally believe it to be solipsism, as with absolute certainty we can only be aware we exist in some manner, and nothing further. Not to say I'm a solipsist, I think we can reject the problem even if just on pragmatism, but rejection is exactly what you try to do to a default position. I think physicalism, dualism, emergence, idealism, etc all require a rejection of this default position. At that point, we accept the position which makes the least assumptions.

Do you agree with this default? What is yours? In what way can the position held, if not solipsism, be supported with the least assumptions?

Personally, I don't like either, it would be a combination of each but in reading there descriptions, scientists would chose physicalism as the default simply because it can be tested and proven true or false. Solipsism is not testable by scientists.
 

George-ananda

Advaita Vedanta, Theosophy, Spiritualism
Premium Member
What is the default position in the mind-body problem?

I think it depends on the prevailing societal indoctrination. If you come from a scientific indoctrination, then physicalism is the default. If you come from a spiritual/religious indoctrination, then there is a body/soul duality default.

As a student of the paranormal though, I believe evidence overrides either default position.
 
Many claim that physicalism is the default assumption, where some believe it is idealism. I personally believe it to be solipsism, as with absolute certainty we can only be aware we exist in some manner, and nothing further. Not to say I'm a solipsist, I think we can reject the problem even if just on pragmatism, but rejection is exactly what you try to do to a default position. I think physicalism, dualism, emergence, idealism, etc all require a rejection of this default position. At that point, we accept the position which makes the least assumptions.

Do you agree with this default? What is yours? In what way can the position held, if not solipsism, be supported with the least assumptions?

My default is Dualism. Though no longer fashionable, and probably yet to be understood, but my assumption may be easier to explain via the idea of aspiration or utopianism. As a species we appear to be able to 'dream' of a more rational, more just, a greener and peaceful planet but are unable to reach out to realize such a dream.That is to say we are without the moral/ethical insights to construct such a culture. That tension between aspiration and the inability to realize the dream is the dualism I'm trying to
describe. What constrains the highest of human aspirations is rarely imagined and remains unknown. For myself, that is both the ultimate religious question and answer!
 

Polymath257

Think & Care
Staff member
Premium Member
Many claim that physicalism is the default assumption, where some believe it is idealism. I personally believe it to be solipsism, as with absolute certainty we can only be aware we exist in some manner, and nothing further. Not to say I'm a solipsist, I think we can reject the problem even if just on pragmatism, but rejection is exactly what you try to do to a default position. I think physicalism, dualism, emergence, idealism, etc all require a rejection of this default position. At that point, we accept the position which makes the least assumptions.

Do you agree with this default? What is yours? In what way can the position held, if not solipsism, be supported with the least assumptions?

Actually, I *do* agree that is the default. Now, what is the next step?

We can do mathematics and logic even from a solipsist position. But both are merely languages, not anything that constitutes knowledge, per se (more, what results follow from various possible assumptions).

Next, we all have experiences. So we start to look for patterns in these experiences. That immediately leads to the scientific method: observe, hypothesize, test, modify if necessary, repeat.

So, what do we hypothesize about what we observe? First, we hypothesize the existence of an external world. This is something we cannot directly test because of the possibility of being a brain in a vat or for something like a Matrix where all is illusory. But the best way out of this paradox is to simply *define* truth as what can be derived through the scientific method from our observations. Without a separate experience that would lead us to believe we are brains in vats, there is no reason to address that possibility.

This leads to a definition of 'physical' as being those things that we can address via the scientific method. Since that is our *only* way of knowing, we are left with the physicalist position.
Even our experiences, our thoughts, our emotions can be addressed in this way and are thereby physical.

This is substantiated much later with the much more detailed observations and theories of modern science which show that emotions, thoughts, and experiences are processes in our brains, and are thereby subservient to the chemical aspects of reality.
 

DrTCH

Member
Nope, not necessarily. Yet, first, I'd like to suggest a better version of DeCarte's maxim, viz., Ego Conscientiam, ergo sum ("I am aware, therefore I exist."), since consciousness/awareness is more fundamental than thinking, per se.

My position is what I understand as the general stance of the Hindu/Buddhism mystical position, that we exist in two realms at the same time, the everyday, "here and now" mundane one, as well as a transcendent one. And, that we exist as a kind of manifestation of the universe, not standing apart from it (in a profoundly organic way, like unto the principles of Taoism). I have little patience for dualistic conceptions...and especially those which posit a "bogeyman" Satan or that speak of "God" as completely removed from our essence and existence. I also have a problem with the seeming obsession of many to overly personalize deity or other conceptions of the “Ultimate Reality,” " the Transcendent" or Tillich's "Ground of Being."
 
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Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
Many claim that physicalism is the default assumption, where some believe it is idealism. I personally believe it to be solipsism, as with absolute certainty we can only be aware we exist in some manner, and nothing further.
Just to clarify, it seems that here you have, at best, defined a version of solipsistic epistemology, not a metaphysical thesis. I generally think of solipsism as a metaphysical thesis, i.e., a thesis about the nature of reality, not a thesis about what we can know or be aware of "with absolute certainty". Certainly several metaphysical theses can entail the proposition that we truly only know our own experiences.

In answer to your question, I think more than one metaphysical thesis can provide a satisfactory solution to the mind-body problem, but each such thesis raises additional conundrums.

If the thesis of metaphysical solipsism were true, then why am I not a billionaire?
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
This leads to a definition of 'physical' as being those things that we can address via the scientific method. Since that is our *only* way of knowing, we are left with the physicalist position.
Define "the scientific method".

According to the hypothetico-deductive model, we cannot conclude that physicalism or any other metaphysical thesis is true--unless and until all experiments have been performed that rule out all other possible metaphysical theses. That certainly has never been done, and I find it hard to imagine that it can be done.

Using the scientific method, what has been determined and what can be determined about, say, free will (which is the big issue in the mind-body problem)? Obviously without the ability to choose between available options, one cannot choose to state or believe a true conclusion about free will rather than a false one.
 

Ponder This

Well-Known Member
I think that the Mind-Body Problem is only a problem if you regard the Mind and Body as being separate and the default position on the problem must be that position which gives rise to the dilemma in the first place.

Physicalism would say that the mind is part of the body and therefore does not give rise to a dilemma.
Idealism would say that the mind gives rise to the body and therefore does not give rise to a dilemma.
Solipsism holds that one cannot know anything outside of one's own mind and that gives rise to a dilemma.
Therefore the default position (the one that gives rise to the problem) is closest to solipsism.
The default position is, more precisely, the idea that the mind and body exist separately.

But what about the difference between physicalism and idealism? Aren't those notions in opposition?
Not really.
Saying that all things are physical in nature doesn't really answer the question of how physical things arise.
Saying that all things are mental constructs doesn't really answer the question of how mental things arise.
In other words, both schools of thought are equally in the dark about the process of how things actually arise.
All they can really say is that things arise and they can't actually say from where they arise (other then espousing a belief).
They both end up having to say that something (physical or mental) pre-existed from whence things (physical or mental) arise and the problem this gives rise to is the problem of origins.

You see once the physical gives rise to a "mind" that "mind" is free to interact with the physical (because it is a part of the physical) and once the mind gives rise to a "body" that "body" is free to interact with the mental (because it is part of the mental). Once this occurs you no longer require a distinction of mind and body. It's all the same stuff anyways.
 

Polymath257

Think & Care
Staff member
Premium Member
Define "the scientific method".

According to the hypothetico-deductive model, we cannot conclude that physicalism or any other metaphysical thesis is true--unless and until all experiments have been performed that rule out all other possible metaphysical theses. That certainly has never been done, and I find it hard to imagine that it can be done.

On the contrary, it considers all viewpoints that make the same predictions for observations to be equivalent. So, unless another metaphysical viewpoint can provide an observationally different result, there is no issue at all. The only meaningful questions are those that can be resolved by observation in some way.

Using the scientific method, what has been determined and what can be determined about, say, free will (which is the big issue in the mind-body problem)? Obviously without the ability to choose between available options, one cannot choose to state or believe a true conclusion about free will rather than a false one.

Well, in order to be testable, the question has to be defined precisely enough and some method of resolving the issue observationally has to be provided. Without both of these, the question is meaningless. With both of these, the question comes down to observational tests.

In the case of free will, it really doesn't look to me that it is even well defined enough to be a meaningful question. Otherwise, what *specifically* does it mean to have free will? What difference is possible in our observations dependent of whether or not we have free will? Without such a difference, the question isn't even a meaningful one, no matter how much people play with it.
 

9-10ths_Penguin

1/10 Subway Stalinist
Premium Member
Many claim that physicalism is the default assumption, where some believe it is idealism. I personally believe it to be solipsism, as with absolute certainty we can only be aware we exist in some manner, and nothing further. Not to say I'm a solipsist, I think we can reject the problem even if just on pragmatism, but rejection is exactly what you try to do to a default position. I think physicalism, dualism, emergence, idealism, etc all require a rejection of this default position. At that point, we accept the position which makes the least assumptions.

Do you agree with this default? What is yours? In what way can the position held, if not solipsism, be supported with the least assumptions?
By "the mind-body problem", I take it you mean the question of what the relationship is between the mind and the body.

Why would there be a default answer (besides "I don't know", of course)?
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
If anyone is interested, this is my solution to the problem.
I hope you will forgive me for responding to your thesis at your website before reading all of it.

You say several times that “will” is a “subjective experience”. Therefore you are indicating that the most commonplace definitions of the noun “will” are false:

noun

1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions:

the freedom of the will.

2. power of choosing one's own actions:

to have a strong or a weak will.

3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition:

My hands are obedient to my will.

the definition of will

It seems you have “solved” the problem of free will vs. determinism by simply denying the existence of “will” according to its primary definition(s). Indeed, none of the 7 definitions given at dictionary.com construe “will” as merely a subjective experience.


By the way, the scientific evidence is consistent in proving the thesis of determinism to be false.

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Causal Determinism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Thus, the thesis of determinism depends on the truth of the postulate of realism used in the tests of Bell and Leggett-Garg inequalities, where realism is the assumption that properties exist in a definite state in the absence of (prior to) a measurement. The findings of those experiments are consistent in demonstrating the violations of those inequalities, thus refuting the postulate of realism:

Bell's inequality is established based on local realism. The violation of Bell's inequality by quantum mechanics implies either locality or realism or both are untenable. Leggett's inequality is derived based on nonlocal realism. The violation of Leggett's inequality implies that quantum mechanics is neither local realistic nor nonlocal realistic. The incompatibility of nonlocal realism and quantum mechanics has been currently confirmed by photon experiments.​

Testing Leggett's Inequality Using Aharonov-Casher Effect : Scientific Reports

You say on your website:

"At least as far as the "free will vs. determinism" debate is concerned, the freedom is freedom from being determined by the rules of the universe."

What is “the rule of the universe” that has determined what color socks I will put on my feet tomorrow?

I am unaware that there is any such rule of the universe. I believe that I am free to choose my multicolored argyle socks rather than my usual black socks, without violating any rules of the universe.


Also by the way, according your thesis, all human movements are essentially involuntary movements, i.e., none are determined by the individual. Is that correct?

If so, how do you account for the fact that I am now able to correctly predict that tomorrow on this thread I will write a post containing the name of King Lear's youngest daughter?
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
Define "the scientific method".

According to the hypothetico-deductive model, we cannot conclude that physicalism or any other metaphysical thesis is true--unless and until all experiments have been performed that rule out all other possible metaphysical theses. That certainly has never been done, and I find it hard to imagine that it can be done.
On the contrary, it considers all viewpoints that make the same predictions for observations to be equivalent. So, unless another metaphysical viewpoint can provide an observationally different result, there is no issue at all.
I don't have a clue as to what any of that is supposed to mean.

The scientific method (whatever you mean by that term) has never demonstrated that "the physicalist position" (your term) is true. Correct?

In the case of free will, it really doesn't look to me that it is even well defined enough to be a meaningful question.
See the definitions of "will" in my above post.

Otherwise, what *specifically* does it mean to have free will?
To be unable to choose to assert and believe proposition that are true rather than propositions that are false is self-stultifying; it means that none of your claims in your posts on this website have any truth value--your claims would be just about words that you couldn't avoid typing and posting here for some inexplicable reason.
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
I never found a definition of free will that I found realistic.
Use any of these 3 definitions of "will":

noun

1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions:

the freedom of the will.

2. power of choosing one's own actions:

to have a strong or a weak will.

3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition:

My hands are obedient to my will.

the definition of will
 
Here is my completely unsolicited opinion on(and insofar as I am concerned, solution to) the freewill vs determinism issue.

It's all determinism. At least, on the physical level(including brain activity and behaviour).

First, cause and effect doesnt act like dominoes, where it's next to the next. It's more like a wave travelling along a horizontal cobweb..if you can visualize that. An infinitely complex web. Or like an infinitely large pool table containing untold amounts of balls in perpetual motion, bouncing around like crazy.

So what does this mean in plain English? Say the other guy talking about socks chooses argyle instead of black. Would he have if he hadn't read this? What if he didn't buy them that day, or have them bought for him? How small a change would it be if he had never gone to get them? What caused that change? What causes rather because things tend to happen for multiple reasons.

So he 'chooses' socks based on an ever limiting series of cause and effect that regresses infinitely, at what point, if at all, does this 'will' supercede the process, and by what means?

Seems a hugely unnecessary leap of faith to me.
 

LuisDantas

Aura of atheification
Premium Member
Use any of these 3 definitions of "will":

noun

1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions:

the freedom of the will.

2. power of choosing one's own actions:

to have a strong or a weak will.

3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition:

My hands are obedient to my will.

the definition of will

Add "free" to either and we are talking a rather ambitious fantasy world concept.
 
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