I guess some people just won't sound reasoning and solid evidence. To each their own though, you materialists obviously aren't interested.
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The evolution of the brain and nervous system, and the mind and consciousness
- Thread starter shunyadragon
- Start date
I guess some people just won't sound reasoning and solid evidence. To each their own though, you materialists obviously aren't interested.
We should probably define the concept of "minimal properties of consciousness" in some way.
Who's proposing such a hypothesis?
The gross anatomy is the same. It's just changed proportion or function over time. Genes may have been gained, replicated, or fused.
A squirrel skeleton has the same bones ours does, but no-one's proposing a squirrel can a squirrel can walk upright or play tennis, as it's presently configured.
But we can, in a pinch. In this case there hasn't been too much change. The visual region can be repurposed to use sound to 'see', just as a bat's was. They're both just variations on an ancestral model, after all. How Does Human Echolocation Work? | Innovation | Smithsonian
No-one's proposing they can. I don't propose you can fly, though you have the same bones, skin and muscles as the aforementioned bat.
I don't think I follow. Can you clarify?
exchemist
Veteran Member
I can't follow your point here. QM is most useful for atomic scale matter, but at larger scales (large, that is, relative to the value of Planck's Constant) QM gives results that progressively merge into classical Newtonian physics. This experiment will no doubt give intermediate results, e.g. interference fringes with very close spacing.
What is the issue?
Salvador
RF's Swedenborgian
Citation from scientifically peer-reviewed research herein needed that matter of various intermediate sizes between sub-atomic and macro-atomic sized matter passing through a double slit does indeed give intermediate results, "e.g. interference fringes with very close spacing."
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exchemist
Veteran Member
This is just what you get by applying de Broglie's relation: λ = h/p, where p is momentum. So a larger molecular mass will, for a given velocity, have greater momentum and so λ, the wavelength of its wave will be shorter, hence you will get a smaller spacing in the interference fringes. Which is what the experimenters reported in your link, wasn't it?
So, again, what is your point here? Everything is as predicted by QM, surely, is it not?
sealchan
Well-Known Member
And neither can you...although you do.
sealchan
Well-Known Member
That one earned an ignore from me.
You misunderstand how this works. The evolution of the brain and nervous system, and the resulting mind and consciousness, like Abiogenesis is not one hypothesis as such, because it a series of hypothesis based on specific proposed mechanisms and chemical evolution based on the objective verifiable evidence concerning the evolution of the brain and nervous systym and the resulting evidence for the evolution of the mind and consciousness. You need to read fully the reference cited already .
At present I have no responses to the reference cited so far.
I only cited on reference which you have failed to respond to. An assumed agenda is reflected in your post, without considering the scientific research and evidence available. It is very likely you did not read the reference.
No, the upper Paleolithic Revolution(?) is not contrary to the science of evolution, and actually not the topic of this thread. I could respond to this issue in an appropriate thread.
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If you dealt more specifically with science, scientific methods, and scientific methods it would help a great deal
It is not a materialist issue it is a scientific issue by definition. There is no claim of materialism (ontological naturalism) is made concerning the subject of the thread..
You have not responded to the evidence based simply on science, which is the subject of the thread.
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I quoted the post claiming that
"scientific data suggests (sic) that the differences between species in terms of the ability to experience the world is one of degree and not kind." From what data was that conclusion derived? Obviously in order to test a hypothesis about "degree" vs. "kind" with respect to "experience," one would need to define those terms. Right? No such data are cited at the blurb linked to.
I quoted the post claiming that "the basic neurophysiologic mechanisms supporting consciousness in humans are found at the earliest points of vertebrate brain evolution." But fish do not have frontal lobes.
Second portion in two posts of the reference cited:
First post.
From: Evolution of Consciousness: Phylogeny, Ontogeny, and Emergence from General Anesthesia - In the Light of Evolution - NCBI Bookshelf
TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES TO CONSCIOUSNESS
To locate the birth of consciousness on the evolutionary timeline, it will be beneficial to consider the basic neural machinery that is thought to be involved in human consciousness (Crick, 1994; Damasio, 1999; Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Tononi, 2004; Baars, 2005; Denton, 2005; Blumenfeld, 2011). The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness was noted, but phenomenal consciousness itself reflects the dissociable neurobiological processes of awareness and arousal (Paus, 2000; Schiff and Plum, 2000; Jones, 2003; Laureys, 2005; Lydic and Baghdoyan, 2005) (Table 3.1). Awareness refers to the content of consciousness (red apple vs. blue sky), whereas arousal refers to brain activation and level of consciousness (alert vs. drowsy vs. asleep vs. anesthetized). A number of current theories about consciousness propose that the cortex is the primary site containing the neural correlates of awareness (Tononi and Edelman, 1998; Van der Werf et al., 2002; Crick and Koch, 2003; Seth et al., 2005; Franks, 2008; Brown EN et al., 2011), whereas midline subcortical brain structures provide ascending arousal influences to the cortex (Van der Werf et al., 2002; Franks, 2008; Brown EN et al., 2011). Thus, we can explore both top-down and bottom-up approaches to consciousness.
Top-Down Approach
Seth et al. (2005) propose three main physiological reasons supporting the importance of the neocortex to the process of consciousness. First, the electroencephalogram of virtually all mammals and birds in the awake state is characterized by desynchronized, high-frequency, and low-amplitude activity. This pattern changes to one of low-frequency, high-amplitude activity during depressed levels of consciousness such as nonrapid eye movement (NREM) sleep, minimally conscious states, and anesthesia. Thus, a state-dependent change in the electrical firing properties of the neurons across the neocortex varies with the level of arousal and strongly supports the idea that neuronal activity in the brain (and particularly in the neocortex) is a necessary requirement for consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006).
Second, consciousness appears to be linked more specifically with neural activity in the thalamocortical system. In this view, the midline brain structures of brainstem and midbrain are thought to be important for keeping the cortex in an aroused or awake state, whereas the cortical regions are thought to serve as specific cognitive modules contributing to the contents of conscious experience. The idea that certain brain regions are more important than others for generating the contents of consciousness is further supported by a number of basic neurological facts. For instance, a person could suffer the loss of the cerebellum or large bilateral portions of the medial temporal lobes, including amygdala and hippocampus complex, and would not become unconscious. However, focal damage to specific areas of cortical tissue will change the contents of a person's consciousness in a way that matches the loss of function associated with the specific area damaged. Cortical lesions can thus result in such specific impairments of consciousness that one may no longer be able to speak, perceive color, or identify parts of themselves as their own (Aguirre et al., 1998). Damage to lower midline brain structures, on the other hand, will likely alter the level of consciousness (i.e., arousal) without necessarily changing its contents."
continued in next post.
First post.
From: Evolution of Consciousness: Phylogeny, Ontogeny, and Emergence from General Anesthesia - In the Light of Evolution - NCBI Bookshelf
TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES TO CONSCIOUSNESS
To locate the birth of consciousness on the evolutionary timeline, it will be beneficial to consider the basic neural machinery that is thought to be involved in human consciousness (Crick, 1994; Damasio, 1999; Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Tononi, 2004; Baars, 2005; Denton, 2005; Blumenfeld, 2011). The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness was noted, but phenomenal consciousness itself reflects the dissociable neurobiological processes of awareness and arousal (Paus, 2000; Schiff and Plum, 2000; Jones, 2003; Laureys, 2005; Lydic and Baghdoyan, 2005) (Table 3.1). Awareness refers to the content of consciousness (red apple vs. blue sky), whereas arousal refers to brain activation and level of consciousness (alert vs. drowsy vs. asleep vs. anesthetized). A number of current theories about consciousness propose that the cortex is the primary site containing the neural correlates of awareness (Tononi and Edelman, 1998; Van der Werf et al., 2002; Crick and Koch, 2003; Seth et al., 2005; Franks, 2008; Brown EN et al., 2011), whereas midline subcortical brain structures provide ascending arousal influences to the cortex (Van der Werf et al., 2002; Franks, 2008; Brown EN et al., 2011). Thus, we can explore both top-down and bottom-up approaches to consciousness.
Top-Down Approach
Seth et al. (2005) propose three main physiological reasons supporting the importance of the neocortex to the process of consciousness. First, the electroencephalogram of virtually all mammals and birds in the awake state is characterized by desynchronized, high-frequency, and low-amplitude activity. This pattern changes to one of low-frequency, high-amplitude activity during depressed levels of consciousness such as nonrapid eye movement (NREM) sleep, minimally conscious states, and anesthesia. Thus, a state-dependent change in the electrical firing properties of the neurons across the neocortex varies with the level of arousal and strongly supports the idea that neuronal activity in the brain (and particularly in the neocortex) is a necessary requirement for consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006).
Second, consciousness appears to be linked more specifically with neural activity in the thalamocortical system. In this view, the midline brain structures of brainstem and midbrain are thought to be important for keeping the cortex in an aroused or awake state, whereas the cortical regions are thought to serve as specific cognitive modules contributing to the contents of conscious experience. The idea that certain brain regions are more important than others for generating the contents of consciousness is further supported by a number of basic neurological facts. For instance, a person could suffer the loss of the cerebellum or large bilateral portions of the medial temporal lobes, including amygdala and hippocampus complex, and would not become unconscious. However, focal damage to specific areas of cortical tissue will change the contents of a person's consciousness in a way that matches the loss of function associated with the specific area damaged. Cortical lesions can thus result in such specific impairments of consciousness that one may no longer be able to speak, perceive color, or identify parts of themselves as their own (Aguirre et al., 1998). Damage to lower midline brain structures, on the other hand, will likely alter the level of consciousness (i.e., arousal) without necessarily changing its contents."
continued in next post.
Second half of the above:
From: Evolution of Consciousness: Phylogeny, Ontogeny, and Emergence from General Anesthesia - In the Light of Evolution - NCBI Bookshelf
"Thalamocortical oscillations have been posited to be of critical importance to consciousness because they help integrate functionally diverse and spatially distinct cognitive modules in the cortex (Saalmann et al., 2012; Schmid et al., 2012). The interplay of segregation and integration is a fundamental focus of the integrated information theory of consciousness (Tononi, 2004, 2012). The capacity of the thalamocortical system to achieve both integration and differentiation is reflected in higher levels of Phi, a proposed metric for consciousness (Tononi, 2004). Phi reflects the amount of information generated by an integrated system beyond the information contained within the components of the system. In principle, this measure captures the emergent property of the system (consciousness) that cannot be causally reduced to individual subsystems (particular brain regions). Phi is predicted to decrease during sleep and seizures; preliminary evidence suggests it also decreases during anesthesia (Lee et al., 2009b), possibly due to impaired long-range coupling of neural spike activity (Lewis et al., 2012). Although the integrated information theory of consciousness has yet to be definitively demonstrated, it is a guiding paradigm that can inform the evolution of consciousness from the network perspective. Creatures with brain network systems that are capable of generating high values of Phi are more likely to be conscious (Edlund et al., 2011).
Third, widespread brain activity appears correlated with conscious activity. Sensory input spreads quickly from sensory cortex to parietal, temporal, and prefrontal areas (Dehaene et al., 2003). This spread of cortical activity is also associated with recurrent local feedback occurring along the way, followed shortly thereafter by long-range feedback from anterior to posterior structures (Lamme, 2006). These long-range connections are thought to be important for the experiential aspects of consciousness (i.e., awareness) (Singer, 1993) and appear to be preferentially suppressed during general anesthesia (Lewis et al., 2012; Schröter et al., 2012). In particular, there is strong evidence that networks across the frontal and parietal cortices are associated with awareness across multiple sensory modalities (Gaillard et al., 2006; Fahrenfort et al., 2008; Blumenfeld, 2012). The lateral frontoparietal network plays a role in mediating consciousness of the environment, whereas the medial frontoparietal network plays a role in mediating internal conscious states such as dreaming and internally directed attention (Boly et al., 2007; Denton et al., 2009). It is becoming increasingly clear that the directionality of corticocortical network communication is relevant to conscious processing. Information processing from the caudal to rostral direction (feedforward) is associated with sensory processing that can occur in the absence of consciousness (e.g., general anesthesia, priming) (Imas et al., 2005; Gaillard et al., 2007). In contrast, information processing in the rostral-to-caudal direction (feedback or cortical reafference) is thought to be associated with experience itself and is preferentially inhibited by general anesthetics (Imas et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2009a; Ku et al., 2011).
The neocortical view of consciousness originates, in part, from early morphologic examination of brain differences across species that suggested the capacities of consciousness increased as brains evolved from more primitive reptilian organization, to mammalian (or, with a limbic system, paleomammalian), and then neo-mammalian organization, characterized by an intricately folded neocortex. This conceptualization of brain evolution occurring in stages during which more “advanced” brains—along with their expanded behavioral repertoire—were built on the structure of earlier forms was popularized by Maclean as “the triune brain” (Maclean, 1990). Importantly, this view of brain evolution is now largely considered erroneous (Emery and Clayton, 2005; Jarvis et al., 2005). It did offer an easy conceptualization for relating brain structure with function and suggested evolutionary time points for when various behaviors would have emerged. Newer findings, however, strongly refute the model of a triune brain, especially the concept of a later-developing neocortex (Fig. 3.1) (Emery and Clayton, 2005). As it turns out, a precursor of the neocortex was actually present in the earliest evolving vertebrates, a claim based on some aspects of connectivity and homology of early transcription factor expression (Striedter, 2005). The basic structural pattern of a brainstem, midbrain, and forebrain did not need to be completely reinvented as each new species emerged. Rather, as various ecological niches were exploited by various creatures, those brain regions best suited for enhancing survival in the local environment were emphasized for further development (Emery and Clayton, 2005).
FIGURE 3.1
Theories of brain evolution. Ancient brain structure evolution theory of Scala Naturae showing brain development proceeding from simple to more complicated with the addition of new brain regions as evolution progressed. This erroneous view is compared (more...)."
From: Evolution of Consciousness: Phylogeny, Ontogeny, and Emergence from General Anesthesia - In the Light of Evolution - NCBI Bookshelf
"Thalamocortical oscillations have been posited to be of critical importance to consciousness because they help integrate functionally diverse and spatially distinct cognitive modules in the cortex (Saalmann et al., 2012; Schmid et al., 2012). The interplay of segregation and integration is a fundamental focus of the integrated information theory of consciousness (Tononi, 2004, 2012). The capacity of the thalamocortical system to achieve both integration and differentiation is reflected in higher levels of Phi, a proposed metric for consciousness (Tononi, 2004). Phi reflects the amount of information generated by an integrated system beyond the information contained within the components of the system. In principle, this measure captures the emergent property of the system (consciousness) that cannot be causally reduced to individual subsystems (particular brain regions). Phi is predicted to decrease during sleep and seizures; preliminary evidence suggests it also decreases during anesthesia (Lee et al., 2009b), possibly due to impaired long-range coupling of neural spike activity (Lewis et al., 2012). Although the integrated information theory of consciousness has yet to be definitively demonstrated, it is a guiding paradigm that can inform the evolution of consciousness from the network perspective. Creatures with brain network systems that are capable of generating high values of Phi are more likely to be conscious (Edlund et al., 2011).
Third, widespread brain activity appears correlated with conscious activity. Sensory input spreads quickly from sensory cortex to parietal, temporal, and prefrontal areas (Dehaene et al., 2003). This spread of cortical activity is also associated with recurrent local feedback occurring along the way, followed shortly thereafter by long-range feedback from anterior to posterior structures (Lamme, 2006). These long-range connections are thought to be important for the experiential aspects of consciousness (i.e., awareness) (Singer, 1993) and appear to be preferentially suppressed during general anesthesia (Lewis et al., 2012; Schröter et al., 2012). In particular, there is strong evidence that networks across the frontal and parietal cortices are associated with awareness across multiple sensory modalities (Gaillard et al., 2006; Fahrenfort et al., 2008; Blumenfeld, 2012). The lateral frontoparietal network plays a role in mediating consciousness of the environment, whereas the medial frontoparietal network plays a role in mediating internal conscious states such as dreaming and internally directed attention (Boly et al., 2007; Denton et al., 2009). It is becoming increasingly clear that the directionality of corticocortical network communication is relevant to conscious processing. Information processing from the caudal to rostral direction (feedforward) is associated with sensory processing that can occur in the absence of consciousness (e.g., general anesthesia, priming) (Imas et al., 2005; Gaillard et al., 2007). In contrast, information processing in the rostral-to-caudal direction (feedback or cortical reafference) is thought to be associated with experience itself and is preferentially inhibited by general anesthetics (Imas et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2009a; Ku et al., 2011).
The neocortical view of consciousness originates, in part, from early morphologic examination of brain differences across species that suggested the capacities of consciousness increased as brains evolved from more primitive reptilian organization, to mammalian (or, with a limbic system, paleomammalian), and then neo-mammalian organization, characterized by an intricately folded neocortex. This conceptualization of brain evolution occurring in stages during which more “advanced” brains—along with their expanded behavioral repertoire—were built on the structure of earlier forms was popularized by Maclean as “the triune brain” (Maclean, 1990). Importantly, this view of brain evolution is now largely considered erroneous (Emery and Clayton, 2005; Jarvis et al., 2005). It did offer an easy conceptualization for relating brain structure with function and suggested evolutionary time points for when various behaviors would have emerged. Newer findings, however, strongly refute the model of a triune brain, especially the concept of a later-developing neocortex (Fig. 3.1) (Emery and Clayton, 2005). As it turns out, a precursor of the neocortex was actually present in the earliest evolving vertebrates, a claim based on some aspects of connectivity and homology of early transcription factor expression (Striedter, 2005). The basic structural pattern of a brainstem, midbrain, and forebrain did not need to be completely reinvented as each new species emerged. Rather, as various ecological niches were exploited by various creatures, those brain regions best suited for enhancing survival in the local environment were emphasized for further development (Emery and Clayton, 2005).
FIGURE 3.1
Theories of brain evolution. Ancient brain structure evolution theory of Scala Naturae showing brain development proceeding from simple to more complicated with the addition of new brain regions as evolution progressed. This erroneous view is compared (more...)."
This is a summary reference with tables. Yes, the gradual evolution of the brain and nervous system specifically show progressive evidence of the mind and consciousness. Fro example. Advanced evolution of mammals do dream, and even some evidence that some reptiles may also dream based on their sleep patterns the same as mammals that are known to dream..
From: Do Reptiles Dream? New Study Suggests The Animals Experience REM Sleep
Lizards sleep in a series of stages, such as Do Reptiles Dream? New Study Suggests The Animals Experience REM Sleep movement (REM) sleep, much like human beings, according to new research. The study even indicated the creatures may dream.
Australian bearded dragons were examined as part of the new study. Investigators were able to show the animals experienced sleep in much the same way as our own species.
This marks the first time any major study has documented proof that lizards sleep in stages, including slow-wave sleep and REM. It is during this latter stage of sleep that most dreaming takes place. Before this recent study, only mammals and birds were shown to exhibit such behavior.
The subjects of a reptile's dream remains a mystery, although the possibilities remain intriguing.
"If you forced me to speculate and to use a loose definition of dreaming, I'd speculate that those dreams are about recent notable events: insects, maybe a place where there are good insects, an aggressive male in the next terrarium, et cetera. If I were an Australian dragon living in Frankfurt, I'd be dreaming of a warm day in the sun," saidGilles Laurent, a neuroscientist from the Max Planck Institute for Brain Research in Germany.
While REM sleep is marked by increased heart rate, blood pressure and dreaming, slow-wave sleep is just the opposite. During this most-restful period of sleep, little dreaming occurs, and brain activity, dominated by delta waves, is reduced.
Humans typically experience REM sleep four to five times each night. Electrodes placed inside the brains of the lizards revealed Pogona vitticeps experienced the effect around 350 times during each period of sleep. These stages lasted an average of just 80 seconds each time.
This discovery suggests that sleep patterns seen in humans and birds evolved 100 million years earlier than previously believed. Researchers believe the behavior likely first evolved in amniotes, a distant common ancestor of lizards, birds, and mammals, which lived between 300 million and 320 million years before our own time.
Nearly all animals sleep, although methods and behaviors during the process differ between species. Animals that do not sleep include dolphins and bullfrogs.
Analysis of the sleep patterns of lizards, and what the discovery can tell us about the evolution of animals, was published in the journal Science.
This is the earliest stages of the evolution of the brain, and not the frontal lobe. First things first.
sealchan
Well-Known Member
I don't think this person is going to listen to that sort of reason. I'm finding that pruning a few people here and there helps me to focus on what is of value in the discussion. This thread is at too high of a level for people to usefully question the basis of scientific evidence. And there is too much of interest here potentially to want to even be a witness to such distractions.
BilliardsBall
Veteran Member
What I heard re: the science is that science is having trouble reconciling the existence of consciousness to naturalistic means/mechanisms.