Question for Materialists: What determines consciousness?

[Rational Agnostic]

More specifically,

If consciousness is a property that can be explained wholly in terms of physical matter, what are the precise physical characteristics or behaviors of things that distinguish conscious things from non-conscious things?

 

[Laika]

If consciousness is a property that can be explained wholly in terms of physical matter, what are the precise physical characteristics or behaviors of things that distinguish conscious things from non-conscious things?

Consciousness is a property of the nervous systems and the brain as material systems. So a person has consciousness because they have a nervous system. A Rock does not possess consciousness because it has no nervous system. Whilst both a person and a rock are material in nature, only a person has a nervous system and can therefore possess consciousness.

 

[Polymath257]

More specifically,

If consciousness is a property that can be explained wholly in terms of physical matter, what are the precise physical characteristics or behaviors of things that distinguish conscious things from non-conscious things?

Simply put, we don't know. We also don't know the identity of dark matter, the mechanisms of early life, or whether there is an island of nuclear stability at Z=126.

All of these are being actively investigated, though.

What *is* clear is that human consciousness is a product of how the brain functions. That is most likely to mean that consciousness arises through the details of how neurons function and are interconnected. We can even point to certain areas of the brain involved in different aspects of consciousness.

But, just like those other questions, we don't have the full answer.

 

[Rational Agnostic]

Simply put, we don't know. We also don't know the identity of dark matter, the mechanisms of early life, or whether there is an island of nuclear stability at Z=126.

All of these are being actively investigated, though.

What *is* clear is that human consciousness is a product of how the brain functions. That is most likely to mean that consciousness arises through the details of how neurons function and are interconnected. We can even point to certain areas of the brain involved in different aspects of consciousness.

But, just like those other questions, we don't have the full answer.

I agree we don't know. But is it possible that consciousness could be explained both in terms of the physical AND mental i.e. conscious experience could be described identically both in terms of physical brain events and non-physical mind events, both of which are built from some substance that is neither mental nor physical? This is the neutral monist position that I've been studying recently, and it's intriguing because it seems to avoid the problems associated with materialism and dualism.

 

[PureX]

Consciousness is a property of the nervous systems and the brain as material systems. So a person has consciousness because they have a nervous system. A Rock does not possess consciousness because it has no nervous system. Whilst both a person and a rock are material in nature, only a person has a nervous system and can therefore possess consciousness.

I think the OP is trying to get someone to explain EXACTLY what they mean by consciousness being a "property of" the nervous system. What EXACTLY constitutes a "property of" in a materialist world view? How can a "property of" even exist in a materialist world view?

For example, if speed is a "property of" time's relation to spacial distance, what defines it, materially? Because it certainly appears to be a purely ideological phenomenon. Yet in a materialist world view, there can be no purely ideological phenomenon.

 

[Polymath257]

I agree we don't know. But is it possible that consciousness could be explained both in terms of the physical AND mental i.e. conscious experience could be described identically both in terms of physical brain events and non-physical mind events, both of which are built from some substance that is neither mental nor physical? This is the neutral monist position that I've been studying recently, and it's intriguing because it seems to avoid the problems associated with materialism and dualism.

I have no idea how to interpret the phrase 'non-physical substance'. The phrase seems self-contradictory to me.

 

[PureX]

Simply put, we don't know. We also don't know the identity of dark matter, the mechanisms of early life, or whether there is an island of nuclear stability at Z=126.

All of these are being actively investigated, though.

What *is* clear is that human consciousness is a product of how the brain functions. That is most likely to mean that consciousness arises through the details of how neurons function and are interconnected. We can even point to certain areas of the brain involved in different aspects of consciousness.

But, just like those other questions, we don't have the full answer.

Even if we understood the material mechanics that enable consciousness to happen, we still don't have any grasp of the phenomenon of consciousness, itself. We still don't know what it is beyond or apart from our personal experience of it.

It's like saying that, "X is an effect caused by Y and Z interacting". It doesn't really mean anything unless we have experienced the effect for ourselves. And even then, it's just labeling that effect "X". And giving it a label, and a cause, doesn't mean we understand what or why it is.

 

[Nakosis]

More specifically,

If consciousness is a property that can be explained wholly in terms of physical matter, what are the precise physical characteristics or behaviors of things that distinguish conscious things from non-conscious things?

the fact of awareness by the mind of itself and the world.
"consciousness emerges from the operations of the brain"

I'll assume that the above it the type of consciousness you are referring to.

I would disagree a bit with the above. Consciousness is firstly awareness of one's surroundings. A computer system is capable of being aware of what is around itself. Self-driving cars as an example.

A mind aware of itself. I really don't think the mind, our mind, is aware of itself. What our mind is aware of is an image of self. Self as a set of properties such as name, gender, occupation, family relationships, an external physical image. These are really all properties external to the mind. However it is an external image that the mind identifies as the self. The mind is probably not really aware of itself except in an abstract way. We might include some concept of what a mind is which gets included in the self-image the mind creates.

So consciousness is an awareness of what is external to the mind/our CNS(central nervous system) including the abstract concept of what is around us including the concept of self. So to me, this is not difficult to understand. IOW no mystery, no magic.

What is difficult to understand/explain is well, in meditation the idea, with some types of meditation, is to set aside awareness fo everything which is external including the image we have of the self. What's left is existence. The experience of existing.

Cogito, ergo sum - I exist, therefore I am, in the word of Descartes

Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; And because some men err in reasoning, and fall into Paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of Geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for Demonstrations; And finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be something; And as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am, was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the Sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.

Whereas the awareness of "other" one would reasonably think could be simulated by a computer program, being conscious of existing remains allusive.

Matter, material possessing a sense of existing...

I don't know. I've no idea what mechanism of nature allows this.

 

[Polymath257]

Even if we understood the material mechanics that enable consciousness to happen, we still don't have any grasp of the phenomenon of consciousness, itself. We still don't know what it is beyond or apart from our personal experience of it.

It's like saying that, "X is an effect". It doesn't really mean anything unless we have experienced the effect for ourselves. And even then, it's just labeling that effect "X".

OK, I disagree. If (and this is still a big if) we can correlate brain activity as measured by brain scans with conscious states as reported or even individually felt, and if that correlation can be used to predict what someone will report, or feel, I'm not sure what *else* is required to say we 'understand consciousness'.

Truthfully, I am not at all sure *I* understand what people are talking about when they talk about consciousness. There seems to be a wide variety of different things that all have that name. I have had people claim that dreams are a form of consciousness while we are certainly unconscious during them in other senses. Maybe we need different words for the different phenomena rather than one catch-all word.

So, I don't know what you mean when you say 'the phenomenon of consciousness itself'. There are way too many variants for this phrase to be unambiguous. Can you give some examples? Both positive and negative examples would the helpful.

We certainly understand enough, for example, to make people unconscious while anesthetized for surgery. Isn't that along a clue to what 'consciousness itself' is? or the simple fact that damaging the brain seems to affect consciousness in well-defined ways?

On the other hand, I have never quite grasped the concept of a quale either. How are qualia different than sensory information? How is the 'experience of green' different than 'seeing green'?

 

[Polymath257]

I think the OP is trying to get someone to explain EXACTLY what they mean by consciousness being a "property of" the nervous system. What EXACTLY constitutes a "property of" in a materialist world view? How can a "property of" even exist in a materialist world view?

Because material objects react differently in different situations. That means they have different properties.

For example, if speed is a "property of" time's relation to spacial distance, what defines it, materially? Because it certainly appears to be a purely ideological phenomenon. Yet in a materialist world view, there can be no purely ideological phenomenon.

Huh? Speed is the rate of change of position as a function of time. That seems to be an eminently materialistic notion. Easy to measure; easy to define; and it affects how things interact.

 

[PureX]

tMatter, material possessing a sense of existing...

I don't know. I've no idea what mechanism of nature allows this.

I think it's the mechanism known as "gestalt". Wherein the a whole is able to exceed the sum of it's parts - in terms of extant possibility. Through gestalt, things becomes possible that were not otherwise possible. And material existence is transcended, from within, into the realm of immaterial (metaphysical) existence.

 

[Yazata]

More specifically,

If consciousness is a property that can be explained wholly in terms of physical matter, what are the precise physical characteristics or behaviors of things that distinguish conscious things from non-conscious things?

I'm not convinced that consciousness is a property. The way I conceive of it, it's a function, a behavior (or a whole collection of interacting behaviors) performed by a suitable data processing system, the human nervous system in our case.

That's pretty vague, and it's the job of neuroscience to better explain it.

I suspect that ultimately, consciousness reduces to causality. We observe protozoa reacting to changes in pH in their environment and swimming the other way. So we can say that they were "aware" of it and responded appropriately. In the case of a single celled organism, I doubt very much whether there was any "mind" involved or any phenomenal consciousness, just chemical pathways that mechanistically caused the innate response. I perceive protozoa like little machines.

As we ascend the phylogenetic ladder, we see organisms responding to their environment in more and more complex ways. They can recognize predators and food. They can recognize sex partners and (usually, not always) distinguish them from food. So they start performing decision processes on the information provided by their senses.

At some point we see them starting to learn from experience. They don't make the same mistakes over and over.

And at some further point, they seem to gain the ability to think about their own thoughts. Or put another way, they can make decisions about their own behavior and decisions, as opposed to simply reacting to sensory stimulation.

And self-consciousness starts to appear.

 

[PureX]

Because material objects react differently in different situations. That means they have different properties.

Huh? Speed is the rate of change of position as a function of time. That seems to be an eminently materialistic notion. Easy to measure; easy to define; and it affects how things interact.

But speed does not materially exist. It's a concept: a 'ratio'. A label for an experience of matter, but not any form of matter, itself. How can that be in a materialists world view?

 

[Laika]

I think the OP is trying to get someone to explain EXACTLY what they mean by consciousness being a "property of" the nervous system. What EXACTLY constitutes a "property of" in a materialist world view? How can a "property of" even exist in a materialist world view?

I have no idea how to make it more self-explanatory than that honestly. I'd have to look much deeper in to neuroscience to see how it plays out.

For example, if speed is a "property of" time's relation to spacial distance, what defines it, materially? Because it certainly appears to be a purely ideological phenomenon. Yet in a materialist world view, there can be no purely ideological phenomenon.

I think you are inferring that time and space are "ideological" phenomenon. From what I am aware of, they are treated as objective properties of matter and not simply mental construct to measure reality. Whilst Time and Space may have a real and objective existence, our concepts or sensation of them may be relative to our position (as there is no absolute time or space thanks to Einstein's theory of relativity).

But I will confess, this is an extremely advanced area in materialism that I am not intimately familiar with. It's all very abstract and confusing.

 

[PureX]

If I were to state that, "consciousness transcends the material realm from which it springs", how does a philosophical materialist respond to this?

 

[exchemist]

But speed does not materially exist. It's a concept: a 'ratio'. A label for an experience of matter, but not any form of matter, itself. How can that be in a materialists world view?

But surely that is exactly why we call it a property, isn't it? Speed is an attribute of an object, rather than an entity. It is no part of any materialist worldview to deny that entities have observable attributes, surely?

 

[Laika]

If I were to state that, "consciousness transcends the material realm from which it springs", how does a philosophical materialist respond to this?

consciousness isn't separate or independent of the "material realm". it is entirely part of the material realm.

 

[PureX]

But surely that is exactly why we call it a property, isn't it? Speed is an attribute of an object, rather than an entity. It is no part of any materialist worldview to deny that entities have observable attributes, surely?

But that was my original question. How can objects HAVE "attributes" in a materialist world view? How could an object have a "property of"? See what I'm saying? How is objective "being" being identified if not from some sort of 'non-objective being' perspective? And if that non-objective being perspective is required, and manifesting, then ... how is materialism not self-contradictory?

 

[Mock Turtle]

I visualise consciousness more like the stack in a computer - no inputs (senses) and no memory (as born essentially), and perhaps few instructions (genes), then not a lot going on with movement of the stack so very little consciousness. But put all these into play like a nice modern computer and voila - we have lift-off!

 

[exchemist]

But that was my original question. How can object HAVE "attributes" in a materialist world view? How could an object have a "property"? See what I'm saying? How is "being" being identified if not from some sort of 'non-being' perspective?

But it is the nature of the material world that entities have attributes. If there were an entity without attributes, we would not be able to detect it, so it would not be there at all!