It would be like suggesting that having a preference for a certain colour (lets say red) is more moral since you might one day be a situation where a red box might have a 99% chance of having kittens in it and a blue box had a 1% chance - the CHOICE might potentially be said to be more moral, the WORLD VIEW that incorporates a preference for some colour (lets say 'blue') on the other hand has no intrinsic moral ramifications.
You completely misunderstood my example, though I appreciate that you've given it some thought.
I will try to clarify it a bit for you:
Rigorous, peer reviewed, scientific methodology demonstrates that box A has a 99.999% chance of containing kittens, and box B has a 0.001% chance.
Some guy off the street who claims to hear the voices of aliens (though provides no evidence for this, and likewise provides no evidence that the aliens are good instead of evil) says box A has a 0% chance of containing kittens, and box B has a 100% chance.
This is where world view influences choice. This is where a world view that rejects science- acting on the choice to reject science- is evil. It results in less reliable moral action.
The only way favoring red would be more moral is if it were demonstrated that red boxes were always more likely to contain kittens, and that there wasn't some other situation (say, bags) where the red choice would be less likely to contain the kittens.
You might therefore suggest that it is not the world view that rejects science but the choice to reject science which is evil....
I would say both are; the world view is of an evil quality, because it promotes evil. And the choice to reject science (where choice is made) is evil.
but there is nothing to suggest that the acceptance of science is 'good' or 'positive' or that the rejection is 'bad' or 'negative' there are indeed negative outcomes of rejecting science, however there may also be positive outcomes, just as there as positive outcomes for accepting science and there may also be negative outcomes.
In the context of a person with a moral will, the acceptance of science (reliable knowledge itself), is inherently beneficial to any material moral goal. Ignorance is harmful to a moral goal.
Of course, an innately evil person accepting science would make him or her better at being evil- but he or she was already evil to begin with for other reasons (accepting science wasn't more immoral, just more efficient). That is, the application of science can be used for good or evil (the application of that knowledge being the evil act in that case, not the presence of it). When we speak of morality, we implicitly speak of the subversion or sabotage of good potential; it's not very coherent to speak of an evil person's knowledge as evil when it is the motivation itself that is driving the evil act.
It wouldn't be unfair to clarify the point:
"If you have good intentions, rejecting science it evil"
But I think this is sufficiently implicit anyway- anybody concerned with not being evil would already have good intentions (or want to have them).
Ridiculous. For starters you have made the unsupported assumption that the correctness of information is not merely a moral objective but the ONLY one pertinent to the issue of 'rejecting' science.
This is not an unsupported assumption; it is supported in my example, and I have also supported it in the thread 'rejection of science is evil', if you are interested in my arguments there.
So? Would that mean we cannot reliably assume that killing someone is immoral for example?
No. Scientific methodology is quite reliable. Just because it is not absolutely certain, doesn't mean it isn't the most probable.
Just because we do not accept the authenticity or legitimacy of the source does not mean that it does not include some elements of truth.
That is true, but those elements are necessarily less reliable. They are the box with the 0.001% chance of containing kittens. To choose to rescue that box at the cost of the other is immoral.
I am sorry, however you continue to rule things out (without demonstrating the reasoning) on the basis of assumptions that are poorly founded.
Assuming the word is useful, and the concept coherent, is not unreasonable.
It is only to say:
"In so far as objective morality exists at all, it must mean this..."
When we discuss what objective morality might be, we have already accepted the working assumption that it may exist.