Must We Believe in an 'Objective Reality' to Do Science?

[Vouthon]

Well @Phil I may be presumptuous in arguing this (if so, do forgive me!)

The original exponents of proto-scientific empiricism were high medieval Christian natural philosophers (and arguably Muslims as well), who thought they were investigating God's plan for the universe by considering how His work functions.

Because their orthodox Nicene creed had compelled them to reject gnostic solipsism and emanationism, in favour of viewing the material universe as a real creation of God (albeit reflecting His eternal 'forms' in the Divine Mind where mathematics came from, as they thought), these Christian natural philosophers 'believed' in objective reality as a given. It would have been heresy for them in their Catholic culture to have denied it.

Beginning with a sixth century Byzantine scientist named John Philoponus, Christians broke with the Graeco-Roman world by performing actual experiments to test whether Aristotelian theories, then dominant in the ancient world, were right or wrong.


See:

The Experimental Revolution

Though the ideas of the Greeks, as expressed by Aristotle (384 BCE–322 BCE), persisted until the time of Galileo, there were many who seriously questioned much of it, and even did experiments to show that Aristotle was wrong. John Philoponus (490–570) (John the Grammarian) experimentally disproved Aristotle's assertion that heavy bodies fall faster than lighter ones. This experiment (dropping heavy and light balls from a height) was repeated by others, including Simon Stevin (1548/49–1620). Their work constituted a gradual revolution in how physics was done, one that showed the importance of deliberate experiments designed to study natural processes. Previous physics had mostly relied on passive observation of phenomena. ​

John Philoponus - Wikipedia

John Philoponus, a Christian philosopher, scientist, and theologian who lived approximately from 490 to 570, is also known as John the Grammarian or John of Alexandria.

Although the Aristotelian-Neoplatonic tradition was the source of his intellectual roots and concerns, he was an original thinker who eventually broke with that tradition in many important respects, both substantive and methodological, and cleared part of the way which led to more critical and empirical approaches in the natural sciences...

He used the same didactic methods of reasoning that modern science uses and thus performed genuine experiments...

Philoponus' theological work is recognized in the history of science as the first attempt at a unified theory of dynamics.

He used the same didactic methods of reasoning that modern science uses and thus performed genuine experiments...

Philoponus' theological work is recognized in the history of science as the first attempt at a unified theory of dynamics.


​

Now, it hasn't escaped my notice that the so-called 'Scientific Revolution' in 17th century Europe and the 'Experimental / Empirical' movement in natural philosophy which presaged it in the medieval period (both in Christendom and the Islamic world), did not emerge in any of the otherwise highly sophisticated cultures - such as Mahayana Buddhist countries and Advaita India - where the concept had become deeply rooted (owing to a certain mystical-religious heritage) that objective reality was maya "illusion" i.e. for we are all really 'Atman' (Self) behind the veil of the phenomenal world.

That very nearly could have become the underlying philosophy of the Western world too, if the Gnostic Valentinus had succeeded in becoming Bishop of Rome in 143 CE. Valentinian Christianity was essentially a 'monistic' version of the faith, with Valentinus himself having taught that: "the entirety was inside of Him--the inconceivable, uncontained, who is superior to all thought." (Gospel of Truth 17:5-9). According to the respected scholar of Gnosticism Bentley Layton (1987), this sort of teaching implies a "cosmological model where all is enclosed by God and ultimately all is God". In contrast to the reality of the Father, "those things which are 'outside' of the Fullness have no true existence... These things are images of those which truly exist." (Irenaeus Against Heresies 2:14:3).

As a consequence of our ignorance of God, Valentinus concluded that humanity had fallen into an illusive understanding of reality ("error" or "deficiency"). According to Valentinus, "Ignorance of the Father caused agitation and fear. And the agitation grew dense like fog, so that no one could see. Thus error found strength" (Gospel of Truth 17:9-20). The metaphysics of the Valentinian school of early Christianity, therefore, assumed that the material universe we perceive with our senses is a mere illusion deriving from our ignorance of the Eternal Father, 'Bythos' the Depth of Supreme Being.

As the scholar Layton (1987) correctly notes, the Valentinian doctrine "is strongly anti-materialist, even illusionist, as regards the reality of material structures". Valentinus describes the "realm of appearance" as being akin to a bad dream "when one falls asleep and finds one's self in the midst of nightmares" (Gospel of Truth 29:8-10f) and enlightenment through Christ the Saviour is 'waking up' to what is "really" Real (i.e. the Pleroma, or Divine Fullness of God the Father). The author of the Treatise on Resurrection similarly describes the material world as follows, "Suddenly the living are dying - surely they are not alive at all in this world of apparition! - the rich have become poor, rulers overthrown: all changes, the world is an apparition" (Treatise on Resurrection 48:19-27cf Irenaeus Against Heresies 2:14).

So Christendom came close to having its 'Advaita' moment with the Pope Valentinus that never was, because he only narrowly lost the episcopal election of 143 CE by a very slender margin and his following in the second century, in terms of discipleship, had been enormous. Instead of becoming pontiff, however, his writings were ultimately declared heretical and lost to history, until some works from his school were uncovered in jars in the Egyptian desert near the cite of Nag Hammadi in 1945.

Now, I have to ponder: there are many things that might have worked for good had Valentinus the Gnostic been appointed Catholic Pope rather than Anicetus his rival, but what would the effect of his theology have been on Western science?

Whether a society "must" believe in an objective reality in order to 'do' science, I'm much less certain of that - all I can do is cite the historical record, which may be indicative that the answer to this question is 'aye'.

One of the greatest deficiencies of classical, Greco-Roman thought (for all its sophistication and profundity) was that they really lacked empiricism and any comprehension of the need for making testable predictions, and Platonism was becoming exceedingly popular - especially in its monistic, solipsistic 'Neoplatonist' form as a rival to Christianity by the third century CE.

If you believe that "nature is full of gods" and that magnets are propelled by active "souls" as Thales did or that the material universe is an illusion because there is only really the divine "Monad" (as Plotinus taught), then I think it does make it more difficult to engage in testable, experimental science because varying initial conditions (a necessity for conducting controlled experiments) would be viewed as violating the "static", cyclical divine order of nature or an 'illusion'.

As the Israeli physicist and philosopher of science Max Jammer explained in a 1997 study:


Foundations Of Quantum Mechanics In The Light Of New Technology: Selected Papers From The Proceedings Of The First Through Fourth International Symposia On Foundations Of Quantum Mechanics

Greek science was not experimental science. During the twelve centuries, from Thales to Philoponus, virtually no serious experiment had been performed. In fact, the very idea of an experiment was unacceptable to the Greek mind.

The world of nature, according to Greek metaphysics was a world alive and divine...Any interference with the course of nature was for the Greek an act of violence...The performance of an experiment performed under artificial or unnatural conditions could consequently never increase knowledge of nature.​

 

[Laika]

Well @Phil I may be presumptuous in arguing this (if so, do forgive me!)

The original exponents of proto-scientific empiricism were high medieval Christian natural philosophers (and arguably Muslims as well), who thought they were investigating God's plan for the universe by considering how His work functions.

Because their orthodox Nicene creed had compelled them to reject gnostic solipsism and emanationism, in favour of viewing the material universe as a real creation of God (albeit reflecting His eternal 'forms' in the Divine Mind where mathematics came from, as they thought), these Christian natural philosophers 'believed' in objective reality as a given. It would have been heresy for them in their Catholic culture to have denied it.

Beginning with a sixth century Byzantine scientist named John Philoponus, Christians broke with the Graeco-Roman world by performing actual experiments to test whether Aristotelian theories, then dominant in the ancient world, were right or wrong.


See:

The Experimental Revolution

Though the ideas of the Greeks, as expressed by Aristotle (384 BCE–322 BCE), persisted until the time of Galileo, there were many who seriously questioned much of it, and even did experiments to show that Aristotle was wrong. John Philoponus (490–570) (John the Grammarian) experimentally disproved Aristotle's assertion that heavy bodies fall faster than lighter ones. This experiment (dropping heavy and light balls from a height) was repeated by others, including Simon Stevin (1548/49–1620). Their work constituted a gradual revolution in how physics was done, one that showed the importance of deliberate experiments designed to study natural processes. Previous physics had mostly relied on passive observation of phenomena. ​

John Philoponus - Wikipedia

John Philoponus, a Christian philosopher, scientist, and theologian who lived approximately from 490 to 570, is also known as John the Grammarian or John of Alexandria.

Although the Aristotelian-Neoplatonic tradition was the source of his intellectual roots and concerns, he was an original thinker who eventually broke with that tradition in many important respects, both substantive and methodological, and cleared part of the way which led to more critical and empirical approaches in the natural sciences...

He used the same didactic methods of reasoning that modern science uses and thus performed genuine experiments...

Philoponus' theological work is recognized in the history of science as the first attempt at a unified theory of dynamics.

He used the same didactic methods of reasoning that modern science uses and thus performed genuine experiments...

Philoponus' theological work is recognized in the history of science as the first attempt at a unified theory of dynamics.


​

Now, it hasn't escaped my notice that the so-called 'Scientific Revolution' in 17th century Europe and the 'Experimental / Empirical' movement in natural philosophy which presaged it in the medieval period (both in Christendom and the Islamic world), did not emerge in any of the otherwise highly sophisticated cultures - such as Mahayana Buddhist countries and Vedantic India - where the concept had become deeply rooted (owing to a certain mystical-religious heritage) that objective reality was maya "illusion" i.e. for we are all really 'Atman' (Self) behind the veil of the phenomenal world.

That very nearly could have become the underlying philosophy of the Western world too, if the Gnostic Valentinus had succeeded in becoming Bishop of Rome in 143 CE. Valentinian Christianity was essentially a 'monistic' version of the faith, with Valentinus himself having taught that: "the entirety was inside of Him--the inconceivable, uncontained, who is superior to all thought." (Gospel of Truth 17:5-9). According to the respected scholar of Gnosticism Bentley Layton (1987), this sort of teaching implies a "cosmological model where all is enclosed by God and ultimately all is God". In contrast to the reality of the Father, "those things which are 'outside' of the Fullness have no true existence... These things are images of those which truly exist." (Irenaeus Against Heresies 2:14:3).

As a consequence of our ignorance of God, Valentinus concluded that humanity had fallen into an illusive understanding of reality ("error" or "deficiency"). According to Valentinus, "Ignorance of the Father caused agitation and fear. And the agitation grew dense like fog, so that no one could see. Thus error found strength" (Gospel of Truth 17:9-20). The metaphysics of the Valentinian school of early Christianity, therefore, assumed that the material universe we perceive with our senses is a mere illusion deriving from our ignorance of the Eternal Father, 'Bythos' the Depth of Supreme Being.

As the scholar Layton (1987) correctly notes, the Valentinian doctrine "is strongly anti-materialist, even illusionist, as regards the reality of material structures". Valentinus describes the "realm of appearance" as being akin to a bad dream "when one falls asleep and finds one's self in the midst of nightmares" (Gospel of Truth 29:8-10f) and enlightenment through Christ the Saviour is 'waking up' to what is "really" Real (i.e. the Pleroma, or Divine Fullness of God the Father). The author of the Treatise on Resurrection similarly describes the material world as follows, "Suddenly the living are dying - surely they are not alive at all in this world of apparition! - the rich have become poor, rulers overthrown: all changes, the world is an apparition" (Treatise on Resurrection 48:19-27cf Irenaeus Against Heresies 2:14).

So Christendom came close to having its 'Vedantic' moment with the Pope Valentinus that never was, because he only narrowly lost the episcopal election of 143 CE by a very slender margin and his following in the second century, in terms of discipleship, had been enormous. Instead of becoming pontiff, however, his writings were ultimately declared heretical and lost to history, until some works from his school were uncovered in jars in the Egyptian desert near the cite of Nag Hammadi in 1945.

Now, I have to ponder: there are many things that might have worked for good had Valentinus the Gnostic been appointed Catholic Pope rather than Anicetus his rival, but what would the effect of his theology have been on Western science?

Whether a society "must" believe in an objective reality in order to 'do' science, I'm much less certain of that - all I can do is cite the historical record, which may be indicative that the answer to this question is 'aye'.

One of the greatest deficiencies of classical, Greco-Roman thought (for all its sophistication and profundity) was that they really lacked empiricism and any comprehension of the need for making testable predictions. If you believe that "nature is full of gods" and that magnets are propelled by active "souls" as Thales did, then I think it does make it more difficult engage in testable, experimental science because varying initial conditions (a necessity for conducting controlled experiments) would be viewed as violating the "static", cyclical divine order of nature.

As the Israeli physicist and philosopher of science Max Jammer explained in a 1997 study:


Foundations Of Quantum Mechanics In The Light Of New Technology: Selected Papers From The Proceedings Of The First Through Fourth International Symposia On Foundations Of Quantum Mechanics

Greek science was not experimental science. During the twelve centuries, from Thales to Philoponus, virtually no serious experiment had been performed. In fact, the very idea of an experiment was unacceptable to the Greek mind.

The world of nature, according to Greek metaphysics was a world alive and divine...Any interference with the course of nature was for the Greek an act of violence...The performance of an experiment performed under artificial or unnatural conditions could consequently never increase knowledge of nature.​

I would give this several winner ratings if I could... one will have to do.

 

[Evangelicalhumanist]

The story I heard was Samuel Johnson and his biographer, Boswell, were discussing solipsism one day while walking somewhere. At some point, Johnson, who was no philosopher, said, "I refute it thus", and then kicked a heavy stone. Boswell, who was no genius, thought that solved the matter and recorded the incident in his biography. Unfortunately, it backfired. Upon publication, Johnson lost a bit of his reputation for brilliance.

Actually, I believe Johnson and Boswell were discussing Bishop Berkeley's ideas on Subjective Idealism (which Berkeley then called Immaterialism).

 

[Laika]

No guessing!




Just kidding. Couldn't resist.

Be careful what you wish for Mr Anderson...

 

[Evangelicalhumanist]

Must we believe in an 'objective reality' to do science?

For the purposes of absolutely ensuring a fruitful and beneficial discussion will be had by all, let us define 'objective reality' as "The metaphysical claim that there exists a reality independent of any mind and/or conscious awareness." That is basically a fancy way of saying, "There exists a non-subjective reality."

Please note the word 'metaphysical'. That is merely a nod to the inescapable fact that any and all claims there is an objective reality are essentially metaphysical claims. If you do not understand why that is so, please be so kind as to read up on the subject before you muck up this thread. You can find a dangerously thrilling discussion of the topic here: Objectivity.​

HINT (For those who like hints): For methodological reasons, metaphysics lies beyond the scope of the sciences. Emphasis on the word "methodological". But why? Roughly put, to establish 'scientific truths' (i.e. reliable facts and hypotheses), one must use both reason (logic) and empirical observation. But one cannot, by definition, empirically observe a non-empirical entity, such as a metaphysical entity. Hence, one cannot bring science to bear on metaphysical claims.

Comments? Questions? Subpoenas?

Good luck!

I don't know, like @PureX, whether "believe in" objective reality is the correct formulation.

Still, I think that it is necessary that we assume that there is an objective reality, because science is intimately involved in observing it. (I'm going to ignore Quantum uncertainty here, because I don't think it plays a role.)

I think also, like @ChristineM, that we don't need metaphysics. As you rightly suggest, we do require reason(logic) and logic sometimes requires the acceptance of axioms, but that is not really the same thing as metaphysics, is it? I mean, accepting that (A and B) implies A hardly needs metaphysics.

 

[blü 2]

Must we believe in an 'objective reality' to do science?

First, some groundwork. I note three assumptions that have in common that they can't be demonstrated to be correct without assuming in advance that they are correct ─ and therefore they have to be assumptions:

that a world exists external to the self
that our senses are capable of informing us of that world, and
that reason is a valid tool.​

Conveniently, if you post here then in doing so you demonstrate that you already share the first two assumptions, and with ordinary luck the third as well.

The justification for the assumptions is that they work in practice.

Other names for the world external to the self are objective reality (or just 'reality'), nature, the realm of the physical sciences, and (of course) the OP's "metaphysical claim that there exists a reality independent of any mind and/or conscious awareness" (though to know about it we need the other two assumptions as well).

Second, science's purpose is to study that external world, explore, describe and seek to explain it. So the belief that it exists is built into the very nature of science (and I think into the evolved nature of humans, indeed all animals).

So the answer to the OP's question is, yes.


(Footnote: further to @Sunstone's useful reference to (non-supernatural) metaphysics, this is the branch of philosophy that studies the fundamental concepts of discourse, not least philosophic and scientific discourse. To give you the flavor, here's a list of the chapter headings in David Armstrong's Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (OUP 2010) ─ you might preface each of them with "What do we mean, and what are the problems, when we say ...":

2. Properties / 3. Relations / 4. States of Affairs / 5. Laws of Nature / 6. Reacting to Dispositionalism / 7. Particulars / 8. Truthmakers / 9. Possibility, Actuality, Necessity / 10. Limits / 11. Absences / 12. The Rational Discipline of Logic and Mathematics / 13. Number / 14. Classes / 15. Time / 16. Mind.)​

 

[Heyo]

Sorry, but the "believe in" thing sends your question right down the crapper.

Isn't the whole point of the scientific process to overcome the whole "we believe in" bias?

As much as possible. But there can't be any system of thought without a set of believes (axioms).

 

[Heyo]

Must we believe in an 'objective reality' to do science?

For the purposes of absolutely ensuring a fruitful and beneficial discussion will be had by all, let us define 'objective reality' as "The metaphysical claim that there exists a reality independent of any mind and/or conscious awareness." That is basically a fancy way of saying, "There exists a non-subjective reality."

Please note the word 'metaphysical'. That is merely a nod to the inescapable fact that any and all claims there is an objective reality are essentially metaphysical claims. If you do not understand why that is so, please be so kind as to read up on the subject before you muck up this thread. You can find a dangerously thrilling discussion of the topic here: Objectivity.​

HINT (For those who like hints): For methodological reasons, metaphysics lies beyond the scope of the sciences. Emphasis on the word "methodological". But why? Roughly put, to establish 'scientific truths' (i.e. reliable facts and hypotheses), one must use both reason (logic) and empirical observation. But one cannot, by definition, empirically observe a non-empirical entity, such as a metaphysical entity. Hence, one cannot bring science to bear on metaphysical claims.

Comments? Questions? Subpoenas?

I think a scientist should believe in the axioms of science.
Alas, not all do and some of them can produce valuable work by applying the axioms only to their line of work.

 

[Evangelicalhumanist]

First, some groundwork. I note three assumptions that have in common that they can't be demonstrated to be correct without assuming in advance that they are correct ─ and therefore they have to be assumptions:

that a world exists external to the self
that our senses are capable of informing us of that world, and
that reason is a valid tool.​

Conveniently, if you post here then in doing so you demonstrate that you already share the first two assumptions, and with ordinary luck the third as well.

The justification for the assumptions is that they work in practice.

I think also you may find that denying any of those assumptions (which I might call axioms) would make it utterly impossible to even begin to understand the world as you perceive it.

How about we consider some thought experiments to demonstrate this (I'll contribute one, but I seriously would love some others by other members).

Here's one thought experiment on the question of whether the world exists independent of oneself:

Let's pretend it does not, that I am the sole creator of this world, and all that happens within it. How do I manufacture this world, and everything that happens within it, so that my imagings (which must always be in the present) can result in news reports and histories that report on things that have already happened -- and that other people become aware of at the same time that I do? And how do I know this? Because they respond to those events on Twitter or Facebook or RF after I became aware of them?

Tell me -- how do I contrive all of that?

 

[Sunstone]

I think a scientist should believe in the axioms of science.
Alas, not all do and some of them can produce valuable work by applying the axioms only to their line of work.

But must they believe? Can science do without objective reality, so to speak?

My contention is it could. That is, science would still be valid without any reference at all to any objective reality.

 

[Heyo]

But must they believe? Can science do without objective reality, so to speak?

My contention is it could. That is, science would be still be valid without any reference at all to any metaphysics.

I'm not so sure. All I can say is that they must not disbelieve. Science is not science if it contradicts the axioms. But not all the axioms may be relevant all the time.

 

[blü 2]

I think also you may find that denying any of those assumptions (which I might call axioms) would make it utterly impossible to even begin to understand the world as you perceive it.

How about we consider some thought experiments to demonstrate this (I'll contribute one, but I seriously would love some others by other members).

Here's one thought experiment on the question of whether the world exists independent of oneself:

Let's pretend it does not, that I am the sole creator of this world, and all that happens within it. How do I manufacture this world, and everything that happens within it, so that my imagings (which must always be in the present) can result in news reports and histories that report on things that have already happened -- and that other people become aware of at the same time that I do? And how do I know this? Because they respond to those events on Twitter or Facebook or RF after I became aware of them?

Tell me -- how do I contrive all of that?

Ahm, I think strict solipsism (like Last Thursdayism or We are a dream in the brain of a Higher Being, or We are an Element in a Superscientist's Experiment (or Tron Game)) is one of those unfalsifiable propositions which, being such, are unacceptable to science. (My first and second assumptions address the solipsism problem ─ by assumption, of course.)

I'm not aware of any set of propositions that could replace the ones I've mentioned and possess both credibility / general acceptance, and at the same time the solution to all such problems.

Of course they're not a problem for science as such, since they're in unfalsifiable form and so excluded. They may however arise in other contexts eg a claim that statement-about-reality X was absolutely true might have to explain how X accounts for them.

 

[Sunstone]

I'm not so sure. All I can say is that they must not disbelieve. Science is not science if it contradicts the axioms. But not all the axioms may be relevant all the time.

Let's do a thought experiment...

First, suppose objective reality. Next, imagine dropping a rock off a cliff onto @Left Coast's foot.

Next, suppose subject reality (no objective reality). Next, repeat dropping the rock, etc.

On what basis are you -- an individual human --- capable of determining which of those realities is the real one, so to speak.

 

[osgart]

So your "we believe" is true for all humans?

First you have to accept that our senses have a true story involved with them as they are.

Isn't it causing you doubts when math is so precisely functional? Or do you think math is pure manipulation and that logic is a subjective feel good story, but not necessarily the truth of things?

 

[Sunstone]

Folks, if you are determined to assert we must believe in an objective reality to do science, please do not leave it at that. That's rather lame. Like me saying I'm the world's greatest lover, then providing not a shred of reason or evidence for my claim I would just be wasting your time, and you're just wasting mine if all you're going to say is we must believe in an objective reality to do science.

Try this. Choose a scientific experiment. Show how the outcome would be different if (1) reality is objective or (2) reality is subjective. If you can demonstrate the outcome would be different, that would be pretty convincing.

 

[Heyo]

Let's do a thought experiment...

First, suppose objective reality. Next, imagine dropping a rock off a cliff onto @Left Coast's foot.

Next, suppose subject reality (no objective reality). Next, repeat dropping the rock, etc.

On what basis are you -- an individual human --- capable of determining which of those realities is the real one, so to speak.

First, not that it would change the outcome of the experiment, but I like to throw the rock at @mikkel_the_dane. He is clearly the most in need of a reality check.
Next, record your observations, and those of your assistant, and those of Mikkel. In an objective reality you'd expect the observation to be very similar, in a subjective reality you'd expect them to be different.
In an objective reality you'd go on and publish your results and expect an other team to confirm your results.
In a subjective reality ... why the hell would you want to publish your results? They would be of no value to anyone as nobody expects to learn from your subjective observations. Nobody could built on your results. No paper would ever reach a double digit cite count.

Similar experiments could be done for uniformity. Knowability is a bit different and probably the most difficult to explain.

 

[blü 2]

I'm the world's greatest lover,

Wow, that IS some credential! Coming from anyone else, I'd have my doubts, but you ...

Well done, well done!

 

[blü 2]

Let's do a thought experiment...

First, suppose objective reality. Next, imagine dropping a rock off a cliff onto @Left Coast's foot.

In reality you're saying, "****, sorry, buddy, musta just slipped out of m' hand."

Next, suppose subject reality (no objective reality). Next, repeat dropping the rock, etc.

If there's no objective reality, then the only reality is the one you devise (strict solipsism).

So the dropee says to you, "Please, please, forgive me, Master, if my agonized cry disturbed your serene thoughts."

On what basis are you -- an individual human --- capable of determining which of those realities is the real one, so to speak.

By the answers?

But if we posit that strict solipsism works beyond conscious control, and in that way has devised the world we're ─ sorry, I'm ─ used to, then there'd be no difference between what we think of as objective reality, and the actual behavior of our subjective reality. And that being an unfalsifiable proposition, it would be rejected by science but that wouldn't totally make it go away; which is where the assumptions I mentioned are useful (and very very very probably but not absolutely certainly true).

(As a variation on a solipsistic theme, I recall a SF story from long ago that has the hero watching the stars go out, and then hearing reports that communications with the rest of the world have gone silent, then with the rest of the country, then the rest of the city till he's standing on the last block in the city surrounded by blackness, by which time he's worked out that his body or mind is the host to a sleeping / dreaming creature of some kind who's responsible for the existence of everything ─ and for some reason is waking up. I forget how in the nick of time he gets it to go back to sleep.)

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

First, some groundwork. I note three assumptions that have in common that they can't be demonstrated to be correct without assuming in advance that they are correct ─ and therefore they have to be assumptions:

that a world exists external to the self
that our senses are capable of informing us of that world, and
that reason is a valid tool.​

Conveniently, if you post here then in doing so you demonstrate that you already share the first two assumptions, and with ordinary luck the third as well.

The justification for the assumptions is that they work in practice.

Other names for the world external to the self are objective reality (or just 'reality'), nature, the realm of the physical sciences, and (of course) the OP's "metaphysical claim that there exists a reality independent of any mind and/or conscious awareness" (though to know about it we need the other two assumptions as well).

Second, science's purpose is to study that external world, explore, describe and seek to explain it. So the belief that it exists is built into the very nature of science (and I think into the evolved nature of humans, indeed all animals).

So the answer to the OP's question is, yes.


(Footnote: further to @Sunstone's useful reference to (non-supernatural) metaphysics, this is the branch of philosophy that studies the fundamental concepts of discourse, not least philosophic and scientific discourse. To give you the flavor, here's a list of the chapter headings in David Armstrong's Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (OUP 2010) ─ you might preface each of them with "What do we mean, and what are the problems, when we say ...":

2. Properties / 3. Relations / 4. States of Affairs / 5. Laws of Nature / 6. Reacting to Dispositionalism / 7. Particulars / 8. Truthmakers / 9. Possibility, Actuality, Necessity / 10. Limits / 11. Absences / 12. The Rational Discipline of Logic and Mathematics / 13. Number / 14. Classes / 15. Time / 16. Mind.)​

I challenge all 3 of yours and replace them with these:

The world is not just external to me
The world is in part in me as I come from the world and a part of the world is me.
That I can use my senses, reason, logic and feelings to make sense of the world including me as a part of it.
That I must test the limits of my senses, reason, logic and feelings as how they work.

You are in effect a dualist and run into to the following problem of causation and what the world is:

If a world is external to the self, then what causes the self to come into existence and how does that happen if a world goes from external to the self to cause the self, yet be external to the self.
That is the problem with your dualism. Something as everything else than the self if strongly external to the self can't cause the self to come into existence, because at the moment of causation it is not external to the self as different.

In practice you see this post. As it is on a computer and screen, it is external to you as your self, yet it is also a chain of causation that ends in you as your understanding of it in your self.
That is the problem with a world external to the self. It is dualism and runs to the problem of how does a world and the self connect?

So here is the absurd consequence of your belief/assumption:
"Second, science's purpose is to study that external world, explore, describe and seek to explain it. So the belief that it exists is built into the very nature of science (and I think into the evolved nature of humans, indeed all animals)."

The word "explain" is not external to the self, because it happens in the self and thus you end up with 2 worlds, which are not connected, because they are not. They are by your very starting assumption a duality. The external and internal worlds.

So here is the problem again: You understand what I have written. That is in your self/mind in the internal world. You now choose to answer, but that involves your computer, which is in the external world.

So here it is for philosophy and your attempt of being authoritative for all humans:

Philosophy, (from Greek, by way of Latin, philosophia, “love of wisdom”) the rational, abstract, and methodical consideration of reality as a whole or of fundamental dimensions of human existence and experience. ...
philosophy | Definition, Systems, Fields, Schools, & Biographies

So you claim that you speak with authority over all human reason. You don't!!! You are in effect an authoritarian, who claim power over reason. You don't have that and you should really stop doing that. You are in effect no different than some dogmatic, fundamentalist religious people. You believe you are the correct source of a "we". You are not!!!

The world is not an external world. The world is also you with your self and you are going to prove that, because you are going to post your internal understanding to counter mine. But that is the proof. That you are a self in the world and a part of it and that you communicate with another self, me.

So that is the limit of your philosophy:
You rely on words, which are not true, because they have no correspondence to the external word and that is the only truth, you accept. But that is not true, because that you accept it, is in the internal world. So you start your system by using non-truth. The world is in part false, because all the internal parts of it are false and that includes you as a self. You are false.
Yet you are not, right?!!! Of course, you are not false, wrong or any of those. You are not even irrational. You are just not aware of the limitations of this:
- that reason is a valid tool.

So here it is for human mobility. Human mobility is a part of the world, but it has limits. The same is the case with reason and your idea that it has to be valid. I am a skeptic and to me reason is a human behaviour in the self, that has limits. Just like truth and logic.
And you are in effect apparently incapable of doubting the limits of your assumptions of how they work in practice. In effect you do the following trick in your thinking. For "that reason is a valid tool" it is a case of A is B in time, space and at least one case. But you are unable to test if there is for another case in another time and space, where reason is not a valid tool.

So here it is for the limits of your assumptions and your kind of science as above:
For the everyday world you can't with your reason, correspondence truth and science do these human behaviours:
https://undsci.berkeley.edu/article/0_0_0/whatisscience_12
You can't do good and useful, and you assume that your good and useful as it is in your post, is universal for all humans. It is not and it will never be that. You are like all other humans a product of nature and nurture and you take your understanding for granted as the correct one for all humans. It is not so.

I don't have to accept your cognition as for your 3 assumptions, because I can doubt them and replace them with another philosophical system.
The world is how it makes sense to humans. That involves at least 3 interconnected categories, which can't be reduced to less than these 3:
The objective as physical.
The inter-subjective as social.
The subjective as individuality.
You try to reduce the world down to the first one and I just do the social and individual differently and that is the falsification of your individual belief in: - that reason is a valid tool.
Reason is a useful, bit limited human behaviour. And so is your belief in objective correspondence truth. I just have to do it differently thus I falsify your "we".

So here it is reduction as absurdum. Since I don't use reason as a valid tool like you, I have already walked out in front of an oncoming truck and is longtime dead. I am so wrong, because I different than you that I am not even in the world as different than you and I haven't written all of this, because I am not like you. So I am not at all!!! I am not in reality and the world. I am so irrational and without your objective, universal, true reason, that you are not even reading this.

Start being a skeptic and doubt yourself!

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

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(As a variation on a solipsistic theme, I recall a SF story from long ago that has the hero watching the stars go out, and then hearing reports that communications with the rest of the world have gone silent, then with the rest of the country, then the rest of the city till he's standing on the last block in the city surrounded by blackness, by which time he's worked out that his body or mind is the host to a sleeping / dreaming creature of some kind who's responsible for the existence of everything ─ and for some reason is waking up. I forget how in the nick of time he gets it to go back to sleep.)

That is not solipsism, because there exists 2 different entities in this story: The hero and the sleeping/dreaming creature Solipsism, as metaphysical/ontological as the only thing that exists, is your mind, is false, because this text is not in your mind, it comes to your mind and you can't control it.

The world is at the base the interconnected level of existence: You and the rest.
In practice that is a lot of processes in time, space and different aspects and you can't reduce that down to objective correspondence truth, because I just act differently than you and believe differently in truth.

You really have to move beyond your understanding of truth. It doesn't work in practice, because you can't explain human diversity other than being false. But that is absurd, because it is a fact that other humans are different than you.
You in effect start with a self-referring negation. You subjectively treat as correct that only objective corresponce truth is correct. But that is not true as it is subjective and thus false. You start your system with a self-referring negation.

You really have to read some more about truth than just correspondence.