Defining Free Will

[PolyHedral]

'Sound' as in 'rational'?...and a human without feelings is normal?...rational?

Well, they'd certainly be rational, and probably be good at whatever they put their mind to. Rationality yields results.

 

[Thief]

Well, they'd certainly be rational, and probably be good at whatever they put their mind to. Rationality yields results.

The lack of emotion would be deemed an illness.
Evaluation...and probably medication... would follow.

Functioning among peers would be awkward.

Ever 'feel' that way?

 

[Willamena]

In reference specifically to the free will debate, I've seen hard indeterminism used as a form of compatibilism. In other words, it's argued that free will is not incompatible with determinism- but that since chance exists (determinism is not completely true), free will is not true.

I'm reading up on the subject. I've read that indeterministic theories fall into three groups: uncaused events, nondeterministically caused events, and agent [or substance] caused events. Which do you suppose what you describe might fall under?

I've read the view that determinism is untrue because free will exists, but I haven't yet got to the compatibilist view that free will is untrue because chance exists. Sounds interesting.

I haven't seen how either chance or causality or any combination of the two can act as reasonable ingredients to free will.

On the macro scale, things are largely causal. Things lead to other things. (If they didn't, then conservation of energy would be untrue, and this would be a remarkable find). On the quantum scale, things are dominated by probabilities, but probabilities are rigorously mathematically defined in relation to causal events for the most part. There is chance involved, but it's chance bound by probability.

So for the most part, something happens, and it has various probabilities of causing certain things- but on the macro scale, the probabilities focus down onto causing the highest probability action. So while it may be reasonably probable for fundamental particles to spring in and out of existence, or go through things they shouldn't be going through, it's drastically improbable for a macro-sized object to do the same, because there would have to be an inconceivable amount of improbable actions occurring towards the same end.

Well, I don't know anything about that.

In reference specifically to the free will debate, I've been reading a bit. The philosophical debate began with two sides: hard determinism, with its implication that the entire universe has a particular destiny or program that it is executing, and that 'free will' is impossible; and libertarians, who asserted versions of 'free will' were possible, and hence the determinism was false. Of the libertarians, there were two camps, one of whom held that our apparent agency was a mystery that stemmed from "god". Later we get compatibilists and incompatibilists, each of who may draw on theories of hard or soft determinism, or indeterminism, to make their arguments. The latter compatibilist types hold that "that free will is possible at worlds where some of our actions have indeterministic event causes (Kane 1996, 1999, Balaguer 2004, 2010) or that free will is possible at worlds where some of our actions are uncaused (Ginet 1990)." (plato.stanford.edu)

 

[Storm]

Yes, but don't we choose in relation to our instincts? Although it would be physically possible, I don't think I could choose right now to go out into the parking lot and break all the windows in every car. No amount of mental gymnastics could lead me to do it, because it's not something I would do.

Ah, but you could. If someone was threatening a loved one if you didn't, I'd bet you would.

My view of human choice, and I see no other alternative, is that we are an iterative system. Each state chooses the next. The choice is real, but all of the inputs and the decision-making systems are part of our current state- and it leads to the next state. From birth to death it's all dominated by causality (perhaps also including a bit of chance, but maybe not). For each given state, the next state is chosen by inputs from the external world, as well as from logical outcomes of what the current state is.

What I mean is, logically speaking (and physically speaking too), there are two identifiable potential causes.

-The first is causality, wherein one thing leads to another (or more realistically, the sum of a whole bunch of things leads to a whole bunch of other things). The common example is that of a pool table, where one strikes a ball and it causes a huge chain reaction towards other balls, and while it may seem random, it's all bound by the laws of physics and causality. If the balls were set up the exact same way again, and a ball hit in the exact same way, the exact same outcome would occur again.

-The second is chance, where things can happen without being caused directly. While it was once thought that the universe is purely deterministic, insights into quantum mechanics has shown that, at least on the small scale, things are determined mainly by probability. But logically speaking, chance is not free. Chance is further from freedom than causality, actually.

I don't perceive any other options for events occurring. Our choices must be based on either one or both of these two things, and neither seems to be what people think of when they think of free will.

OK, thanks.

It should be noted thatI don't believe in absolute free will. We do have a certain amount of involuntary programming, as well as a complete lack of control over our circumstances. However, I believe we ultimately choose what we do with the programming inresponse to the circumstances.

 

[Penumbra]

I'm reading up on the subject. I've read that indeterministic theories fall into three groups: uncaused events, nondeterministically caused events, and agent [or substance] caused events. Which do you suppose what you describe might fall under?

My view is similar to compatibilism in that determinism is largely true, and we still have meaningful choices, but I don't call it free will like they would, and have some differences.

I've read the view that determinism is untrue because free will exists, but I haven't yet got to the compatibilist view that free will is untrue because chance exists. Sounds interesting.

The compatibilist view is more broad than that- it's simply the idea that free will and determinism are compatible. Hard indeterminism is tricky to group in either compatibilist or incompatibilist (I've seen it grouped in both), but mostly I've seen it put in the compatibilist group. Unlike most compatibilists, that would argue that both determinism and free will are true (and that they are compatible), hard indeterminists can argue that both free will and determinism are compatible, but that determinism is not true and that free will is not true (based on the argument that determinism is necessary for free will).

Well, I don't know anything about that.

In reference specifically to the free will debate, I've been reading a bit. The philosophical debate began with two sides: hard determinism, with its implication that the entire universe has a particular destiny or program that it is executing, and that 'free will' is impossible; and libertarians, who asserted versions of 'free will' were possible, and hence the determinism was false. Of the libertarians, there were two camps, one of whom held that our apparent agency was a mystery that stemmed from "god". Later we get compatibilists and incompatibilists, each of who may draw on theories of hard or soft determinism, or indeterminism, to make their arguments. The latter compatibilist types hold that "that free will is possible at worlds where some of our actions have indeterministic event causes (Kane 1996, 1999, Balaguer 2004, 2010) or that free will is possible at worlds where some of our actions are uncaused (Ginet 1990)." (plato.stanford.edu)

I believe hard determinism was more prevalent in the era of Newtonian physics (as well as before his time), considering that many philosophical understandings of the universe looked upon it as being like a mechanism of pure causality.

The concept of free will being a mystery from god is something I view as purely a god of the caps rather than a substantive position. If a person argues it comes from god, I would expect them to back it up with substance.

 

[Storm]

The compatibilist view is more broad than that- it's simply the idea that free will and determinism are compatible. Hard indeterminism is tricky to group in either compatibilist or incompatibilist (I've seen it grouped in both), but mostly I've seen it put in the compatibilist group. Unlike most compatibilists, that would argue that both determinism and free will are true (and that they are compatible), hard indeterminists can argue that both free will and determinism are compatible, but that determinism is not true and that free will is not true (based on the argument that determinism is necessary for free will).

Ah. I'm a compatibilist, then!

 

[Sunstone]

Perhaps someone could start by clearly identifying the difference between free will and plain old will.

Free will is promiscuous and morally suspect. Plain old will is boring and usually divorced by middle age.

 

[idav]

Yes, but don't we choose in relation to our instincts? Although it would be physically possible, I don't think I could choose right now to go out into the parking lot and break all the windows in every car. No amount of mental gymnastics could lead me to do it, because it's not something I would do.

My view of human choice, and I see no other alternative, is that we are an iterative system. Each state chooses the next. The choice is real, but all of the inputs and the decision-making systems are part of our current state- and it leads to the next state. From birth to death it's all dominated by causality (perhaps also including a bit of chance, but maybe not). For each given state, the next state is chosen by inputs from the external world, as well as from logical outcomes of what the current state is.

What I mean is, logically speaking (and physically speaking too), there are two identifiable potential causes.

-The first is causality, wherein one thing leads to another (or more realistically, the sum of a whole bunch of things leads to a whole bunch of other things). The common example is that of a pool table, where one strikes a ball and it causes a huge chain reaction towards other balls, and while it may seem random, it's all bound by the laws of physics and causality. If the balls were set up the exact same way again, and a ball hit in the exact same way, the exact same outcome would occur again.

-The second is chance, where things can happen without being caused directly. While it was once thought that the universe is purely deterministic, insights into quantum mechanics has shown that, at least on the small scale, things are determined mainly by probability. But logically speaking, chance is not free. Chance is further from freedom than causality, actually.

I don't perceive any other options for events occurring. Our choices must be based on either one or both of these two things, and neither seems to be what people think of when they think of free will.

Not that you would just choose to go out and smash everyones car windows. You could choose to but your saying you would need cause to. I don't really think people need cause to do anything. People can be destructive with no cause for it and if anything not being destructive is exercisiing our free will. Also when one decides Im going to go mess with everyones car there are several choices like egging, busting lights on the cars, scratching everyones paint, slashing tires or whatever. Several choices can be exercised without there being a specific cause for which one you choose. To me free will seems to be a degree of separation of an event from its initial cause.

I do understand that our choices are limited. If we come to a fork in the road and there were 5 different direction to go through there would be a choice to make. If I made the choice "randomly" I'm saying that would be a greater degree of free will than choosing the road that went west because there is something for you over there. I don't like the word random maybe some hidden mechanism in your subconscious knew which direction you wanted to go but it is still greater free will than the conscious decision.

 

[sandy whitelinger]

What is a choice?

Having more than one option.

 

[sandy whitelinger]

But then my computer has free will.

My computer exercises it's will over mine continuously.

 

[idav]

My computer exercises it's will over mine continuously.

Yup, my computer hates me.