It seems most of the objections people make to Divine Command Theory (DCT) rest completely on its uncomfortable implications. For example, Sam Harris argues that if DCT is true, then if Muslim terrorists have the right god, what they're doing is good, but this is just an appeal to emotion and so obviously doesn't refute what DCT asserts. It doesn't matter how you feel about reality, after all; it's still reality. To actually refute DCT one has to do so on purely logical grounds, and by this, I mean to actually demonstrate logical flaws in the theory itself, not to simply say that it's logical implications are uncomfortable. If you say, "well, if DCT is true, then God's commands are arbitrary," how exactly is that a refutation? Obviously, God is beyond causality and so does not act on reasons or justifications, which would necessitate causality within his essence—that fact is already implied when you're talking about the god of classical theism—but he is obviously not arbitrary in the same way as us. Our being arbitrary is a contrast to our acting upon justification, which we are obliged to do. God, on the other hand, is free from obligation. He does not act arbitrarily in any real sense, that is to say, in the human sense, because if something has no obligation to act upon justifications, or is such that it does not act upon justifications at all, then what does it even mean to be arbitrary? In short, we act arbitrarily out of our human weakness; God acts 'arbitrarily' out of his divine freedom, his divine power, etc. Any objections, I've seen, to DCT end up completely missing the point about what God is. The questions/objections springing from the Euthyphro dilemma work fine, I suppose, when you're talking about the pagan gods of Ancient Greece, but they don't work so well when you're talking about a completely different kind of god.
