Do you have any purely logical objections to Divine Command Theory?

[Anti-Climacus]

It seems most of the objections people make to Divine Command Theory (DCT) rest completely on its uncomfortable implications. For example, Sam Harris argues that if DCT is true, then if Muslim terrorists have the right god, what they're doing is good, but this is just an appeal to emotion and so obviously doesn't refute what DCT asserts. It doesn't matter how you feel about reality, after all; it's still reality. To actually refute DCT one has to do so on purely logical grounds, and by this, I mean to actually demonstrate logical flaws in the theory itself, not to simply say that it's logical implications are uncomfortable. If you say, "well, if DCT is true, then God's commands are arbitrary," how exactly is that a refutation? Obviously, God is beyond causality and so does not act on reasons or justifications, which would necessitate causality within his essence—that fact is already implied when you're talking about the god of classical theism—but he is obviously not arbitrary in the same way as us. Our being arbitrary is a contrast to our acting upon justification, which we are obliged to do. God, on the other hand, is free from obligation. He does not act arbitrarily in any real sense, that is to say, in the human sense, because if something has no obligation to act upon justifications, or is such that it does not act upon justifications at all, then what does it even mean to be arbitrary? In short, we act arbitrarily out of our human weakness; God acts 'arbitrarily' out of his divine freedom, his divine power, etc. Any objections, I've seen, to DCT end up completely missing the point about what God is. The questions/objections springing from the Euthyphro dilemma work fine, I suppose, when you're talking about the pagan gods of Ancient Greece, but they don't work so well when you're talking about a completely different kind of god.

 

[Phaedrus]

It is easy enough for theists to talk about something without first providing evidence of its existence. The approach makes no sense, but there it is, and I would personally first need evidence of god's existence before I could even discuss the assumptive philosophical characteristics of stated being. That's just me, though.

 

[Sunstone]

Welcome to the Forum, Anti-Climacus!

Quite a thrilling first post. Thank you for it.

 

[Sunstone]

One my concerns with Divine Command Theory would be of an epistemic nature. How would you know that a "divine command" were from god?

 

[danieldemol]

It seems most of the objections people make to Divine Command Theory (DCT) rest completely on its uncomfortable implications. For example, Sam Harris argues that if DCT is true, then if Muslim terrorists have the right god, what they're doing is good, but this is just an appeal to emotion and so obviously doesn't refute what DCT asserts. It doesn't matter how you feel about reality, after all; it's still reality. To actually refute DCT one has to do so on purely logical grounds, and by this, I mean to actually demonstrate logical flaws in the theory itself, not to simply say that it's logical implications are uncomfortable. If you say, "well, if DCT is true, then God's commands are arbitrary," how exactly is that a refutation? Obviously, God is beyond causality and so does not act on reasons or justifications, which would necessitate causality within his essence—that fact is already implied when you're talking about the god of classical theism—but he is obviously not arbitrary in the same way as us. Our being arbitrary is a contrast to our acting upon justification, which we are obliged to do. God, on the other hand, is free from obligation. He does not act arbitrarily in any real sense, that is to say, in the human sense, because if something has no obligation to act upon justifications, or is such that it does not act upon justifications at all, then what does it even mean to be arbitrary? In short, we act arbitrarily out of our human weakness; God acts 'arbitrarily' out of his divine freedom, his divine power, etc. Any objections, I've seen, to DCT end up completely missing the point about what God is. The questions/objections springing from the Euthyphro dilemma work fine, I suppose, when you're talking about the pagan gods of Ancient Greece, but they don't work so well when you're talking about a completely different kind of god.

Possibly not what you’re asking but suppose DCT is true, we would still have the responsibility of determining what God commanded, and if God’s commandments aren’t aligned to what is independently good, we would have no means of discerning what God commanded from what ancient men imagined God to command, thus all would be lost unless God were to personally reveal God’s will to all of us, which God apparently does not do.

 

[Sunstone]

Possibly not what you’re asking but suppose DCT is true, we would still have the responsibility of determining what God commanded, and if God’s commandments aren’t aligned to what is independently good, we would have no means of discerning what God commanded from what ancient men imagined God to command, thus all would be lost unless God were to personally reveal God’s will to all of us, which God apparently does not do.

Outstanding point! Thank you so much for making that.

Daniel, the OP fascinates me, but I have yet to take a position for or against it. Consequently, I am currently much more interested in simply exploring it than I am in arguing a position relative to it. With that in mind, I would ask you to clarify something. You speak of assessing allegedly divine commands against what we humans know to be "independently good". Correct me if I'm missing something, but to my mind that raises the question of whether we humans are in a position to know what is independently good compared to a god's position to know what is good.

For instance, suppose notable theologian, respected biblical scholar, brilliant prophet, and admirable genius Pat Robertson reports to us that god came to him in a dream and wants everyone to henceforth and forevermore hop on one leg for an hour each noon (local time). How would we humans know that hoping around on one leg was not ultimately good for us? The command might appear to us silly, but assuming this god can foresee consequences of our actions that we ourselves cannot foresee, how could we be certain that our assessment of the command was silly overrule the god's assessment that it was good?

 

[danieldemol]

Outstanding point! Thank you so much for making that.

Daniel, the OP fascinates me, but I have yet to take a position for or against it. Consequently, I am currently much more interested in simply exploring it than I am in arguing a position relative to it. With that in mind, I would ask you to clarify something. You speak of assessing allegedly divine commands against what we humans know to be "independently good". Correct me if I'm missing something, but to my mind that raises the question of whether we humans are in a position to know what is independently good compared to a god's position to know what is good.

For instance, suppose notable theologian, respected biblical scholar, brilliant prophet, and admirable genius Pat Robertson reports to us that god came to him in a dream and wants everyone to henceforth and forevermore hop on one leg for an hour each noon (local time). How would we humans know that hoping around on one leg was not ultimately good for us? The command might appear to us silly, but assuming this god can foresee consequences of our actions that we ourselves cannot foresee, how could we be certain that our assessment of the command was silly overrule the god's assessment that it was good?

There could be no certainty even of Pat Robertson’s dream to us, nor could there be certainty that our assessment of Pat Robertson’s dream as silly is objectively correct. It is a no-win situation in which we could only hope that a God would be just enough not to judge us on that which we could not possibly know. Especially if it is a merciful God

 

[Heyo]

Any objections, I've seen, to DCT end up completely missing the point about what God is.

You just answered your question.
The proponents of DCT have failed to give a comprehensible definition of what god is and left it open to interpretation. That omission is by design because no two DCT proponents would have the same definition. Iow, it's not only the opponents of DCT who don't know what god is, the proponent don't either.

 

[tas8831]

It seems most of the objections people make to Divine Command Theory (DCT) rest completely on its uncomfortable implications. For example, Sam Harris argues that if DCT is true, then if Muslim terrorists have the right god, what they're doing is good, but this is just an appeal to emotion and so obviously doesn't refute what DCT asserts. It doesn't matter how you feel about reality, after all; it's still reality. To actually refute DCT one has to do so on purely logical grounds, and by this, I mean to actually demonstrate logical flaws in the theory itself, not to simply say that it's logical implications are uncomfortable.

I've not seen the logic of DCT. Seems like a shifting of burden.

Obviously, God is beyond causality and so does not act on reasons or justifications, which would necessitate causality within his essence

Sounds like special pleading.
So, I guess DCT is just a justification for special pleading, which means that it is a fallacy. Logical refutation of DCT.

 

[Thief]

He does not act arbitrarily in any real sense,

Let there be light...…

is an aberration

God was God...….in the darkness
God was god of the Darkness
before creating light

and the darkness was perfect
no heat
no cold
no movement
no ripple
nothing
perfect...….nothing

the void

and why then create?

kinda hard to say …..I AM!
without something to show for it

but why?
why?......say anything at all

 

[HonestJoe]

It seems most of the objections people make to Divine Command Theory (DCT) rest completely on its uncomfortable implications.

I’d never seen the idea given such a formal name and had to look it up. It feels like a stretch to call it a “theory”, even in common terms.

Regardless, I’d suggest that the core objection would be that is presumes the existence of a god to make the commands in the first place and typically leads to circular reasoning. All the other objections really stem from that core problem.

Also, don’t the main reasons for arguing in favour of this idea rest on the uncomfortable implications of the alternative relative morality?

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

To actually refute DCT one has to do so on purely logical grounds, and by this, I mean to actually demonstrate logical flaws in the theory itself

There is nothing to refute. You have presented no argument, just an unevidenced claim that you're calling a theory.

• "What can be asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence." - Christopher Hitchens

I'm also not interested in what other people tell me that a god told them to command me do. I just watched several crime shows that demonstrate quite nicely how that can turn out, including ones on David Koresh, Jim Jones, and Warren Jeffs, all of which simply made claims to gullible people that they believed and obeyed to their detriment. It's pretty much the worse way to accumulate moral values. I prefer 'conscience command theory'. I'll let my conscience be my guide. It's done a good job directing my values and choices to date.

Why would anyone trade in a moral system that works for another one that doesn't seem to be doing much good in the lives living by it? How did divine command theory work out in the Catholic Church? About as well as prayer. When Christians show me that they can perform more morally that the rest of us, I might take another look at their moral theory.

 

[Anti-Climacus]

I’d never seen the idea given such a formal name and had to look it up. It feels like a stretch to call it a “theory”, even in common terms.

There is nothing to refute. You have presented no argument, just an unevidenced claim that you're calling a theory.

It's a philosophical theory, not a scientific theory—that's what it's known as in the literature—and this is not a discussion about the existence of God; it's about the philosophical implications of the concept of the god of classical theism.

I'm also not interested in what other people tell me that a god told them to command me do. I just watched several crime shows that demonstrate quite nicely how that can turn out, including ones on David Koresh, Jim Jones, and Warren Jeffs, all of which simply made claims to gullible people that they believed and obeyed to their detriment.

Well, the People's Temple mass suicide has nothing to do with DCT. Jim Jones framed it as an act of protest. But assume, for example, that David Koresh or Warren Jeffs were right. Then what they did, which they claimed to be commanded by God to do, was right accorded to DCT. The implications are uncomfortable, yes, but that doesn't refute the argument. Appealing to such an case doesn't work. I've already addressed the same kind of argument made by Sam Harris.

When Christians show me that they can perform more morally that the rest of us, I might take another look at their moral theory.

It makes little sense to talk about being "more moral" when you're speaking from the standpoint of subjective morality. Even if Christianity is untrue, its morals have just as much basis as any other man-made morals.

 

[j1i]

It seems most of the objections people make to Divine Command Theory (DCT) rest completely on its uncomfortable implications. For example, Sam Harris argues that if DCT is true, then if Muslim terrorists have the right god, what they're doing is good, but this is just an appeal to emotion and so obviously doesn't refute what DCT asserts. It doesn't matter how you feel about reality, after all; it's still reality. To actually refute DCT one has to do so on purely logical grounds, and by this, I mean to actually demonstrate logical flaws in the theory itself, not to simply say that it's logical implications are uncomfortable. If you say, "well, if DCT is true, then God's commands are arbitrary," how exactly is that a refutation? Obviously, God is beyond causality and so does not act on reasons or justifications, which would necessitate causality within his essence—that fact is already implied when you're talking about the god of classical theism—but he is obviously not arbitrary in the same way as us. Our being arbitrary is a contrast to our acting upon justification, which we are obliged to do. God, on the other hand, is free from obligation. He does not act arbitrarily in any real sense, that is to say, in the human sense, because if something has no obligation to act upon justifications, or is such that it does not act upon justifications at all, then what does it even mean to be arbitrary? In short, we act arbitrarily out of our human weakness; God acts 'arbitrarily' out of his divine freedom, his divine power, etc. Any objections, I've seen, to DCT end up completely missing the point about what God is. The questions/objections springing from the Euthyphro dilemma work fine, I suppose, when you're talking about the pagan gods of Ancient Greece, but they don't work so well when you're talking about a completely different kind of god.

Do not forget that human behavior towards himself is also uncomfortable
We find lies, charlatans and fallacies between emphasizing the importance of things and exceeding them during desire as a kind of contradiction
Clerics are stealing
Writers steal the work of others
Ethical education at school and then corrupting moral outside the school

And now
What others are doing in the claim that it is God's wish, though orders
There are factors that cause others to look negatively on the activity of hardliners
Lack of knowledge and weakness in understanding and the absence of the element of wisdom
Many lack professionalism in participation or cultural exchange
We must understand each other

Regarding terrorism, I think it is a phenomenon that exists everywhere, like a silent, deadly disease
Political terrorism (colonialism) in unconventional ways and blackmail

I would like to discuss in an integrated manner from all sides and know why the Buddhists in Burma, have pushed for purges against the Rohingya minority.

 

[Subduction Zone]

My objection? That it does not appear to be a theory at all. Instead it is merely an ad hoc explanation. What reasonable test could possibly refute this "theory"?

 

[Anti-Climacus]

My objection? That it does not appear to be a theory at all. Instead it is merely an ad hoc explanation. What reasonable test could possibly refute this "theory"?

As I said, we are talking here about a philosophical theory, not a scientific one.

 

[LuisDantas]

Interesting idea.

Unless I am missing something, this DCT idea amounts to third-partying any and all moral responsibility to this presumed God.

Excellent grounds to question the moral validity of God-ideas. Not very useful for anything else.

To think that one could reasonably renounce one's own moral responsibility on behalf of a supposed divine command... really, I find the very idea insulting to theism, to religion, and to humanity.

 

[Anti-Climacus]

Excellent grounds to question the moral validity of God-ideas. Not very useful for anything else.

And a proponent of DCT would reply that it's meaningless to talk about 'moral validity' unless you presuppose the existence of a God who issues moral injunctions.

 

[LuisDantas]

And a proponent of DCT would reply that it's meaningless to talk about 'moral validity' unless you presuppose the existence of a God who issues moral injunctions.

I suppose they would. That is just nuts, but they just might.

I wonder how many people actually swallow such a pill.

Sad as it is, I have to consider such a stance as a perhaps decisive factor for denying people such things as the right to vote and custodianship of children.

People who do not feel responsible for their own actions should probably be treated accordingly.

 

[Anti-Climacus]

I suppose they would. That is just nuts, but they just might.

That's just an argumentum ad lapidem. How is it nuts?