That's more or less the conclusion of 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, who "found that there seems to be a significant difference between
positive statements (about what is) and prescriptive or
normative statements (about what ought to be), and that it is not obvious how one can coherently move from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones." Philosophers call this the is-ought problem. One cannot get from an knowledge of what is to what ought to be.
Sam Harris disagrees, and makes his case in this TED talk:
https://www.ted.com/talks/sam_harris_science_can_answer_moral_questions?language=en#t-90307 If you prefer reading a transcript, it can be found here:
https://www.ted.com/talks/sam_harris_science_can_answer_moral_questions/transcript?language=en
Here's a teaser from the transcript to give you a sense of whether this would be of interest to you, since I might not be addressing the matter of interest to you here. You'll see that Harris doesn't frame the matter as you do - a contest between feeling and reason: "instead of increasing the likelihood of making correct choices, we rely on our feelings to make value judgements. Those values are generally not the best choices for us but the choices that will provide the desired feeling."
I'm going to speak today about the relationship between science and human values. Now, it's generally understood that questions of morality -- questions of good and evil and right and wrong -- are questions about which science officially has no opinion. It's thought that science can help us get what we value, but it can never tell us what we ought to value. And, consequently, most people -- I think most people probably here -- think that science will never answer the most important questions in human life: questions like, "What is worth living for?" "What is worth dying for?" "What constitutes a good life?"
So, I'm going to argue that this is an illusion -- that the separation between science and human values is an illusion -- and actually quite a dangerous one at this point in human history. Now, it's often said that science cannot give us a foundation for morality and human values, because science deals with facts, and facts and values seem to belong to different spheres. It's often thought that there's no description of the way the world is that can tell us how the world ought to be. But I think this is quite clearly untrue. Values are a certain kind of fact. They are facts about the well-being of conscious creatures.
I don't know that I agree with Harris that we can determine
ought any way other than intuitively - what feels right and wrong - and then apply reason in order to devise a set of norms to facilitate that goal. He refers to morality being centered around the fact that certain living things can suffer, and that this is undesirable. I agree, but I can't give you a reason for feeling that way. It's an intuition. It's simply what I want. I could give reasons for not wanting to suffer myself that are purely based in reason and the understanding that I don't want to suffer, but in order to want to apply that attitude to others, I need empathy, not reason.
Still, one can decide what kind of a person one wants to be based on the expected life it produces, and this could be pure reason applied to experience. For example, I could decide that the best life is the one where I have maximum wealth or power, and choose a life intended to realize those goals based in reason without any moral intuition. A wiser person might decide that if he can do it, he ought to embody the classic virtues such as integrity, loyalty, kindness, etc.. to maximize life's experience. If that ever happens, then we can say his kindness is not borne of any moral intuition, but reason. Don't con men try to imitate this for advantage, until they reveal their actual intentions. Imagine having no other intentions apart from enjoying the benefit that a life well lived offers.
But it also occurs to me that you may be discussing the battle between man's higher self and his animal self when you talk about feelings versus science. Freud's language is adequate for this purpose, where Freud sees the superego attempting to restrain the id, the superego being the higher self that reasons using symbols and has moral inclinations, the id being the base urges, which you alluded to with the words "Fear, anger, love, lust etc... are triggered by a subconscious process, which is not a rational process." And of course, Freud's ego, which is the observer, and receives instructions from both the id and superego, often depicted like this:
View attachment 57046
Or the man can be seen as reason mediating between the moral faculty and the baser desires. That's what Plato does with his metaphor of a chariot rider with reins: "The Charioteer represents intellect, reason, or the part of the soul that must guide the soul to truth; one horse represents rational or moral impulse or the positive part of passionate nature (e.g., righteous indignation); while the other represents the soul's irrational passions, appetites, or concupiscent nature."
You might have been referring to this struggle. If this is what you mean by the problem of morals - how to keep the higher self in charge, yes, that's the human condition, and we must all mediate between these conflicting desires. We have two wills, the one from reason or reason plus conscience, and one inherited from our pre-human ancestors. To a neuroscientist, these are the cortex and the limbic system.
This is also a good formulation for discussing free will, which becomes more interesting when we consider that we have two wills that can be in conflict. For example, a smoker wants to quit, and repeatedly experiences a will to smoke and a will not to do so at the same time. Think of it as a tug-of-war. For many, the urge to smoke prevails some of the time. Maybe after three days of successfully reining in that urge, one backslides and has a cigarette. This isn't a moral issue at all unless one wants to call smoking immoral.
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