Should we believe in Free Will?

[Nous]

Regardless of whether one should “believe in free will,” a person can only logically and soundly conclude that s/he has the ability to choose between available options. In the first place, there is an undeniable stark difference between our voluntary acts and involuntary bodily movements: in the case of the former, we can foretell far in advance what we voluntarily will do, a fact that is accounted for only because one wills those acts.

But other than that, the conclusion that one can choose between available options is the only logical and sound conclusion because denial of such ability is self-stultifying, for similar reasons that the assertion of epiphenomenalism is self-stultifying. See the OP here: Like Epiphenomenalism, Denial of Free Will is Self-Stultifying Any such thoughts or assertions that an object that lacks the ability to choose between available options may think or assert are simply thoughts or assertions that the volitionless object cannot avoid thinking or asserting, and therefore have no truth value. An object that cannot choose between available options cannot choose to think or assert what is true in answer to the question of whether or not it has free will.

 

[Nous]

It's so interesting that the issue of free will is certainly one of the, if not the, most discussed issues on RF. Objects that lack the ability to choose between available options don't seem to ever have a question about the ability to choose between available options.

 

[Willamena]

The problem is the outcome of the chain of cause and effect events and decisions limits our freedom (?) of our future choices.

I believe the claim of any significant 'freedom' is an illusion. How you use 'freedom' is not easily compared to the nature of human will or free will.

Why is that a problem?

The 'freedom' referred to in the term is the ability of a mind to make choices. Regardless that events have limited the options that one has to choose from, one is still free to make choices.

 

[Willamena]

I object the ideas that tend to come along with "free will," such as the idea that we are always free to make our own choices and decisions in life. I think we can and do make some decisions and choices, but there is so much that affects us that what room we have left for our own decisions and choices that are actually of our own volition and not primed by external factors that the idea of a "free will" is rendered inaccurate and we need a term to reflect things such as how we might choose to have coffee or juice for breakfast, but we didn't choose to have an urge to belong somewhere socially because that is a genetic/evolutionary feature that we come equipped with.

That we have an ability to choose doesn't preclude urges. Mental faculties, in these arguments, traditionally stand in contrast to nature. Terms like "volition," "external," and even "own" arise from such a metaphysics: nature is mindless, the continuous roll of cause and effect events, and man is mindful and effects his own events.

 

[shunyadragon]

Why is that a problem?

The 'freedom' referred to in the term is the ability of a mind to make choices. Regardless that events have limited the options that one has to choose from, one is still free to make choices.

Here is where we disagree. Your view approaches Libertarian Free Will, which I find untenable. I believe we are NOT free to make choices as you describe. The chain of outcomes cause and effect events and choices we make greatly limit our will to make any other than a very narrow framework of choices.

I have read Dennett and others who advocate compatibilism, only acknowledge a highly limited expression of will that may be called free.

I describe what I call 'potential ability of free will,' in that we have a will but it is not necessarily free.

 

[Shadow Link]

It makes more sense for me to use the terms "free agency" where I see some trying to define "free will"

 

[Buddha Dharma]

It makes more sense for me to use the terms "free agency" where I see some trying to define "free will"

Precisely

 

[Skwim]

It makes more sense for me to use the terms "free agency" where I see some trying to define "free will"

What do you see as the crucial difference, and why it makes more sense to use "free agency"?

.

 

[Willamena]

Here is where we disagree. Your view approaches Libertarian Free Will, which I find untenable. I believe we are NOT free to make choices as you describe. The chain of outcomes cause and effect events and choices we make greatly limit our will to make any other than a very narrow framework of choices.

I have read Dennett and others who advocate compatibilism, only acknowledge a highly limited expression of will that may be called free.

I describe what I call 'potential ability of free will,' in that we have a will but it is not necessarily free.

"...a very narrow framework of choices" sounds awfully like you're talking about options, rather than the ability to choose.

 

[shunyadragon]

"...a very narrow framework of choices" sounds awfully like you're talking about options, rather than the ability to choose.

Well, ah . . . both. When I talk about the 'potential of free will,' yes there is the 'possible ability to choose,' but most do not understand the influence of the outcomes of cause and effect events and choices of not only you, but all those people, things and events you relate to, and come in contact with that limit the ability of one to chose alternatives in any given situation.

 

[Willamena]

Well, ah . . . both. When I talk about the 'potential of free will,' yes there is the 'possible ability to choose,' but most do not understand the influence of the outcomes of cause and effect events and choices of not only you, but all those people, things and events you relate to, and come in contact with that limit the ability of one to chose alternatives in any given situation.

How so? If the outcome of events has led me here to answer your question, how has it limited my decision to reply to this post? Here I am, having successfully replied.


Note, when I speak of choosing, ability to choose, decision, etc. I am referring to the faculty of mind--that folk depiction of a mental event that, in its exercise, advances the individual's personal narrative. I don't see it being limited by the outcomes of exterior events.

 

[Skwim]

How so? If the outcome of events has led me here to answer your question, how has it limited my decision to reply to this post? Here I am, having successfully replied.

Note, when I speak of choosing, ability to choose, decision, etc. I am referring to the faculty of mind--that folk depiction of a mental event that, in its exercise, advances the individual's personal narrative. I don't see it being limited by the outcomes of exterior events.

In as much as shunyadragon is no longer on line I'll attempt an answer. It's not necessarily limited only by the outcomes of exterior events, but inevitably directed to be the only thing it can be by all the causal events---including mental events---that determined your action. You had no true ability to chose or make a decision that had any possibility of being different than what you did. Choosing and decision making imply an ability to do differently, but no such ability actually exists. To do B instead of A some different causal determinant would have to have been operating, and if that were the case then there was no possibility for A to occur. One would have to do B.

It comes down the fact that one could never have done differently than what they did. A common description of determinism.


.

 

[`mud]

hey Skwim,
Maybe she did C instead, with a little help from her `gods` ?
Or an angel on her shoulder, maybe...who really knows ?
But....she had the ability to chose didn't she ?

 

[Buddha Dharma]

@'mud speaking from the Buddhist perspective of deities still being within Samsara here- I think the god element wouldn't necessarily refute determinism. It would be a matter of yet more factors in the equation.

One we wouldn't be able to observe at a certain cutoff point to be sure. Guess it depends on the nature of deities.

 

[Willamena]

In as much as shunyadragon is no longer on line I'll attempt an answer. It's not necessarily limited only by the outcomes of exterior events, but inevitably directed to be the only thing it can be by all the causal events---including mental events---that determined your action. You had no true ability to chose or make a decision that had any possibility of being different than what you did. Choosing and decision making imply an ability to do differently, but no such ability actually exists. To do B instead of A some different causal determinant would have to have been operating, and if that were the case then there was no possibility for A to occur. One would have to do B.

It comes down the fact that one could never have done differently than what they did. A common description of determinism.


.

Mental phenomena don't exist actually, so cause and effect applies to them symbolically. They are part of the personal narrative, the story of "me." Mental events, like choice, decision, belief, knowing, are symbolic: their nature is meaningful, rather than physical.

If they are limited, it is only by what we tell ourselves.

 

[Mock Turtle]

Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Coincidentally, I have just been reading, The Art of Failure, by Dr Neel Burton, which has a short chapter dealing with this issue (not that it makes it any clearer. Just checking that I have ticked all the boxes for failures.

The two points - It is impossible for the past or future history of the universe to be other than it is, and that it is theoretically possible to map out every single past and future event in the universe - I have to question. Firstly, because our knowledge is not sufficient to say the first is necessarily correct, and similarly for the second. Our knowledge of physics (mine particularly) is not, if I understand it correctly, at all complete, so I think theory is just that.

For myself, I believe that one must believe in free will for oneself, and to take full responsibility for all actions, but I would not deem the same for others necessarily although I would hope they would do the same. We are however, individuals with all sorts of differences and experiences to affect us, such that understanding should usually come before (if any) condemnation.

 

[Skwim]

Mental phenomena don't exist actually, so cause and effect applies to them symbolically. They are part of the personal narrative, the story of "me." Mental events, like choice, decision, belief, knowing, are symbolic: their nature is meaningful, rather than physical.

If they are limited, it is only by what we tell ourselves.

I'm curious. What is it to "exist actually"?

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[Shadow Link]

What do you see as the crucial difference, and why it makes more sense to use "free agency"?

.

I see desire vs. nonsense.


Because the will is directed by understanding, it is not free.

 

[shunyadragon]

In as much as shunyadragon is no longer on line I'll attempt an answer. It's not necessarily limited only by the outcomes of exterior events, but inevitably directed to be the only thing it can be by all the causal events---including mental events---that determined your action. You had no true ability to chose or make a decision that had any possibility of being different than what you did. Choosing and decision making imply an ability to do differently, but no such ability actually exists. To do B instead of A some different causal determinant would have to have been operating, and if that were the case then there was no possibility for A to occur. One would have to do B.

It comes down the fact that one could never have done differently than what they did. A common description of determinism.


.

I disagree in that the options may be extremely limited, and at times only one choice is possible, there may be times for a limited range of possible choices in some of our decisions.

 

[Willamena]

I'm curious. What is it to "exist actually"?

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The adjective "actual" refers to fact, which refers to the narrative of truth.