Question for Moral Realists

[Meow Mix]

If there are moral truths, what does it mean for them to be true? What does it mean for a moral statement to be truth-apt?

For instance, consider a type of statement that's generally not controversial to deny is truth apt: a preference statement, such as "cheese is the best food."

Usually when something is said to be "true" we mean that it corresponds in some way to reality mind-externally: if it's true that "my phone is sitting on the desk," the reason it's true is because in reality my phone is on the desk regardless of whether I'm even aware of that or not. But what would it mean for "cheese is the best" to be true -- what would correspond to reality about the statement? Most people just agree that the statement isn't truth-apt at all: it doesn't make statements about reality, but rather it's understood to be a statement about how someone feels.

Well, likewise, what corresponds to reality about ought statements such as, "you ought not to punch babies?" If, as a moral realist, you believe it's truth-apt -- from whence does its truth-aptness come, what about it corresponds?

For instance, consider the following four statements:

1) Cheese is the best food.
2) Erin believes cheese is the best food.
3) One ought not to punch babies.
4) Erin believes one ought not to punch babies.

It appears to me that only (2) and (4) are truth-apt: the correspondence to reality is that there is something in reality (Erin) that has a certain property (holds a belief about something).

(1) and (3) appear to behave similarly in that neither is very obviously truth-apt: (1) we call a preference. Why do many of us insist (3) is different from a preference qualitatively? If (3) is truth-apt, where do we "look" in reality for its truth; how do we justify it?

 

[icehorse]

To me it depends on how far down the rabbit hole you want to go. It sounds to me as though you're hinting at the stance of the moral relativist, is that correct?

If so, I don't think anyone can give you a justification defending that #3 is "true". In other words, in my experience, when you take the position of a moral relativist, you really can't lose if you say there is no "true" ought.

As for why most of us share the intuition that #3 is "true", I personally think it gets down to evolution at work. We've evolved to favor those things that will tend to promote the survival of the species.

 

[Sunstone]

We've evolved to favor those things that will tend to promote the survival of the species.

Are you sure our behaviors have evolved to further the "survival of the species"? What, then, would be the case when a behavior wasn't all that good for the species in the long term but furthered an individual's survival in the short-term -- say long enough for that individual to reproduce?

 

[Meow Mix]

To me it depends on how far down the rabbit hole you want to go. It sounds to me as though you're hinting at the stance of the moral relativist, is that correct?

I'm more of a non-cognitivist. If I were to get nitpicky on what moral relativism is, relativists may find it difficult to self-consistently believe some oughts are better than others; whereas a noncognitivist can self-consistently believe that.

If so, I don't think anyone can give you a justification defending that #3 is "true". In other words, in my experience, when you take the position of a moral relativist, you really can't lose if you say there is no "true" ought.

As for why most of us share the intuition that #3 is "true", I personally think it gets down to evolution at work. We've evolved to favor those things that will tend to promote the survival of the species.

I agree there are probably evolutionary reasons for our intuitions; but that doesn't speak towards justifying them as true or even truth-apt. I understand however that you've already said you weren't sure whether that can be done towards a skeptic, which is interesting: like some form of moral fideism?

 

[Meow Mix]

Also, I should add that there are ought statements with truth-aptness: but as far as I know they're all hypothetical imperatives.

IF I want to survive, THEN I ought to eat.

 

[Sunstone]

I think one of the challenges for moral realism is that, even if you assume an external reality that would make certain moral or prescriptive claims truth-apt -- such as "stealing is bad" -- you still have not demonstrated you have any way of knowing that reality. (And by "knowledge", I mean -- at the very the least -- a "justified true belief"). Hypothetical imperatives perhaps being an exception.

For instance, "Lying is bad" -- by what means of inquiry would you establish that to be a justified true belief, even if you assumed that there exists an external reality in which "lying is bad"?

 

[Tumah]

I don't understand what you mean by "truth-apt" but I would guess that "you out not to punch babies" is true because the law states that battery is prohibited.

 

[Sunstone]

I don't understand what you mean by "truth-apt"....

In philosophy, a "truth-apt" statement is one that could be true or false -- as contrasted with a statement (such as "Do this!" or "What is the price of potatoes?") that it makes no sense to ask whether it's true or false.

Moral realists believe that prescriptive or moral statements are truth-apt. e.g. "Fornication is bad" might be to them a statement that is either true or false.

 

[HonestJoe]

(1) and (3) appear to behave similarly in that neither is very obviously truth-apt: (1) we call a preference. Why do many of us insist (3) is different from a preference qualitatively? If (3) is truth-apt, where do we "look" in reality for its truth; how do we justify it?

Isn’t it as simple as the significance of the consequences? It doesn’t really matter if I don’t agree cheese is the best food but it does matter if I think it’s OK to punch babies.

Also, opinions don’t exist in vacuums. They’re based on facts and logic (even if it’s flawed). There will be very few definitive facts and lots of opinion and personal preference regarding the question of the "best" food. There will be more definitive facts and commonly shared opinion regarding punching babies; the physical harm it could cause and that causing such harm to people, especially vulnerable people like babies, is wrong.

Basically, though the underlying grammatical logic of two statements might be the same, the semantic realities of them can still be vastly different.

 

[Tumah]

In philosophy, a "truth-apt" statement is one that could be true or false -- as contrasted with a statement (such as "Do this!" or "What is the price of potatoes?") that it makes no sense to ask whether it's true or false.

Moral realists believe that prescriptive or moral statements are truth-apt. e.g. "Fornication is bad" might be to them a statement that is either true or false.

So it's just a fancy way of saying "true"?

Using the example of the OP, is the reason "the cup is on the table" true because when you stand with your feet on the ground, the cup appears to be on top of the table or is it true because the cup is objectively on the table?

Edit: I'm saying, does a truth statement have to be objectively true from every angle in order to be true, or is it enough that it's true only from one angle.

 

[Sunstone]

So it's just a fancy way of saying "true"?

Not really. It's a short-hand way of saying "The statement can be potentially found to be true or false." Not the same thing as saying "The statement is true".

Using the example of the OP, is the reason "the cup is on the table" true because when you stand with your feet on the ground, the cup appears to be on top of the table or is it true because the cup is objectively on the table?

You'll have to ask Meow Mix that. I can't speak for her metaphysics, except to say that, from what she's said, I think she could believe in a mind-independent reality -- which would mean "the cup is objectively on the table".

 

[Sunstone]

Isn’t it as simple as the significance of the consequences? It doesn’t really matter if I don’t agree cheese is the best food but it does matter if I think it’s OK to punch babies.

The consequences might be vastly different, but the epistemic basis for each could also be logically equivalent. That's what's being explored here, so far as I can see.

Also, opinions don’t exist in vacuums. They’re based on facts and logic (even if it’s flawed).

Just curious here, but what about opinions based on falsehoods, fantasies, delusions, illusions, etc, but few if any facts?

There will be very few definitive facts and lots of opinion and personal preference regarding the question of the "best" food. There will be more definitive facts and commonly shared opinion regarding punching babies; the physical harm it could cause and that causing such harm to people, especially vulnerable people like babies, is wrong.

Basically, though the underlying grammatical logic of two statements might be the same, the semantic realities of them can still be vastly different.

What do you make of people who believe it is justified (at least in some circumstances) to punch or even murder babies? Do you think they are wrong? Do you think you could reason them out of their beliefs using facts and logic alone -- assuming they were reasonable?

 

[HonestJoe]

The consequences might be vastly different, but the epistemic basis for each could also be logically equivalent. That's what's being explored here, so far as I can see.

The question seemed to be why the two opinion-based statements are treated differently despite being semantically and logically equivalent. My point was that the practical meaning and consequences of the statements are what cause them to be treated differently, because people don’t (can't!) view them in some kind of semantic isolation.

Just curious here, but what about opinions based on falsehoods, fantasies, delusions, illusions, etc, but few if any facts?

I don’t think it matters in the context of my answer. It only matters is that there is always something involved beyond the raw semantic logic.

What do you make of people who believe it is justified (at least in some circumstances) to punch or even murder babies? Do you think they are wrong? Do you think you could reason them out of their beliefs using facts and logic alone -- assuming they were reasonable?

”Punching” and “murdering” (and “killing”) are entirely difference questions and adding “in some circumstances” or extending to specific circumstances makes them different again. If semantics was the only relevant factor, none of that would be relevant. I could make reasonable arguments that it is wrong to punch a baby but then I could make reasonable arguments that cheese isn’t the best food too. What is significant to the OP question is that those arguments would be entirely different, even if they took the same semantic forms.

 

[Enoch07]

I love watching intellectuals push and pull to define such a simple word as "truth". It truly is fascinating to see how subjective the word can be.

Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson argued for 1.5 hours just to establish the terms of their 1st debate. What did they argue over? The definition of truth.

 

[sayak83]

If there are moral truths, what does it mean for them to be true? What does it mean for a moral statement to be truth-apt?

For instance, consider a type of statement that's generally not controversial to deny is truth apt: a preference statement, such as "cheese is the best food."

Usually when something is said to be "true" we mean that it corresponds in some way to reality mind-externally: if it's true that "my phone is sitting on the desk," the reason it's true is because in reality my phone is on the desk regardless of whether I'm even aware of that or not. But what would it mean for "cheese is the best" to be true -- what would correspond to reality about the statement? Most people just agree that the statement isn't truth-apt at all: it doesn't make statements about reality, but rather it's understood to be a statement about how someone feels.

Well, likewise, what corresponds to reality about ought statements such as, "you ought not to punch babies?" If, as a moral realist, you believe it's truth-apt -- from whence does its truth-aptness come, what about it corresponds?

For instance, consider the following four statements:

1) Cheese is the best food.
2) Erin believes cheese is the best food.
3) One ought not to punch babies.
4) Erin believes one ought not to punch babies.

It appears to me that only (2) and (4) are truth-apt: the correspondence to reality is that there is something in reality (Erin) that has a certain property (holds a belief about something).

(1) and (3) appear to behave similarly in that neither is very obviously truth-apt: (1) we call a preference. Why do many of us insist (3) is different from a preference qualitatively? If (3) is truth-apt, where do we "look" in reality for its truth; how do we justify it?

Here's a stab at it.

Definition:- Actions that cause intentional avoidable suffering in sentient beings are morally bad.
Definition :- Actions that cause increase in well being of sentient beings are morally good.

Then the statements below are true:-
Punching a baby causes intentional avoidable suffering for the baby.
Thus baby punching is a morally bad action.

Seems straightforward.

 

[Revoltingest]

We moral realists (speaking for all of us) don't believe in "true" (outside of math).
There is only "widely agreed upon".
To say any more about it is unnecessary complication.

 

[Sunstone]

Here's a stab at it.

Definition:- Actions that cause intentional avoidable suffering in sentient beings are morally bad.
Definition :- Actions that cause increase in well being of sentient beings are morally good.

Then the statements below are true:-
Punching a baby causes intentional avoidable suffering for the baby.
Thus baby punching is a morally bad action.

Seems straightforward.

Aren't your "definitions" axioms in the sense of being propositions that are assumed true without proof?

 

[Polymath257]

If there are moral truths, what does it mean for them to be true? What does it mean for a moral statement to be truth-apt?

For instance, consider a type of statement that's generally not controversial to deny is truth apt: a preference statement, such as "cheese is the best food."

Usually when something is said to be "true" we mean that it corresponds in some way to reality mind-externally: if it's true that "my phone is sitting on the desk," the reason it's true is because in reality my phone is on the desk regardless of whether I'm even aware of that or not. But what would it mean for "cheese is the best" to be true -- what would correspond to reality about the statement? Most people just agree that the statement isn't truth-apt at all: it doesn't make statements about reality, but rather it's understood to be a statement about how someone feels.

Well, likewise, what corresponds to reality about ought statements such as, "you ought not to punch babies?" If, as a moral realist, you believe it's truth-apt -- from whence does its truth-aptness come, what about it corresponds?

For instance, consider the following four statements:

1) Cheese is the best food.
2) Erin believes cheese is the best food.
3) One ought not to punch babies.
4) Erin believes one ought not to punch babies.

It appears to me that only (2) and (4) are truth-apt: the correspondence to reality is that there is something in reality (Erin) that has a certain property (holds a belief about something).

(1) and (3) appear to behave similarly in that neither is very obviously truth-apt: (1) we call a preference. Why do many of us insist (3) is different from a preference qualitatively? If (3) is truth-apt, where do we "look" in reality for its truth; how do we justify it?

I'm not completely sure where I stand on moral truths. In some ways, I am not a realist, but I do think that *some* moral statements can have a truth value.

As far as I can see, morality reduces to the question of long-term human well-being. So, for example, punching babies doesn't help human well-being because it damages a human at a critical stage of development when such damage can have long-term negative consequences.

Of course, the problem then reduces to what 'well-being' means. One obvious criterion is survival: so nothing that promotes the extinction of the species will possibly be moral. Unfortunately, it isn't always apparent when that happens. The murkier grounds are when we get into issues of fulfillment and happiness. Humans have a deep desire to explore and to learn. So any system should be able to promote those values. That at least implies a certain level of freedom as a moral value.

Anyway, I am not sure just how far such questions can have answers: I think a great many moral statements *don't* have definite truth values.

 

[icehorse]

I'm more of a non-cognitivist. If I were to get nitpicky on what moral relativism is, relativists may find it difficult to self-consistently believe some oughts are better than others; whereas a noncognitivist can self-consistently believe that.

I agree there are probably evolutionary reasons for our intuitions; but that doesn't speak towards justifying them as true or even truth-apt. I understand however that you've already said you weren't sure whether that can be done towards a skeptic, which is interesting: like some form of moral fideism?

I don't think I hold purely to any given philosophy (or maybe I do and I just don't know its name ), but I think I'm close to utilitarianism. A phrase I first heard from Sam Harris is "the well being of conscious creatures". Which I take to mean "the well being of conscious creatures for as many generations as possible" (WBMG). My claim is that most philosophies need at least one axiom, and WBMG is the one I take. In other words, if you were to argue that I cannot defend WBMG as being truth-apt, I would have to agree. For me WBMG is axiomatic, unprovable.

So I guess it boils down to this: In your OP, can you allow for axiom(s) or not?

 

[sayak83]

Aren't your "definitions" axioms in the sense of being propositions that are assumed true without proof?

Not really. In any situation one has to define what a word is supposed to mean. So, I have defined what the words morally good and morally bad means. The rest follows from there. Now it may be the case, other people wish to define morally good and morally bad differently. But then, we are having an argument about definitions which can apply to anything. Suppose one group says that the word apple is to be used to mean what we say is orange, then also this problem will rise. What I have shown here that if we do reach and agreement on the definitions of moral good and moral bad, then truth statements can be made from there.