Question for Moral Realists

[Polymath257]

Aren't your "definitions" axioms in the sense of being propositions that are assumed true without proof?

Yes, they are axioms. Alternatively, they are a definition of 'morally good' and 'morally bad', although I would consider them partial definitions and not complete ones.

 

[Polymath257]

Not really. In any situation one has to define what a word is supposed to mean. So, I have defined what the words morally good and morally bad means. The rest follows from there. Now it may be the case, other people wish to define morally good and morally bad differently. But then, we are having an argument about definitions which can apply to anything. Suppose one group says that the word apple is to be used to mean what we say is orange, then also this problem will rise. What I have shown here that if we do reach and agreement on the definitions of moral good and moral bad, then truth statements can be made from there.

One aspect of axiomatic systems is that the axioms serve to define the area of study. So it really is ambiguous whether you consider your statements axioms for morality or definitions of the terms 'morally good' and 'morally bad'.

One issue that is NOT addressed in the definitions is that we *ought* to do morally good things and we *ought not* to do morally bad things. And *those* claims are axioms.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Also, I should add that there are ought statements with truth-aptness: but as far as I know they're all hypothetical imperatives.

IF I want to survive, THEN I ought to eat.

One approach I've seen (from Matt Dillahunty, who I think based it on Sam Harris) is to define morality in terms of well-being of sentient creatures... so moral truths end up getting expressed as "if you care about the well-being of sentient creatures, you will do what is moral."

So morality ends up being phrased as a hypothetical imperative and therefore moral statements can be objectively true (since "X is moral" is just a rephrasing of "X is in accordance with well-being").

 

[LuisDantas]

For instance, consider the following four statements:

1) Cheese is the best food.
2) Erin believes cheese is the best food.
3) One ought not to punch babies.
4) Erin believes one ought not to punch babies.

It appears to me that only (2) and (4) are truth-apt: the correspondence to reality is that there is something in reality (Erin) that has a certain property (holds a belief about something).

(1) and (3) appear to behave similarly in that neither is very obviously truth-apt: (1) we call a preference. Why do many of us insist (3) is different from a preference qualitatively? If (3) is truth-apt, where do we "look" in reality for its truth; how do we justify it?

(3) is indeed truth-apt, if we support it with adequate premises, which is both possible and morally imperative.

Those premises involve the acknowledgement of human suffering, of its causes and consequences. Those may not be cosmically significant, but they serve well enough for all practical purposes.

 

[Sunstone]

Not really. In any situation one has to define what a word is supposed to mean. So, I have defined what the words morally good and morally bad means. The rest follows from there. Now it may be the case, other people wish to define morally good and morally bad differently. But then, we are having an argument about definitions which can apply to anything. Suppose one group says that the word apple is to be used to mean what we say is orange, then also this problem will rise. What I have shown here that if we do reach and agreement on the definitions of moral good and moral bad, then truth statements can be made from there.

Interesting! Yet, don't your definitions contain an unproven assumption -- namely that we should do what is morally good, and eschew what is morally bad?

 

[Sunstone]

One approach I've seen (from Matt Dillahunty, who I think based it on Sam Harris) is to define morality in terms of well-being of sentient creatures... so moral truths end up getting expressed as "if you care about the well-being of sentient creatures, you will do what is moral."

So morality ends up being phrased as a hypothetical imperative and therefore moral statements can be objectively true (since "X is moral" is just a rephrasing of "X is in accordance with well-being").

Is saying something is morally good (or bad) the same to you as saying we ought to do what is morally good and eschew what is morally bad? And if so, do you believe you have demonstrated that to be an objective fact, and not actually a mere unproven value judgment? Or am I misunderstanding you?

 

[Sunstone]

Yes, they are axioms. Alternatively, they are a definition of 'morally good' and 'morally bad', although I would consider them partial definitions and not complete ones.

That's a good point. I was taking them as implying "oughts" (ought to do good, ought to eschew doing bad), but of course, you can read them as not implying oughts -- i.e. as mere definitions.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Is saying something is morally good (or bad) the same to you as saying we ought to what is morally good and eschew what is morally bad?

No.

And if so, do you believe you have demonstrated that to be an objective fact, and not actually a mere unproven value judgment?

No. Generally, we reach common ground on morality based on characteristics we happen to share with each other, not based on universal truths.

 

[sayak83]

One aspect of axiomatic systems is that the axioms serve to define the area of study. So it really is ambiguous whether you consider your statements axioms for morality or definitions of the terms 'morally good' and 'morally bad'.

One issue that is NOT addressed in the definitions is that we *ought* to do morally good things and we *ought not* to do morally bad things. And *those* claims are axioms.

Also @Sunstone
I consider them to be definitions of moral good and moral bad.

Regarding the ought issue, I believe that there are no oughts that we need to do at all. However the quality of life of individuals living in a society where most people eschew actions that are morally bad (as I have defined) most of the time tend to be better than the quality of life of individuals who do not live in such a society. That would be the visible motivation for preferring actions that are morally good over ones that are not, and many societies exist where those preferences had been codified into normative laws that are internally enforced, though with imperfections. That is the state of affairs, now one can decide how to act given these facts. One has free will after all.

 

[icehorse]

Are you sure our behaviors have evolved to further the "survival of the species"? What, then, would be the case when a behavior wasn't all that good for the species in the long term but furthered an individual's survival in the short-term -- say long enough for that individual to reproduce?

Well that's a really interesting topic - seems like it needs its own thread?

For example, the individual makes a short term decision, but is later ostracized from the tribe. And a different individual makes a sacrifice, and the tribe later protects his offspring.

 

[Meow Mix]

I don't understand what you mean by "truth-apt" but I would guess that "you out not to punch babies" is true because the law states that battery is prohibited.

A statement which is truth-apt is also called a proposition: it's a statement that has a truth value (which includes "false," false is a truth value). For instance, "Don't do that!" is not truth-apt, it's a command, not something that's true or false. Our preferences are also not truth-apt -- "cheese is the best food" doesn't have an actual truth value, though "Erin thinks cheese is the best food" *does* have a truth value if you note the difference between them (one is universally about cheese, one is about Erin having a particular property).

It is true that battery is prohibited by the law. But the question is whether it's true or just some sort of preference that we ought not to strike babies. (It's a different question to ask "is it legal?")

Note I'm not advocating for hitting babies. I believe wholeheartedly one ought NOT to do that. But it's still a valid philosophical question as to whether my belief one ought not to do that is because it's *true,* or because it's a powerful preference I happen to just have.

 

[Meow Mix]

Isn’t it as simple as the significance of the consequences? It doesn’t really matter if I don’t agree cheese is the best food but it does matter if I think it’s OK to punch babies.

There seems to be an unsubstantiated premise here ("It matters that I think it's OK to punch babies.") Now, I happen to agree that it does matter. But is that becuase it's TRUE, or because we both happen to have a preference that it matters? Remember, it must mean something for it to be "true," there must be some correspondence to reality if it's "true." So far we don't seem to be able to establish that; we can only establish that we FEEL like it matters. Some people may not feel like that matters: do they have a "false" belief? How do we establish that? Truth-aptness depends on being able to justify truth or falsity.

Also, opinions don’t exist in vacuums. They’re based on facts and logic (even if it’s flawed). There will be very few definitive facts and lots of opinion and personal preference regarding the question of the "best" food. There will be more definitive facts and commonly shared opinion regarding punching babies; the physical harm it could cause and that causing such harm to people, especially vulnerable people like babies, is wrong.

Basically, though the underlying grammatical logic of two statements might be the same, the semantic realities of them can still be vastly different.

The objection here isn't against the hypothetical imperative, "If one is altruistic, one ought not to punch babies" (true statement), or "if one values what's best for society, one ought not to punch babies) (true statement).

But they're just microcosms of the original problem: for every one of those "ifs," we eventually get to an "ought" that's just sort of... there. Unjustified. Is it TRUE that we ought to be altruistic, or do we just happen to feel we should be? (Is it false that we should NOT be altruistic?) Etc. There will always be a microcosm that hypothetical imperatives don't save you (general you) from this problem. Eventually truth-aptness has to be established for moral statements at some link in the chain -- but never seems to be established.

 

[Meow Mix]

I love watching intellectuals push and pull to define such a simple word as "truth". It truly is fascinating to see how subjective the word can be.

Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson argued for 1.5 hours just to establish the terms of their 1st debate. What did they argue over? The definition of truth.

You don't think it's a worthwhile endeavor to nail down what we mean when we use words like "knowledge," "truth," "justification?"

 

[Meow Mix]

Here's a stab at it.

Definition:- Actions that cause intentional avoidable suffering in sentient beings are morally bad.
Definition :- Actions that cause increase in well being of sentient beings are morally good.

Then the statements below are true:-
Punching a baby causes intentional avoidable suffering for the baby.
Thus baby punching is a morally bad action.

Seems straightforward.

This works in a tautologous way; but it's trivially defined and isn't really the position of moral *realism* that there are mind-independent moral facts.

 

[Meow Mix]

We moral realists (speaking for all of us) don't believe in "true" (outside of math).
There is only "widely agreed upon".
To say any more about it is unnecessary complication.

This wouldn't be moral realism, though -- as the concept you're talking about is inherently mind-dependent (popularity of view rather than correspondence to external reality).

 

[Meow Mix]

I'm not completely sure where I stand on moral truths. In some ways, I am not a realist, but I do think that *some* moral statements can have a truth value.

As far as I can see, morality reduces to the question of long-term human well-being. So, for example, punching babies doesn't help human well-being because it damages a human at a critical stage of development when such damage can have long-term negative consequences.

Of course, the problem then reduces to what 'well-being' means. One obvious criterion is survival: so nothing that promotes the extinction of the species will possibly be moral. Unfortunately, it isn't always apparent when that happens. The murkier grounds are when we get into issues of fulfillment and happiness. Humans have a deep desire to explore and to learn. So any system should be able to promote those values. That at least implies a certain level of freedom as a moral value.

Anyway, I am not sure just how far such questions can have answers: I think a great many moral statements *don't* have definite truth values.

Hypothetical imperative "oughts" can indeed have a truth value, but you will always encounter a microcosm of the original problem. All hypothetical imperatives rely on if-thens: you're eventually going to have to justify the "if."

If we value long term sapient/sentient well-being, then we ought to do certain things is truth-apt: but why ought we to value long term sapient/sentient well-being? Either we ought to value it because it's true we ought to value it... or perhaps most of us value it because we just happen to. Maybe it's preferential, maybe doxastic voluntarism is false and we can't even help but to value it. Etc. The hypothetical doesn't save moral realism is all I'm saying: it only brings us to a microcosm.

 

[Meow Mix]

I don't think I hold purely to any given philosophy (or maybe I do and I just don't know its name ), but I think I'm close to utilitarianism. A phrase I first heard from Sam Harris is "the well being of conscious creatures". Which I take to mean "the well being of conscious creatures for as many generations as possible" (WBMG). My claim is that most philosophies need at least one axiom, and WBMG is the one I take. In other words, if you were to argue that I cannot defend WBMG as being truth-apt, I would have to agree. For me WBMG is axiomatic, unprovable.

So I guess it boils down to this: In your OP, can you allow for axiom(s) or not?

Axioms are allowable in general but for moral *realist* claims to be true, there's probably gonna need to be some justification. WBMG is a great axiom (one that I share); it may just be something more like a preference than a mind-independent truth is all. Unless there is some justification forthcoming for why we OUGHT to agree with WBMG. (If there isn't, it doesn't mean we OUGHTN'T agree with it; it may just come down to what we happen to value. We may even have no control over what we value in the first place.)

 

[Meow Mix]

One approach I've seen (from Matt Dillahunty, who I think based it on Sam Harris) is to define morality in terms of well-being of sentient creatures... so moral truths end up getting expressed as "if you care about the well-being of sentient creatures, you will do what is moral."

So morality ends up being phrased as a hypothetical imperative and therefore moral statements can be objectively true (since "X is moral" is just a rephrasing of "X is in accordance with well-being").

This is all well and good! However, as I brought up to Polymath, hypothetical imperatives don't help is with moral realism. Every hypothetical imperative rests on an "if," and that "if" is going to have a microcosm of our original problem.

IF we value altruism, then we shouldn't punch babies.

Well, why ought we value altruism? Is it true that we ought to? Or do most of us just happen to, almost like a preference?

 

[Meow Mix]

(3) is indeed truth-apt, if we support it with adequate premises, which is both possible and morally imperative.

Those premises involve the acknowledgement of human suffering, of its causes and consequences. Those may not be cosmically significant, but they serve well enough for all practical purposes.

We can support it with the hypothetical imperative. I don't think this is a bad idea at all!

However, it doesn't help us with moral *realism.* The reason why is because hypothetical imperatives always rely on "ifs." Those ifs are going to have microcosms of the original problem with oughts.

If we value avoiding human suffering, then we ought not to steal and murder.

But is it true we ought to value avoiding human suffering? Is that a truth? Or is that a preference (or something like it) we just happen to hold? If it's a truth, what corresponds to reality about it, and in what way? This is the problem.

 

[sayak83]

This works in a tautologous way; but it's trivially defined and isn't really the position of moral *realism* that there are mind-independent moral facts.

I am not sure how moral principles can be enumerated regarding non-minded beings like rocks. So what do you mean by mind-independent?