If there are moral truths, what does it mean for them to be true? What does it mean for a moral statement to be truth-apt?
For instance, consider a type of statement that's generally not controversial to deny is truth apt: a preference statement, such as "cheese is the best food."
Usually when something is said to be "true" we mean that it corresponds in some way to reality mind-externally: if it's true that "my phone is sitting on the desk," the reason it's true is because in reality my phone is on the desk regardless of whether I'm even aware of that or not. But what would it mean for "cheese is the best" to be true -- what would correspond to reality about the statement? Most people just agree that the statement isn't truth-apt at all: it doesn't make statements about reality, but rather it's understood to be a statement about how someone feels.
Well, likewise, what corresponds to reality about ought statements such as, "you ought not to punch babies?" If, as a moral realist, you believe it's truth-apt -- from whence does its truth-aptness come, what about it corresponds?
For instance, consider the following four statements:
1) Cheese is the best food.
2) Erin believes cheese is the best food.
3) One ought not to punch babies.
4) Erin believes one ought not to punch babies.
It appears to me that only (2) and (4) are truth-apt: the correspondence to reality is that there is something in reality (Erin) that has a certain property (holds a belief about something).
(1) and (3) appear to behave similarly in that neither is very obviously truth-apt: (1) we call a preference. Why do many of us insist (3) is different from a preference qualitatively? If (3) is truth-apt, where do we "look" in reality for its truth; how do we justify it?
For instance, consider a type of statement that's generally not controversial to deny is truth apt: a preference statement, such as "cheese is the best food."
Usually when something is said to be "true" we mean that it corresponds in some way to reality mind-externally: if it's true that "my phone is sitting on the desk," the reason it's true is because in reality my phone is on the desk regardless of whether I'm even aware of that or not. But what would it mean for "cheese is the best" to be true -- what would correspond to reality about the statement? Most people just agree that the statement isn't truth-apt at all: it doesn't make statements about reality, but rather it's understood to be a statement about how someone feels.
Well, likewise, what corresponds to reality about ought statements such as, "you ought not to punch babies?" If, as a moral realist, you believe it's truth-apt -- from whence does its truth-aptness come, what about it corresponds?
For instance, consider the following four statements:
1) Cheese is the best food.
2) Erin believes cheese is the best food.
3) One ought not to punch babies.
4) Erin believes one ought not to punch babies.
It appears to me that only (2) and (4) are truth-apt: the correspondence to reality is that there is something in reality (Erin) that has a certain property (holds a belief about something).
(1) and (3) appear to behave similarly in that neither is very obviously truth-apt: (1) we call a preference. Why do many of us insist (3) is different from a preference qualitatively? If (3) is truth-apt, where do we "look" in reality for its truth; how do we justify it?