To say mind “emerges” from matter explains nothing. Logically, if one believes mind is an emergent property of mechanistic mathematical probabilities and whatnot, consistency demands that he or she also believe that everything that emerges from mind is of like character. Mechanism does afford a universe frame of thought, howbeit one in which, to be consistent, the impossible must be done: the observer must be separated from the observed. Without a concept of preexisting mind, the rationalist must face the insurmountable task of explaining how something that is independent of the mechanism can arise from mechanism: as it were, he must be able to explain the motive-power of electricity in terms of the construction of a motor. Failing in this, the rationalist must admit that he has no more claim to truth than the theist, any more than there can there be a question of the phenomenon of a bird being more true or meaningful than the phenomenon of a rock.