Why not. It has preference for milk and fish.
Okay, so you grant that there are versions of "sensual desire" less sophisticated than human ones. Is the gap you think is too large from inorganic matter to any "sensual desire" of any life form, no matter how rudimentary, or from the sensual desires of other animals to humans?
Consider your current world view.
There are some particles and their arrangements out there. There is also a particular arrangement of neurones in brain. The brain recreates a picture of what is out there.
So, what is realistic about that?
From the perspective of a layperson who knows minimal science, it is as realistic as it gets. I perceive a stove turned on, I place my hand on it. Lo and behold, the stove is hot and I feel pain. In the future when I avoid the hot stove, I do not feel the same heat or pain.
As I learn more, I can discover that I can actually measure how hot the stove is, and that measurement is consistent over time. I can discover that there is a degree of heat at which the stove no longer hurts when I place my hand on it.
As I learn even more, I can discover that the heat of an object is actually caused by how energetically its particles are moving around, and I can change the heat of an object by applying more or less energy to it.
As I learn even more, I can discover my nervous system, connected to my brain, and that it allows me to feel that heat and pain. If my nerves get damaged, I can observe that I can no longer perceive the heat or pain that I did before, until those nerves are healed.
Now again, could all of the above be a dream, a hallucination, a figment of my over-active imagination? Maybe. But again, if the reality I interact with acts exactly like I would expect an external reality to work, then who cares?
It is the most abstract situation.
How? It is literally as pragmatic as one can get. The reason empirical explanations of phenomena stick around is because they are useful. If they weren't, people would abandon them.
How do we ever know that there is something out there? How do we know that the representation manufactured by the particular arrangement of material (brain) is actually what it is? How do we even know that brain itself is not a representation?
By testing it. This is how we help people who suffer from psychotic disorders, who hallucinate things that aren't actually there.
Philosophically, I don't know a way around the problem of hard solipsism, because like all unfalsifiable assertions there's no way to ever completely rule it out.
Furthermore, how these material entities that are characterised by mass, spin, momentum etc. generate phenomenal experiences?
Even if we don't understand every step of the process (scientists who study this surely know more than I do), the fact that they are generated via physical/natural processes is undeniable. Again, we know this because we have tested it. When people have disorders that distort their perceptions, the only testable, verifiable solutions we have ever come up with to help them in the history of our species are physical/natural remedies. I'm near-sighted. How do we fix that? I wear glasses that supplement my eyes' deficient ability to properly refract light. And when I wear them, lo and behold, my vision is corrected. Again, if physical properties of reality don't produce phenomenal experiences, that shouldn't work. And yet it does work.
OTOH, science is not very comfortable with realism that we speak highly about.
An experimental test of non-local realism
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Looks like you have to buy the article to get access beyond the abstract. Sounds interesting, I don't know much about the concept of "locality," so I'll have to read up.