What is the default position in the mind-body problem?

[Nous]

Well, actually, quantum mechanics is a local non-realistic description.

You are contradicted by the scientists in the peer-reviewed literature:

Bell's inequality is established based on local realism. The violation of Bell's inequality by quantum mechanics implies either locality or realism or both are untenable. Leggett's inequality is derived based on nonlocal realism. The violation of Leggett's inequality implies that quantum mechanics is neither local realistic nor nonlocal realistic.​

Testing Leggett's Inequality Using Aharonov-Casher Effect : Scientific Reports

 

[Nous]

We don't usually detect momentum, but we can build devices that measure it and makes those measurements available to our senses.

What device can detect momentum?

 

[Nous]

Particles have been around as long as energy and time.

I'm sticking with my claim that energy is primary to matter.

During the first four seconds of the universe, matter formed by pair production.​

Lecture 44: The First Three Minutes

 

[Nous]

Well, they don't have a name other than 'thoughts', but they tend to happen in the pre-frontal cortex of the brain.

What do intentions look like in the pre-frontal cortex? How can one test a hypothesis by which to determine that something one observes in a pre-frontal cortex is an intention?

 

[Polymath257]

You are contradicted by the scientists in the peer-reviewed literature:

Bell's inequality is established based on local realism. The violation of Bell's inequality by quantum mechanics implies either locality or realism or both are untenable. Leggett's inequality is derived based on nonlocal realism. The violation of Leggett's inequality implies that quantum mechanics is neither local realistic nor nonlocal realistic.​

Testing Leggett's Inequality Using Aharonov-Casher Effect : Scientific Reports

Read closely what is said.
"quantum mechanics is neither local realistic nor nonlocal realistic."

As I said, QM is local and non-realistic.

 

[Nous]

As I said, QM is local

Prove it.

 

[Polymath257]

With what instrument can one observe energy?

Typically, a calorimeter.

By what testable hypothesis about energy can one determine what caused the energy of the closed system of the universe?

I'm not even sure this is a question that makes sense.

Do both rest mass and relativistic mass exist? If so, this sort of physicalism is not monist. If not, which one can one eliminate by an observation?

Well, the fundamental one is the 'rest mass'. In fact, many particle physicists just use the word 'mass' for this. Relativistic mass is a derived concept that isn't used very much any longer.

Does one differentiate objects according to their differing effects?

Um, yes.

Obviously there is no testable hypothesis by which to conclude that any proposition is true about everything (such as the proposition that “everything that exists is physical”). The scientific method cannot be used to eliminate the possible existence of something about which a hypothesis is not being tested.

Yes. But that is why we go for falsifiability. We insist on testability and eliminate those hypotheses that have been shown to be wrong.

 

[Polymath257]

Prove it.

Well, the Schrodinger equation is a local (i.e, a differential) equation. More relevantly, the equations for quantum field theories are all local. Again, ultimately because they are partial differential equations with finite propagation speeds for the probabilities.

 

[Nous]

As I said, QM is local

Obviously you have your own idiosyncratic beliefs. As I said, he scientists in the peer-reviewed literature contradict you:

Nonlocality is the most characteristic feature of quantum mechanics, but recent research seems to suggest the possible existence of nonlocal correlations stronger than those predicted by theory.
​

Nonlocality beyond quantum mechanics : Nature Physics : Nature Research

 

[Nous]

Typically, a calorimeter.

Heat is merely a form of energy.

I'm not even sure this is a question that makes sense.

If the cause of the energy of the universe is not a testable hypothesis, then, according to your definition of "physical," the cause is (or was) not physical. Thus disproving the thesis of physicalism.

Well, the fundamental one is the 'rest mass'.

I guess that means "yes". Therefore, the thesis of physcialism, besides being false, is not a monist thesis.

Um, yes.

So a rock and a water-filled balloon of the same mass would be different objects as they would cause different effects. Therefore, the thesis of physicalism, besides being false, is again not monist.

We insist on testability and eliminate those hypotheses that have been shown to be wrong.

Then how do you test the hypothesis that something exists other than what you have have defined as "physical"?

 

[Willamena]

I'm sticking with my claim that energy is primary to matter.

During the first four seconds of the universe, matter formed by pair production.​

Lecture 44: The First Three Minutes

How do you figure that energy is primary from that article?

 

[Polymath257]

Heat is merely a form of energy.

And yet we use calorimeters to measure the kinetic energy of particles generated in an accelerator.

If the cause of the energy of the universe is not a testable hypothesis, then, according to your definition of "physical," the cause is (or was) not physical. Thus disproving the thesis of physicalism. [/QUOTE]
Only if you assume there is a cause.

I guess that means "yes". Therefore, the thesis of physcialism, besides being false, is not a monist thesis.

How is it false if the relativistic mass is a derived quantity? And who cares whether or not it is a monist thesis? I don't claim there is only one type of physical thing.

So a rock and a water-filled balloon of the same mass would be different objects as they would cause different effects. Therefore, the thesis of physicalism, besides being false, is again not monist.

Why are you so fixated on monism? Yes, they are different htngs because they have different effects. So? I allow for there to be different types of physical things.

Then how do you test the hypothesis that something exists other than what you have have defined as "physical"?

By producing evidence that there is something that doesn't interact with anything physical. Good luck.

 

[Polymath257]

Obviously you have your own idiosyncratic beliefs. As I said, he scientists in the peer-reviewed literature contradict you:

Nonlocality is the most characteristic feature of quantum mechanics, but recent research seems to suggest the possible existence of nonlocal correlations stronger than those predicted by theory.
​

Nonlocality beyond quantum mechanics : Nature Physics : Nature Research

There are non-local correlations. Those have been shown by Arrow's experiment, for example. But the basic theory is local: those correlations are produced because of a common point in the past where the entangled particles are produced.

 

[siti]

I guess that means you also know of no philosopher who has argued for "nonrealistic physicalism". It's apparently a non-existent thesis in the world of philosophers.

Nope - it means you are persisting in attempting to discredit the 'idea' of 'non-realistic physicalism' when I was clearly talking about accommodating indeterminacy within a realistic physicalist worldview.

I don't much care what exists in "the world of philosophers" - it seems odd to me to make the assumption that in a world that apparently allows observers a free "choice" of what to observe, the underlying reality (of the observers themselves mind you) is presumed to be wholly deterministic. That is such an obviously absurd claim that I can't believe that anyone really believes it after thinking about it for more than 30 seconds - the point being that you don't get any (points that is) for not believing it.

But that the world is physical (i.e. composed of matter/energy) in nature is - it seems to me - undeniable. So to me the question is not whether the world is fundamentally real or unreal, material or mental, body or mind...etc. but how it can, as it seems to me to be, fundamentally (and unavoidably) both 'physical' and 'mental' at the same time. This is not an ontological dualism (it might be a form of property dualism but I don't really like that either because it seems to suggest that there are two kinds of properties which is not what I am suggesting either) - it is not an overlapping of two realities made of 'physical' stuff and 'mental' stuff - it is a world made of 'real' stuff that always (and even down to the most fundamental levels) has 'physical' and 'mental' aspects. I am avoiding the use of the word 'properties' because you are - as many do - equating the notion of 'properties' with determinism by using the term to mean 'defined properties'. But why should 'undefined' or 'indeterminate' be equated with 'unreal'?

The world IS the world and the world is also its own best (most accurate and detailed) possible description. It IS what it is and it is WHAT it is at the same time. You ARE what you are and you are WHAT you are. I AM what I am and I am WHAT I am. A quark IS what it is and it is WHAT it is.

When I look at you, you become part of my reality and I become part of yours. Why assume that this is not also the case when I 'look' at a quark? Or when two quarks 'look' at one another? The 'reality' that is observed is not merely a product of the predetermined properties that history has bequeathed the observer and the observed, but also, at least partly, a product of the process of two real (physical) entities 'looking' at one another.

I don't see anything in that that forces one to deny the physical nature of reality whilst at the same time acknowledging a degree of randomness and the possibility of volitional observations (which are, presumably, even in your interpretation, extremely rare?)

 

[Willamena]

Nope - it means you are persisting in attempting to discredit the 'idea' of 'non-realistic physicalism' when I was clearly talking about accommodating indeterminacy within a realistic physicalist worldview.

I don't much care what exists in "the world of philosophers" - it seems odd to me to make the assumption that in a world that apparently allows observers a free "choice" of what to observe, the underlying reality (of the observers themselves mind you) is presumed to be wholly deterministic (that is such an obviously absurd claim that I can't believe that anyone really believes it after thinking about it for more than 30 seconds).

But that the world is physical (i.e. composed of matter/energy) in nature is - it seems to me - undeniable. So to me the question is not whether the world is fundamentally real or unreal, material or mental, body or mind...etc. but how it can, as it seems to me to be, fundamentally (and unavoidably) both 'physical' and 'mental' at the same time. This is not an ontological dualism (it might be a form of property dualism but I don't really like that either because it seems to suggest that there are two kinds of properties which is not what I am suggesting either) - it is not an overlapping of two realities made of 'physical' stuff and 'mental' stuff - it is a world made of 'real' stuff that always (and even down to the most fundamental levels) has 'physical' and 'mental' aspects. I am avoiding the use of the word 'properties' because you are - as many do - equating the notion of 'properties' with determinism by using the term to mean 'defined properties'. But why should 'undefined' or 'indeterminate' be equated with 'unreal'?

The world IS the world and the world is also its own best (most accurate and detailed) possible description. It IS what it is and it is WHAT it is at the same time. You ARE what you are and you are WHAT you are. I AM what I am and I am WHAT I am. A quark IS what it is and it is WHAT it is.

When I look at you, you become part of my reality and I become part of yours. Why assume that this is not also the case when I 'look' at a quark? Or when two quarks 'look' at one another? The 'reality' that is observed is not merely a product of the predetermined properties that history has bequeathed the observer and the observed, but also, at least partly, a product of the process of two real (physical) entities 'looking' at one another.

I don't see anything in that that forces one to deny the physical nature of reality whilst at the same time acknowledging a degree of randomness and the possibility of volitional observations (which are, presumably, even in your interpretation, extremely rare?)

Well said.

 

[Nous]

How do you figure that energy is primary from that article?

I guess one has understand that it requires energy in order for pair production of matter to occur.

One can also learn that inflation, which was driven by energy, occurred before pair production of matter: Inflation (cosmology) - Wikipedia

 

[Nous]

And yet we use calorimeters to measure the kinetic energy of particles generated in an accelerator.

Energy is a conserved quantity. Heat is not a conserved quantity. That's one way we can deduce that those are not merely two different terms for the same phenomenon (quantity).

If the cause of the energy of the universe is not a testable hypothesis, then, according to your definition of "physical," the cause is (or was) not physical. Thus disproving the thesis of physicalism.

Only if you assume there is a cause.

Apparently there is no rational reason to assume that the energy of the closed system of the universe was without a cause.

I don't claim there is only one type of physical thing.

When one thing does not reduce to another thing, one is left with a metaphysical thesis that isn't monist.

By producing evidence that there is something that doesn't interact with anything physical.

What experiment would you perform by which you would conclude that nothing exists that is nonphysical?

BTW, this incoherence of the thesis of physicalism is due to the fact that is a metaphysical that attempts to define its supposedly single constituent epistemologically.

 

[Nous]

There are non-local correlations. Those have been shown by Arrow's experiment, for example. But the basic theory is local

What you are referring to as "the basic theory" does not account for the empirical evidence.

In his book, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, this is what Bell said about the theorem he proved: "If [a hidden variable theory] is local it will not agree with quantum mechanics, and if it agrees with quantum mechanics it will not be local. This is what the theorem says."

Collapse of the wavefunction of a single particle is nonlocal:

Abstract

A single quantum particle can be described by a wavefunction that spreads over arbitrarily large distances; however, it is never detected in two (or more) places. This strange phenomenon is explained in the quantum theory by what Einstein repudiated as ‘spooky action at a distance’: the instantaneous nonlocal collapse of the wavefunction to wherever the particle is detected. Here we demonstrate this single-particle spooky action, with no efficiency loophole, by splitting a single photon between two laboratories and experimentally testing whether the choice of measurement in one laboratory really causes a change in the local quantum state in the other laboratory. To this end, we use homodyne measurements with six different measurement settings and quantitatively verify Einstein’s spooky action by violating an Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen-steering inequality by 0.042±0.006. Our experiment also verifies the entanglement of the split single photon even when one side is untrusted.

* * *​

Einstein never accepted orthodox quantum mechanics because he did not believe that its nonlocal collapse of the wavefunction could be real. When he first made this argument in 1927 (ref. 1), he considered just a single particle. The particle’s wavefunction was diffracted through a tiny hole so that it ‘dispersed’ over a large hemispherical area before encountering a screen of that shape covered in photographic film. Since the film only ever registers the particle at one point on the screen, orthodox quantum mechanics must postulate a ‘peculiar mechanism of action at a distance, which prevents the wave... from producing an action in two places on the screen’1. That is, according to the theory, the detection at one point must instantaneously collapse the wavefunction to nothing at all other points.​

Experimental proof of nonlocal wavefunction collapse for a single particle using homodyne measurements : Nature Communications

 

[Nous]

But that the world is physical (i.e. composed of matter/energy) in nature is - it seems to me - undeniable.

What is the "physical" (your definition) mechanism that causes the correlations found in the tests of the Bell and Leggett-Garg inequalities?

 

[Nous]

What do intentions look like in the pre-frontal cortex? How can one test a hypothesis by which to determine that something one observes in a pre-frontal cortex is an intention?

The issue of how mental causation works, of how the mind is able to cause bodily movements, is the primary issue of the mind-body problem. Evidently, "physicalism" (however one defines that term) does not offer any solution to that problem.