What is the default position in the mind-body problem?

[Polymath257]

Have you ever solved Schrodinger's equation?

Do you believe I said something erroneous about Schrodinger's equation? If so, show it.

Yes, I did solutions of the Schrodinger equation when I was 15 years old. Yes, the full partial differential equation version for the hydrogen atom. It is truly amazing to see the periodic table come out of a PDE.

The Schrodinger equation does NOT allow for 'infinite possibilities' for the future. In fact, the possibilities are well constrained by the environment and the available energy. They are not *determined* (usually), but they do not have an infinite range of possibilities either. That is why it is even possible to use the Schrodinger equation in a testable way.

Now, what the Schrodinger equation *does* do is determine the wave function, which in tern determines the possible outcomes and their probabilities.

 

[Polymath257]

OK. My point was that energy is primary to matter. Energy was first; particles came later.

If anything it is the reverse. But even that is rather missing the essence. Instead, we have one type of particle (like the hIggs) that can decay into other particles with less mass and thereby more kinetic energy. These, in turn can decay or combine into what we see around us. It is particles that are primary in this.

 

[Polymath257]

The point particles of modern physics definitely pose a problem for the thesis of materialism.

I don't find that they pose any problems at all if the term 'physicalism' is properly understood. Anyone who claims these particles are not physical has the wrong definition of 'physical'.

Only because what you are calling "physical" are actually abstract quantities--contrary to commonplace definitions and ideas about the adjective "physical":

2 a : having material existence : perceptible especially through the senses and subject to the laws of nature

everything physical is measurable by weight, motion, and resistance — Thomas De Quincey​

b : of or relating to material things​

Definition of PHYSICAL

The problem is that this makes assumptions that are not congruent to what we have learned about physical things. Everyone agrees that a chair is physical. They also agree that anything that makes up something physical is again physical. By that, those point particles (like electrons and quarks) are definitely physical.

If they are not via your definition, then your definition needs to be updated.

 

[siti]

There is no other coherent thesis of "physicalism" (insofar as it is a coherent thesis to begin with) than "physical realism". Physicalism requires realism of the properties of the fundamental constituents. The empirical evidence unequivocally shows that the properties of the fundamental constituents of the alleged "physical world" are non-realistic, therefore the "physical world" at its most fundamental level is non-realistic.

You're just arguing semantics in the first two sentences - its just about what the terms are usually taken to mean. But it is certainly possible to formulate a 'physicalism' that entails a form of 'panpsyhcism' (you may recall I have argued this previously) - I don't like that term (I prefer 'panexperientialism') but it is the one that has been used most by both proponents and opponents of the notion - in which the fundamentally physical reality has something akin to what Whitehead called a 'mental pole'. But you can't (ever) separate that from the physical reality. But we know that the most fundamental bits of physical reality sometimes don't "know" for certain what their properties are - which is to say they are indeterminate...and yes I know that this has been taken to mean non-realistic, but the point I am making is that these two ideas (realism and determinism) have to be separated - they actually don't mean the same thing and physicalism could, in principle, as far as I can see, accommodate a realism that is indeterminate. Indeed, isn't that precisely the position that 'physical science' must adopt given that the experimental evidence so far indicates that this is the case - i.e. that there is an observable physical reality that is nevertheless fundamentally indeterminate?

 

[Nous]

So you're saying here that you do not have control over what acts you will perform, such as what you write in your posts here, that all of your acts are mere involuntary acts.

Not at all. The difference that you don't see is that *I* am a process in my brain also.

My comment was merely based on your claims about "choice" being something that neurons do. That is, of course, ridiculous--there is no reason to conclude that any neuron (or group of neurons) knows what alternative possibilities exist, and there is no reason to conclude that any neuron or group of neurons consciously or intentionally selects one of the possibilities.

It also doesn't add any clarity to any issue to call a "process" among neurons by another term, an "I".

Who said that my actions are involuntary?

As the medical encyclopedia quoted earlier says, the motor signals that control voluntary bodily movements are initiated by thought, not by some unconscious process such as a neuron releasing a clump of calcium.

Nobody else is preventing me from doing what I will do. All the activity that determines what I will do is in *my* head and *is me*. Isn't that what it means to have free will?

No, free will does not mean not being restrained by someone else, and does not mean having electrical activity happening in your skull. Not even close.

 

[Nous]

Not at all. I am saying that any definition of the term 'physical' that doesn't include these as being physical is inadequate.

I already quoted a definition of "physical" that is found in most dictionaries. OED says the same: physical - definition of physical in English | Oxford Dictionaries

So what is your "adequate" definition? As I recall, above you defined "physical" in relation to "the scientific method," but when I asked you to define "the scientific method," you didn't.

 

[Nous]

Single neurons do not. Processes involving neurons do.

Name the "processes" that have intentions.

 

[Nous]

Yes, I did solutions of the Schrodinger equation when I was 15 years old. Yes, the full partial differential equation version for the hydrogen atom. It is truly amazing to see the periodic table come out of a PDE.

The Schrodinger equation does NOT allow for 'infinite possibilities' for the future. In fact, the possibilities are well constrained by the environment and the available energy. They are not *determined* (usually), but they do not have an infinite range of possibilities either. That is why it is even possible to use the Schrodinger equation in a testable way.

Now, what the Schrodinger equation *does* do is determine the wave function, which in tern determines the possible outcomes and their probabilities.

Yes, I should have said that the wave function provides for infinite possibilities.

 

[Nous]

OK. My point was that energy is primary to matter. Energy was first; particles came later.

If anything it is the reverse.

What caused the universe's particles? They haven't always been around.

 

[Nous]

I don't find that they pose any problems at all if the term 'physicalism' is properly understood. Anyone who claims these particles are not physical has the wrong definition of 'physical'.



The problem is that this makes assumptions that are not congruent to what we have learned about physical things. Everyone agrees that a chair is physical. They also agree that anything that makes up something physical is again physical. By that, those point particles (like electrons and quarks) are definitely physical.

If they are not via your definition, then your definition needs to be updated.

It's the definition found in multiple dictionaries, and it seems to me to be the traditional concept of "physical" as something that someone can at least theoretically have some sort of sensory detection of.

 

[Nous]

There is no other coherent thesis of "physicalism" (insofar as it is a coherent thesis to begin with) than "physical realism". Physicalism requires realism of the properties of the fundamental constituents. The empirical evidence unequivocally shows that the properties of the fundamental constituents of the alleged "physical world" are non-realistic, therefore the "physical world" at its most fundamental level is non-realistic.

You're just arguing semantics in the first two sentences - its just about what the terms are usually taken to mean.

I don't know of any philosopher who has argue for any sort of "non-realistic physicalism". To the best of my reckoning, the findings that empirical reality, at its most fundamental "level," is neither local realistic nor nonlocal realistic, but is nonlocal nonrealistic, are entirely consistent with any form of modern idealism. If those findings are also somehow consistent with some unknown form of "non-realistic physicalism," it isn't idealism that has been revised to accommodate the evidence.

 

[siti]

I don't know of any philosopher who has argue for any sort of "non-realistic physicalism". To the best of my reckoning, the findings that empirical reality, at its most fundamental "level," is neither local realistic nor nonlocal realistic, but is nonlocal nonrealistic, are entirely consistent with any form of modern idealism. If those findings are also somehow consistent with some unknown form of "non-realistic physicalism," it isn't idealism that has been revised to accommodate the evidence.

 

[Polymath257]

I already quoted a definition of "physical" that is found in most dictionaries. OED says the same: physical - definition of physical in English | Oxford Dictionaries

So what is your "adequate" definition? As I recall, above you defined "physical" in relation to "the scientific method," but when I asked you to define "the scientific method," you didn't.

And in the post of mine that you quoted when asking for the definition of the scientific method, I explained the scientific method:

1. Make observations.
2. Formulate testable hypotheses based on the observations
3. Determine experiment or observation to distinguish between available hypotheses or to show given hypothesis incorrect
4. go to 1

The point is that each hysis must be testable via some observation and observations must actually be made.

 

[Polymath257]

I don't know of any philosopher who has argue for any sort of "non-realistic physicalism". To the best of my reckoning, the findings that empirical reality, at its most fundamental "level," is neither local realistic nor nonlocal realistic, but is nonlocal nonrealistic, are entirely consistent with any form of modern idealism. If those findings are also somehow consistent with some unknown form of "non-realistic physicalism," it isn't idealism that has been revised to accommodate the evidence.

Well, actually, quantum mechanics is a local non-realistic description. So the default currently is neither local realistic nor non-local non-realistic.

Quantum particles do not have definite states (non-realism), but all correlations are formed within past light cones (local).

 

[Polymath257]

It's the definition found in multiple dictionaries, and it seems to me to be the traditional concept of "physical" as something that someone can at least theoretically have some sort of sensory detection of.

Which is equivalent if 'sensory detection' allows for extensions based on devices we create. So, for example, we don't naturally detect radio waves, but we can build radios to make them detectable.

We don't usually detect momentum, but we can build devices that measure it and makes those measurements available to our senses.

Ultimately, anything that interacts with something physical is detectable through that interaction and that detection can be made available to our senses.

 

[Polymath257]

What caused the universe's particles? They haven't always been around.

Particles have been around as long as energy and time.

 

[Polymath257]

Yes, I should have said that the wave function provides for infinite possibilities.

Depends on what you mean by that. Usually, this is just false.

 

[Polymath257]

Name the "processes" that have intentions.

Well, they don't have a name other than 'thoughts', but they tend to happen in the pre-frontal cortex of the brain.

 

[Nous]

I guess that means you also know of no philosopher who has argued for "nonrealistic physicalism". It's apparently a non-existent thesis in the world of philosophers.

 

[Nous]

And in the post of mine that you quoted when asking for the definition of the scientific method, I explained the scientific method:

1. Make observations.
2. Formulate testable hypotheses based on the observations
3. Determine experiment or observation to distinguish between available hypotheses or to show given hypothesis incorrect
4. go to 1

The point is that each hysis must be testable via some observation and observations must actually be made.

There are all manner of logical and scientific inconsistencies with the idea that physicalism is a monist metaphysical thesis where “everything that exists is physical,” and that “physical” means “any observable phenomena about which a human can test hypotheses.”

With what instrument can one observe energy? By what testable hypothesis about energy can one determine what caused the energy of the closed system of the universe?

Do both rest mass and relativistic mass exist? If so, this sort of physicalism is not monist. If not, which one can one eliminate by an observation?

Does one differentiate objects according to their differing effects?

Obviously there is no testable hypothesis by which to conclude that any proposition is true about everything (such as the proposition that “everything that exists is physical”). The scientific method cannot be used to eliminate the possible existence of something about which a hypothesis is not being tested.