• Welcome to Religious Forums, a friendly forum to discuss all religions in a friendly surrounding.

    Your voice is missing! You will need to register to get access to the following site features:
    • Reply to discussions and create your own threads.
    • Our modern chat room. No add-ons or extensions required, just login and start chatting!
    • Access to private conversations with other members.

    We hope to see you as a part of our community soon!

The multiverse is more likely to be true than any religion.

serp777

Well-Known Member
Ironic, given that many physicists and cosmologists feel the multiverse hypothesis is religious in nature:
"Despite the growing popularity of the multiverse proposal, it must be admitted that many physicists remain deeply uncomfortable with it. The reason is clear: the idea is highly speculative and, from both a cosmological and a particle physics perspective,
........................
Because it is as supported by evidence as "god did it" or "it's turtles all the way down."

The universe is by definition all that could possibly exist. This is a terminological issue in the literature, as often "multiverse" really refers to regions of the universe.

An irrelevant distinction. Actually, universe has been defined, in several cases, to mean everything within our space time. I wouldn't call it a terminological issue; I would call it a redefinition. But of course, that's just a matter of opinion. I will continue to use universe out of convenience.

Actually, the opposite is true. Certain outcomes of observations in quantum physics are more likely given a particular preparation and measurement of a system. According to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, every possible outcome should be realized in some branch of the universe. Yet there is no logical basis or explanation in such interpretations for the fundamental fact that given a particular preparation and measurment, certain outcomes are more likely. In other words, if the many-worlds interpretation were true, then for some bizarre reason that totally violates all logic particular universes should result more frequently than others because of observations in a single universe that is causally unrelated to the universes in which alternative outcomes are realized. It's like saying that all possibilities of experiments are realized, but for some reason those in our universe are more likely than in the universes that we can't measure, can't observe, and have no evidence for.

No, you're confused. The probabilities would be the same in each branched universe. Your argument would be like saying that flipping a coin ten times and having it land tails each time means that the probability of landing on tails changed. Ridiculous, the probably of of flipping a coin never changed--there are simply ten realizations where the coin happened to land on tails. Then there would also be a branch for every other combination of heads and tails. If you were to average the coin flips of all the possible universes, you would arrive at the standard probability distribution. This standard probability distribution is determined by the laws of physics. This neither violates logic nor is bizarre.

Furthermore, the reason certain outcomes are more likely than others is because of the laws of Quantum Mechanics. That's the logical framework you're looking for. ALso plenty of scientists find the many world's interpretation to be reasonable and have some evidence.

The book explains how the paradox of Schroedinger's cat led to an understanding of reality in quantum physics. The contents of the book is divided into three parts. Part one concerns light, atoms and Bohr's atom. Quantum mechanics is discussed in Part Two, including photons and electrons, matrices and waves, and applications of quanta. The last part deals with chance and uncertainty, paradoxes and possibilities, the experimental proof of the paradoxical reality of the quantum world, and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. (U.K.)
https://inis.iaea.org/search/search.aspx?orig_q=RN:19024297

This has no relevant explanatory power.

Its some evidence for the existence of other universes. I think you're confused here or you're just throwing away evidence as a convenience. Either way, ignoring evidence for the multiverse and making an irrelevant statement isn't an argument.



Inflationary theory is based purely upon mathematical niceties. There is absolutely no empirical evidence for it, and even mathematical physicists like Penrose are highly critical of such convenient mathematical tricks.

Arguing from authority that Penrose is critical isn't persuasive. It wouldn't be good science if there wasn't critical peer review. However,

Fluctuations in the intensity and polarization of the cosmic microwave background (CMB) and the large-scale distribution of matter in the universe each contain clues about the nature of the earliest moments of time. The next generation of CMB and large-scale structure (LSS) experiments are poised to test the leading paradigm for these earliest moments---the theory of cosmic inflation---and to detect the imprints of the inflationary epoch, thereby dramatically increasing our understanding of fundamental physics and the early universe.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1309.5381

And here are the following authors of this paper:

K.N. Abazajian, K. Arnold, J. Austermann, B.A. Benson, C. Bischoff, J. Bock, J.R. Bond, J. Borrill, I. Buder, D.L. Burke, E. Calabrese, J.E. Carlstrom, C.S. Carvalho, C.L. Chang, H.C. Chiang, S. Church, A. Cooray, T.M. Crawford, B.P. Crill, K.S. Dawson, S. Das, M.J. Devlin, M. Dobbs, .................
Inflationary theory does have predictive power and can be tested by determining inflation's effect on the CMB. It isn't just mathematical guesswork; making such a vague and simple argument isn't sufficient. Ill cite more papers as well if you'd like.

This is completely false. Multiverse cosmologies that attempt to deal with the fine-tuning problem explain nothing; they are constructed such that the particular constants and parameter values which are problematic cease to be so because infinitely many alternatives are defined into existence without evidence just to make the appearance of the values of such parameters and constants explainable. To assert multiverse cosmologies explain fine-tuning issues is like saying that there is no solution in algebra for x/0=? because division by 0 is by definition not defined. You can't "explain" anything by defining the result to be true because it is.

Nobody is explaining anything by defining the result to be true. I never asserted that a result was true by default. In fact, I never even said the multiverse was true necesserily. Furthermore, there doesn't need to be an infinite multiverse; that's a false dilemma. There could simply be a large, but finite number of universes.

And what part of they explain why the values of certain constants are so peculiar seems like it explains nothing? An infinite number of universes would indeed explain the particular values that constants have since every possible permutation of constants would exist. A more accurate analogy would be--you can find any integer in the set of integers (which is infinite). Your analogy is inappropriate. Similarly, you can find any universe in the set of universes (the multiverse).

String theory is not only currently untestable, it also makes no predictions and cannot make any prediction even in theory because there are infinitely many ways to compactify the necessary extra spatial dimensions. In fact, string theory is so far from explaining ANYTHING that it isn't even known what the mathematical equations SHOULD be such that we would need to solve them to be able to formulate a consistent model.

Its obviously not fleshed out, but there are numerous prominent scientists pursuing this theory actively. Clearly there is something to it, or rather scientists believe that it eventually might be developed enough to have some explanatory power. Clearly a number of scientists think it has potential.

Because it is as supported by evidence as "god did it" or "it's turtles all the way down.
No, it isn't. You asserted that there is no evidence but you certainly haven't demonstrated it.
 

serp777

Well-Known Member
Why would the two be mutually exclusive?

Well certain conceptions of God would be exclusive. Other God or God(s) might not be inconsistent. I did add the caveat in OP that religions which accept that the multiverse could be true are exempt.
 

serp777

Well-Known Member
In the case of the multiverse - everything exists (including God) ... in the case of no multiverse, fine tuning exists soooooo either way, chances are God exists.

The point of religion is not to explain existence (I am a Christian, but do not believe that we exist because "God did it" - the word "create" in the Bible is better translated as "organize what eternally is" not "ex-Nihlo create").. the point of religion is to find the best way to exist and progress. It is about refining the spirit, about building character, - about love one another, blessed are the humble and the meek etc. etc.
Not true. First of all we can't even put a probability on God, so you couldn't possibly say that chances are God exists. But yes, religion often attempts to explain our existence with super natural origins. What you're talking about is philosophy, not religion. Finding the best way to exist and progress is literally like philosophical buddhism or something.
 

serp777

Well-Known Member
A major role of religions is to address questions and topics relevant to day to day human lives (for which "truth" is frequently not the point, by the way). Thus a question I have is in what way is the possible existence of multiverses at all significant for day to day human life?

I feel like what you're talking about is philosophy, not religion. However, I think it would be correct to say that religion is a subset of both philosophy and theology; in this case I think you're drifting over into the philosophical subset. Our existence and place in the universe doesn't really have an effect on our day to day lives, but nonetheless it still interests me to consider these things.
 

serp777

Well-Known Member
Faith, real faith is based on evidence, not speculation. The only universe known to exist is our own. The existence of our universe and its order, complexity, and natural laws point me to a grand Creator of supreme power and intellect.

then the multiverse should be easy because it has some evidence. All of the things you just mentioned could also point to the multiverse easily.
 

beenherebeforeagain

Rogue Animist
Premium Member
In the absence of a creator deity, the multiverse makes a lot more sense, by making the probability much higher that there will be a universe that matches what we see around us, for us to live in, because every combination of possibilities/forces/whatever will eventually happen.

If there is not a multiverse nor a creator deity, but a single random event leading to this universe (without a "multiverse" within which it can exist), it would seem to be very unlikely--although since it happened, it happened, however unlikely it might otherwise be...

If there is a creator deity, then there does not need to be a multiverse, because such a deity could set the conditions for the universe as necessary to have us be here--assuming, of course, that we really are the intended purpose of the universe...something that can be debated....

but if there is a creator deity AND a multiverse, there doesn't seem to be much need for such a creator deity, as our universe would eventually happen by itself...At the same time, the sort of deity/being that would inhabit a multiverse at least to the extent it could be responsible for creating or overseeing our universe would be of a nature totally unlike humans--I simply don't understand how humans can even talk about such a being, and I can't conceive of such a being being aware of individuals of a species on one speck in the comos--or maybe on lots of specks in the cosmos...

Still, I don't know how you would go about saying it's more likely that there is or isn't something that we can't possibly detect or measure...
 

gnostic

The Lost One
It's worth noting that the concept of an expanding universe was originally developed by a catholic preist. ;)
And yet, Georges Lemaître was very upset with his pope, when Pius XII attempt to link or validate Catholicism with Lemaître's theory.

Lemaître wanted his theory to be recognised among his peers in science (more specifically in physics), not by his church, because he see his theory as religion-neutral, and advised the Pope, to not mix religion with science.

Wikipedia on Georges Lemaître said:
Simon Singh (2010). Big Bang. HarperCollins UK. p. 362. ISBN9780007375509.

"Lemaître was determined to discourage the Pope from making proclamations about cosmology, partly to halt the embarrassment that was being caused to supporters of the Big Bang, but also to avoid any potential difficulties for the Church. ...Lemaître contacted Daniel O'Connell, director of the Vatican Observatory and the Pope's science advisor, and suggested that together they try to persuade the Pope to keep quiet on cosmology. The Pope was surprisingly compliant and agreed to the request - the Big Bang would no longer be a matter suitable for Papal addresses."

"It was Lemaître's firm belief that scientific endeavour should stand isolated from the religious realm. With specific regard to his Big Bang theory, he commented: 'As far as I can see, such a theory remains entirely outside any metaphysical or religious question.' Lemaître had always been careful to keep his parallel careers in cosmology and theology on separate tracks, in the belief that one led him to a clearer comprehension of the material world, while the other led to a greater understanding of the spiritual realm... ...Not surprisingly, he was frustrated and annoyed by the Pope's deliberate mixing of theology and cosmology. One student who saw Lemaître upon his return from hearing the Pope's address to the Academy recalled him 'storming into class...his usual jocularity entirely missing'."
 

URAVIP2ME

Veteran Member
then the multiverse should be easy because it has some evidence. All of the things you just mentioned could also point to the multiverse easily.

Just a thought, In the Hebrew the plural at Genesis 1:1is that God created the heaven(s) and the Earth ?______
Since heavens is in the plural, then there can be or will be more than one universe.
 

gnostic

The Lost One
Faith, real faith is based on evidence, not speculation.

Disagree.

Faith is merely one's conviction that what he (or she) believe in, to be true, and that conviction has nothing to do with evidence.

When you say "I believe in the gospels that Jesus can walk on water", then this is merely YOU expressing your belief and opinion that Jesus can and had literally walk on water; that's your faith in believing in the miracle, it is not evidence.

For it to be evidence, you would need more than blind faith in the biblical account; you would need to show that walking on water is demonstrably possible.

The only universe known to exist is our own.

I would agree with you here...BUT you've gone and ruined it wi the next line:

The existence of our universe and its order, complexity, and natural laws point me to a grand Creator of supreme power and intellect.

You have no evidences to support this claim...it is merely your blind faith, that want to twist reality into thinking that this creator exist,when you cannot show that God actually exist.

I hate to say it, but you have no idea what "evidence" is.

Evidences has everything to do with repeatable, quantifiable and testable observations.
  1. If you can't test the evidence, then it isn't scientific.
  2. If you can't repeatedly test the evidences, then it is not scientific.
  3. If you can't quantify the observation, then it is not scientific.
  4. If you can't observe the evidence, then it is not scientific.
What "point" to you is merely your wishful-thinking or make-believe fantasy.

Sorry, but your hour is up; I will have to see the next patient.
 

idav

Being
Premium Member
I think and agree with LegionOnomaMoi that the multiverse position is still speculative and untestable.

Mathematically it is true, hence it is theoretical, but there are no evidences to support multiverse cosmology, therefore it is still hypothetical.

And while I do find multiverse to be fascinating subject, it is only show to be true in sci-fi or fantasy.
It is testable but Quantum physicists don't have an answer as to what the objects are really doing. Many worlds interpretation is consistent with the evidence quantum mechanics without resorting to a mystical collapse.

As with the other interpretations of quantum mechanics, the many-worlds interpretation is motivated by behavior that can be illustrated by the double-slit experiment. When particles of light (or anything else) are passed through the double slit, a calculation assuming wave-like behavior of light can be used to identify where the particles are likely to be observed. Yet when the particles are observed in this experiment, they appear as particles (i.e., at definite places) and not as non-localized waves.

Some versions of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics proposed a process of "collapse" in which an indeterminate quantum system would probabilistically collapse down onto, or select, just one determinate outcome to "explain" this phenomenon of observation. Wavefunction collapse was widely regarded as artificial and ad hoc[citation needed], so an alternative interpretation in which the behavior of measurement could be understood from more fundamental physical principles was considered desirable.

Everett's Ph.D. work provided such an alternative interpretation. Everett stated that for a composite system – for example a subject (the "observer" or measuring apparatus) observing an object (the "observed" system, such as a particle) – the statement that either the observer or the observed has a well-defined state is meaningless; in modern parlance, the observer and the observed have become entangled; we can only specify the state of one relative to the other, i.e., the state of the observer and the observed are correlated after the observation is made. This led Everett to derive from the unitary, deterministic dynamics alone (i.e., without assuming wavefunction collapse) the notion of a relativity of states.

Everett noticed that the unitary, deterministic dynamics alone decreed that after an observation is made each element of the quantum superposition of the combined subject–object wavefunction contains two "relative states": a "collapsed" object state and an associated observer who has observed the same collapsed outcome; what the observer sees and the state of the object have become correlated by the act of measurement or observation. The subsequent evolution of each pair of relative subject–object states proceeds with complete indifference as to the presence or absence of the other elements, as ifwavefunction collapse has occurred, which has the consequence that later observations are always consistent with the earlier observations. Thus the appearance of the object's wavefunction's collapse has emerged from the unitary, deterministic theory itself. (This answered Einstein's early criticism of quantum theory, that the theory should define what is observed, not for the observables to define the theory).[25]Since the wavefunction merely appears to have collapsed then, Everett reasoned, there was no need to actually assume that it had collapsed. And so, invoking Occam's razor, he removed the postulate of wavefunction collapse from the theory.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
An irrelevant distinction.
I noticed you glossed over the more important point in what you quoted, which I will repeat:
Ironic, given that many physicists and cosmologists feel the multiverse hypothesis is religious in nature:
"Despite the growing popularity of the multiverse proposal, it must be admitted that many physicists remain deeply uncomfortable with it. The reason is clear: the idea is highly speculative and, from both a cosmological and a particle physics perspective, the reality of a multiverse is currently untestable...For these reasons, some physicists do not regard these ideas as coming under the purvey of science at all. Since our confidence in them is based on faith and aesthetic considerations (for example mathematical beauty) rather than experimental data, they regard them as having more in common with religion than science."
from the editor's introduction to Carr, B. (Ed.). (2007). Universe or multiverse?. Cambridge University Press.



No, you're confused. The probabilities would be the same in each branched universe.
Wrong:
"The problem of probability in the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics arises because the splitting of worlds is unrelated to the Born probabilities. The theory implies that any possible combinatorial sequence of measurement outcomes is realized in some branch of the quantum state regardless of the size of its quantum amplitude (provided it is non-zero). This seems to mean that the theory has no empirical content...
Born’s rule cannot be derived from the many worlds theory. If the many worlds theory is true, only the frequencies occuring in some subset of all the worlds will match Born’s rule. Therefore, only observers that track the worlds in this subset will consider both Born’s rule (and in fact quantum theory) to be true. Moreover, in the many worlds theory, not only Born’s rule but any probability rule is meaningless."
Hemmo, M., & Pitowsky, I. (2007). Quantum probability and many worlds. Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 38(2), 333-350.

"Many different and incompatible attempts to define a coherent Everettian quantum theory have been made over the past 50 years. However, no known version of the theory (unadorned by extra ad hoc postulates) can account for the appearance of probabilities and explain why the theory it was meant to replace, Copenhagen quantum theory, appears to be confirmed, or more generally why our evolutionary history appears to be Born-rule typical."
Kent, A. (2010). One World Versus Many: The Inadequacy of Everettian Accounts of Evolution, Probability, and Scientific Confirmation. In S. Suanders, J. Barrett, A. Kent, & D. Wallace (Eds.) Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality (pp. 307-354). Oxford University Press.

"Critics and supporters of Everett alike have noted that this interpretation of the amplitude-squared measure does not seem to be dictated solely by the formalism; some critics insist that the assignment of probabilities to branches thus qualifies as the addition of a new physical principle to the theory of the universal wave function. Other critics make the stronger claim that the assignment of what amount to physical probabilities is simply incompatible with the deterministic nature of the collapse-free formalism."
Cunningham, A. J. (2014). Branches in the Everett interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 46, 247-262.

Your argument would be like saying that flipping a coin ten times and having it land tails each time means that the probability of landing on tails changed.
No, it's based on the fact that probabilities of experimental outcomes in quantum mechanics are not necessarily uniform in the sense that particular "collapsed" states out of the set of possible states can be more probable. The many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics and the equivalent multiverse theories (the equivalency demonstrated in particular by Bousso, R., & Susskind, L. (2012). Multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics. Physical Review D, 85(4), 045007.) cannot explain why the foundations of the entirety of quantum mechanics (i.e., the Born rule for the probabilistic approach to outcomes of quantum experiments and the associated distributions for particular prepared systems and specified measurements) doesn't hold. That is, while in reality the specifications on the manner of preparation of a particular quantum system and the associated specifications of the manner of measurement of the system yield observable values according to specific probability distributions which favor some outcomes over others, the multiverse/many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics cannot explain why we find ourselves in the "branches" that we do. This is actually a problem for all collapse-free interpretations and is arguably equivalent with the preferred basis problem, although there are differences

Ridiculous, the probably of flipping a coin never changed
Oops. Sorry- I overestimated your understanding of multiverse cosmologies and quantum mechanics. Put more simply, the framework (which is interpretation-independent) doesn't assign equal probabilities as in the example of coin flips. Thus the realization of all possible outcomes of a wave-function, each in a particular new universe-branch, cannot be derived by the formal framework of the theory. This is the preferred basis problem. The issue with probabilities more specifically concerns the Born rule and can simplistically be understood in terms of your coin-flipping experiment: the branches emerge like multiple coin flips (always with the same probability) but the mathematical framework (the interpretation independent aspect of the theory) requires non-uniform probability distributions.
If you were to average the coin flips of all the possible universes, you would arrive at the standard probability distribution. This standard probability distribution is determined by the laws of physics.
1) The "standard probability distribution" doesn't exist but is specific to the system in question and the manner in which it is prepared as well as the specifications of the system, the preparation, and the measurement.
2) Averaging probabilities here doesn't yield the set of possible outcomes for non-collapse theories and thus can't produce branching universes that emerge from the probability distributions.
3) Any non-uniform probability distribution would require an explanation for why any observation is found in any "universe-branch" when the probabilities given for branching universes do not agree with the probability distributions for the outcomes of measurement.


ALso plenty of scientists find the many world's interpretation to be reasonable and have some evidence.
Actually, nobody could possibly have any evidence for the MWI specifically, as all the evidence comes from quantum mechanics, which means that it exists for every interpretation. Plenty of scientists find it preferable to alternative interpretations for ideological reasons, but this is now metaphysics. And as such, it is no more empirical or scientific than theology.
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
continued from above:

ALso plenty of scientists find the many world's interpretation to be reasonable and have some evidence.

Actually, nobody could possibly have any evidence for the MWI specifically, as all the evidence comes from quantum mechanics, which means that it exists for every interpretation. Plenty of scientists find it preferable to alternative interpretations for ideological reasons, but this is now metaphysics. And as such, it is no more empirical or scientific than theology.



Arguing from authority that Penrose is critical isn't persuasive.

But repeating that “many scientists find X” to be the case is supposed to be?

Anyway, it's not meant to persuade, but to explain the epistemological foundations for such cosmologies and their problems. They all involve not only highly speculative metaphysics and derivations based on mathematical aesthetics rather than any empirical findings or even a consequence of such findings. Inflationary cosmologies are mathematical solutions to issues that are metaphysical and ideological in nature (on the mathematical foundations in relationship to the theory see e.g., Mitra, A. (2014). Why the Big Bang Model does not allow inflationary and cyclic cosmologies though mathematically one can obtain any model with favourable assumptions. New Astronomy, 30, 46-50.). There is nothing empirically problematic in physical cosmology that necessitates or even suggests the possibility of inflationary models ("The standard big bang (SBB) model has a number of puzzles, particularly the so-called horizon and flatness problems, which are believed to require explanation and not just be accepted by fiat"; Coule, D. H. (2000). Quantum creation and inflationary universes: A critical appraisal. Physical Review D, 62(12), 124010.)


In fact, what empirical evidence exists that is supposed to merit inflationary models has now proved to make inflation a problem rather than a solution:
Ijjas, A., Steinhardt, P. J., & Loeb, A. (2013). Inflationary paradigm in trouble after Planck2013. Physics Letters B, 723(4), 261-266.

&
"Ultimately, the result is an eternal multiverse in which “anything can happen and will happen an infinite number of times”. What does inflation predict to be the most likely outcome in the multiverse?...the volume-weighted prediction is that our observable universe is exponentially unlikely by a factor exceeding 10^−10^55 or more! Classic inflation is a catastrophic failure by this measure; numerically, it is one of the worst failures in the history of science.
How has a theory that fails catastrophically continued to survive in scientific discourse?" (emphasis added)
Ijjas, A., Steinhardt, P. J., & Loeb, A. (2014). Inflationary schism. Physics Letters B, 736, 142-146.


Luckily, we don't need to be debating whether or not inflationary models are ultimately supportable or even scientific. This is because regardless of whether or not one is a supporter of inflation, the evidence and reasons for the proposal remain the same: it is supposed to solve problems that are only problems granted certain aesthetic and metaphysical assumptions. The solution is a mathematical derivation that cannot be tested apart from the assumptions made to motivate the models in the first place (i.e., we can empirically investigate e.g., the so-called "flatness problem" but whether inflation presents a fix for such issues remains a philosophical or metaphysical matter that is only supportable to the extent it is actually a "fix" and the problem is actually a problem, which again isn't an empirical matter but an ideological one).



Inflationary theory does have predictive power and can be tested by determining inflation's effect on the CMB.

What does it predict?

It isn't just mathematical guesswork

It's a set of models that result from a mathematical derivation.


Nobody is explaining anything by defining the result to be true.

Nobody except physicists and cosmologists. Again, the most succinct expression of this fact comes from Carr's introductory essay in the volume for and by specialists cited above on the issue of the multiverse:

"To the hard-line physicist, the multiverse may not be entirely respectable, but it is at least preferable to invoking a Creator. Indeed anthropically inclined physicists like Susskind and Weinberg are attracted to the multiverse precisely because it seems to dispense with God as the explanation of cosmic design" (emphases added)
from the editor's introduction to Carr, B. (Ed.). (2007). Universe or multiverse?. Cambridge University Press.


An infinite number of universes would indeed explain the particular values that constants have since every possible permutation of constants would exist.

Wrong. First you are wrong because technically the constants aren't permuted: it's called tuning for a reason (they have values) and even if we set the number of parameters equal to that of the standard model, we wouldn't be permuting them.
Second, and far more importantly, a countably infinite number of universes could not contain the set of all possible universes in which the values of a single constant changed by any real-valued number less than 0.0000000000001 (there are uncountably infinitely many real numbers in every interval).

Your analogy is inappropriate.

I didn't make an analogy. I claimed that defining the multiverse into existence to "solve" the fine-tuning problem isn't an explanation. Here's an analogy: The probability of winning the lottery is tiny, but (at least for some lotteries) there is necessarily a winner. So the fact that some improbable result happens here is explained by the fact that even though the specific individual need not have won, someone had to. Likewise, with an infinite number of universes, we can state simply that we were the lottery winners. The problem is that the only reason to suppose there was a lottery to begin with (i.e., that there are infinitely many universes and we happen to find ourselves in one fine-tuned the way it is) is to explain away the problem of fine-tuning. One can (and many have) equally argue that God did it and state with just as much validity that this is an explanation. It is, but it is a poor one.


Its obviously not fleshed out, but there are numerous prominent scientists pursuing this theory actively.

And most of them continue to subscribe to a theory that not only hasn't generated any testable prediction in over 30 years, if a consistent, complete version of the theory were derived it would necessarily lack all predictive power because of the infinitely many ways to compactify the extra dimensions. The public is generally unaware of how much high energy physicists, theoretical physicists, particle physicists, cosmologists, etc., rely one theory-construction using mathematical derivations and ad hoc mathematical solutions (and I'm not talking about the use of Noether's theorem and the use of symmetry to formulate theories via conservation entailed by the theorem).


Clearly there is something to it, or rather scientists believe that it eventually might be developed enough to have some explanatory power.

Many scientists who are supporters don't think the multiverse theories will ever be testable. Some are so thoroughly caught up in the idea that modern fundamental physics is essentially mathematically derived and often built upon more fundamental theories that were never and currently cannot be tested that they subscribe to the ideology that mathematics is reality. The best example of this view may be found in the writings of Tegmark, whose popular book Our Mathematical Universe takes Wigner's "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics" to the extreme by positing that reality is mathematics. A similar view is widespread particularly among promoters of multiverse cosmologies and string theories, but is also an unfortunate side-effect of the nature of fundamental physics and the divide between the formalisms and the physics present in QM and all extensions of it (e.g., QFT, QED, quantum loop gravity, particle physics, etc.).
 

idav

Being
Premium Member
1) The "standard probability distribution" doesn't exist but is specific to the system in question and the manner in which it is prepared as well as the specifications of the system, the preparation, and the measurement.
This doesn't affect many worlds theory but yes, thats how predictions come about from experiments. We know what the results will be when the experiment is different.
2) Averaging probabilities here doesn't yield the set of possible outcomes for non-collapse theories and thus can't produce branching universes that emerge from the probability distributions.
3) Any non-uniform probability distribution would require an explanation for why any observation is found in any "universe-branch" when the probabilities given for branching universes do not agree with the probability distributions for the outcomes of measurement.
The branching universes don't have to actually be produced. Why should one electron become a hundred electrons distributed in the wave function? It simply needs the potential which is there because of the nature of the wave function. I for one am not fixed on the multiple universes needing to actualize.
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
This doesn't affect many worlds theory but yes, thats how predictions come about from experiments. We know what the results will be when the experiment is different.
It absolutely affects the many-worlds interpretation (it's not a theory), because there isn't any probability in the MWI:
"There is no randomness, there is no chance: A happens with certainty, but other non compatible outcomes happen with certainty too, so a standard concept of probability addressing the dilemma A or not A is not applicable here. We have no uncertainty, everything is known. We have a complete description prior to the measurement and the process of measurement is some known deterministic evolution; so we know the complete description now and forever. These leads us to the conclusion that we do not have probability here in the usual sense. But this can be expected since the picture of multiple worlds is rather unusual."
Vaidman, L. (2012). Probability in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. In Probability in physics (pp. 299-311). Springer.

The branching universes don't have to actually be produced.
They do according to the MWI, because otherwise the wave-function would collapse resulting in particular outcome out of the full set of possible outcomes. The entire point of the MWI is to interpret the formalism literally. Every state is realized, but as only one can be observed in any single universe, there must be a different "world" or branching universe for each of these observations

Why should one electron become a hundred electrons distributed in the wave function?
Because the wave-function or state vector for a quantum-mechanical system must "collapse" to yield a single value if measured. In no-collapse interpretations like the MWI, EVERY possible state is realized in some universe.
It simply needs the potential which is there because of the nature of the wave function. I for one am not fixed on the multiple universes needing to actualize.
The ENTIRE POINT of the MWI is that THIS ISN'T the nature of the wave function (and, indeed, EVERY interpretation of QM involves a different conception of what the wave function's nature is).
 

idav

Being
Premium Member
It absolutely affects the many-worlds interpretation (it's not a theory), because there isn't any probability in the MWI:
"There is no randomness, there is no chance: A happens with certainty, but other non compatible outcomes happen with certainty too, so a standard concept of probability addressing the dilemma A or not A is not applicable here. We have no uncertainty, everything is known. We have a complete description prior to the measurement and the process of measurement is some known deterministic evolution; so we know the complete description now and forever. These leads us to the conclusion that we do not have probability here in the usual sense. But this can be expected since the picture of multiple worlds is rather unusual."
Vaidman, L. (2012). Probability in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. In Probability in physics (pp. 299-311). Springer.
But there is no certainty, though many worlds uses deterministic equations, it still reconciles with non-deterministic events.
They do according to the MWI, because otherwise the wave-function would collapse resulting in particular outcome out of the full set of possible outcomes. The entire point of the MWI is to interpret the formalism literally. Every state is realized, but as only one can be observed in any single universe, there must be a different "world" or branching universe for each of these observations
The realization can't be proven but the potential can and has.
Because the wave-function or state vector for a quantum-mechanical system must "collapse" to yield a single value if measured. In no-collapse interpretations like the MWI, EVERY possible state is realized in some universe.
Yes many worlds says that but it doesn't have to, it can be only potential and not actualizing. You say it has to collapse but that is a mystical view as if looking at the wave function will make it realize one actualization. So your saying the wave function is actualizing all the points and must collapse which is nonsensical. Well if the copenhagen interpretation is actualizing everything before collapse then that isn't very far from the many world interpretation anyhow.
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
But there is no certainty, though many worlds uses deterministic equations, it still reconciles with non-deterministic events.
I'm not arguing that there is. In fact, I don't think there is. I am describing the many-worlds interpretation. The Schrödinger equation is a partial differential equation, which means that it is deterministic. Quantum indeterminacy results from the fact that the equation includes the state vector which is generally interpreted probabilistically. In the MWI, it isn't interpreted probabilistically, and the equation is therefore not only deterministic but so are all outcomes, as every possible outcome described by the equation actually occurs.

Yes many worlds says that but it doesn't have to
It's an interpretation. That's what the interpretation says. It's not what quantum mechanics says, and it certainly isn't a position one has to hold (most don't).
 

idav

Being
Premium Member
I'm not arguing that there is. In fact, I don't think there is. I am describing the many-worlds interpretation. The Schrödinger equation is a partial differential equation, which means that it is deterministic. Quantum indeterminacy results from the fact that the equation includes the state vector which is generally interpreted probabilistically. In the MWI, it isn't interpreted probabilistically, and the equation is therefore not only deterministic but so are all outcomes, as every possible outcome described by the equation actually occurs.


It's an interpretation. That's what the interpretation says. It's not what quantum mechanics says, and it certainly isn't a position one has to hold (most don't).
Is the copenhagen interpretation already acknowledging "many worlds" but then collapse so there is one?
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Is the copenhagen interpretation already acknowledging "many worlds" but then collapse so there is one?
The MWI is fundamentally opposed to the orthodox and Copenhagen interpretation. The latter interpretations correspond more or less to your potentials: outcomes that are possible aren't necessarily realized (in fact, only 1 is). There are no many-worlds, just possibilities.
 
Top