Subjective problems with philosophies on Morals and ethic such as Moral Tralism

[MikeF]

Read the explanation again and focus on all the words as single words and then you might notice something.
As long as you don't notice that and understand how come that word is there and how it is also there in other versions of empiricism, we won't progress any further. We are in effect using two different philosophical versions of empiricism and they are contradictory.

Also, no response to my comments regarding this statement from you:

Well, if you could give evidence as per observation of the real world, I would listen to you. But you never do that, you just explain how you think and how that makes sense to you and then you declare that we must all think like you.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

Perhaps we should simply drop the use of philosophical terms all together and avoid all historical baggage and bias that have accummulated in regards to the terms. A priori and a posteriori are terms that originate with Aristotle and reflect his limited perspective and understanding of the world in his lifetime. I say we thow those terms on the rubbish heap of history and come up with terms adequate to our current understanding of the world.

Yeah, but the word "predominantly " might just still be relevant. Just might, but how you understand that can still be understood differently by me. That is both not objective as independent of our both brains. It is just different.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

Also, no response to my comments regarding this statement from you:

Yeah, we have to nitpick "predominantly ". Then if we can agree, we can move on. If we can't agree, then that is also a part of the real world. It is just happening in our brains in both case.

 

[MikeF]

Yeah, we have to nitpick "predominantly ". Then if we can agree, we can move on. If we can't agree, then that is also a part of the real world. It is just happening in our brains in both case.

Sounds good. Do you want to start? What is your theory of knowledge? How is it aquired? How is knowledge verified to be true or accurate?

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

Sounds good. Do you want to start? What is your theory of knowledge? How is it aquired? How is knowledge verified to be true or accurate?

Can you hold the idea that there is no one kind of knowledge and that truth is relative to different contexts and that the objective is only one context?
If you don't want that in the end, it is okay. Then we just continue to do it differently in some, but not all cases for contexts.

 

[MikeF]

I 100% reject the idea that God has anything to do with moral objectivity (whether he exists or not). I started a thread about it a while back.

This idea just came to me so I am writing down quickly in post before I forget:

Right and Wrong, Morality, is an ought problem. What ought or should occur. An ought problem requires an agent that holds the expectation of what should occur or be the case. A question of ought can never be objective because the existence of the ought requires an agent, the expectation of an agent being subjective. Therefore, there cannot be objective morality.

Let me know what you think.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

This idea just came to me so I am writing down quickly in post before I forget:

Right and Wrong, Morality, is an ought problem. What ought or should occur. An ought problem requires an agent that holds the expectation of what should occur or be the case. A question of ought can never be objective because the existence of the ought requires an agent, the expectation of an agent being subjective. Therefore, there cannot be objective morality.

Let me know what you think.

Yeah ,the other way to that one is this. Imagine you observe and record the killing of a person with a knife by another person. Now explain what observation makes it clear that it is right or wrong. It ought to have happened or it ought not to have happened.

 

[MikeF]

Can you hold the idea that there is no one kind of knowledge

You are going to have to be more specific here. Simply saying there is more than one kind of "knowledge" (however it is that you are defining that term) is not true simply because you declare it so. Tell us what the different kinds of knowledge are and why they should be considered different from each other and in their own category. With that information, others can either agree with you, or have something upon which they can make arguments as to why it is not the case.

and that truth is relative to different contexts and that the objective is only one context?

This is technically true, but the concept requires great care in applying it. I can speak about what is realativily true in the fictional world of Harry Potter, but those truths do not appy to the real world. For the sake of this discussion, I am primarily interested in your opinion as to how knowledge is aquired about objective knowledge of the real world.

If you don't want that in the end, it is okay. Then we just continue to do it differently in some, but not all cases for contexts.

It is not about what I want Mikkel. That is the whole point. Getting to the objective means disregarding any particular individuals subjective needs or wants. Those subjective needs and wants are immaterial to the objective status of objective phenomena.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

...

It is not about what I want Mikkel. That is the whole point. Getting to the objective means disregarding any particular individuals subjective needs or wants. Those subjective needs and wants are immaterial to the objective status of objective phenomena.

So who is getting to the objective and why does that matter? For the latter only use objective observation. But you can't because that is in your brain as something you subjectively want to happen.
That you subjectively want to get to the objective, is what you don't understand. But it is true that you subjectively want that. Think it through.

 

[osgart]

Yeah ,the other way to that one is this. Imagine you observe and record the killing of a person with a knife by another person. Now explain what observation makes it clear that it is right or wrong. It ought to have happened or it ought not to have happened.

Well either you are dealing with malicious intent, or a matter of self defense, or defense of others as well. Observation alone may not reveal the whole circumstance. Establishing motive is essential. Morality is most clearly seen by understanding one's own motives. Very hard to read others' state of conscience. Honest accounts of the situation are necessary to establish what happened. There could also be a perceived benefit the killer will gain from the act revealed with hard evidence. Or the whole thing just may be senseless hatred.

The killer may be responding to direct threats against what he/she values. The killer may feel that the person killed just wasn't living up to someone's intellectual standards of human flourishing. Flourish or else.

In any event, morality that is clearly good or bad has consequences in society. Morality is heavily relied on to make society work. We can't just say I prefer not to murder, but oh well it doesn't offend me, its just not my taste to do it if I don't have to. Any undermining of innocence is going to undermine any attempt at making peace in the world, so that people can function civilly. Immorality invites conflict and oppression.

 

[MikeF]

So who is getting to the objective and why does that matter? For the latter only use objective observation. But you can't because that is in your brain as something you subjectively want to happen.
That you subjectively want to get to the objective, is what you don't understand. But it is true that you subjectively want that. Think it through.

There is a difference between wanting something to be the case and verifying that something actually is the case.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

There is a difference between wanting something to be the case and verifying that something actually is the case.

Yeah, you want everything to be objective, but that you want it, is subjective. As long as that doesn't register as subjective with you, we can't move on. So if you try to verify that you want, you verify that is something you want and that is the case, because you want it.

 

[MikeF]

Yeah, you want everything to be objective, but that you want it, is subjective. As long as that doesn't register as subjective with you, we can't move on. So if you try to verify that you want, you verify that is something you want and that is the case, because you want it.

Mikkel, it is not in question whether or not the product of an individuals mind should be considered subjective. We are in full agreement on that score. What is at issue is whether or not the subjective product can represent or convey an objective phenomenon or condition and how can we know. Subjective ideas can either always be coherent, or conform to objective reality, sometimes be coherent with objective reality, or are never coherent with objective reality. I assert that they are coherent with reality sometimes, and we know this through intersubjective corroboration along with inquiry compliant with scientific principles and standards.

To illustrate, if you and I are atop the Empire State Building in NY, and you tell me that you are going to jump from the observation platform atop the building, flap your arms and fly around NY City for a little tour, and I say you shouldn't because you will plummet to the ground and die upon impact with the pavement. Both statements are subjective statements. Which statement, however, most closely represents objective reality, is coherent with reality? Can we subjectively know about and talk about objective things?

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

Mikkel, it is not in question whether or not the product of an individuals mind should be considered subjective. We are in full agreement on that score. What is at issue is whether or not the subjective product can represent or convey an objective phenomenon or condition and how can we know. Subjective ideas can either always be coherent, or conform to objective reality, sometimes be coherent with objective reality, or are never coherent with objective reality. I assert that they are coherent with reality sometimes, and we know this through intersubjective corroboration along with inquiry compliant with scientific principles and standards.

To illustrate, if you and I are atop the Empire State Building in NY, and you tell me that you are going to jump from the observation platform atop the building, flap your arms and fly around NY City for a little tour, and I say you shouldn't because you will plummet to the ground and die upon impact with the pavement. Both statements are subjective statements. Which statement, however, most closely represents objective reality, is coherent with reality? Can we subjectively know about and talk about objective things?

You are still doing a subjective choice of examples. Let me explain your example in general terms.
For all cases of binary outcomes of doing X or not X as Y one of them will always kill you.
Now you say yes and I say no, and one of us are now dead. That is the falsification of your example as general for all of the world. If you don't understand that, you are now dead.

 

[MikeF]

You are still doing a subjective choice of examples. Let me explain your example in general terms.
For all cases of binary outcomes of doing X or not X as Y one of them will always kill you.
Now you say yes and I say no, and one of us are now dead. That is the falsification of your example as general for all of the world. If you don't understand that, you are now dead.

I do not understand what you wrote.

===

===

===

I still seem to be here. Alive and kicking.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

I do not understand what you wrote.

===

===

===

I still seem to be here. Alive and kicking.

You made a universal yet limited example of a binary outcome. If I do X, the universe will kill me. If I don't do X, the universe not kill me. Correct?

 

[vulcanlogician]

Right and Wrong, Morality, is an ought problem. What ought or should occur. An ought problem requires an agent that holds the expectation of what should occur or be the case. A question of ought can never be objective because the existence of the ought requires an agent, the expectation of an agent being subjective. Therefore, there cannot be objective morality.

Let me know what you think.

When we do ethics, we are trying to determine which moral judgments are correct or incorrect. That's what a moral realist tries to do anyway. A moral relativist doesn't claim that the involvement of agents is what makes morality subjective. The relativist claims that moral propositions are true only in relation to a moral code.

But the involvement of agents does complicate things. Agents (particularly human ones) tend to use the word "ought" in self-interested (or otherwise distorted) ways for a myriad of reasons. The non-cognitivist hones in on this tendency in humans and supposes that moral judgments are nothing more than human bias. The non-cognitivists argue this position. (they claim that moral judgments are emotions, commands, an expression of norms, or something else-- but not any kind of belief or fact).

But this, I think, is the only good criticism of the involvement of agents. The involvement of an agent with a particular perspective does not preclude something from objectivity. There are only three ways (that I can think of) that agency affects normativity. Agents sometimes make moral judgments. But just because an agent makes a judgment does not mean that judgment is necessarily subjective. Agents also make judgments about the natural world. Some of those judgments are true. Others are false. Each judgment is made from a particular perspective. Galileo made judgments about the moon, sun, and planets-- where they were located relative to one another, what they might be made of, and so on. Other people (like the ancients) made judgments contrary to Galileo's. They thought that the sun circled the Earth. Both views originated from an agent or agents... but that doesn't make either view subjective. One view is more correct than the other. Objectivity is possible here, even though each view assumes the perspective of a given agent.

The second way that agency affects normativity is that "ought" implies a preference. And preferences can only be held by agents. I think this is what you were getting at with your criticism, Mike, and it's a fair point. (But I had to clarify the other role agents play so we could hone in on this issue.) The assertion that moral judgments are merely preferences (and how that is problematic) is covered under noncognitivism.

As for the third way, you could bring in Stephen Stich. He has done some wonderful work in raising this issue in a cognitivist-neutral manner. Long story short, he argues that moral judgments (whether they are beliefs or not) are the result of a set of environmental factors... these factors are as much determined by necessity as accident. He argues that environment factors create in us moral prejudices... prejudices that we cannot escape because they precede our rational faculties. We can discuss Stich if you'd like. He has done some brilliant work criticizing moral realism. I could also hook you up with some lectures. This guy has presented several hard arguments that really have me stumped on how to defend moral realism from them.

Here is a flowchart of Stich's "moral epistemology". Lemmie know if you'd like me to clarify certain elements of it that appear confusing. Or I would also be happy to post a (45 minute) lecture or two by Stich if you'd prefer to hear it from the horse's mouth.

Spoiler

Speaking of flowcharts, I think it's time I broke out the ultimate metaethics flow chart:

Spoiler

I call this the "flowchart of fun" and by GOD I think it is an incredible tool for parsing through metaethical theories. It basically asks a series of metaethical questions in a boolean fashion. Whatever answers you give to these questions slots you into a certain metaethical theory. Whether you like the flowchart or not, I'm interested to hear where you end up. I'm guessing @Koldo would wind up in a judgment-based theory... if he's still interested in this discussion anyway. I'm also interested where @mikkel_the_dane ends up.

Where do you end up, Mike? Tbh, I'm not really sure what a judgment-based theory is, but based on the flowchart question, I'd assume that moral relativists fall into this category. Also... again tbh... I have no idea what the last question about "surface-level analytic connections" means in the slightest. But I feel like I can explain the rest of the flowchart precisely if you'd like clarification. I end up at "moral non-naturalism." But some of my answers to the flowchart's questions are tentative, so I am in no way an "orthodox" non-naturalist. I just find the theory the least troubling of the bunch.

I suppose there is a fourth way that agency may impact normativity. Would you mind explaining it if you think that's the case?

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

@vulcanlogician
@MikeF
Here is some science.

Princeton - News - Brain imaging study sheds light on moral decision-making

How does morality work in the brain? A functional and structural perspective of moral behavior

Neural underpinnings of morality are not yet well understood. Researchers in moral neuroscience have tried to find specific structures and processes that shed light on how morality works. Here, we review the main brain areas that have been associated with morality at both structural and...

www.frontiersin.org

There is more and other brain scans, just Google to the effect of brain scans of morality.

So here is the formal problem for humans. We are all cases of same, similar and/or different.
As for brains, they are not the same as one function. They are similar for different functions and the dichotomy of cognitive or not don't seem to hold up in practice. It is rather a combination of rational as based on facts or reason and not on emotions or feelings; and irrational as based on emotions or feelings.

Now the falsification in practice of same in similar cases is if it can be done differently for similar cases. In short for morality the question is, if we can observe different morality and we can. Then for "playing" false as universally the same for all similar cases, I just do in the end reductio ad absurdum on that. I am so false for the world that I really can't do it at all and thus I didn't write this. This is how unreal, false, irrational and all the other negatives are.

Most people choose truth as better. I choose false as better as a skeptic, if we are to "play" better. Yeah, I am weird that way, but I am a former soldier for doing FUBAR and deal with that.
Any sufficiently complex plan Will break down when it comes in contact with the enemy. That also applies to any plan of the universe as such and for any plan of "we....", I just check if I can get away with being one of them. So yes, MikeF, for this you are a we and I am them. Now deal with that as you like including explaining me away as irrelevant for the world, however you do that. But then you might consider, that I am still here.

That is my trick, it is simple once I learned to do that, but it is not simple to learn.

 

[MikeF]

When we do ethics, we are trying to determine which moral judgments are correct or incorrect. That's what a moral realist tries to do anyway. A moral relativist doesn't claim that the involvement of agents is what makes morality subjective. The relativist claims that moral propositions are true only in relation to a moral code.

But the involvement of agents does complicate things. Agents (particularly human ones) tend to use the word "ought" in self-interested (or otherwise distorted) ways for a myriad of reasons. The non-cognitivist hones in on this tendency in humans and supposes that moral judgments are nothing more than human bias. The non-cognitivists argue this position. (they claim that moral judgments are emotions, commands, an expression of norms, or something else-- but not any kind of belief or fact).

But this, I think, is the only good criticism of the involvement of agents. The involvement of an agent with a particular perspective does not preclude something from objectivity. There are only three ways (that I can think of) that agency affects normativity. Agents sometimes make moral judgments. But just because an agent makes a judgment does not mean that judgment is necessarily subjective. Agents also make judgments about the natural world. Some of those judgments are true. Others are false. Each judgment is made from a particular perspective. Galileo made judgments about the moon, sun, and planets-- where they were located relative to one another, what they might be made of, and so on. Other people (like the ancients) made judgments contrary to Galileo's. They thought that the sun circled the Earth. Both views originated from an agent or agents... but that doesn't make either view subjective. One view is more correct than the other. Objectivity is possible here, even though each view assumes the perspective of a given agent.

The second way that agency affects normativity is that "ought" implies a preference. And preferences can only be held by agents. I think this is what you were getting at with your criticism, Mike, and it's a fair point. (But I had to clarify the other role agents play so we could hone in on this issue.) The assertion that moral judgments are merely preferences (and how that is problematic) is covered under noncognitivism.

As for the third way, you could bring in Stephen Stich. He has done some wonderful work in raising this issue in a cognitivist-neutral manner. Long story short, he argues that moral judgments (whether they are beliefs or not) are the result of a set of environmental factors... these factors are as much determined by necessity as accident. He argues that environment factors create in us moral prejudices... prejudices that we cannot escape because they precede our rational faculties. We can discuss Stich if you'd like. He has done some brilliant work criticizing moral realism. I could also hook you up with some lectures. This guy has presented several hard arguments that really have me stumped on how to defend moral realism from them.

Here is a flowchart of Stich's "moral epistemology". Lemmie know if you'd like me to clarify certain elements of it that appear confusing. Or I would also be happy to post a (45 minute) lecture or two by Stich if you'd prefer to hear it from the horse's mouth.
Speaking of flowcharts, I think it's time I broke out the ultimate metaethics flow chart:
I call this the "flowchart of fun" and by GOD I think it is an incredible tool for parsing through metaethical theories. It basically asks a series of metaethical questions in a boolean fashion. Whatever answers you give to these questions slots you into a certain metaethical theory. Whether you like the flowchart or not, I'm interested to hear where you end up. I'm guessing @Koldo would wind up in a judgment-based theory... if he's still interested in this discussion anyway. I'm also interested where @mikkel_the_dane ends up.

Where do you end up, Mike? Tbh, I'm not really sure what a judgment-based theory is, but based on the flowchart question, I'd assume that moral relativists fall into this category. Also... again tbh... I have no idea what the last question about "surface-level analytic connections" means in the slightest. But I feel like I can explain the rest of the flowchart precisely if you'd like clarification. I end up at "moral non-naturalism." But some of my answers to the flowchart's questions are tentative, so I am in no way an "orthodox" non-naturalist. I just find the theory the least troubling of the bunch.

I suppose there is a fourth way that agency may impact normativity. Would you mind explaining it if you think that's the case?

It appears you have a different conception of what constitutes subjective and objective and how that is to be determined or demarcated.

It is my view, and I will be bold and say also that of the institution of science in general, that any product of the mind, the thoughts we have and which we communicate to each other, are all to be considered subjective. Each mind is the compilation and culmination of a unique physical structure and a unique set of experiences over the life of its operation. No two minds are identical. Additionally, abilities of any particular mind are necessarily limited by its physical structure and its particular unique set of experiences. Any product of a particular mind is subject to those specific limitations unique to itself, and hence is considered subjective.

Objective, on the other hand, would be all that which exists independent of the mind or irrespective of the mind. Take away all minds and what is left is the objective world.

You misspoke, IMO, when you said, “ Both views [Galileo’s and the geocentrists] originated from an agent or agents... but that doesn't make either view subjective.” What I and science would say is that both views *are* subjective, but agents can speak subjectively about objective things. This is a significant difference because it expressly asserts that an agent cannot take for granted that when it intends to speak about objective things, that it actually *is* talking about objective things.

How does the subjective mind verify or ensure that its subjective thoughts about what it perceives are actually synthetic to actual objective things? In the case of normal everyday events it is a body of experience which provides confidence that what is subjectively believed is objectively true. We develop reasoned expectations based on experience. This has limitations, however, as the quality of those reasoned expectations are limited by the ability to acquire sufficient information upon which to form an accurate or realistic expectation. One way to expand one’s personal experience is to communicate and share subjective experiences with other subjective agents. Inter-subjective corroboration provides an additional layer of confidence in the reasoned expectations formed from not only our own experience, but with those of other subjective observers as well. And again, this works quite well in the everyday world of our macroscopic interactions.

Yet, we are still imperfect creatures and despite all of the above, and especially in light of situations with limited access to the data required to form an accurate reasoned expectation, extra measures must be taken at a professional level to verify and confirm that our thoughts and ideas continue to correspond to objective phenomena, that they remain synthetic to the real world. Hence the requirement for scientific principles and standards to mitigate the inherent fallibility of subjective agents and maintain a demarcation between thoughts and ideas synthetic to the real world and those that are not.

We don’t always need or wish to talk about objective phenomena however. We can think about and share abstract non-objective ideas, and how we hold and internalize those abstract ideas can affect how we behave as an individual as well as how we interact with others. These ideas that are purely analytical and do not map to objective physical phenomena would all fall under the category of subjective. They are all products of a subjective agent or agents.

I will leave objective/subjective here and wait to see what issues you may have with what I have said to this point.

On to normativity. We have not really addressed this other than for you to provide me with your understanding of what it means through Scanlon’s lecture. I need clarification on exactly how I am to interpret “normativity”. From Scanlon it is my impression that normativity is synonymous with reasons. However, reasons in my mind require an agent and refer to the agent's rationalizations for a particular action, decision, or judgment. Reasons are the subjective product of that particular mind, that agent. Reasons would be considered distinct from causes. We may say in common speech that the reason an apple falls from a tree is that gravity acted upon it, but what we are really describing is the cause. There was no agent involved, no choice or decision to be made. There certainly may be objective causes that affect or influence an agent's reasons and those causes may be identifiable and explored. I feel Scanlon’s scheme blurs these distinctions in an unhelpful way. If we are setting an agent's reasons (as I have defined) aside and are instead looking for causes, we have now expressly moved into the dominion of science. To fully understand what factors cause a particular behavior in an organism would at the very least require a full understanding of the organisms various systems and how they interact with each other and react to external stimuli. Wouldn’t you agree?

And finally on to your flowchart of fun.

In regards to the first question, do moral judgements express beliefs, I say yes. A variety of factors influence those beliefs, both internal and external, but the result is a subjective belief of the individual. This sends me down the Cognitivism path, whatever Cognitivism is.

Next question is whether those beliefs are sometimes true. Here I assume that truth is determined in some fashion other than the individual's opinion, that there is some external measure or standard separate from the individual with which to evaluate the truth or falsity of any particular subjective moral belief. My answer here is no, and I end the process at Error Theory. My answers are not tentative within my understanding of the terms used and as I describe. Is this what you expected? Let me know if it was or if you saw me ending up somewhere else.

In trying to interpret the chart, my take on Moral Non-Naturalism would mean essentially that morality was sourced supernaturally, which would include theistic models. Of course it doesn’t imply theistic sources as the only source. I would be interested to know what non-natural sources you are contemplating.

I’ll leave it here. Cheers!

 

[vulcanlogician]

It appears you have a different conception of what constitutes subjective and objective and how that is to be determined or demarcated.

Yeah. That is totally what's going on with our discussion of agents' involvement in moral realism. Good eye. But the cool thing is, we don't have to debate about demarcation. All we need to do is understand what the other means when demarcating, rather than, one of us insisting on the model we're using.

In some conversations, demarcation is a salient and divisive issue (and ought to be, because it concerns a fundamental difference). But not in this conversation. That's because you and I (I don't believe) differ essentially in what we consider to objective or subjective as far as human experience goes.

Where I think our issue lies is that I only take issue with the validity of subjectivity when it results in the expression of beliefs. That is, I don't like truth claims that are perspective-dependent being considered "true" in some way. I don't like "truth" being dirtied by opinion. Truth concerns facts, not opinions. And even the word "fact" confuses the matter.

What is a fact? There are two definitions that we use for the word "fact" at the same time. And when we start writing premises using the word fact, if we don't clarify what we mean, we end up equivocating.

1) A fact is something that is to be differentiated from opinion. A fact is a belief. (Opinions are also beliefs.) But opinions are perspective-dependent. Facts are true irrespective of one's perspective.

2) A fact something that is demonstrably true. (ie. "It is a scientific fact that smoking causes cancer.) This definition doesn't contrast with opinion. It contrasts with things that are demonstrably false (ie. "Smoking doesn't cause cancer.")

1 and 2 are different things. And I think our demarcation problem lies in the difference between the two. When I criticize moral realism, I very much have 1 in mind. Opinions ought not enter into the truth-value of moral claims. I do not mean anything near #2 when I use the term "moral fact."

But what's the big difference between 1 and 2? Well, a fact, according to definition 1, could be false. Here is an example fact (and keep definition 1 in mind): "I have an apple tree in my yard." I actually DO have an apple tree in my yard. (Crab apples. They are sour and nasty, barely worth eating.) But what if I turned out to be wrong? Maybe my neighbor came over and cut down my apple tree and took it away without my knowing. In that case, when I say "there is an apple tree in my yard" I am still expressing a fact according to definition 1-- because me being wrong doesn't make it a matter of opinion. But (according to definition 2) I have NOT stated a fact.

If moral realism is true, that doesn't mean that *anyone* has any of the moral facts correct (as per definition 2)... but it does mean that it is (potentially) possible to make objectively true determinations about morality.

This sends me down the Cognitivism path, whatever Cognitivism is.

You already know what cognitivism is.

Our brains produce in us "cognitions" (ie. ideas, beliefs, and thoughts)... but they also produce emotions and sensations (happiness, anger, pain, and bliss). A cognitivist thinks moral claims have to do with cognitions (specifically beliefs). A non-cognitivist sees moral claims as imperatives, feelings, or something else. In other words, not belief-related. Rather, something related to our desires, emotions, or something else our brain does... but not cognitions or beliefs.

I end the process at Error Theory.

I think error theory is hands down the strongest anti-realist theory. Head and shoulders above the competition.

In trying to interpret the chart, my take on Moral Non-Naturalism would mean essentially that morality was sourced supernaturally, which would include theistic models.

Nope. Nothing to do with the supernatural. "Non-natural" in the sense that the Pythagorean theorem is not a statement about a specific thing in nature. The pythagorean theorem is true whether a triangular shaped thing exists or not. On the hand, "Mars is further from the sun than the Earth" is a natural fact. The latter is true synthetically (and I love that you use that term so precisely... your understanding of that concept will help us see eye to eye on this, I think).

I don't think that moral facts are natural facts. I think they are more like the Pythagorean theorem. That's all that is meant by non-naturalism. No ectoplasm required.

You misspoke, IMO, when you said, “ Both views [Galileo’s and the geocentrists] originated from an agent or agents... but that doesn't make either view subjective.” What I and science would say is that both views *are* subjective, but agents can speak subjectively about objective things. This is a significant difference because it expressly asserts that an agent cannot take for granted that when it intends to speak about objective things, that it actually *is* talking about objective things.

We 100% agree on this. But I do want to clarify one thing.

We can make objective determinations about subjective events, right? We can say that when a person puts their hand on the stove that they experience pain, right? But pain is a subjective experience. But that doesn't make statements involving pain necessarily subjective.

A psychologist may discover that some phenomenon causes depression. But that doesn't mean that her observation is subjective... even though it is a claim ABOUT the subjective. What if she claims that experiences of anger lead to greater instances of violence? (That is, her claim is, the more angry people are, the more prone they are to violence.) That claim involves subjective experience (anger)... but the whole claim nonetheless espouses an objective truth.

That's the kind of way I approach ethics, and (as far as demarcation goes) I think that's why I think it's an objective issue while you want to call it subjective.

Do I have you pegged wrong?