And who gets to decide what is and isn't "adequate justification"?
I've said it's subjective; but provided a proposed litmus test: any method of justification that leads to admittedly incomplete epistemic positions that literally can't be gotten out of no matter what the evidence is probably not an acceptable or reasonable one.
To a believer, "God moves in mysterious ways", might serve as adequate justification.
Such a weak epistemic scheme could be used to "justify" anything, which is to say it justifies nothing at all.
IMO, the idea that the same standards that we use to judge people might not be adaquite for judging an omnipotent being seems like adequate justification for dismissing those standards.
Analogously, people with more power and more knowledge are capable of worse atrocities and have to do a better job of defending it if it's in fact justified.
In God's case we have only "the entirety of physical suffering throughout eternity" to justify.
Whether or not the "general principal properly applies to the situation" is also up for grabs. It isn't something that you have a right as a participant in a discussion like this to decide for everyone else, and it makes your reasoning sound circular.
I am not sure where you got the idea I was "deciding for everyone else," am I not allowed to argue my case? What are you doing if not arguing your case? That's just a confusing response.
I think that the general principle applies to both cases and I have argued why. You think it does not. So that's the discussion. Presenting argument isn't "deciding for everyone." You and me are cool, right? This is just fun discussion? Because it seems like you are accusing me a couple of times now of arguing in bad faith. Is that really what you think?
Except that's not what's being discussed. The position your OP is dealing with is one where someone is saying, "we don't have the information necessary to make this judgment", not "I have information but I can't share it with you".
Okay, maybe I didn't make it explicit, but it seems as though silence is epistemically the same in this instance as not being silent (but only saying, "I can't tell you.") God is ostensibly silent about justifying atrocities like childhood leukemia (or perhaps not, there are other bad theodicies like "it's because of the Fall" and such, but you get the idea). You're right that I should have explicitly brought out this premise, so I do so now.
Remember in your OP you're not arguing with God, you're arguing against someone whos suggesting that there may be some greater purpose that we don't understand that potentially negates the PoE.
Yes, but we're ostensibly arguing with that person to say, "your acceptance of a position you literally can't be evidenced out of is not a reasonable move."
Nope. That's not what your hypothetical answer to the PoE is suggesting at all. Its not saying "I have information but I'm not going to give it to you" it's saying "Neither one of us has the information we need to make this judgment". Its a completely different scenario.
Again (not an exasperated "again," more just meaning I said something new about this just a few lines above), God's ostensible silence on the issue is about the same as God saying something, but only saying "I can't tell you why." They affect the reasoning the same way. If we are not given good justification for the appearance of malevolence, we should not put ourselves in an epistemic position where we don't know it's benevolent, yet assume it, and then set that position up so we can literally never be given evidence to the contrary that we'd accept.
Yes, for someone who believes in God in this way, any action is justifiable, although "justifiable" isn't really the right word, since to someone with that kind of belief nothing would need to be justified. Still doesn't make this special pleading.
I'm not attached to fallacy names so I don't mind dropping it (it still is special pleading, though). As long as you understand the problem with it, I don't care what you call it.
OK then, how about explaining how your analogy is pertinent, instead of just saying that it is.
In both cases we have a claim of special knowledge that could explain away evidence of malevolence. In both cases we must either accept that on faith (or doubt it). In both cases if we accept it without a good reason, then we fall into a trap whereby there will never be a good reason to stop accepting it. It's an epistemic trap, and thus it is not reasonable to uphold.