If al Qaida and other terrorist groups are still making significant efforts to acquire nuclear materials, and if the religious justification for nuclear terrorism seems to have become more explicit within certain strands of Islamist fundamentalism, why has this kind of attack not yet been conducted? There are several possible explanations.
The most straightforward explanation centres on the immense technical difficulties of orchestrating such an attack. In this view, al Qaida simply has been unable to master the technical challenges involved in such a plot. As of today, no state appears to have supplied al Qaida with the elaborate infrastructure necessary to ‘go nuclear’, let alone any fully working devices.
Another view holds that the enormous loss of life caused by such an attack would undermine rather than advance the terrorists' cause. According to this view, a terrorist act of such a scale would alienate large segments of al-Qaida’s own constituency, which accepts terrorist methods in principle, yet would not condone the wanton destruction of a ‘nuclear 9/11’.
It appears that some of al-Qaida’s attempts to obtain nuclear material on the ‘black market’ failed because their limited nuclear expertise made them easy victims for swindlers
A third explanation is that some of al-Qaida’s efforts may have been disrupted through counter-terrorism efforts. Indeed, it appears that since ‘9/11’ several planned attacks involving the use of weapons of mass destruction have been thwarted.
Moreover, the international intervention in Afghanistan has effectively denied al Qaida its major home base and has forced it to disperse, thereby making any concerted planning of a nuclear attack far more difficult. The national and collective measures taken by many governments, such as intelligence cooperation, enhanced container security, uncovering nuclear smuggling networks, securing ‘loose nukes’ from the former Soviet Union, and draining terrorist financing networks, may have further degraded the ability of terrorists to launch a nuclear attack.
Yet another reason might be deterrence. While much has been made of the claim that suicidal terrorists can not be deterred, states that sponsor terrorism are likely to remain susceptible to threats of retaliation. Since terrorist cells require territory on which to train and from which to operate, a threat against any country willing to serve as a ‘host’ might have a restraining influence on the kinds of activities it may allow its ‘guests’ to undertake.
This connection between non-state and state actors lies at the heart of French, British and US statements about the role of their nuclear forces in deterring state-sponsored terrorism. Coupled with improved ‘nuclear forensics’, i.e. the technical ability to trace an attack back to its sources, such statements may indeed have a deterrence value against states that provide a safe haven for terrorists.