Moral Truths

[Curious George]

You've misunderstood me. I'm not talking about marriage or its defintion. I'm talking about the relationship between two people and just using a married couple as an example. They can be married or siblings or friends or enemies.

To my mind, such relationships are rich, ambiguous, varied, complex, and require words to express. Nor do I consider such relationships to exist apart from human opinions. Does your wife hate you with a burning fury or is she just indifferent toward you? Hard to say. She might insist on the latter while you opine that the former seems more like one true aspect of your relationship. Do you resent her for that fury, or do you react to her with a tired disdain?

I'd say neither. They're just opinions, expressed with words, about how people are relating to each other.

But yet given enough information you could determine whether these relations of spouse, sibling, friends or enemies exist. While we can have opinions that are personally subjective we can also have objective criteria for classifying relationships.

Let us use sibling: If two people share one or more parent then they are siblings. Sure we use this string of words to classify relations, but this is a description of something real. A relationship that exists and based on common characteristics and need we have given it a name.

 

[AmbiguousGuy]

But yet given enough information you could determine whether these relations of spouse, sibling, friends or enemies exist. While we can have opinions that are personally subjective we can also have objective criteria for classifying relationships.

You seem to be focused on relationship definitions, while I'm trying to talk about 'states of affairs' between entities.

Let us use sibling: If two people share one or more parent then they are siblings. Sure we use this string of words to classify relations, but this is a description of something real. A relationship that exists and based on common characteristics and need we have given it a name.

Yeah, we can define words and then go out in the world and try to find physical objects which seem to match our definitions. But I guess I'm not following the dialogue well enough to understand what relevance that might have.

 

[Curious George]

You seem to be focused on relationship definitions, while I'm trying to talk about 'states of affairs' between entities.



Yeah, we can define words and then go out in the world and try to find physical objects which seem to match our definitions. But I guess I'm not following the dialogue well enough to understand what relevance that might have.

State of affairs is nothing more than relationships.

I would suggest that the opposite happens- we create definitions for physical objects, relationships which exist.

 

[psychoslice]

Morals are not truth, your morals might not be my morals, and that is seen in many cultures.

Truth is seeing this, its not seeing one over the other, its just simply seeing what is, then its up too you, live your truth be that good or bad, after all who is judging, truth doesn't judge, people do.

 

[Curious George]

Morals are not truth, your morals might not be my morals, and that is seen in many cultures.

Truth is seeing this, its not seeing one over the other, its just simply seeing what is, then its up too you, live your truth be that good or bad, after all who is judging, truth doesn't judge, people do.

I realize their is a subjective connection or flavor to "morality," but I am not so quick to dismiss an objective morality.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

I realize their is a subjective connection or flavor to "morality," but I am not so quick to dismiss an objective morality.

But unless someone can state how "objective" morality would even work, and on what grounds one could determine whether a moral claim was true or not, it doesn't look like we have much choice.

 

[psychoslice]

I realize their is a subjective connection or flavor to "morality," but I am not so quick to dismiss an objective morality.

yes that can be true, while we are living in this world with so many ignorant people, yes for that reason we need morals, those who are not ignorant have no reason to harm another, therefore no morals are needed, but don't tell the ignorant that lol.

 

[Curious George]

But unless someone can state how "objective" morality would even work, and on what grounds one could determine whether a moral claim was true or not, it doesn't look like we have much choice.

I already suggested that it was tied to logic. The problem is knowing the right definitions. Similar to any objective truth morality is bound by the conditions that we set within the framework. However, any absolute truth in reality would require an absolute definition. These are hard to extract. We use inductive means to generate strong or weak truths on which we must rely in order to create parameters in which we can speak of concepts as true or untrue. Yet just because we do not have absolute truth does not mean that absolute truth cannot exist.

 

[Curious George]

yes that can be true, while we are living in this world with so many ignorant people, yes for that reason we need morals, those who are not ignorant have no reason to harm another, therefore no morals are needed, but don't tell the ignorant that lol.

I would suggest we are all ignorant.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

I already suggested that it was tied to logic. The problem is knowing the right definitions. Similar to any objective truth morality is bound by the conditions that we set within the framework. However, any absolute truth in reality would require an absolute definition. These are hard to extract. We use inductive means to generate strong or weak truths on which we must rely in order to create parameters in which we can speak of concepts as true or untrue. Yet just because we do not have absolute truth does not mean that absolute truth cannot exist.

This answer is too vague for me- could you give an example of how this would work? Given the is/ought distinction, we can never infer any sort of moral obligation or prohibition from any set of facts; in other words, logic doesn't appear to be any help to us here, since it can never dictate any values, should's or should not's. The only way logic could help us is if we are already taking for granted precisely what is in question here- i.e. assuming the truth of certain moral claims, from which we can then derive further moral claims. But unless you start with a moral claim (as a presupposition or axiom), you can never arrive at a moral claim via logic.

 

[Slapstick]

A picture may be worth a thousand words, and even silence can speak volumes, but actions speak loudest of all.

I agree with this. I made a post about it dealing with moral truths, but it has been lost in the rubble.

 

[psychoslice]

I would suggest we are all ignorant.

That is true, but still there are those who do see beyond what the majority see, call it what you like.

 

[Monk Of Reason]

Thanks, you have no idea how happy that makes me because when I look through it I just see a garbled, ADHD ridden mess I was at work, constantly multitasking, losing my train of thought and then coming back. Hmm, that or you just find a method in my madness

Your welcome. Even if it had random bits it all tied into the same idea so its all good.

Why is whether or not I should dropkick a baby more applicable than whether or not I should wear a green shirt? What does "to be applicable" mean? I'm not being obtuse, I get what you mean, I'm just pointing out though that you're bringing in a framework here already that depends on mental states rather than external facts.

Not necessarily. As I stated in my previous post moral basis of "ought" and "ought not" must have two predispositions. The first being that something is sentient. The second that it must have a predisposed goal of "survival". Without sentience to have ramifications or at least the ability to concieve of ramifications or negative effects then there is no morally wrong or "ought not" to the situation. For example in what way could we do something morally wrong to a non-sentient rock? What possible action could be considered and "ought" or an "ought not" from the perspective of a rock? One could make the argument that one "ought not" use the rock to bash someone's head it. However that is from one sentient being to another. Or one might "ought not" smash your hand with the rock. Then that is sentient being to itself.

Secondly with the goal of survival. The goal of survival is the very key to evolution. Where that goal nonexistant then we would in fact...not exist. Everything we do that has devloped as a moral truth, "ought" or "ought not" is devised specifically in the context of what a sentient being should or should not do in a given framework. Ergo the functionality is key.

That's quite a bomb to drop though: if there is a universal truth that x happening to y (where y is sentient), what is corresponding to reality?

Because the equation is as such. X happens to Y but only if Y is a sentient being. One cannot even have the discussion without a Y. One cannot even have the discussion without a sentient being as without a sentient being there is no context for the ought or ought not. However we are in every sense of the word "the universe". We are made from elements forged in the center of a star that exploded some trillion years ago and they from atoms created at the inseption of the universe itself.

What you are discussing is similar to another example of something physical.
"In our universe if there was no light would there still be an exact speed of light?"

And we can say with as much certainty as a tree falling in the woods with no one to hear it, unequivocally yes. The same goes for ought and ought not. One cannot discuss the speed of light without light and one cannot discuss ought/ought not without sentient beings that gives it a definite existence.

That's a good question, but that's why I'm doubting there's any correspondence at all in the relevant sense. We can make truth statements about whether we feel we ought to do x, but I'm not sure how we could make truth statements about whether we ought to do x.

We can't. We can only make statements such as these with ourselves or other sentient beings in the context of the statement. But so long as we exist in the context of the statement any ought or ought not must have some imperative universal truth to it at that given moment. Though I "ought not" say that P) as I am sure there are examples that lay outside this parameter I have just set up.

But I hope the example about speed of light in a universe without light should "shed some light" on the viewpiont I am trying to convey.

The "ought" implication I was speaking of had more to do with categorical imperatives: IF I value this color over that one, IF that valuation extends to displaying it, etc., then I feel as though I ought to choose a green shirt over a yellow one (given the right chain of ifs). It seems like categorical imperatives are "oughts" to me, they give the same feeling as moral "oughts" in that we just vaguely feel as though we "should" do some particular thing.

But we find that the "feeling" is actually the way we precieve a biological and evolutionary function that is imperative to our being. In many ways it can be argued that without those base functions that we "feel" as "oughts" are, partially at least, part of the process that is us.

 

[Curious George]

This answer is too vague for me- could you give an example of how this would work? Given the is/ought distinction, we can never infer any sort of moral obligation or prohibition from any set of facts; in other words, logic doesn't appear to be any help to us here, since it can never dictate any values, should's or should not's. The only way logic could help us is if we are already taking for granted precisely what is in question here- i.e. assuming the truth of certain moral claims, from which we can then derive further moral claims. But unless you start with a moral claim (as a presupposition or axiom), you can never arrive at a moral claim via logic.

Sure: Let's use the dropkicking babies. But let us narrow it a little to "mothers ought not dropkick their babies."

Part of our definition of mother is likely to include protector of the child.

If we have defined the mother as such and rely on this definition an action that goes against that definition such as a mother dropkicking the baby is likely inconsistent with the definition of protector.

I understand this includes a subjective definition of mother. But it is easy to see the reliance that individuals, society, and humanity place on this definition. You might insist that defining the mother as "protector" begs the question, because it assumes a mother ought to protect the child. But I would just say that such a moral statement comes from our definition basic responsibility. Of course you could then say that the imposition of this definition comes from the moral statement that a mother ought take basic responsibility. Now instead of continuing to chase this rabbit hole which would amount to us going back and forth changing words we can accept that humans must at some point rely on inductive reasoning to create any definition. The mother relies on interpretations of chemical reactions which occur through pregnancy, child birth, and bonding thereafter. But let us look at this problem slightly different.

We can say:
Sally defines mothers as protectors of their children
Protectors do not dropkick those whom they protect
Sally dropkicks her child
Sally acted inconsistent with her definition of mother.
To act consistent with her definition of mother Sally ought not dropkick her child.

This of course assumes an ought- it assumes one ought act consistent with one's definitions. This ought, however is the expression of a preference of logic. This preference of logic is based on inductive reasoning that is necessary for the acceptance of logic.

Now, instead of using an individual we can use groups. Theoretically, any group relying on the same definition could fit into sally's place if we tweak the other parts of the argument. So, objective moral truths would be truths which replace Sally with all sentient beings. I do not know of any objective moral truths which fit this bill, but I can see that the ability to find an objective moral truth is contingent on our ability to find a relational definition on which all sentient beings rely.

 

[AmbiguousGuy]

State of affairs is nothing more than relationships.

OK. I have trouble with words, I guess. They never seem to stand still for me. Dialogues like these make my eyes cross after awhile.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Sure: Let's use the dropkicking babies. But let us narrow it a little to "mothers ought not dropkick their babies."

Part of our definition of mother is likely to include protector of the child.

If we have defined the mother as such and rely on this definition an action that goes against that definition such as a mother dropkicking the baby is likely inconsistent with the definition of protector.


I understand this includes a subjective definition of mother. But it is easy to see the reliance that individuals, society, and humanity place on this definition. You might insist that defining the mother as "protector" begs the question, because it assumes a mother ought to protect the child. But I would just say that such a moral statement comes from our definition basic responsibility. Of course you could then say that the imposition of this definition comes from the moral statement that a mother ought take basic responsibility. Now instead of continuing to chase this rabbit hole which would amount to us going back and forth changing words we can accept that humans must at some point rely on inductive reasoning to create any definition. The mother relies on interpretations of chemical reactions which occur through pregnancy, child birth, and bonding thereafter. But let us look at this problem slightly different.

We can say:
Sally defines mothers as protectors of their children
Protectors do not dropkick those whom they protect
Sally dropkicks her child
Sally acted inconsistent with her definition of mother.
To act consistent with her definition of mother Sally ought not dropkick her child.

This of course assumes an ought- it assumes one ought act consistent with one's definitions. This ought, however is the expression of a preference of logic. This preference of logic is based on inductive reasoning that is necessary for the acceptance of logic.

But it isn't; this assumption, that we should act in accordance with our definitions, has no practical significance for logic- logic can get along just fine without it. And this is precisely what I meant about needing to beg the question- you've had to insert the ought into the premises, in effect, rather than being able to infer or derive that ought from a set of facts. To the person who flatly disagrees, and sees no moral obligation in acting in accordance with some particular set of definitions, there are no facts we can show them that will show they are wrong- once again, morals come down to subjective preferences, rather than objective matters of fact.

Also, we have to remember that our definitions are only descriptive, they have no normative or prescriptive weight- just because "mother" often includes "protector of the child" doesn't tend to imply, in any way, that mothers should be protectors of the child- only that they in fact often are. This is, of course, what is often described as the is/ought divide, or the fact/value distinction.

 

[Bird123]

(This was written while at work multitasking, so please forgive the sloppiness and the redundance in a few areas -- it's due to losing my train of thought and then starting over mid-sentence and that sort of thing.)

What would it mean for there to exist a moral truth?

These are two of the most loaded words in all of philosophy, so this thread is probably going to be a fun ride. That being said, I'll present definitions which I think are best to use for these terms; but as this is an open discussion on the subject, feel free to use different definitions so long as everyone keeps which way who's using what term straight. (Ok seriously, "which way who's using what" was fun to type)

I'm a realist, and I use correspondence theory of truth, for instance: for something to be "true," the proposition assented to by the believer must correspond to an external reality. In other words, my belief that there is a keyboard on my desk is only true if my belief about a keyboard on the desk corresponds to reality (only if there "really is a keyboard there").

So there is this demarcation between a truth (which is a special kind of belief in a mind) and a fact (which is a real thing outside of a mind): truths are beliefs we have about facts. There is no such thing as a truth without a corresponding fact: something about reality must be a certain way or contain a certain something in order for a truth to be made about it. Truths are formed by minds and are about facts which are pieces of actual, external reality.

There are facts without truths (those parts of actual reality which we haven't discovered anything about to form beliefs about which correspond to it), but there are no truths without facts. This may seem redundant, but it's just a wildly abstract concept that needs to be pinned down for this discussion to go anywhere.

-----

Ok, so what about morals? Whenever we talk about morals, we're generally not talking about things: rocks are understood to be amoral (at least to non-animists, etc.), so are computers, and so on. This is because when we talk about morals we're talking about choices.

However, they have to be some sort of special kind of choice: choosing between two paths on a trail doesn't generally entail any sort of ascribed moral connotation, nor generally does choosing to drink some water or iced tea.

No, our conception of "morals" get more bizarre because they're used to describe an ought.

Most of the time choosing between two garments to buy isn't a moral choice, but as soon as it becomes considered that buying one of them supports slave wagery in a 3rd world country whereas the other one is produced by a company that pays its workers a living wage, the choice is suddenly a moral one, presumably, because a normal person will experience at least a small feeling that they ought to choose one over the other given this new information when previously the garments might have been tied in the buyer's esteem.

Not all "oughts" that we experience are moral, though, so we must further distinguish somehow. For instance, we have the categorical imperative and preferences -- if I want to stop being thirsty, then I experience a notion that I ought to drink. This will come in important later.

-----

Ok, so then what are moral truths? If a person were to say, "Dropkicking babies is wrong," this is a proposed example of a moral truth -- they are affirming a proposition about something corresponding to reality in a moral way. Since morals are about oughts and ought-nots, we can expand this expression to "It's true that we ought not to dropkick babies."

However, this is where the problem comes in (fans of Hume likely saw this coming): what is corresponding to reality in order for the statement to be true?

If I say, "[There is a] baby," then it's obvious that what's corresponding to reality in this proposition is the presence of a baby: either there is or is not a baby in reality, external to our minds.

If I say, "[That ball was] dropkicked," then it's obvious that what's corresponding to reality is an event which either happened or did not happen to a particular thing in reality.

But what does it mean to say "[There is an] ought-not?" How can an ought-not be part of reality external to a mind, what does that even mean? In order for that to be true there must be an external fact; but how can an "ought" or an "ought-not" be an external fact of reality?

-----

The closer "oughts" are looked at, the more and more they appear like any other preference.

It's incoherent (unless anyone has any ideas) how an "ought" or an "ought-not" can correspond to reality -- what is doing the corresponding?

Someone might say, "That you feel the ought corresponds to reality," and that would be true -- but that alters the subject of the sentence to a feeling corresponding to reality, not an ought. If the feeling corresponds to reality, it gets us nowhere in determining why that feeling is there or why it shouldn't have any other value.

I can think of one other situation where this is the case: preferences.

For instance, consider the following statement: "Green is the best color."

Well, what does it mean for "is the best" to correspond to reality? Nothing -- it's incoherent nonsense. "Green is the best color" isn't a truth, then, because nothing is corresponding to reality; there's no fact to it. It's a preference. It's not true that green "is the best" or not in reality because "is the best" is meaningless.

However, "Erin thinks green is the best color" does correspond to reality -- and is a truth -- because the subject that's corresponding to reality now is a state of affairs about what Erin thinks: it is the case that either "Erin thinks [something]" or not. The problem, though, is that even if "Erin thinks green is the best color" is true (and it is), it does nothing to tell us where this preference came from or why it doesn't simply have any other value.

"Oughts" and "ought-nots" behave utterly identically to "is bests" and "is worsts" and -- well, basically, I can find no discernable difference between oughts (be they categorical imperative or ethics related) and preferences.

-----

So, are there any differences between oughts and preferences?

Does anything correspond to reality about "ought" or "ought-not?" If so, what? How?

Interesting. Seems you are doing your best to define the process instead of the true facts. Example: If your favorite color is green, that is not truth based in reality. That is a belief and nothing else.

Perhaps, I can paint you a new picture of reality by which you can come to see and understand the truth based in reality.

It's all about knowledge and understanding. Until we have enough knowledge and understanding there will appear to be several answers. When one acquires understanding, one discovers just like in math, there is only one answer. Until that point is reached, beliefs and truth will be a mixed bag.

Freedom of choice is crucial to learning. Each should make their choices freely. Everything you do in life returns to you in time. This is not just in this lifetime, but the multitude of lifetimes it takes to learn and understand it all. When our actions return, we see what our actions really mean. We see and understand that side. We experience truth first hand. When we discover the real truth. We see there is only one answer.

Something for you to ponder: When this process advances far enough, rules, morals, and laws are no longer needed. Why not? True intelligence always makes the right choices. Rules, laws and morals are for those who lack the intelligence, knowledge and understanding to make the only one choice that there is. So do we all lack intelligence, knowledge and understanding? Yes, I cry that but that is OK. Even as we make wrong choices we will discover they are wrong, leading us to the one answer that is Truth.

It will take much time through this learning process to get there but everyone walks toward that goal whether they realize it or not. We all have learned different things through our choices. Those around us help us to discover other sides. Looking beyond the surface shows that there is so much we do not see, Yet.

 

[McBell]

If your favorite color is green, that is not truth based in reality.

Then what is their favourite colour?

 

[Curious George]

But it isn't; this assumption, that we should act in accordance with our definitions, has no practical significance for logic- logic can get along just fine without it.

Logic does not get along without it. To assert such a statement would be to assert that "ones argument ought flow from ones premises" is not necessary for logic. This is simply not true.

And this is precisely what I meant about needing to beg the question- you've had to insert the ought into the premises, in effect, rather than being able to infer or derive that ought from a set of facts. To the person who flatly disagrees, and sees no moral obligation in acting in accordance with some particular set of definitions, there are no facts we can show them that will show they are wrong- once again, morals come down to subjective preferences, rather than objective matters of fact.

I disagree. In order for them to maintain such a stance they have to either disagree with the definitions or acknowledge that their actions are not consistent with logic. Choosing to act inconsistent with logic deprives society of necessary consistency.

Also, we have to remember that our definitions are only descriptive, they have no normative or prescriptive weight- just because "mother" often includes "protector of the child" doesn't tend to imply, in any way, that mothers should be protectors of the child- only that they in fact often are. This is, of course, what is often described as the is/ought divide, or the fact/value distinction.

You are inserting "often" to allow for discrepancy. I acknowledge that saying mothers are often protectors of children more accurately describes the mother child relationship. Yet, when one chooses to define and others rely on the definition that omits the qualifier, then we see the problem.

Take the instance of Sally dropkicking her baby.

You are thinking of it like this:

Premise 1: Mothers are protectors of their children
Premise 2: Sally dropkicks her child
Conclusion 1: It is possible that Sally is not the mother of her child;
Conclusion 2: It is possible that Mothers are not always the protectors of their
children; or
Conclusion 3: It is possible that dropkicking the child was protecting the child.

If the parameters that we have set state that mothers are protectors of their children (not just often)
Then we are left with the conclusion that our definition is wrong, she was protecting the child, or Sally is not a mother. Either way we come up against a logical inconsistency. I understand that you are trying to say that the definition is wrong.

However if we change the argument to look like this:

Premise 1: Sally defines mothers as protectors of children
Premise 2: Sally dropkicks her child


Now, we can see that two of the possible logical conclusions- dropkicking her child was protecting the child or sally is not the mother of her child- are still possible. Similar to the first scenario- the definition of mother could be wrong- but our conclusion would suggest that Sally defines mother wrong. However, an addition possible conclusion has also come: Sally acted inconsistent with her definition of mother.

We can try to explain away this addition possibility by suggesting that her definition included a prescriptive element and was therefore wrong. But the second argument did not set out a prescriptive definition. The statement that "Sally defines mothers as protectors of children" is actually descriptive. Granted we can say try to assert that Sally's definition is prescriptive but this is not necessarily true. The statement X are Y is not necessarily prescriptive. The possibility of Sally's statement as descriptive is encompassed in possible conclusion that "Sally defined mothers wrong." Not that it matters, because we are not trying to evaluate Sally's definition. Even though Sally may be "wrong" in her definition it can still remain true that "Sally defines Mothers as..."

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Logic does not get along without it. To assert such a statement would be to assert that "ones argument ought flow from ones premises" is not necessary for logic. This is simply not true.

But that isn't what I said at all- I said that how we act has no implications for logic. Logic deal with linguistic items- arguments, propositions, etc. It does not deal with behavior or actions.

I disagree. In order for them to maintain such a stance they have to either disagree with the definitions or acknowledge that their actions are not consistent with logic.

They could simply acknowledge that they are not acting in accordance with certain definitions- and there is nothing inherently illogical about that. Definitions tell us how things are, not how things should be- just because things are a certain way doesn't entail that there is any obligation that they continue to be that way.

You are inserting "often" to allow for discrepancy. I acknowledge that saying mothers are often protectors of children more accurately describes the mother child relationship. Yet, when one chooses to define and others rely on the definition that omits the qualifier, then we see the problem.

Whether its "often" or "always" doesn't affect the matter- mothers could always be the protectors of children, and it still wouldn't follow that there is any obligation or duty that they be protectors of their children; if Sally dropkicked her baby despite mothers always being protectors, this would simply mean that they are not always protectors after all.

Take the instance of Sally dropkicking her baby.

You are thinking of it like this:

Premise 1: Mothers are protectors of their children
Premise 2: Sally dropkicks her child
Conclusion 1: It is possible that Sally is not the mother of her child;
Conclusion 2: It is possible that Mothers are not always the protectors of their
children; or
Conclusion 3: It is possible that dropkicking the child was protecting the child.

If the parameters that we have set state that mothers are protectors of their children (not just often)
Then we are left with the conclusion that our definition is wrong, she was protecting the child, or Sally is not a mother. Either way we come up against a logical inconsistency. I understand that you are trying to say that the definition is wrong.

However if we change the argument to look like this:

Premise 1: Sally defines mothers as protectors of children
Premise 2: Sally dropkicks her child


Now, we can see that two of the possible logical conclusions- dropkicking her child was protecting the child or sally is not the mother of her child- are still possible. Similar to the first scenario- the definition of mother could be wrong- but our conclusion would suggest that Sally defines mother wrong. However, an addition possible conclusion has also come: Sally acted inconsistent with her definition of mother.

Sure, but there's nothing inherently moral about that- I still see no basis for saying that "Sally dropkicking her baby is wrong" is a true statement; true in virtue of what?

We can try to explain away this addition possibility by suggesting that her definition included a prescriptive element and was therefore wrong. But the second argument did not set out a prescriptive definition.

Which is why it doesn't get us anywhere close to moral obligation or moral truth.