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Moral Truths

Meow Mix

Chatte Féministe
(This was written while at work multitasking, so please forgive the sloppiness and the redundance in a few areas -- it's due to losing my train of thought and then starting over mid-sentence and that sort of thing.)

What would it mean for there to exist a moral truth?

These are two of the most loaded words in all of philosophy, so this thread is probably going to be a fun ride. That being said, I'll present definitions which I think are best to use for these terms; but as this is an open discussion on the subject, feel free to use different definitions so long as everyone keeps which way who's using what term straight. (Ok seriously, "which way who's using what" was fun to type)

I'm a realist, and I use correspondence theory of truth, for instance: for something to be "true," the proposition assented to by the believer must correspond to an external reality. In other words, my belief that there is a keyboard on my desk is only true if my belief about a keyboard on the desk corresponds to reality (only if there "really is a keyboard there").

So there is this demarcation between a truth (which is a special kind of belief in a mind) and a fact (which is a real thing outside of a mind): truths are beliefs we have about facts. There is no such thing as a truth without a corresponding fact: something about reality must be a certain way or contain a certain something in order for a truth to be made about it. Truths are formed by minds and are about facts which are pieces of actual, external reality.

There are facts without truths (those parts of actual reality which we haven't discovered anything about to form beliefs about which correspond to it), but there are no truths without facts. This may seem redundant, but it's just a wildly abstract concept that needs to be pinned down for this discussion to go anywhere.

-----

Ok, so what about morals? Whenever we talk about morals, we're generally not talking about things: rocks are understood to be amoral (at least to non-animists, etc.), so are computers, and so on. This is because when we talk about morals we're talking about choices.

However, they have to be some sort of special kind of choice: choosing between two paths on a trail doesn't generally entail any sort of ascribed moral connotation, nor generally does choosing to drink some water or iced tea.

No, our conception of "morals" get more bizarre because they're used to describe an ought.

Most of the time choosing between two garments to buy isn't a moral choice, but as soon as it becomes considered that buying one of them supports slave wagery in a 3rd world country whereas the other one is produced by a company that pays its workers a living wage, the choice is suddenly a moral one, presumably, because a normal person will experience at least a small feeling that they ought to choose one over the other given this new information when previously the garments might have been tied in the buyer's esteem.

Not all "oughts" that we experience are moral, though, so we must further distinguish somehow. For instance, we have the categorical imperative and preferences -- if I want to stop being thirsty, then I experience a notion that I ought to drink. This will come in important later.

-----

Ok, so then what are moral truths? If a person were to say, "Dropkicking babies is wrong," this is a proposed example of a moral truth -- they are affirming a proposition about something corresponding to reality in a moral way. Since morals are about oughts and ought-nots, we can expand this expression to "It's true that we ought not to dropkick babies."

However, this is where the problem comes in (fans of Hume likely saw this coming): what is corresponding to reality in order for the statement to be true?

If I say, "[There is a] baby," then it's obvious that what's corresponding to reality in this proposition is the presence of a baby: either there is or is not a baby in reality, external to our minds.

If I say, "[That ball was] dropkicked," then it's obvious that what's corresponding to reality is an event which either happened or did not happen to a particular thing in reality.

But what does it mean to say "[There is an] ought-not?" How can an ought-not be part of reality external to a mind, what does that even mean? In order for that to be true there must be an external fact; but how can an "ought" or an "ought-not" be an external fact of reality?

-----

The closer "oughts" are looked at, the more and more they appear like any other preference.

It's incoherent (unless anyone has any ideas) how an "ought" or an "ought-not" can correspond to reality -- what is doing the corresponding?

Someone might say, "That you feel the ought corresponds to reality," and that would be true -- but that alters the subject of the sentence to a feeling corresponding to reality, not an ought. If the feeling corresponds to reality, it gets us nowhere in determining why that feeling is there or why it shouldn't have any other value.

I can think of one other situation where this is the case: preferences.

For instance, consider the following statement: "Green is the best color."

Well, what does it mean for "is the best" to correspond to reality? Nothing -- it's incoherent nonsense. "Green is the best color" isn't a truth, then, because nothing is corresponding to reality; there's no fact to it. It's a preference. It's not true that green "is the best" or not in reality because "is the best" is meaningless.

However, "Erin thinks green is the best color" does correspond to reality -- and is a truth -- because the subject that's corresponding to reality now is a state of affairs about what Erin thinks: it is the case that either "Erin thinks [something]" or not. The problem, though, is that even if "Erin thinks green is the best color" is true (and it is), it does nothing to tell us where this preference came from or why it doesn't simply have any other value.

"Oughts" and "ought-nots" behave utterly identically to "is bests" and "is worsts" and -- well, basically, I can find no discernable difference between oughts (be they categorical imperative or ethics related) and preferences.

-----

So, are there any differences between oughts and preferences?

Does anything correspond to reality about "ought" or "ought-not?" If so, what? How?
 
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Whiterain

Get me off of this planet
Hello, you're analogies are way out of context. Moral's should be near an instinct
in the modern world and even in survival, between humans, it is present. When people
begin starving to death they may dine on the living or deceased out of desperation, that's
still wrong even if you are starving,

To inflict harm for pleasure that is wrong, to take what is not needed for desire is wrong
over giving to those with less to spare, food as well.

Good and Bad is still present in the realm of survival and can be observed.


Moral values should be our native sense of conscience by now through thousands
of years of progress.
 

Caladan

Agnostic Pantheist
The closer "oughts" are looked at, the more and more they appear like any other preference.

It's incoherent (unless anyone has any ideas) how an "ought" or an "ought-not" can correspond to reality -- what is doing the corresponding?

Someone might say, "That you feel the ought corresponds to reality," and that would be true -- but that alters the subject of the sentence to a feeling corresponding to reality, not an ought. If the feeling corresponds to reality, it gets us nowhere in determining why that feeling is there or why it shouldn't have any other value.

I can think of one other situation where this is the case: preferences.

For instance, consider the following statement: "Green is the best color."

Well, what does it mean for "is the best" to correspond to reality? Nothing -- it's incoherent nonsense. "Green is the best color" isn't a truth, then, because nothing is corresponding to reality; there's no fact to it. It's a preference. It's not true that green "is the best" or not in reality because "is the best" is meaningless.

However, "Erin thinks green is the best color" does correspond to reality -- and is a truth -- because the subject that's corresponding to reality now is a state of affairs about what Erin thinks: it is the case that either "Erin thinks [something]" or not. The problem, though, is that even if "Erin thinks green is the best color" is true (and it is), it does nothing to tell us where this preference came from or why it doesn't simply have any other value.

"Oughts" and "ought-nots" behave utterly identically to "is bests" and "is worsts" and -- well, basically, I can find no discernable difference between oughts (be they categorical imperative or ethics related) and preferences.
If I understood you above (bear with me it's 1:30 AM here, and I'm feeling sadistic enough that I read this entire post in this hour :D), you are projecting from aesthetic preferences (the color green) on a myriad of circumstances which may be rooted in far more primal, basic and essential factors. Can such an aesthetic preference tell us about 'ought' and 'ought-not' in relation to reality?

I'll illustrate this. I worked all week with a worker called Mustafa (true story). He drinks dark and bitter Arabic coffee everyday and I felt like preparing hot cider in the field all week. Although I live off black Arabic coffee in the field on regular basis, there is a limit of that kind of intake for me. At the same time, my hot cider is a complete foreign taste for Mustafa, and it simply didn't grow on him. So for the most part, this week he stuck to black and bitter Arabic coffee, and I experimented with various herbal fusions. However, when it comes to the fieldwork we both have basic and corresponding ought and ought-not in our joint work.

So did I understand your logic, or am I simply dozing off and drooling all over my keyboard?
 

Meow Mix

Chatte Féministe
Hello, you're analogies are way out of context. Moral's should be near an instinct
in the modern world and even in survival, between humans, it is present.

I don't deny that we instinctually feel moral oughts and ought-nots. I feel moral oughts and ought-nots very powerfully, myself.

I'm questioning whether there is a difference between moral oughts and preferential oughts. Neither of their base statements ("I ought to do x," "x is the best") are propositional (they don't have truth values -- there is nothing about them to correspond to reality or not that I can tell).

When people
begin starving to death they may dine on the living or deceased out of desperation, that's
still wrong even if you are starving,

Hmm, I beg to differ here though. I don't see anything wrong with cannibalism to survive in need if someone is already dead, for instance.

So, "It is wrong to eat people even if you are starving" is a statement. Is it a TRUTH statement, though? Is it a proposition at all? What about this statement corresponds to reality -- what fact of reality is being corresponded to by saying "is wrong?"

To inflict harm for pleasure that is wrong, to take what is not needed for desire is wrong
over giving to those with less to spare, food as well.

Sure, I agree with these, but are they truth statements? Do they correspond to facts of reality, or are they preferences we happen to have (maybe because of evolutionary reasons, maybe because a deity caused those preferences, etc. -- but still, not caused by an external fact of reality itself)?

Good and Bad is still present in the realm of survival and can be observed.


Moral values should be our native sense of conscience by now through thousands
of years of progress.

Well, I agree that humans experience a sensation of having moral beliefs -- and I'm glad for that.

But that doesn't answer whether or not there are moral "truths." For there to be moral "truths," there would have to be moral facts. No such example is forthcoming so far. Moral beliefs behave an awful lot like preferential beliefs though, in terms of how their metaphysics go...
 

Meow Mix

Chatte Féministe
If I understood you above (bear with me it's 1:30 AM here, and I'm feeling sadistic enough that I read this entire post in this hour :D), you are projecting from aesthetic preferences (the color green) on a myriad of circumstances which may be rooted in far more primal, basic and essential factors. Can such an aesthetic preference tell us about 'ought' and 'ought-not' in relation to reality?

Hmm. I'm not sure where you're coming from on this.

I wasn't trying to say that aesthetic preferences are the same thing as moral beliefs -- only that I'm pointing out similar characteristics between how each of them "works" metaphysically: neither one's basic statement (morals: "x ought to y," preferences: "x is better than y") ostensibly have any referent in external reality with which to correspond. They are separate kinds of oughts triggered by separate types of things, but it appears that everything that is true about how preferences relate to reality is also true about how moral oughts relate to reality.

In other words, if someone were to say "It's true that green is the best color," you might object and say "well, that's your opinion" or "actually that isn't a proposition since it has no truth value."

My point is that all the same objections appear to work for someone saying "It's true that dropkicking babies is wrong." We feel a much stronger inclination (hopefully) to agree with the statement, but if we were to analyze it, we'd find that it suffers from all the same weaknesses the aesthetic preference statement above makes: it isn't a proposition unless it can be determined to have a truth value; but in order to have a truth value, something must correspond to some fact of reality -- what is it? Nothing is forthcoming as a candidate.

This is a serious problem if we're going to entertain the idea that there are moral truths. If something about moral oughts isn't found to somehow meaningful correspond to a fact about reality, then there are no moral truths any more than there are aesthetic truths. We are essentially left with the prospect that moral beliefs are a type of preference rather than an objective, external facet of reality: powerful preferences, yes, which have common characteristics across the species despite some cultural differences, but not moral truths.

Unless something about moral oughts is found to meaningfully correspond to reality, then it wouldn't be "true" that we ought not to dropkick babies -- it would only HAPPEN to be a powerful and common preference. A preference which only exists in people's minds and reckoning, not a fact of reality "out there" external to us: eliminate all of us and "dropkicking babies is wrong" no longer has meaning if this is the case; whereas if it were a fact about reality (in order to be a truth) then it would still be "wrong" regardless of whether there were any babies to kick.

Caladan said:
I'll illustrate this. I worked all week with a worker called Mustafa (true story). He drinks dark and bitter Arabic coffee everyday and I felt like preparing hot cider in the field all week. Although I live off black Arabic coffee in the field on regular basis, there is a limit of that kind of intake for me. At the same time, my hot cider is a complete foreign taste for Mustafa, and it simply didn't grow on him. So for the most part, this week he stuck to black and bitter Arabic coffee, and I experimented with various herbal fusions. However, when it comes to the fieldwork we both have basic and corresponding ought and ought-not in our joint work.

So did I understand your logic, or am I simply dozing off and drooling all over my keyboard?

I think my OP was too jargled from all the interruptions at work to have been really clear -- and this is a really abstract topic in the first place. I wasn't equating aesthetic preferences to moral beliefs, only pointing out that they follow the same metaphysical rules (i.e. neither appears to have elements in their basic statements which refer to anything in reality to correspond to; there is no "ought-not" or "is better" in reality for them to correspond to because that's just nonsensical!)
 

lunamoth

Will to love
I think an important part of the distinction of morality is that it is something that impacts other people in some way, directly or indirectly. Even something like alcohol or drug use, sexual promiscuity, etc., so-called 'victimless' moral choices, actually do impact others indirectly.

But, you still end up with the question of why should we care about other people.
 

Caladan

Agnostic Pantheist
Hmm. I'm not sure where you're coming from on this.

I wasn't trying to say that aesthetic preferences are the same thing as moral beliefs -- only that I'm pointing out similar characteristics between how each of them "works" metaphysically: neither one's basic statement (morals: "x ought to y," preferences: "x is better than y") ostensibly have any referent in external reality with which to correspond. They are separate kinds of oughts triggered by separate types of things, but it appears that everything that is true about how preferences relate to reality is also true about how moral oughts relate to reality.

In other words, if someone were to say "It's true that green is the best color," you might object and say "well, that's your opinion" or "actually that isn't a proposition since it has no truth value."

My point is that all the same objections appear to work for someone saying "It's true that dropkicking babies is wrong." We feel a much stronger inclination (hopefully) to agree with the statement, but if we were to analyze it, we'd find that it suffers from all the same weaknesses the aesthetic preference statement above makes: it isn't a proposition unless it can be determined to have a truth value; but in order to have a truth value, something must correspond to some fact of reality -- what is it? Nothing is forthcoming as a candidate.

This is a serious problem if we're going to entertain the idea that there are moral truths. If something about moral oughts isn't found to somehow meaningful correspond to a fact about reality, then there are no moral truths any more than there are aesthetic truths. We are essentially left with the prospect that moral beliefs are a type of preference rather than an objective, external facet of reality: powerful preferences, yes, which have common characteristics across the species despite some cultural differences, but not moral truths.

Unless something about moral oughts is found to meaningfully correspond to reality, then it wouldn't be "true" that we ought not to dropkick babies -- it would only HAPPEN to be a powerful and common preference. A preference which only exists in people's minds and reckoning, not a fact of reality "out there" external to us: eliminate all of us and "dropkicking babies is wrong" no longer has meaning if this is the case; whereas if it were a fact about reality (in order to be a truth) then it would still be "wrong" regardless of whether there were any babies to kick.
I think I understand the source for us seeing it differently. I don't seek truth, nor am I a great believer in metaphysical truths. I look for facts. Or to quote my favorite fictional colleague:
Archaeology is the search for fact ... not truth. If it's truth you're interested in, Dr. Tyree's philosophy class is right down the hall.
However you should take note, that you yourself recognize that there is more weight to a certain (correct? rational?) behavioral (moral?) pattern (such as not dropkicking babies) than color preferences. So in your philosophical frame which you discuss here, how would you define your differentiation between preferences and what you called moral beliefs above? In other words what is the source for people like you and me (and most people) to know that dropkicking babies is wrong, but at the same time we may casually choose to paint our bedrooms in different shades?
 

InformedIgnorance

Do you 'know' or believe?
A very interesting discussion; I would note that a choice appears (from my reasoning and indeed my intuitions agree) to attain moralistic associations when we perceive the capacity to effect another agent; most particularly in a way that it is perceived that they may find (un)desirable.

When this effect appears to be more direct, then this association is more easily made. Let us examine for example choosing to break a stone - clearly the stone has no agency, it apparently has no capacity to feel discomfort let alone fear or pain - it will therefore not be diminished in any form by your actions and the action can be considered amoral; if on the other hand we were to perceive that the stone had some measure of importance to an agent (such as person) because it was an otherwise undistinguishable grave marker (or perhaps was intended for use for some purpose) - then choosing to damage this rock takes on moral associations as a result of the indirect impact it has on an agent able to perceive the outcomes of the action to be undesirable; compare this to the idea that the stone is aware - in which case you are directly effecting an agent so the immediacy of the impact is much greater and the perception that it might be an effect which is perceived as significantly undesirable is marked - the apparent moral associations are therefore far more significant.

There are likely a multitude of other factors that would play into this, degree of potential choices, capacity to perceive potential impacts, severity of potential impacts, centralisation of potential impacts, perception of potential effected agents etc. However all seem to require the belief it will impact on some agent able to perceive that impact and have the capacity to find it (un)desirable in some fashion - moreover such questions necessitate the capacity to foresee events to some significant extent; thus a discussion of this is contingent upon the presence of an entity capable of perceiving these factors (and indeed conceiving them through foresight).


On the question of outght(s) and ought nots; I would assume abstraction to a class of potential facts (such as babies) is appropriate and this categorisation itself corresponds to some component(s) within the medium(s) in which the philosopher(s) is/are housed (in our brain for example rather than merely our mind) the representation thereof therefore lies within the domain of facts (it is merely one we have constructed).

Attempting to determine ought(s) and ought nots thus becomes the fallible (largely intuitive) process of recognising correlation between perceived facts (arising from our perception of some experience) and largely subjective constructed abstract fact sets (which of themselves may be complex constructions including hierarchies and rough heuristics). None of this however suggests a fact other than that which we have constructed; however this in turn results from mental processes influenced by experiences which are of themselves based on myriad facts (a curious replication process). None of which imply some 'ought' based on anything other than the subject's perceived experience and surroundings. While this may not indicate a universal (or similar) ought/ought not, it can perhaps be used to identify an abstracted ought/ought not paradigm - it is merely that this would be informed significantly by subjectivity. Remembering my earlier conclusion that a discussion of the potential (un)desirability of impacts of choices is contingent upon the presence of an entity capable of perceiving (and conceiving of) a significant variety of factors; I consider this an entirely natural and even potentially defining characteristic.

While I personally have no problem with the idea of subjective morality I understand others do not have such a position; therefore we can look to attempt to extract an objective framework from this enormous set of facts based on axiomatic premises - the construction of (let alone the reasoning produced) is likely to be contentious as well as bounded by the need to satisfice as a result of information limitations.
 
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Meow Mix

Chatte Féministe
I think an important part of the distinction of morality is that it is something that impacts other people in some way, directly or indirectly. Even something like alcohol or drug use, sexual promiscuity, etc., so-called 'victimless' moral choices, actually do impact others indirectly.

But, you still end up with the question of why should we care about other people.

I agree, I think this is worth noting. Aesthetic preferences only affect us (unless we're agitating other peoples' aesthetic preference, I guess, such as Revolting always smelling so bad), whereas moral oughts and ought-nots seem to have to do with other people largely.

I think it's interesting to point out that can't be the defining characteristic since there is at least one counterexample (ironically enough, depending on your ethics): suicide.

I don't want the thread to derail and be about suicide or any other hot-button ethical issues, mind you; but I'm just bringing it up because it's interesting: for those who consider suicide to have negative moral connotations, perhaps there needs to be a reason thought up for why it's associated with morals when nearly all other morals are associated with others?

I suppose a theist could argue because even if they don't have family/friends to miss them that God still wouldn't want them to do it -- or something.
 

InformedIgnorance

Do you 'know' or believe?
I agree, I think this is worth noting. Aesthetic preferences only affect us (unless we're agitating other peoples' aesthetic preference, I guess, such as Revolting always smelling so bad), whereas moral oughts and ought-nots seem to have to do with other people largely.

I think it's interesting to point out that can't be the defining characteristic since there is at least one counterexample (ironically enough, depending on your ethics): suicide.

I don't want the thread to derail and be about suicide or any other hot-button ethical issues, mind you; but I'm just bringing it up because it's interesting: for those who consider suicide to have negative moral connotations, perhaps there needs to be a reason thought up for why it's associated with morals when nearly all other morals are associated with others?

I suppose a theist could argue because even if they don't have family/friends to miss them that God still wouldn't want them to do it -- or something.
How would suicide be a counterexample? One posits this as a potential moral issue for a limited number of reasons:
Perception of a negative effect on the ceased agent (loss of agent's potential)
Perception of a negative effect on associated agents (suffering of family/friends)
Perception of a negative effect on local agents (those who find the body, those who own the hotel you decided to hang yourself in etc)
Perception of a negative effect on a purported supernatural agent (a sin)

On the issue of potential or opportunity cost etc - one can most easily see the difference comparing the perception of euthanasia of a terminally ill patient as compared to suicide by a currently inebriated depressed youth who has just had a major set back (such as being dumped) in which case the later is perceived as having a much higher chance of one day considering having prior attempted suicide to be undesirable.

It is these we find the most contentious; where we assert a concerned divine agent, where the departed apparently had unrestricted potential (young, healthy etc), where they had loved ones and when the circumstances with which they ended their life inconvenienced others (not to be callous - but for example were someone to kill themselves in front of little children - obviously has a component we would at least subconsciously account for in our reaction to such an event) - an interesting counterpoint to the last one would be if they had clearly demonstrated significant foresight to limit the impact it would have on others in which case I believe we would likely find the event no less emotionally effecting but rather that we might feel more keenly the loss of potential (given the individual has demonstrated significant consideration for others even at a very troubling time for themselves).
 
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Meow Mix

Chatte Féministe
I think I understand the source for us seeing it differently. I don't seek truth, nor am I a great believer in metaphysical truths. I look for facts. Or to quote my favorite fictional colleague:

I am not using so stiff a definition of "truth" here. Dr. Jones was referring to "truth" as in "absolute truth" -- the truth I'm talking about here is much more benign, and in fact one that you're using even now. For instance when you assert anything like "I think I understand the source...," that's a proposition because it has a truth value; and it's true if your conception corresponds to reality -- so there is an implicit "[It is true that] I think I understand the source..."

Caladan said:
However you should take note, that you yourself recognize that there is more weight to a certain (correct? rational?) behavioral (moral?) pattern (such as not dropkicking babies) than color preferences. So in your philosophical frame which you discuss here, how would you define your differentiation between preferences and what you called moral beliefs above? In other words what is the source for people like you and me (and most people) to know that dropkicking babies is wrong, but at the same time we may casually choose to paint our bedrooms in different shades?

Well, we could come up with a few things to distinguish them. One, as you note, is the strength at which they are felt in normal people. Another, as Luna brought up, is that aesthetic preferences tend only to involve ourselves (i.e. "What do I like?") whereas moral beliefs tend usually to involve other beings (i.e. "Would x like/dislike y?")

I am not saying they're the same thing, just that it seems like they're the same class of things if that makes sense.

I would call them moral preferences, by the way, if I were more confident that some objective referent for moral oughts won't crop up. At this point I'm leaving the matter open: whether or not moral beliefs are actually moral preferences depends on whether there are concrete, objective referents for moral oughts to correspond to in reality. (I'm having a really hard time seeing how it would make sense for such a thing to exist, but that's the point of these discussions -- to open up different perspectives!)
 

idea

Question Everything
...
Ok, so then what are moral truths? ...to correspond to reality? ....
Does anything correspond to reality about "ought" or "ought-not?" If so, what? How?

Absolute moral truths only exist if God exists. God would be the reality that makes moral truths a reality.
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Which one?
For example:
legiononomamoi-albums-other-picture4801-truth-theories.jpg
 

idea

Question Everything
What about God saying what is right makes them moral? [Said Socrates to Euthyphro]

I take the other horn, that goodness is it's own entity, (not defined by God). Without God, goodness and perfection would only be an abstract idea. With God, goodness becomes a physical reality.
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
I take the other horn, that goodness is it's own entity, (not defined by God).
Then it exists independently of God and God is not required for it.

With God, goodness becomes a physical reality.
But we have no need for god now that we exist (assuming that god exists and created physical reality) because right and wrong would, in your view, exist without god.
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
(I'm already confused with the first one, isn't it called deflationary if truth is not a property?)
More or less, and good catch! The author deliberately doesn't use the term:
"Let me insert here a remark on terminological policy. I shall steadfastly refrain from using the term ‘deflationism’, which has been applied to various entries on my flow chart (in particular to nihilism, disquotationalism, and minimalism). What deflationism comes to varies with the target that is alleged to be inflated. So we find a confusing multiplicity of uses in the literature. According to Field, ‘“Deflationism” is the view that truth is at bottom disquotational.’ This implies that deflationists must take truth to be a property of something that can be put between quotation marks. But then Horwich’s minimalism cannot be called deflationist, since he takes truth to be a property of propositions. Yet he is very keen to promote his conception of truth under the label ‘deflationism’. Nihilists, too, would lose the right to call themselves deflationists, since they deny that truth is a property at all. Marian David links deflationism with a metaphysical distaste for non-physical entities. Again, minimalism is out, and so is every conception according to which truth is a property of type-sentences. According to Paul Boghossian, Crispin Wright, and William Alston, deflationism is the view that ‘it is a mistake to suppose that there is a property of truth (falsity) that one attributes to propositions, statements, beliefs, and/or sentences’. Once again, minimalism turns out to be inflationist, and so does disquotationalism, because they take truth to be a property of propositions or of certain linguistic objects. A few pages later Wright tells us that it is deflationism’s ‘most basic and distinctive contention that “true” is merely a device for endorsing assertions’. But this characterization only fits the position that Strawson took in 1949. Horwich himself seems to mean by ‘deflationism’ the denial of the claim that ‘the property of truth has some sort of underlying nature,’ but why not call the minimalist account an attempt at disclosing the nature of truth? In view of this terminological chaos, I propose to put the term ‘deflationism’ on what Otto Neurath once called, tongue in cheek, the Index Verborum Prohibitorum."
Künne, W. (2003). Conceptions of truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Also I'm not sure exactly what a few of these are asking.

I could clarify if you tell me which one.

You're fired from the band.
Damn. Can I at least be a roadie? Please!?
 
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