I don't need a link. Your're the only atheist that I have heard claim that there is absolute morality in your worldview, if that is what you are saying. However your link doesn't satisfy me because it says that humans were created and says that "moral systems cannot persuade moral action or be regarded as bases for moral judgments against others..." That isn't absolute morality.
There might be a basis for morality in your worldview, which is the common good, but there is no basis for absolute morality where things are wrong in all situations. If you think there is, then you need to debate your own atheist philosophers first before me.
On the contrary, one of my points is that you and I (theist and atheist) are on equal ground in terms of absolute morality.
We can each demonstrate that there is an ultimate method to know what is moral, but the problem with each of our worldviews is that there is no absolute duty to take up that cause.
For instance, I've shown that there can be a moral system based on rationality. But there is no duty to be rational unless one is already rational. That's the shortcoming of the system I describe.
Your moral system is based on divine fiat, but it comes with a hefty paradox known as Euthyphro's Dilemma: is what God commands us to do good because it is good, or is it good because God commands it?
1) If what God commands us to do is good because God commands it, then morality isn't absolute: God could command us to punch babies and that would therefore be "good," and so morality isn't absolute at all but rather subject to God's whim rather than society's.
2) If God commands things because they are in themselves good, then notice that the goodness isn't coming from God: it appears in this case that God is simply following some principle of goodness outside of Himself and passing it along to us; in which case theism isn't in principle necessary for objective morality after all.
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The most common objection to (1) is that God would never command us to murder or to punch babies; but this is actually making an appeal to the fundamentally incompatible state of affairs in (2): why wouldn't God command us to punch babies? If he did decide to command it, it would in fact be just as good as commanding us instead to love one another -- if we're going to believe that "goodness" comes from divine command alone, then God ordering us to torture people is just as good as God ordering us not to -- so there's no reason why He wouldn't eventually decide to do exactly that. If we say that God doesn't "like" suffering, then we're again dangerously approaching (2): why not? If goodness derives from divine command, then it would be just as holy and good and righteous to command us to torture as not. Why wouldn't God like it?
If goodness doesn't come from God's command -- if there's some reason why God doesn't command us to torture -- then "goodness" comes from some other place than God, then, which God is just following. Again, this means that theism would not be required for absolute morality.
When it comes down to it, theists are not in a more rational place than atheists are when it comes to morality. In fact, it seems to me that they're much worse off. Euthyphro's dilemma devastates the notion of theistic morality; and furthermore secular ethics (based on rationality) is easier to demonstrate a duty for accepting.
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