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In order to be free agents (as understood in a theological sense), we necessarily require the capacity to do that which God does not wish us to. We must also have agency, of course, and therefore the ability to act, and to choose to act in particular ways. "Before" creation (whatever that might mean), where only God existed and the cosmos did not, there was no morality. Not only were there no agents around who could act at all, such that an act might be immoral or moral, there were also no moral "rules". This no longer is true (for an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good God) once the Cosmos exists. There is the capacity for things which we think of as immoral to occur (murder, genocide, etc.). Barring Ned Flanders, there are not many philosophers who would find Homer's question ("could God microwave a burrito so hot that he himself could not eat it?") or similar "limitations" actually limitations at all. A less well-known (relative to Homer's question) is Swinburne's proposal: it is not a limitation of God to assert "that if he is to keep Jones a bachelor he must keep him an unmarried man" or, put another way, that God is compelled to make Jones unmarried if Jones is a bachelor. That Jones is unmarried if Jones is a bachelor flows independently of God, but not in any way that limits God's omnipotence. It is simply to say that a thing is what it is.
Before the Cosmos, moral laws had no parallels to tautologies, logical validity, etc. We are left with "dummy variable" morality: "if x has the moral property y, then it is necessarily true that x has the moral property y." However, God then created as universe in which there would be humans. Humans feel pain. They can be harmed in any number of ways. Creating humans with the capacity to act freely and to be able to do wrong (even if given a sense of what is right), including e.g., burning another human alive, entails certain logical truths: it is true that if a human is burned alive, they will die in agony. This is not a necessary truth in and of itself, in that (in a creationist cosmology) God could have created drones incapable of pain, free will, and/or evil acts. However, it becomes a necessary truth which is contingent upon the manner in which humans experience things like being burned.
In order to have agents capable of doing that which God does not want, or that which God does not approve of, these agents must have some properties such that they can act in ways contrary to God's desire (if they could not, they would not have free will). So, in any possible world God creates, free agents must have some property x which allows them to commit some act y such that God does not approve.
Necessary morality is independent of God, but God of course approves of moral behavior. If God creates agents incapable of immoral behavior, God has ensured that these agents are bound to do whatever God wants and only that which God wants. They are thus not free.
Therefore, given any possible world, God's free agents must necessarily be able to act immorally. They must be able to act in a manner which has the property of being immoral. However, the particular nature of these properties is contingent upon God's choice. Depending upon the manner of creation, God could create a world in which being burned alive is pleasant or horrific, or even a world in which physical pain does not exist. However, there must be ways in which humans can act immorally, or God has not created free agents. Likewise, as God is benevolent, ensuring that agents are only capable of benevolent actions is again to deny them free agency by ensuring they do only that which God desires. So agents must be able to act malevolently. Once more, the ways in which acts become malevolent or not are contingent upon the manner of creation, but they are necessary components of it.
Or at least this is one answer to the Euthyphro dilemma that not only relates to why evil exists but absolute morality dependent upon God.
In order to be free agents (as understood in a theological sense), we necessarily require the capacity to do that which God does not wish us to. We must also have agency, of course, and therefore the ability to act, and to choose to act in particular ways. "Before" creation (whatever that might mean), where only God existed and the cosmos did not, there was no morality. Not only were there no agents around who could act at all, such that an act might be immoral or moral, there were also no moral "rules". This no longer is true (for an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good God) once the Cosmos exists. There is the capacity for things which we think of as immoral to occur (murder, genocide, etc.). Barring Ned Flanders, there are not many philosophers who would find Homer's question ("could God microwave a burrito so hot that he himself could not eat it?") or similar "limitations" actually limitations at all. A less well-known (relative to Homer's question) is Swinburne's proposal: it is not a limitation of God to assert "that if he is to keep Jones a bachelor he must keep him an unmarried man" or, put another way, that God is compelled to make Jones unmarried if Jones is a bachelor. That Jones is unmarried if Jones is a bachelor flows independently of God, but not in any way that limits God's omnipotence. It is simply to say that a thing is what it is.
Before the Cosmos, moral laws had no parallels to tautologies, logical validity, etc. We are left with "dummy variable" morality: "if x has the moral property y, then it is necessarily true that x has the moral property y." However, God then created as universe in which there would be humans. Humans feel pain. They can be harmed in any number of ways. Creating humans with the capacity to act freely and to be able to do wrong (even if given a sense of what is right), including e.g., burning another human alive, entails certain logical truths: it is true that if a human is burned alive, they will die in agony. This is not a necessary truth in and of itself, in that (in a creationist cosmology) God could have created drones incapable of pain, free will, and/or evil acts. However, it becomes a necessary truth which is contingent upon the manner in which humans experience things like being burned.
In order to have agents capable of doing that which God does not want, or that which God does not approve of, these agents must have some properties such that they can act in ways contrary to God's desire (if they could not, they would not have free will). So, in any possible world God creates, free agents must have some property x which allows them to commit some act y such that God does not approve.
Necessary morality is independent of God, but God of course approves of moral behavior. If God creates agents incapable of immoral behavior, God has ensured that these agents are bound to do whatever God wants and only that which God wants. They are thus not free.
Therefore, given any possible world, God's free agents must necessarily be able to act immorally. They must be able to act in a manner which has the property of being immoral. However, the particular nature of these properties is contingent upon God's choice. Depending upon the manner of creation, God could create a world in which being burned alive is pleasant or horrific, or even a world in which physical pain does not exist. However, there must be ways in which humans can act immorally, or God has not created free agents. Likewise, as God is benevolent, ensuring that agents are only capable of benevolent actions is again to deny them free agency by ensuring they do only that which God desires. So agents must be able to act malevolently. Once more, the ways in which acts become malevolent or not are contingent upon the manner of creation, but they are necessary components of it.
Or at least this is one answer to the Euthyphro dilemma that not only relates to why evil exists but absolute morality dependent upon God.
