Freewill, all or nothing?

[fantome profane]

This is a branch off of the most recent "The Problem of Evil" thread.

Must freewill be all, or nothing? Or is it conceivable that freewill can be limited, without being completely eliminated?

It has been suggested in response to the Problem of Evil, that if "God" were to interfere in anyway with freewill this would mean eliminating freewill completely from all humans. I really hope I am not presenting a straw-man here. But this is really what seemed to be argued. And it is not the first time I have heard this argument, an other poster who has not been here for some time often argued that for "God" to interfere with freewill would turn all of humanity into mindless automatons. I was never able to get her to give me an explanation for this, and it seems completely illogical to me, not to mention contrary to observation.

So let me set out my position. I believe freewill is a relative thing. No human being in this world has unfettered freewill. I believe some individuals in our world have more freewill than others. And I believe that the amount of freewill an individual has can vary depending on circumstances.

And I don't need to resort to magical powers (flying like Superman) to illustrate my position, I am talking about real world situations that can be observed and experienced.

A sexual predator with a preference for children wants to rape a certain child. That child's father, uncle, and older brother stand nearby. That predator will not be able to harm that child. That is not a paradox, that is not illogical, and it certainly is not immoral for the father to protect his child. This is not a logical paradox. This does not turn the entire human race into automatons, it does not even turn the predator into an automaton (unless he gets his head bashed in).

I doubt the father in that situation have moral qualms about interfering with the predators freewill. I doubt he would have major concerns about what the predator may have learned from abusing his child. I doubt he would have any difficulty in judging which has more value, the freewill of the predator to rape, or the freewill of the child not to be raped.

So:

Must freewill be absolutely all or absolutely nothing?

 

[idav]

Freewill can be said to be using determinism to your advantage. Not many beings are free to do that so I think there is an area where both are relevant. Will and volition by defintion have some semblance of freedom. A good question I heard asked, think it was willamena, how is will not free.

 

[bobhikes]

I treat Free Will as an ability, necessary for survival but not necessary all the time.

As the determinist says you can just let the causes dictate the actions. With free will you have the ability to choose.

God and Free Will. In my mind God would be natural and nature has to be dealt with, its why you have free will. You decide to go to the store but a tree falls on your car. Now you have to decide something else. Free will was interfered with but not lost in fact the result is you have to use it again.

 

[The Sum of Awe]

There is Compatibalism

 

[technomage]

Must freewill be all, or nothing? Or is it conceivable that freewill can be limited, without being completely eliminated?

Just as we do not have a good definition of consciousness, we do not have a functional definition of free will. Nevertheless, my free will _seems_ to be only constrained by my personality (I could not, for instance, engage in casual murder or rape because doing so would violate my personal sense of right and wrong), and by my physical limitations (I cannot, for instance, flap my arms and fly to he moon).

If, however, free will was constrained by something else (an external constraint), then while my will is still somewhat free, it is not truly free. There's room for external constraint without saying "Oh, that mean police officer would arrest me if I punch you, therefore I do not have free will."

 

[LuisDantas]

Must freewill be absolutely all or absolutely nothing?

You seem to be defining free will as "freedom of action and expression".

I'm not sure that is a natural meaning, since far as I can tell Free Will as a concept was created to limit God, or perhaps just to explain what would seem to be his limitations. I don't know that it can be found or defined in any other contexts.

In any case, going by your scenario, it is both natural and unavoidable to find limitations to our freedom. That is often actually helpful, in that it sets clear priorities and gives meaning to our choices.

An absolute freedom is impossible in practice, and not particularly desirable even in the abstract.

 

[CynthiaCypher]

Thing is, culture, environment, biology, upbringing and more are all determinants to our choices. Most people are unaware that things like biology and culture are influencing behavior and therefore limiting will.

Take teenagers during puberty for example.

 

[Skwim]

Just as we do not have a good definition of consciousness, we do not have a functional definition of free will.

As I've said before, I think a good working definition of freewill is: "The ability to have done differently."

There is Compatibalism

As William James once said of compatibilists "They create a quagmire of evasion" by stealing the name of freedom to mask their underlying determinism.

 

[Saint Frankenstein]

I agree with the OP. Of course free will isn't unlimited. We are bound by laws of the physical universe, biology and life circumstances. But we have choices within that. So it's in the middle.

 

[gree0232]

Free Will is the open exercise of all possibilities before us. We are not omnipotent beings and are therefore limited by our physical capacity, which is not a limit on the exercise of free will.

In its simplest, free will is the exercise of available choices:

A: Go right.

B: Go left.

If we exercise either of these, at our discretion for whatever reason we choose, then we have free will. If at any point we block either option, we will have a serious issue. For example, if we say that anyone thinking about French Fries (Or Freedom Fries in Washington) cannot turn left ... people would tend to notice. As in, I could not turn left because I was thinking about French Fries and I got into a car accident as a result. Others thinking about French Fries would no doubt find the same thing. Others would then test it, think about French Fries and notice that they could not turn left.

Then would come the question: why is free will limited?

In short, any limitation of the exercise of free will would be rather quickly noted by humanity.

There are two problems here that seem to get atheists upset:

#1 - That there should be a limit of negative choices (like turning left above). So where is that line drawn?

Should you be allowed to eat Burger King? Even if you know its going to give you diabetes and make you fat? Or is that YOUR decision to make? Should you be allowed to NOT exercise? An get the same consequences as those who DO exercise?

And think bigger for a minute. If nothing bad can happen, how do people learn about the reality of abusing power? Should we have been allowed to invade Iraq? Because trust me, there are all kinds of bad things that happen as a result of that decision? What would happen if suddenly, no matter what we can do, we could not invade Iraq? Because some people in that chain of reasoning were clearly abusing power? Others, quite honestly, believed that they were standing up to a murderous tyrant. and to suddenly have human history blocked on a massive scale because nothing negative can happen would ... well it would both prove that there is a God and it would fundamentally undermine the human experience wouldn't it?

To grant free will means you accept that some people will abuse it. They will face consequences for their actions. Most people will not choose evil. And that reality is born of the tremendous faith and love God has for US - to allow that and suffer the consequences of the decision to have faith in US.

#2 - Atheists seem to be confusing free will with omnipotence. They are not the same thing. Being able to exercise all possibilities before you is free will. Omnipotence, unfortunately, undermines the point: consequences.

You can indeed freely choose to attempt to run through a stone wall at full speed. Not being omnipotent will rather quickly result in a rather jarring form of consequence as a result of the unwise application of judgement with regard to physical boundaries. Indeed, the guy that built the wall, built it precisely to keep you out, and his free will would not appreciate your free will busting through his wall now would he?

We exist to learn, and that requires consequences for our actions. Both good and bad. Its kind of the point.

Omnipotence prevents free will, because omnipotence can violate free will. And if we had it, given that human abuse what little physical power we have by comparison, I am sure we would abuse unlimited power as well - with all the attendant consequences THAT would have.

In short, God does indeed seem to trust us - just not blindly so. He loves us, he's not stupid.

 

[Willamena]

This is a branch off of the most recent "The Problem of Evil" thread.

Must freewill be all, or nothing? Or is it conceivable that freewill can be limited, without being completely eliminated?

All or nothing, yes, which is to say that it is or it is not.

It has been suggested in response to the Problem of Evil, that if "God" were to interfere in anyway with freewill this would mean eliminating freewill completely from all humans. I really hope I am not presenting a straw-man here. But this is really what seemed to be argued. And it is not the first time I have heard this argument, an other poster who has not been here for some time often argued that for "God" to interfere with freewill would turn all of humanity into mindless automatons. I was never able to get her to give me an explanation for this, and it seems completely illogical to me, not to mention contrary to observation.

The base idea is that free will is tied to agency. If agency is given to anyone/anything else to perform, then it's not given to us to perform. Agency is integral with identity, hence the dichotomy is one of identity, so it's pretty much absolute. If "God" does for "me" for what I should do for myself, then "God" and not "me" is the agent in that incident. Automatons execute the program they are given. The agent is their programmer, and not them.

So let me set out my position. I believe freewill is a relative thing. No human being in this world has unfettered freewill. I believe some individuals in our world have more freewill than others. And I believe that the amount of freewill an individual has can vary depending on circumstances.

And I don't need to resort to magical powers (flying like Superman) to illustrate my position, I am talking about real world situations that can be observed and experienced.

A sexual predator with a preference for children wants to rape a certain child. That child's father, uncle, and older brother stand nearby. That predator will not be able to harm that child. That is not a paradox, that is not illogical, and it certainly is not immoral for the father to protect his child. This is not a logical paradox. This does not turn the entire human race into automatons, it does not even turn the predator into an automaton (unless he gets his head bashed in).

That ties free will with ability, so a different image of free will.

So:

Must freewill be absolutely all or absolutely nothing?

Here's me. There's you.

I can do things independent of you, and you can do things independent of me, and we can do things dependent on each other, things in interaction. If there was no you, I could still do things. If there was no me, you could still do things. We just couldn't do things that depend on each other.

Here's me. Here's the world.

I can do things that are either independent of or depend on my interaction with the world. Agency is the idea that I can do some things independent of the world, that I can act on the world and exact changes in accord with my wants and preferences.

There's "God," for all intents and purposes the natural world. Here's me, acting to affect nature: I can build machines that defy gravity, I can build straight lines and precise boxes, I can cure diseases, I can improve the environment, and I can destroy it.

If it's not me doing these things, if it's all a part of a grand scheme of God's (or gods), or if it's all a part of the pre-determined natural course--in other words, if we write "me" out of the picture and give agency to someone or something else--then we are left with automatons, going about the business of either a grand plan or utter chaos. In the latter case, we are reduced to billiard balls, bouncing around our lives like molecules of gas in a jar.

 

[Kilgore Trout]

I'm not sure if or how this relates to your question, but if freewill essentially boils down to it having been possible for you to have made a different decision than what you did, then I think that freewill is extremely limited, and possibly near to the point of non-existence. I tend to think of it as mostly an illusion created by our consciousness which gives us the false sense that we are beings who go through life navigating a series of possible free choices. However, in fact, when you take into account habit, genetics, imprinted patterns and experiences, subconscious and autonomic drives and urges, and the somewhat hazy illusion of our consciousness in general, it's looking more and more like the majority of our "free choices" wouldn't/couldn't have happened any other way, and thus, fundamentally were never really choices at all.

 

[The Sum of Awe]

As William James once said of compatibilists "They create a quagmire of evasion" by stealing the name of freedom to mask their underlying determinism.

I am merely a hard determinist offering titles.

 

[1137]

The fact that we are self aware may allow for a conscious "veto" against determinism, therefore allowing a tiny bit of free will within a deterministic universe. So I'd say that it is not an either / or type thing. There may be only determinism or there may be determinism with a shred of free will, I see no other options.

 

[Objective Qualia]

It has been suggested in response to the Problem of Evil, that if "God" were to interfere in anyway with freewill this would mean eliminating freewill completely from all humans. I really hope I am not presenting a straw-man here. But this is really what seemed to be argued. And it is not the first time I have heard this argument, an other poster who has not been here for some time often argued that for "God" to interfere with freewill would turn all of humanity into mindless automatons. I was never able to get her to give me an explanation for this, and it seems completely illogical to me, not to mention contrary to observation.

Must freewill be absolutely all or absolutely nothing?

"God" has already limited our free will. If you agree this god has designed our bodies, minds and physical universe then our options are limited from the start. No one can live under water like a fish or survive on nothing but water and sunlight no matter how much they will it to be so. Likewise for our minds, we cannot imagine a new color we've never experienced. The limitations on our free will are staggering.

 

[yoda89]

Must freewill be all, or nothing? Or is it conceivable that freewill can be limited, without being completely eliminated?

In our actions and thoughts there is an amount of determinism. The fact that since you liked a certain soda you will probably buy it again. People are more inclined to do various things based on previous experiences. Our thoughts arise from these previous experiences and our thoughts influence our current actions. Those current actions will influence future actions. Therefore it cannot be absolute.

The argument that if I do not have total free will means that is none at all somewhat of a simplistic argument method. If God has given us all free rein and if I do not have absolute free rein. Then there cannot be any free rein. Pretty simple.

I disagree with your concept of people having different degrees of free will. Many people are inclined to choice what they wish to because of outside factors.

 

[idav]

There may be only determinism or there may be determinism with a shred of free will, I see no other options.

This pretty much sums it.

 

[Amechania]

Obviously we have will enough to make choices every day. Those choices are conditioned by experience and our morality, but the will is free enough to break our conditioning. I prefer moral choices that avoid experiencing a sense of guilt. Guilt is the arbiter of free will. Regret can alter will just as will can overcome regret.

 

[Skwim]

From a post I made a couple of years ago.

As I see it, free will is important to many because without it would mean each of is nothing more than a robot, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If I have no freedom of choice how can I be blamed for what I do? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given.

Any exception to free will is seen as temporary constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes and prevents it. Of course this isn't at all what the issue of free will is about. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think a decent working definition of "free will" is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished.

Those who most disagree with this are the hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused then we could not have done differently, therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic level: Are we free to do other than what we chose or not? I say, No you are not. Free will is an illusion. But before going into why, we first need to get rid of the term "choice" because it assumes to be true the condition under consideration, freedom to do what we want. So no use of "choice," "choosing,"chosen," or any other form of the word.

Here's how I see it.
There are only two ways actions take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely randomly" I mean absolutely random, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, appears to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway, completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that negate any randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless the causes had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with our decisions. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.

What does this all mean then? It means that we cannot do any any differently than what we do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, the will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..

Of course this means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. If you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .
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