Yes, but he's still wrong - if we can't know anything about what is at stake or what kind of odds are involved
The wager is a philosophical point regarding probabilistic decision making under uncertainty. This is a different concept to gambling which generally involves risk (rough probabilities are known) rather than uncertainty (probabilities can't be known but a decision still needs to be made).
Figured out awhile ago that Pascal's wager was an...at the very least...false dichotomy. It would only work if one knew that only two possibilities existed; a very specific god, or none at all. Looking around me I see far too many versions of God...pretty much contradictory. Which one should one 'bet' upon?
Not necessarily. It could be argued that betting on one of many possible alternatives still carries a higher expected payoff than refusing to choose. With unbounded upsides/downsides even a tiny probability of being correct can offer a superior expected payout.
The Wager is a supremely ironic work
One of the most utterly flawed and unconvincing examples of argument known to humanity - to the point that I doubt that it was ever meant for argument - yet it just keeps being presented in apparent seriousness anyway.
It does not even support its own weight by any measure, not even theologically. But people just ignore that and march on presenting it again.
It is impressive in a very dismaying way.
This is a danger of taking ideas out of a historical context and treating them anachronistically in isolation.
Pascal made important contributions to the experimental scientific method, geometry, literature etc. yet some scholars consider his probabilistic views on god to be among the most influential of his contributions to the modern world. They marked a change in perspective from thinking God was something that could be proved, to something which could only be accepted without a high degree of certainty.
Other than being an innovative way to think about God in the Western tradition, it formed part of a broader philosophical view regarding how we make judgements about truth in situations where we lack the information to make accurate decisions.
People today tend to look at Pascal's wager far too much from the perspective of the contemporary religious environment, rather than as a 17th C application of the philosophical application of probability theory onto an issue that people could relate to.
From a purely probabilistic perspective you can still find contemporary scholarship that argues he has a point, even though there are obvious issues with his reasoning that are more apparent to a modern audience.
Even if we assume he is completely wrong, to dismiss it as idiotic is facile, as things which are 'wrong' can still express aspects of truth and have positive impacts as the history of ideas so clearly demonstrates.
My professor taught that it was uncertain whether Pascal wanted his wager to be taken too seriously. You see, Pascal had some friends who were gamblers. According to my professor, it is arguable on the basis of some things Pascal said about his wager that he wasn't so much trying to come up with a completely serious proposal, but was rather trying to couch the issue of Christian salvation in such terms that his friends -- the gamblers -- would become interested in discussing the subject, and might even at some point wish to be saved.
I've heard similar points raised.
It's also debatable how compatible PW was with his Jansenist theology which had a greater focus on predestination and the idea that one could only be saved through the grace of God.
It was rather selfish of him to die before he finished his tome, wasn't it?