Does the non-existence of free will change your beliefs?

[NIX]

Assuming the deteministic model is true, we do so many truly SILLY things!

Awards, medals, accalaids for people who have displayed "valor, heroism, knowledge, creativity, talent, ability, hard work, kindness".... ANYTHING. AS IF they have done anything exceptional, above and beyond, meritorious, when all they did was "do what they do" like everyone else. Other people may have liked what they did, sure. But this is no reflection on the person who did it. Under this model heroism is dead (except in stories, myths and fairy tales-- ie, people's minds).

 

[crossfire]

Well this really depends on who is defining 'good'.

When you change a major life outlook, it changes You, and as a result, it changes choices you would have otherwise made if it had been determined that you continue down the road of your previous model.

Now whether the "old you" or the "new you" is more or less good? It is a subjective notion. Good for who? Good in what way/s?

Frubal! (Karma-self interaction. You might like the Mind like Fire: The Self and Karma thread.)

 

[NIX]

We are the characters in our own mythologies.

 

[Gjallarhorn]

Assuming the deteministic model is true, we do so many truly SILLY things!

Awards, medals, accalaids for people who have displayed "valor, heroism, knowledge, creativity, talent, ability, hard work, kindness".... ANYTHING. AS IF they have done anything exceptional, above and beyond, meritorious, when all they did was "do what they do" like everyone else. Other people may have liked what they did, sure. But this is no reflection on the person who did it. Under this model heroism is dead (except in stories, myths and fairy tales-- ie, people's minds).

Considering the deterministic model is true, there is no such thing as a silly thing.

 

[NIX]

Considering the deterministic model is true, there is no such thing as a silly thing.

When we dress our folly in pomp, some of us can't help but laugh.

 

[Gjallarhorn]

When we dress our folly in pomp, some of us can't help but laugh.

It's not your fault. The laws of physics enjoy irony.

 

[crossfire]

It's not your fault. The laws of physics enjoy irony.

lol, frubal!
{after I spread some more around}

 

[Skwim]

That's why I don't think hard-determinists really act as hard-determinists.

They don't.

Their belief is only brain-deep, but it doesn't sink in, really. You are like Christmas-day Christians: You only go to church on Christmas day, and if someone asks what you believe, you say "Yeah, sure, Jesus died for my sins." You're talking the talk, but you ain't walking the walk.

The truth is, we can only operate in the world as the forces of determinism have led us to operate. In a very real sense it is an illusion, but an illusion we have no option in participating in. I can do no differently than to behave as if I have freewill even though I recognize it is false. What can I say.

Again with this false notion of choosing: that you freely opt to do this rather than that. Truth is, you had to do "this."

Prove it.

Proof is for math and formal logic, but I will attempt to explain. The following is from a post I made last year.

"There are only two ways actions take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely randomly" I mean absolutely random, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, appears to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate, completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that negate any randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless the causes had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with our decisions. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.

What does this all mean then? It means that we cannot do any any differently than what we do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, the will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..

Of course this means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. If you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .
Link to original
​

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

They don't.
The truth is, we can only operate in the world as the forces of determinism have led us to operate.

Which forces?

"The emergence of QM undermined the traditional way of understanding the problem of free will by undermining our prima facie reasons for believing determinism and, indeed, by revealing that determinism is not the sort of doctrine that can be motivated by prima facie, pretheoretic, armchair arguments. Rather, it is a controversial empirical thesis about the workings of the physical world; in short, it is a question for scientists, most notably physicists. Today, many (perhaps even most) physicists and philosophers of physics reject determinism and endorse indeterminism." from Mark Balaguer's Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem (MIT Press, 2010). (emphasis added)

"In theories that, like QM, sanction nonlocal correlations, nonlocality and indeterminism cooperate to prevent signaling and protect compatibility with STR."
-Wayne C. Myrvold

"As for the cut between classical and quantum systems, this also is mandated by the fact that quantum mechanics is a theory devised for the explanation of the behavior of systems that are inherently indeterministic"
-Yemima Ben-Menahem

Both quotes above (emphases added) are taken from the papers by the respective authors in the volume Probability in Physics a volume from Springer's monograph series The Frontiers Collection (2012). Although both interpretations and models of physics differ when it comes to determinism, the tendency (both in approach and research) is to accept that the universe is rather fundamentally indeterministic:

"First of all, the idea of ‘absolute precision’ in determining a system’s state is an abstract concept (or even intrinsically wrong), completely lacking in meaning in practice, absolutely unachievable in any measurement, at least (but not only) due to the constraints posed by the principle of quantum indetermination."
from Bertuglia, C.S., & Vaio, F. (2005). Nonlinearity, Chaos, and Complexity: The Dynamics of Natural and Social Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press

The entire volume concerns the persistent and problematic assumptions carried over from classical physics despite the fact that the classical model is wrong and even apart from QM complex systems are not easily modeled or explained using classical methods. The latter point is central to that particular volume (i.e., that indeterminancy should not be relegated to the quantum world and therefore ignored). Although models of nonlinear systems date back to Newton, "chaos theory" (dynamical systems theory) hasn't even been around as long as QM. Unlike physics, however, more and more fields have adopted a dynamical systems approach and worked on methods for dealing with indeterminancy. In fact, there are even works like Scott's monograph The Nonlinear Universe (from Springer's Frontiers Collection, 2007) or Brown's Physical Relativity- Space-time Structure from a Dynamical Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2005) which approach QM from a dynamical systems framework. In other words, "chaos theory" seems to be the theoretical framework for (among other things) the cosmos.

There are regular conferences, entire journals, various monograph series, and so forth, not only on quantum indeterminacy and its relevance at the macroscopic level, but on complex systems with emergent properties which cannot (even in principle) be determined by any laws.

And for the brain, we have both QM approaches and dynamical systems approaches (not to mention a few combinations). Springer's Understanding Complex Systems put out the edited volume Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will in 2009. Similar series (Oxford's Representation and Mind, Oxford's Philosophy of Mind, Springer's Frontiers Collection mentioned above, MIT Press' Computational Neuroscience, etc.) are either largely dedicated to or at least put out scholarship on the same topic. There are several journals which are likewise dedicated to either compex systems and indeterminacy in general, or with the brain specifically.

Determinism is largely a relic of a bygone age. Not that chaos theory and/or QM solve the issue of free will, of course, but why must we continually use outdated models of physics, systems, and the human brain when the issue of free will inevitably arises in another thread?

 

[Skwim]

Which forces?

Cause and effect.

"The emergence of QM undermined the traditional way of understanding the problem of free will by undermining our prima facie reasons for believing determinism and, indeed, by revealing that determinism is not the sort of doctrine that can be motivated by prima facie, pretheoretic, armchair arguments. Rather, it is a controversial empirical thesis about the workings of the physical world; in short, it is a question for scientists, most notably physicists. Today, many (perhaps even most) physicists and philosophers of physics reject determinism and endorse indeterminism." from Mark Balaguer's Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem (MIT Press, 2010). (emphasis added)

My understanding is based on conclusions such as

"The main argument against the quantum mind proposition is that quantum states in the brain would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale at which they could be useful for neural processing. This argument was elaborated by the physicist, Max Tegmark. Based on his calculations, Tegmark concluded that quantum systems in the brain decohere quickly and cannot control brain function.[3][4]
source

[3]Based on a calculation of neural decoherence rates, we argue that the degrees of freedom of the human brain that relate to cognitive processes should be thought of as a classical rather than quantum system, i.e., that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the current classical approach to neural network simulations. We find that the decoherence time scales (∼10-13–10-20s) are typically much shorter than the relevant dynamical time scales (∼10-3–10-1s), both for regular neuron firing and for kinklike polarization excitations in microtubules. This conclusion disagrees with suggestions by Penrose and others that the brain acts as a quantum computer, and that quantum coherence is related to consciousness in a fundamental way.

[4] Calculations show that collapsing wave functions of tiny structures in the brain can't explain the mystery of thought. The findings deal a sharp blow to "quantum consciousness," the idea that thoughts arise in the brain through the workings of quantum mechanics. By combining data about the brain's temperature, the sizes of proposed quantum objects, and disturbances caused by such things as ions, a physicist has concluded that possible quantum microprocessors decohere far too rapidly to orchestrate the firings of neurons.

​

As for the rest of your post, your points and references do not persuade.

Mark Balaguer's Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem is reviewed here. Among the many other observations the reviewer makes is this

"Balaguer is not committed to incompatibilism, because he doesn't claim that L-freedom is free will, yet given the central role of L-freedom in his theory the compatibility problem seems to matter. I can't help but think the project would be better placed within a compatibilist framework. Indeed, at the end of the review I argue that Balaguer is committed to compatibilism."
​

The remarks you quote by Wayne C. Myrvold, Yemima Ben-Menahem, and Bertuglia, C.S., & Vaio, F. are irrelevant, as is your

"The entire volume concerns the persistent and problematic assumptions carried over from classical physics despite the fact that the classical model is wrong and even apart from QM complex systems are not easily modeled or explained using classical methods."
​

And while your conclusion

"Determinism is largely a relic of a bygone age. Not that chaos theory and/or QM solve the issue of free will, of course, but why must we continually use outdated models of physics, systems, and the human brain when the issue of free will inevitably arises in another thread?"
​

is interesting, begging the question is not.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Cause and effect.

These are not forces. They are philosophical concepts.

My understanding is based on conclusions such as

Did you read the sources (i.e., not just the science magazine review of Tegmark's study, but Tegmark's study itself)? Tegmark's study came out in 2000, in the journal Physics Review E (Vol. 61 no. 4). And his central argument, as he states, is a particular model of neurons/neural activity:"In this analysis, the object is the neuron, and the superposition will be destroyed by any interaction with other (environment) degrees of freedom that is sensitive to where the ions are located" p. 4197.

However, there are issues with Tegmark's description of neural activity (some are merely the result of the study being over a decade old) as well as his use of decoherence. We don't even have to switch journals. The obvious place to start would by the reply to Tegmark in volume 65 by Hagan, Hameroff, and Tuszynski. But as it is Hameroff's model under attack, why not go with a neutral party? Volume 70 (2004) included a study by Rosa & Faber: "Quantum models of the mind: Are they compatible with environment decoherence?" The authors (like Tegmark) criticized the Penrose & Hameroff model and its account of coherence. However, they state:

"based on this difference, we do not conclude, as Tegmark does, that the quantum approach to the brain problem is refuted if we use decoherence instead of gravitational collapse. The first point is that we must also consider the time for building coherence, while the system either remains relatively isolated to sustain coherence or there is no coherent collective state...Our result does not discard the conjecture that quantum theory can help us to understand the functioning of the brain, and maybe also to understand consciousness...We still propose a new quantum model in the brain where the most important thing is the sequence of coherent states accumulating in the microtubule."

Then there's the issue of the change with the field of physics concerning quantum coherence: Tegmark got it wrong. In fact, a paper published from the 2011 Journal of Physics conference not only criticizes Tegmark's analysis, but proposes several components of biological systems which rely on quantum coherence. In the paper ("Plausibility of quantum coherent states in biological systems" by V Salari, J Tuszynski, M Rahnama, G Bernroider), the authors state:

"Hagan et al. have shown that Tegmark used wrong assumptions for his investigation of MTs. Another main objection to the estimate in equation is that Tegmarks formula yields decoherence times that increase with temperature contrary to well-established physical laws and the behavior of quantum coherent states. In view of these (and other) problems in Tegmarks estimates, Hagan et al. assert that the values of quantities in Tegmarks relation are not correct and thus the decoherence time should be approximately 10^10 [ten to the tenth power] times larger leading to a ms range of values for typical decoherence times. According to Hagan et al., MTs in neurons could possibly avoid decoherence via several mechanisms for quantum processing to occur there."

Another paper ("Quantum mechanical aspects of cell microtubules: science fiction or realistic possibility?") published in the same volume (306) of the Journal of Physics conference proceedings has more of the same:
"In view of this specific model, we are therefore in stark disagreement with the conclusions of Tegmark, i.e. that only classical physics is relevant for studying the energy and signal transfer in biological matter. Tegmark’s conclusions did not take proper account of the possible isolation against environmental interactions, which seems to occur inside certain regions of MT with appropriate geometry and properties."

In fact, in Kurita's paper "Indispensable role of quantum theory in the brain dynamics" (published in the peer-reviewed journal BioSystems vol. 80, 2005) Tegmark's study in particular is heavily criticized as flawed.

I could go on and on here, as Tegmark's study has been critiqued by multiple authors in multiple fields in multiple sources and even types of sources (peer-reviewed papers, studies, monographs, and volumes).

Mark Balaguer's Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem is reviewed here. Among the many other observations the reviewer makes is this

"Balaguer is not committed to incompatibilism, because he doesn't claim that L-freedom is free will, yet given the central role of L-freedom in his theory the compatibility problem seems to matter. I can't help but think the project would be better placed within a compatibilist framework. Indeed, at the end of the review I argue that Balaguer is committed to compatibilism."
​

And your point? What did I quote him for? You spoke of determinism (which apparently you take to mean an ontological model of cause and effect). What I quoted was his statement about the fundamental indeterminism of the universe.

The remarks you quote by Wayne C. Myrvold, Yemima Ben-Menahem, and Bertuglia, C.S., & Vaio, F. are irrelevant, as is your

Again, you spoke of determinism.

They don't.
The truth is, we can only operate in the world as the forces of determinism have led us to operate.

Those quotes were simply two of many about the indeterministic nature of reality. if you wish to assert that everything is driven by determistic forces, then I would think you'd want your theory to incorporate modern physics and accounts of determinism.

And while your conclusion

"Determinism is largely a relic of a bygone age. Not that chaos theory and/or QM solve the issue of free will, of course, but why must we continually use outdated models of physics, systems, and the human brain when the issue of free will inevitably arises in another thread?"
​

is interesting, begging the question is not.

So, first you say that quoting experts on the issue of determinism and (among other things) physics is irrelevant, and then you say I'm "begging the question". So your account of determinism has no relationship with physics or models of determinism in the sciences? Otherwise, I can't see how the quotes are irrelevant.

 

[Skwim]

These are not forces. They are philosophical concepts.

As, no doubt, is force.

Did you read the sources (i.e., not just the science magazine review of Tegmark's study, but Tegmark's study itself)? Tegmark's study came out in 2000, in the journal Physics Review E (Vol. 61 no. 4). And his central argument, as he states, is a particular model of neurons/neural activity:"In this analysis, the object is the neuron, and the superposition will be destroyed by any interaction with other (environment) degrees of freedom that is sensitive to where the ions are located" p. 4197.

However, there are issues with Tegmark's description of neural activity (some are merely the result of the study being over a decade old) as well as his use of decoherence. We don't even have to switch journals. The obvious place to start would by the reply to Tegmark in volume 65 by Hagan, Hameroff, and Tuszynski. But as it is Hameroff's model under attack, why not go with a neutral party? Volume 70 (2004) included a study by Rosa & Faber: "Quantum models of the mind: Are they compatible with environment decoherence?" The authors (like Tegmark) criticized the Penrose & Hameroff model and its account of coherence. However, they state:

"based on this difference, we do not conclude, as Tegmark does, that the quantum approach to the brain problem is refuted if we use decoherence instead of gravitational collapse. The first point is that we must also consider the time for building coherence, while the system either remains relatively isolated to sustain coherence or there is no coherent collective state...Our result does not discard the conjecture that quantum theory can help us to understand the functioning of the brain, and maybe also to understand consciousness...We still propose a new quantum model in the brain where the most important thing is the sequence of coherent states accumulating in the microtubule."

Then there's the issue of the change with the field of physics concerning quantum coherence: Tegmark got it wrong. In fact, a paper published from the 2011 Journal of Physics conference not only criticizes Tegmark's analysis, but proposes several components of biological systems which rely on quantum coherence. In the paper ("Plausibility of quantum coherent states in biological systems" by V Salari, J Tuszynski, M Rahnama, G Bernroider), the authors state:

"Hagan et al. have shown that Tegmark used wrong assumptions for his investigation of MTs. Another main objection to the estimate in equation is that Tegmarks formula yields decoherence times that increase with temperature contrary to well-established physical laws and the behavior of quantum coherent states. In view of these (and other) problems in Tegmarks estimates, Hagan et al. assert that the values of quantities in Tegmarks relation are not correct and thus the decoherence time should be approximately 10^10 [ten to the tenth power] times larger leading to a ms range of values for typical decoherence times. According to Hagan et al., MTs in neurons could possibly avoid decoherence via several mechanisms for quantum processing to occur there."

Another paper ("Quantum mechanical aspects of cell microtubules: science fiction or realistic possibility?") published in the same volume (306) of the Journal of Physics conference proceedings has more of the same:
"In view of this specific model, we are therefore in stark disagreement with the conclusions of Tegmark, i.e. that only classical physics is relevant for studying the energy and signal transfer in biological matter. Tegmark’s conclusions did not take proper account of the possible isolation against environmental interactions, which seems to occur inside certain regions of MT with appropriate geometry and properties."

In fact, in Kurita's paper "Indispensable role of quantum theory in the brain dynamics" (published in the peer-reviewed journal BioSystems vol. 80, 2005) Tegmark's study in particular is heavily criticized as flawed.

I could go on and on here, as Tegmark's study has been critiqued by multiple authors in multiple fields in multiple sources and even types of sources (peer-reviewed papers, studies, monographs, and volumes).

Unfortunately, I don't have the resources you do, and only have brief re-caps and soforth to go on.

And your point? What did I quote him for? You spoke of determinism (which apparently you take to mean an ontological model of cause and effect). What I quoted was his statement about the fundamental indeterminism of the universe.

And I wasn't interested in his take on the fundamental indeterminism of the universe, but in determinism/indeterminism as it relates to freewill.

Those quotes were simply two of many about the indeterministic nature of reality. if you wish to assert that everything is driven by determistic forces, then I would think you'd want your theory to incorporate modern physics and accounts of determinism.

Perhaps another time.

So, first you say that quoting experts on the issue of determinism and (among other things) physics is irrelevant, and then you say I'm "begging the question". So your account of determinism has no relationship with physics or models of determinism in the sciences? Otherwise, I can't see how the quotes are irrelevant.

Please, no tap dancing in the forum. They're irrelevant because they fail to address the "non-existence of freewill" as announced in the thread title.


Edited to ask: And as long as you have the resources to examine the claims of others, what did you find out about the other source I cited [4] by Charles Seife? (Click on the [4] .)

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

As, no doubt, is force.

I can't tell whether or not you actually see the difference a philosophical concept and one which may be used within philosophy but has empirical implications and/or applications, such as "gravity" or "force". Causality is certainly an issue in the sciences (in everything from mathematical/statistical models to social theory). Causation as you used it (something which describes the cosmos) is not a "force" in any scientific sense of either word. It's a conceptual model or reality which cannot be quantified or treated with mathematical formalism the way things like forces in physics can.

Semantics would be irrelevant, were it not for the fact that you appear to be using a philosophical model as a scientific one without incorporating actual scientific models, theories, or evidence. When you talk about "deterministic forces" and equate these with causation, and then proceed to use your causal model as a complete description of nature/reality (i.e., all processes and entities in the universe follow your model, or that the universe is fundamentally deterministic), I would think these "forces" would have to correspond to those within scientific models.

Unfortunately, I don't have the resources you do, and only have brief re-caps and soforth to go on.

Yet it would be quite possible for you to defend many different accounts of causation and determinism using the same resources you have already. For example, wikipedia's page on quantum consciousness has only a small section from which selected. Why? Why spend effort defending your view by selecting and searching only for support, rather than on whether or not you are correct? You clearly believe and have thought much about "free will" and causation (based on the number of posts of yours I've read). As I don't think you hold the view that you do because of some spiritual/religious faith, I imagine something or somethings convinced you so thoroughly that selectively going through available sources is not an issue, because anything which contradicts your view is wrong. In general, this is how everyone operates (apart from psychological research, this kind of approach has now been quantified and is used in machine learning). The more one believes something to be true, the more it takes to convince them otherwise. But what convinced you in the first place?

And I wasn't interested in his take on the fundamental indeterminism of the universe, but in determinism/indeterminism as it relates to freewill.

Why? Especially given the title of the book? Perhaps more importantly, it isn't just his account. As he said, an indeterministic view of reality is perhaps the dominant view within the physics community.

Perhaps another time.

You mean at this time, your theory does not "incorporate modern physics and accounts of determinism"? What is it based on then?

Please, no tap dancing in the forum. They're irrelevant because they fail to address the "non-existence of freewill" as announced in the thread title.

One view (yours at least) for thinking that free will does not exist is that everything that ever happens or is has a necessary and sufficient cause or causes because the universe and reality are deterministic. I've argued, using various sources, that this view is at odds with physics and other sciences. I think that the question which is the title of the thread involves an assumption that is contentious at best and without any support at worse. If you are suggesting that in order to discuss anything in this thread one must start by assuming that free will dooes not exist, then what is the point? For those who already believe it does not exist, nothing changes. For those who believe it does, having to assume what they don't think is correct makes the question meaningless.

Additionally, I responded to a rather specific point you made about "deterministic forces". Namely, that such a view is increasingly without support in the sciences thanks to two developments in the 20th century which had implications for all sciences: QM and "chaos theory". Complete determinism would certainly negate most conceptions of free will. So how is arguing that this approach is a relic from pre-20th century physics and philosophy not "address[ing] the 'non-existence of free will'"?

 

[idea]

... a reality that is absolutely deterministic

For starters, free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. Free will is deterministic - Free will = determining one's own actions - which is deterministic. In-determinant/random/un-caused actions are now free will...

Assume that free will does not exist

That would be like assuming that cause/effect does not exist...

 

[GawdAweful]

Originally Posted by GawdAweful
It has nothing to do with any human endeavors.

We are part of the universe :slap:

Slap accepted on that one.

 

[s2a]

I would assume he does, which I second.

Fate has a gender?

No you don't. And any purpose would be whatever your mind concluded was appropriate, a conclusion it had to come to.

Or, horrors to even contemplate… perhaps my perspectives were built upon scary conspiratorial ideals long before fate even has a chance to work “HIS” magical brainwashing…

No. what determinism forces you to do has no more purpose than the purpose of a tornado. It just is.

So, “Fate” is a kind of boring and predictable guy then, like Jerry Seinfeld, or just…you?

These are all the consequences of deterministic forces, genetic, physiological, and other biologically developed conditions, which have created such a capacity, and have led people to reason.

Ahh, I see. That’s so illuminating.

But we are capable of affecting outcomes or circumstances by means of reason or logic. It's just that such reasoning and logic are the culmination of a series of causes and effects: determinism in action.

Determinism being a “he”, of course. Perhaps “he” influences fashion and music trends too?

And the notion of choosing is nothing more than assigning the outcome of cause/effect to the fancy of freewill. The fact is no true choosing occurrs. We do what we do because we cannot do otherwise.

“Determinism” told me to tell you that you are a quack. Don’t blame me. “He” said so… not me.

Yup, but it can grow leaves. So what's your point; that we can do things an oak tree cannot? Believe it or not, all things can do what others cannot. .

Brilliant. Genius. Extraordinary insight into… *yawn*. ..

Again with this false notion of choosing: that you freely opt to do this rather than that. Truth is, you had to do "this."

Well of course I did… so, who is going to win the Powerball lottery this weekend, and by chance…will “he” reveal the predetermined/predestined winning numbers for us all, just to demonstrate that “HE” can?

So, do you know of, or ever heard of, anyone who does this? I haven't, and I'm a hard determinist acquainted with other hard determinists..

Of course I have both heard and seen many folks that claim insight into future events and predetermined outcomes…

…and they are likely to appear again upon the street corners of my humble lil city yet again this weekend (tho' most could use a shower...just saying)…warning of impending doom and “the end of the world as we know it”…just as their antecedent purveyors of especially enlightened insight have perpetuated over the last few millennia…

“The End Is Near!”

With that track record of um, …100% failure rate to date… how might anyone doubt their claims?

 

[Skwim]

I can't tell whether or not you actually see the difference a philosophical concept and one which may be used within philosophy but has empirical implications and/or applications, such as "gravity" or "force". Causality is certainly an issue in the sciences (in everything from mathematical/statistical models to social theory). Causation as you used it (something which describes the cosmos) is not a "force" in any scientific sense of either word. It's a conceptual model or reality which cannot be quantified or treated with mathematical formalism the way things like forces in physics can.

Semantics would be irrelevant, were it not for the fact that you appear to be using a philosophical model as a scientific one without incorporating actual scientific models, theories, or evidence. When you talk about "deterministic forces" and equate these with causation, and then proceed to use your causal model as a complete description of nature/reality (i.e., all processes and entities in the universe follow your model, or that the universe is fundamentally deterministic), I would think these "forces" would have to correspond to those within scientific models.

My realm of concern wasn't the universe, but sentiant activity, human to be specific. My remark, to which you addressed your question, was "The truth is, we can only operate in the world as the forces of determinism have led us to operate." I'm not concerned with how cause/effect operates outside of human physical and mental activity.

Yet it would be quite possible for you to defend many different accounts of causation and determinism using the same resources you have already. For example, wikipedia's page on quantum consciousness has only a small section from which selected. Why? Why spend effort defending your view by selecting and searching only for support, rather than on whether or not you are correct? You clearly believe and have thought much about "free will" and causation (based on the number of posts of yours I've read). As I don't think you hold the view that you do because of some spiritual/religious faith, I imagine something or somethings convinced you so thoroughly that selectively going through available sources is not an issue, because anything which contradicts your view is wrong.

I'm not predisposed to really get into it. I've only grown familiar with the issue by answering questions that have arisen. I don't care to make a study of the freewill v. determinism issue, or formulate an airtight defence of determinism. So, if I find something that appears to answer a challenge to my position I go no further than that. And this is why I went no further than the argument elaborated by Max Tegmark [3] and Charles Seife [4] in answering questions about quantum indetermency as regards our actions.

In general, this is how everyone operates (apart from psychological research, this kind of approach has now been quantified and is used in machine learning). The more one believes something to be true, the more it takes to convince them otherwise. But what convinced you in the first place?

A recognition that because all actions, both physical and mental, had unbidden causes. They were either determined by the series of cause/effect events that led up to the moment of an act, or the act was an absolutely random event (I've never seen a third alternative). In either case the act would not be the result of a freewill---free will being the ability to do differently.

You mean at this time, your theory does not "incorporate modern physics and accounts of determinism"? What is it based on then?

No, just that I've grown a bit weary of the subject.

One view (yours at least) for thinking that free will does not exist is that everything that ever happens or is has a necessary and sufficient cause or causes because the universe and reality are deterministic.

No. I recognize that random events appear to occur at the subatomic level, so I won't go so far as to say our universe is entirely deterministic; however, at the superatomic level where neurons fire I'm fine with saying that free will does not exist because everything that happens in the body has a necessary and sufficient cause or causes, and because I've yet to see an acceptiable alternative explanation for our actions.

I've argued, using various sources, that this view is at odds with physics and other sciences. I think that the question which is the title of the thread involves an assumption that is contentious at best and without any support at worse. If you are suggesting that in order to discuss anything in this thread one must start by assuming that free will dooes not exist, then what is the point?

And I don't expect such a thing, but what would be interesting is to see a good alternative explanation.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Edited to ask: And as long as you have the resources to examine the claims of others, what did you find out about the other source I cited [4] by Charles Seife? (Click on the [4] .)

I didn't realize you didn't know what it was (which was stupid of me, because you would need full access to read the entire article). It's a news piece about Tegmark's study written the same year Tegmark's study was published. It's even less relevant than Tegmark's actual study, because it is completely reliant on his work but without any of the actual science.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I'm not predisposed to really get into it.

Yet you've participated in such discussions since for as long as I've been a member.

I've only grown familiar with the issue by answering questions that have arisen. I don't care to make a study of the freewill v. determinism issue, or formulate an airtight defence of determinism. So, if I find something that appears to answer a challenge to my position I go no further than that. And this is why I went no further than the argument elaborated by Max Tegmark [3] and Charles Seife [4] in answering questions about quantum indetermency as regards our actions.

What you did, it seems, is look up wikipedia's entry on quantum consciousness, found the section with criticisms, and ignored the rest (also, it doesn't appear that you actually read either Tegmark's work).

But Tegmark's study has been thoroughly critiqued and I provided several references demonstrating this. So there was something that appeared "to anser a challenge to [your] position" such that you referenced Tegmark (and Seife, not knowing that Seife was simply talking about Tegmark's study). Does this not imply that the "challenge to [your] position" remains?

A recognition that because all actions, both physical and mental, had unbidden causes.

Let's assume all actions have causes. The question then becomes what constitutes a cause. After all, if I choose to respond to a thread here, there are any number of ways that I can describe the causes behind that choice. I can refer to my upbringing, my internet connection, neural networks, memory, vision, light, etc. I can even say (although I do not believe it to be true) that god caused me to respond. Likewise, I can say that my capacity to decide to do something rather than something else caused me to respond.

In other words, I can incorporate my ability to make decisions which are influenced, but not determined, by the entirety of the universe surrounding the moment in which my decision is made into the set of "causes". In which case "choice" is a cause.

You reject this, as you hold that I could not have made any other choice. This is no longer, then a question of "actions must have causes" (itself a questionable doctrine), but that the causes cannot be determined by conscious choice. If this is your position, then wouldn't a knowledge of complex systems and emergent properties as well as the possibility of quantum consciousness all be extremely relevant? The fact that there are two areas of overlapping cross-disciplinary research and both of them support the idea that it is in fact possible for certain systems (like the human brain) to determine their own state would seem to be extremely relevant here.

They were either determined by the series of cause/effect events that led up to the moment of an act, or the act was an absolutely random event (I've never seen a third alternative)

That "third alternative" would be a non-reductionist account of complex systems. For example, Feinberg's Neuroontological irreducibility as described in his paper "Neuroontology, neurobiological naturalism, and consciousness: A challenge to scientific reduction and a solution" (Physics of Life Reviews vol. 9; 2012):
"My account in this paper is wholly within the context of consciousness and the nervous system, and therefore I refer to these features as neuroontologically irreducible features of consciousness (NOIF). These are features of consciousness that appear to be irreducible to the nervous system. These four features are referral, mental unity, qualia, and mental causation." (italics in original). In terms of mental causation, Feinberg uses Revonsuo's definition: "The idea that the mind or mental phenomena have causal powers to change some purely material (e.g. biological or neural) process in the brain."

In other words, conscious intent or volition is itself a "cause". There is a vast amount of research on complexity and irreducible systems in general, and on the brain in particular.

No. I recognize that random events appear to occur at the subatomic level, so I won't go so far as to say our universe is entirely deterministic; however, at the superatomic level where neurons fire I'm fine with saying that free will does not exist because everything that happens in the body has a necessary and sufficient cause or causes, and because I've yet to see an acceptiable alternative explanation for our actions.

Neural networks cannot be reduced to neural firing, even if one argues that QM is irrelevant in terms of consciousness. A paper which drives this point home rather well is Khrennikov's "Quantum-like model of processing of information in the brain based on classical electromagnetic field" (BioSystems 105; 2011). The basic point of the paper is that the brain violates classical probability and that at the very least the formalism of quantum mechanics is needed. However, this approach to the brain (and complex systems in general) is increasingly common, i.e., that complex systems do not behave according to classical physics in that they cannot be reduced into component parts such that the classical schema of cause/effect and locality apply.

And I don't expect such a thing, but what would be interesting is to see a good alternative explanation.

I've referenced volumes and papers that you could examine in their entirety (e.g., Free Will and Consciousness: How they Might Work, Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Freewill, The Nonlinear Universe: Chaos, Emergence, Life, etc.). There are many more. If it "would be interesting" to see alternative explanations, why not read them?

 

[Skwim]

Yet you've participated in such discussions since for as long as I've been a member.

Yup.

What you did, it seems, is look up wikipedia's entry on quantum consciousness, found the section with criticisms, and ignored the rest (also, it doesn't appear that you actually read either Tegmark's work).

No I didn't. As I mentioned before, I don't have access to his works as you do. I took him at face value.

But Tegmark's study has been thoroughly critiqued and I provided several references demonstrating this. So there was something that appeared "to anser a challenge to [your] position" such that you referenced Tegmark (and Seife, not knowing that Seife was simply talking about Tegmark's study). Does this not imply that the "challenge to [your] position" remains?

Yes it does, and because of your findings I will no longer cite Tegmark. However, until I see evidence that quantum indeterminancy does, in fact, affect neuron activity to the extent that it interferes with the on-going mental cause/effect operation, I'll continue to contend that it does not.

Let's assume all actions have causes. The question then becomes what constitutes a cause.

It's any action or condition that produces an effect.

After all, if I choose to respond to a thread here, there are any number of ways that I can describe the causes behind that choice. I can refer to my upbringing, my internet connection, neural networks, memory, vision, light, etc. I can even say (although I do not believe it to be true) that god caused me to respond. Likewise, I can say that my capacity to decide to do something rather than something else caused me to respond.

It doesn't matter what the specific actions or conditions are. The fact is, your "choice" was determined, unless that is, you contend that it arose completely at random: it could just as well have been different than what it was.

In other words, I can incorporate my ability to make decisions which are influenced, but not determined, by the entirety of the universe surrounding the moment in which my decision is made into the set of "causes". In which case "choice" is a cause.

But this ability is determined, unless it operates at random, and I don't believe you want to assert that your "choosing" is an utterly random event. The end result is that your "choice" could not be any different than what it was. To be so would necessarily mean that those cause/effect events leading up to your "choice" would have to be different. But they were what they were, which means your "choice" had to be what it was.

You reject this, as you hold that I could not have made any other choice. This is no longer, then a question of "actions must have causes" (itself a questionable doctrine), but that the causes cannot be determined by conscious choice.

If it feels better to label some cause "conscious choice" go right ahead, it makes no difference. However, I don't like to phrase such actions as "choice," "choosing," or any of the other forms the word can take because it carries the presumption of a "freedom to do otherwise," which I disavow. And, of course, a cause such as your "conscious choice" can indeed determine other causes. If, for example, your "conscious choice" is to pull the trigger it could well cause a death.

If this is your position, then wouldn't a knowledge of complex systems and emergent properties as well as the possibility of quantum consciousness all be extremely relevant?

Deterministic operations are not necessarily contingent on what we know. They may or may not be. One fully conversant with quantum effects and the brain is no less controlled by causes/effects than is a new born baby.

The fact that there are two areas of overlapping cross-disciplinary research and both of them support the idea that it is in fact possible for certain systems (like the human brain) to determine their own state would seem to be extremely relevant here.

Only so far as to introduce a random factor into the cause/effect operation. If the human brain determines its own state then whatever that state happens to be will be X and not Y beCAUSE. . . . . . . . . Follow me?

That "third alternative" would be a non-reductionist account of complex systems. For example, Feinberg's Neuroontological irreducibility as described in his paper "Neuroontology, neurobiological naturalism, and consciousness: A challenge to scientific reduction and a solution" (Physics of Life Reviews vol. 9; 2012):
"My account in this paper is wholly within the context of consciousness and the nervous system, and therefore I refer to these features as neuroontologically irreducible features of consciousness (NOIF). These are features of consciousness that appear to be irreducible to the nervous system. These four features are referral, mental unity, qualia, and mental causation." (italics in original). In terms of mental causation, Feinberg uses Revonsuo's definition: "The idea that the mind or mental phenomena have causal powers to change some purely material (e.g. biological or neural) process in the brain."

In other words, conscious intent or volition is itself a "cause". There is a vast amount of research on complexity and irreducible systems in general, and on the brain in particular.

Fine, but why was the conscious intent or volition what it was and not something else? What made this conscious intent or volition consist of W,X,Y, and Z
rather than A,B,C, and D?

Neural networks cannot be reduced to neural firing, even if one argues that QM is irrelevant in terms of consciousness. A paper which drives this point home rather well is Khrennikov's "Quantum-like model of processing of information in the brain based on classical electromagnetic field" (BioSystems 105; 2011). The basic point of the paper is that the brain violates classical probability and that at the very least the formalism of quantum mechanics is needed. However, this approach to the brain (and complex systems in general) is increasingly common, i.e., that complex systems do not behave according to classical physics in that they cannot be reduced into component parts such that the classical schema of cause/effect and locality apply.

Which appears to introduce a random element into the works, which, if the case, doesn't bode any better for freewill.

I've referenced volumes and papers that you could examine in their entirety (e.g., Free Will and Consciousness: How they Might Work, Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Freewill, The Nonlinear Universe: Chaos, Emergence, Life, etc.). There are many more. If it "would be interesting" to see alternative explanations, why not read them?

Thanks,

but if they're not readily available online I'll have to pass.