Tsk. Tsk. A Common and Appalling Definition of "Objective" Morals, Values, and Duties. Tsk. Tsk.

[Sunstone]

Some very good folks are of the horrifying persuasion that morals, values, rights, and duties can be said to be "objective" if they are inherent in humans. That is, they can be said to be "objective" if they are rooted in our DNA as a consequence of evolution.

"ZOUNDS! But it is enough to send strong men and women rushing for their smelling salts!" Quote @SalixIncendium (Only Salix was talking about something else entirely and quoting him here is entirely out of context and wholly meaningless. Nevertheless, It always imparts a certain sense of style to the OP to quote Salix.)​

For example: It might thus be argued that reciprocity -- or that a tendency to reciprocate -- is an "objective" value or moral behavior, since reciprocity and/or a tendency to reciprocate are evidently rooted in our DNA.

BUT...

One of the several various and sundry problems with such a definition of "objective" is it commits the Naturalistic Fallacy of logic -- and that is NOT a pretty sight! Not a pretty sight at all!

The Naturalistic Fallacy is a clear and obvious violation of Section IX, paragraph 12, subsection iii of "The Fact/Value Distinction"! In the Old West, men were hanged for less. Simply put, The fact X is natural, does not mean X is moral. Murder is arguably a natural human behavior, but that does not mean murder is a moral behavior. Rape is not ubiquitous to primates, but is only found in a few species -- such as humans -- but just because it is natural in humans does not make it moral. And so forth.

THUS, HENCE, and IN CONCLUSION, the argument that morals, etc. can be said to be objective if they are rooted in our DNA is a heinous sin against good and sound reasoning if and when it is stated or implied that such morals, etc are thus made desirable. And in practice, that very thing almost always is stated or implied.



________________________
And now...

 

[icehorse]

For the sake of discussion, I'm going to use "The Golden Rule" (TGR™) as an example of a commonly held moral:

- It's "probably" the case that over the last couple million years smart animals have naturally selectively bred for individuals who naturally follow TGR™. But strictly speaking, I don't think it MUST be in our DNA for us to follow TGR™, but it's probably easier for those individuals whose DNA does.

- It's "probably" the case that what most of us would agree are "good morals" like TGR™ help societies last longer. And it's "probably" the case that a preference for propagating and being long lasting is in our DNA.

(I'm hedging and air-quoting here because IMO and sadly, there is no good argument against moral relativism. So to me, it always gets down to values. E.g., If we value survival and health, we have a place from which to evaluate morals. But the relativist can question seemingly obvious values like survival and health..)

 

[joe1776]

Moral judgments are objective.

Unlike opinions on art, music or beauty which are subjective, moral judgments are objective. If two people disagree on whether a specific act is moral or immoral, one of them is wrong.

Sally does not deny killing her husband, Harry. She claims that the killing was justified as an act of self-defense.

Upon hearing the facts, eleven of the twelve jurors agree with her. The one juror who disagrees is wrong.

If Sally's act was morally wrong, the jurors would have felt the wrongfulness intuitively. That feeling would have been followed by the urge to punish Sally. Those feelings emerge immediately and intuitively from the unconscious mind once the facts are known. We call those feelings 'conscience.' Conscience is the only moral authority we have, so we have no choice but to accept its judgment.

 

[icehorse]

Sally does not deny killing her husband, Harry. She claims that the killing was justified as an act of self-defense.

Upon hearing the facts, eleven of the twelve jurors agree with her. The one juror who disagrees is wrong.

What if it was 11 to 1 in the opposite direction?

 

[joe1776]

What if it was 11 to 1 in the opposite direction?

Obviously, that judgment would be based on a different set of facts. In your hypothetical, the killing would be judged immoral and Sally would be punished.

The urge to punish is confirmation that the act was immoral. When that urge is missing, a bias caused by flawed reasoning can be suspected. For example, you will hear people claim that abortion is murder but they don't have the urge to severely punish the woman who terminates her pregnancy. That missing urge signals that the 'abortion is murder' reasoning is flawed.

 

[icehorse]

In that case, the killing would be judged immoral and Sally would be punished.

The urge to punish is confirmation that the act was immoral. When that urge is missing, a bias caused by flawed reasoning can be suspected. For example, you will hear people claim that abortion is murder but they don't have the urge to severely punish the woman who terminates her pregnancy. That missing urge signals that the 'abortion is murder' reasoning is flawed.

So it sounds like you're saying the morality is based on popularity? Is that a correct interpretation of your claim?

 

[joe1776]

So it sounds like you're saying the morality is based on popularity? Is that a correct interpretation of your claim?

No, it isn't. The word 'popularity' trivializes the idea.

Only specific acts can be judged...and the judgment of the collective conscience of a jury unbiased on the case is the standard accepted world-wide.

That "jury" doesn't have to be in a court. The citizens of countries not involved in the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers might be thought of as an unbiased jury to sit in moral judgment of the act.

 

[Revoltingest]

No, it isn't. The word 'popularity' trivializes the idea.

What if it's called "consensus" instead?
It lacks the dismissive connotation, but it's essentially the same thing.

 

[joe1776]

What if it's called "consensus" instead?
It lacks the dismissive connotation, but it's essentially the same thing.

It's my understanding that in decision-making reaching a consensus has a specific meaning that is unlike the simple majority rule I'm referring to.

 

[Sunstone]

It's my understanding that in decision-making reaching a consensus has a specific meaning that is unlike the simple majority rule I'm referring to.

That is true, depending on the context. In the sciences, for example, reaching a consensus is quite distinct from simply achieving some measure or degree of popularity. Specifically, the term "consensus" is usually understood to mean a consensus of the people who are well informed about an issue. In other words, not just every person who comes along is counted for the purposes of determining whether a consensus has been reached, so mere popularity is not what a "consensus" refers to in the sciences.

Now "well informed" is admittedly a somewhat vague term or standard, but nevertheless, in practice it is usually not so hard in most cases to distinguish between people who are well-informed about something and people are not well-informed about that thing. Heck, almost every adult human on the planet is capable of making such distinctions under the right circumstances.

Even I, for instance, can distinguish between someone who is well informed about how to wank and someone who is not well informed about how to wank because I myself am well informed on the subject. Fat chance some amateur wanker will ever be able to pass themselves off as a pro to me! And in much the same way, people who are well informed about this or that scientific subject are generally pretty good at telling who is or isn't well informed.

 

[Sunstone]

So it sounds like you're saying the morality is based on popularity? Is that a correct interpretation of your claim?

You question strikes me as precisely the most useful question to ask, given what was said by Joe.

 

[lewisnotmiller]

Moral judgments are objective.

Unlike opinions on art, music or beauty which are subjective, moral judgments are objective. If two people disagree on whether a specific act is moral or immoral, one of them is wrong.

Sally does not deny killing her husband, Harry. She claims that the killing was justified as an act of self-defense.

Upon hearing the facts, eleven of the twelve jurors agree with her. The one juror who disagrees is wrong.

If Sally's act was morally wrong, the jurors would have felt the wrongfulness intuitively. That feeling would have been followed by the urge to punish Sally. Those feelings emerge immediately and intuitively from the unconscious mind once the facts are known. We call those feelings 'conscience.' Conscience is the only moral authority we have, so we have no choice but to accept its judgment.

What possible proof of this could you have, unless you're just arguing that a montheistic God has placed objective morals in us, but you're dressing up the same argument in different clothes.

 

[Sunstone]

For the sake of discussion, I'm going to use "The Golden Rule" (TGR™) as an example of a commonly held moral:

- It's "probably" the case that over the last couple million years smart animals have naturally selectively bred for individuals who naturally follow TGR™. But strictly speaking, I don't think it MUST be in our DNA for us to follow TGR™, but it's probably easier for those individuals whose DNA does.

- It's "probably" the case that what most of us would agree are "good morals" like TGR™ help societies last longer. And it's "probably" the case that a preference for propagating and being long lasting is in our DNA.

(I'm hedging and air-quoting here because IMO and sadly, there is no good argument against moral relativism. So to me, it always gets down to values. E.g., If we value survival and health, we have a place from which to evaluate morals. But the relativist can question seemingly obvious values like survival and health..)

I think that is an excellent example of a behavior that -- most likely -- is to at least some degree rooted in our DNA (perhaps as some kind of impulse or instinct to reciprocate or to encourage reciprocation by others). The thing is, the degree to which it is rooted in our DNA has nothing to do -- in and of itself -- with whether we ought to consider it a good or bad behavior. Rather, if we are to judge it good or bad, we must do so by some other standard or test than simply "is it rooted in our DNA?"

As for moral relativism, I think the relativists have a point, my friend, but I also think they often push their point further than it will comfortably go. That is, their arguments too often leap from, "Any X can be judged by us either good or bad." --- which is true -- to at least implying, "Questions of value, etc. are WHOLLY or ALWAYS subjective" -- which is not true. It is more accurate to say something along the lines of "Questions of value are ULTIMATELY subjective (but not always subjective in their implications)".

For example, if I first posit as a moral axiom that X is bad, then I can scientifically ("objectively") investigate whether Y encourages or discourages X. If I first posit that lying is bad, then I can scientifically investigate whether a specific punishment for lying encourages, discourages, or has no effect upon the incidence of lying. I might find out, for instance, that spanking actually encourages lying in some bizarre way. Moreover, I might (at least in principle) establish that as a reliable fact.

So what is the importance of that? To me, it suggests that there can be a whole lot more "objectivity" involved in making value decisions that at least some moral relativists seem willing to concede. True, I must first posit a moral axiom, and that axiom is subjective (albeit not necessarily arbitrary), but having once done that, I open the door to all sorts of "objectivity".

Moreover, just about everything in life to some degree or another works precisely the same way. When you think about it, I cannot even say "I know that water is comprised of hydrogen and oxygen" without first assuming or consciously positing a few axioms. Thus it is possible to argue that saying "lying is bad" is not all that different in principle from saying "water is hydrogen and oxygen". Different, yes, but perhaps not as different as we are usually trained to believe. An interesting question, no?

 

[lewisnotmiller]

No, it isn't. The word 'popularity' trivializes the idea.

Only specific acts can be judged...and the judgment of the collective conscience of a jury unbiased on the case is the standard accepted world-wide.

That "jury" doesn't have to be in a court. The citizens of countries not involved in the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers might be thought of as an unbiased jury to sit in moral judgment of the act.

Juries should be sitting in legal judgement. Not moral judgement.

 

[Sunstone]

If Sally's act was morally wrong, the jurors would have felt the wrongfulness intuitively. That feeling would have been followed by the urge to punish Sally. Those feelings emerge immediately and intuitively from the unconscious mind once the facts are known. We call those feelings 'conscience.' Conscience is the only moral authority we have, so we have no choice but to accept its judgment.

Those are interesting ideas, but so far as I can see, Joe, you have provided no reasons or evidence for supposing they are true. If you have a reasoned, well evidenced argument for your beliefs, now might be a good time to advance it.

 

[icehorse]

So what is the importance of that? To me, it suggests that there can be a whole lot more "objectivity" involved in making value decisions that at least some moral relativists seem willing to concede. True, I must first posit a moral axiom, and that axiom is subjective (albeit not necessarily arbitrary), having once done that, I open the door to all sorts of "objectivity".

We're in agreement. (FYI, I'm not a relativist, but I've debated them, and they're tough.)

I'm happy with working from axioms, it's more or less what I meant when I suggested working from a few core values.

 

[Sunstone]

We're in agreement. (FYI, I'm not a relativist, but I've debated them, and they're tough.)

I'm not sure how to best label my views in this case, assuming I want to communicate their gist. I concede that values are ultimately subjective (but so is everything else -- at least from an epistemic standpoint), but I am unhappy with the notion they are wholly or entirely subjective. So I guess that makes me a "*******" relativist, as opposed to a "purebred" relativist.

I'm happy with working from axioms...

Totally agree with you here. Indeed, I knew I was preaching to the choir because I have for sometime been aware that you and I pretty much see eye to eye on this issue.

 

[Revoltingest]

It's my understanding that in decision-making reaching a consensus has a specific meaning that is unlike the simple majority rule I'm referring to.

They seem generally the same to me.
I don't consider arcane definitions, so
both are what is most "popular".

 

[Augustus]

Upon hearing the facts, eleven of the twelve jurors agree with her. The one juror who disagrees is wrong.

What about the countless wrongful convictions that have happened?

Conscience is the only moral authority we have, so we have no choice but to accept its judgment.

And that conscience has told many historical jurors that the [factually innocent] black guy is guilty, and they have a moral responsibility to see him hang.

 

[joe1776]

What possible proof of this could you have, unless you're just arguing that a montheistic God has placed objective morals in us, but you're dressing up the same argument in different clothes.

You seem to assume that the conclusion that moral judgments are objective relies on them being connected to God. Why?
I see the judgments of conscience as intuition well-aligned with human survival.