Tsk. Tsk. A Common and Appalling Definition of "Objective" Morals, Values, and Duties. Tsk. Tsk.

[icehorse]

I'll grant that expert intuition and moral intuition are alike in that judgments can't be explained. Now, if you can persuasively explain how we all become experts in moral reasoning, I'll concede I'm wrong.

We might be at loggerheads here. Because I think you need to demonstrate why moral reasoning is more complex than chess. In other words, moral reasoning seems like just another complex topic to gain mastery of. Why do you think morals are more complex than other complex topics?

Please explain, if you can, how we humans learn, by reasoning, to become masters of moral judgments.

I'm going to continue to discuss this with you, even though your'e headed towards personal attacks, which seem completely unnecessary, and if anything, weaken your case..

Well now "reasoning" is another can of worms sort of topic. So for example, when a toddler learns through experience how to tell whether they're looking at a cat vs. a dog, would you call that "reasoning"? No trickery here, I'm just trying to pin down the definitions. IMO, humans are - among other things - pattern matching machines. A lot of what we can do as humans, we learn to do through high repetition that leads to being able to do pattern matching. It would seem for our discussion that that would be a type of reasoning. So far so good? If so, then part of how we become good at making moral judgments is through the same pattern matching mechanisms we use to learn so many other things.

 

[Sunstone]

Over the last 30 years, there has been scientific evidence that our moral judgments are intuitive and not products of reason. David Hume suggested this back in the 18th Century. This implies that most moral philosophers, for centuries, have been making their arguments based on the false premise that moral judgments are the product of reason.

Social scientists engaged in this research don't agree with me or with each other on much of anything except that our morals are the product of intuition.

This is in conflict with theologians as well. The Catechism of the Catholic Church states that the judgments of conscience are the product of reason. If the RCC is wrong on this they have no basis for the claim that the Church can "inform the conscience" by advising their faithful on moral matters.

Here's a website that might interest you.

The New Science of Morality | Edge.org

Are you not arguing, Joe, that moral judgements based on "conscience" (or perhaps intuition) are correct? And is that somewhat different from arguing that moral judgements originate as intuitions? I mean, isn't there a difference between saying how something originates and saying that something is morally right or correct?

 

[joe1776]

Are you not arguing, Joe, that moral judgements based on "conscience" (or perhaps intuition) are correct? And is that somewhat different from arguing that moral judgements originate as intuitions? I mean, isn't there a difference between saying how something originates and saying that something is morally right or correct?

My position is that conscience (moral intuition) is the only authority on morality we have. Consequently, we humans have no choice but to accept its judgments as infallible.

Conscience works case-by-case. Given all the relevant facts of the case Colorado v. Sunstone, a jury, unbiased on the relevant issues, unhindered by law, would feel the wrongfulness and feel the urge to punish if you were guilty. If they didn't have those feelings, you would be found innocent.

If Colorado law on your case (the product of reason) agreed with the judgment of conscience, it would be coincidentally right, the way a stopped clock is right twice a day. If the law was in conflict with the conscience of a jury, it would become a potential bias capable of rendering injustice.

Everything our reasoning minds know or think we know about morality we learned from conscience. Then, with an excess of pride in our ability to reason, we humans thought we could do better than case-by-case reliance on conscience, so we wrote laws.

Criminal laws are foolish attempts to write an absolute rule to cover an almost unlimited variety of fact situations. It's something like trying to write rules governing the construction of snowflakes.

Religions need to rely on the idea that the judgments of conscience are the product of reason; otherwise, they have no basis for giving moral guidance.

Conscience isn't evidence of the existence of a Creator. But think about it: if you were the Creator and wanted your children to have moral guidance, wouldn't it be a simple, cross-cultural signal that doesn't rely on language? The question is always simple: Is this act morally wrong?

 

[Sunstone]

My position is that conscience (moral intuition) is the only authority on morality we have. Consequently, we humans have no choice but to accept its judgments as infallible.

How does that work, Joe? What is the rule or principle that says because X is the only opinion you have, X is infallible?

 

[joe1776]

How does that work, Joe? What is the rule or principle that says because X is the only opinion you have, X is infallible?

I haven't gone back to be certain but I believe I wrote that we have to regard conscience as infallible because it's the only judgment we have. I think that's a logical deduction.

You used the word 'opinion' rather than 'judgment though. Opinion is a word usually associated with different positions on an issue. So, I'm wondering if you don't see the logic of my statement because you haven't accepted the premise that it's the only judgment.

If you accept my position that conscience is our only moral authority as a conditional premise, do you still disagree on the logic of my statement?

 

[icehorse]

You're asking the wrong question. You need to explain why you think all human beings are like highly intelligent chess masters. That's an absurd comparison

I used chess as an example, but tacit knowledge / expert intuition is a part of virtually all expertise. So a master chef is using expert intuition. So is a jazz musician, so is a master plumber, a senior tech support person, an auto mechanic, a photographer, a good high school basketball player, and on and on.

Moral expertise fits into that broad category of "things a human can become an expert at" quite cleanly. And it's almost always the case that the expert - in whatever domain you choose - cannot truly explain their expertise.

 

[joe1776]

We might be at loggerheads here. Because I think you need to demonstrate why moral reasoning is more complex than chess. In other words, moral reasoning seems like just another complex topic to gain mastery of. Why do you think morals are more complex than other complex topics?

I don't think that.

You're asking the wrong question. You need to explain why you think all human beings are like highly intelligent chess masters. That's an absurd comparison.

We agree that intuition, of any kind, cannot be explained. That's the only fair comparison you can make between expert intuition and moral intuition (conscience).

I'm going to continue to discuss this with you, even though your'e headed towards personal attacks, which seem completely unnecessary, and if anything, weaken your case..

I'm headed toward personal attacks? Please quote me. What did I write that supports that prediction?

Well now "reasoning" is another can of worms sort of topic. So for example, when a toddler learns through experience how to tell whether they're looking at a cat vs. a dog, would you call that "reasoning"? No trickery here, I'm just trying to pin down the definitions. IMO, humans are - among other things - pattern matching machines. A lot of what we can do as humans, we learn to do through high repetition that leads to being able to do pattern matching. It would seem for our discussion that that would be a type of reasoning. So far so good? If so, then part of how we become good at making moral judgments is through the same pattern matching mechanisms we use to learn so many other things.

I agree with what you wrote but you stopped short of the key insight.

Imagine that we witness two killings. One was a cold-blooded murder, the other was done in a clear case of self-defense. The visual patterns of the two cases are pretty much the same. The difference between the patterns isn't what we see but how we feel about them. What we feel is a moral judgment. We didn't reason our way to that judgment.

 

[joe1776]

I used chess as an example, but tacit knowledge / expert intuition is a part of virtually all expertise. So a master chef is using expert intuition. So is a jazz musician, so is a master plumber, a senior tech support person, an auto mechanic, a photographer, a good high school basketball player, and on and on.

Moral expertise fits into that broad category of "things a human can become an expert at" quite cleanly. And it's almost always the case that the expert - in whatever domain you choose - cannot truly explain their expertise.

I won't try to convince you that your claim that all or most human beings have the ability to reason their way to expertise in moral judgments is ridiculous. But that's the way I see it.

 

[icehorse]

I won't try to convince you that your claim that all or most human beings have the ability to reason their way to expertise in moral judgments is ridiculous. But that's the way I see it.

That's not my claim. My claim is that there is nothing about moral expertise that makes it uniquely challenging to acquire. It is just another complex domain.

 

[joe1776]

That's not my claim. My claim is that there is nothing about moral expertise that makes it uniquely challenging to acquire. It is just another complex domain.

It's challenging enough that highly intelligent legislators, trying for more than a thousand years (since English Common Law), have not been able to write a rule to cover all future cases of just one act: the act of killing.

In the USA, the 50 states have 50 different massive laws on murder. The very same killing might qualify as justifiable self-defense in some states but not in others.

The attempt to write comprehensive moral laws isn't just challenging, it's impossible.

 

[icehorse]

It's challenging enough that highly intelligent legislators, trying for more than a thousand years (since English Common Law), have not been able to write a rule to cover all future cases of just one act: the act of killing.

In the USA, the 50 states have 50 different massive laws on murder. The very same killing might qualify as justifiable self-defense in some states but not in others.

The attempt to write comprehensive moral laws isn't just challenging, it's impossible.

Which is consistent with what I've been saying. There are MANY, MANY, MANY domains in which experts cannot write down the rules that capture their expertise.

 

[joe1776]

Which is consistent with what I've been saying. There are MANY, MANY, MANY domains in which experts cannot write down the rules that capture their expertise.

Have I misunderstood? Are you claiming that the writing of perfect laws is impossible because the reasoning mind cannot properly explain the intuition which you claim is the product of the reasoning mind?

 

[icehorse]

Have I misunderstood? Are you claiming that the writing of perfect laws is impossible because the reasoning mind cannot properly explain the intuition which you claim is the product of the reasoning mind?

Kind of. I think the fact that every secular country's body of law is constantly under refinement and revision is testament to the fact that codifying expertise is a really, really tricky job.

 

[joe1776]

Kind of. I think the fact that every secular country's body of law is constantly under refinement and revision is testament to the fact that codifying expertise is a really, really tricky job.

I asked: Are you claiming that the writing of perfect laws is impossible because the reasoning mind cannot properly explain the intuition which you claim is the product of the reasoning mind?

And your answer was "kind of." I think you must see that your claims conflict.

 

[icehorse]

I asked: Are you claiming that the writing of perfect laws is impossible because the reasoning mind cannot properly explain the intuition which you claim is the product of the reasoning mind?

And your answer was "kind of." I think you must see that your claims conflict.

I was responding to your claim. I think your claim is "kind of" correct. If you feel my claims conflict, you might be correct, can you show me where you see a conflict?

 

[joe1776]

I was responding to your claim. I think your claim is "kind of" correct. If you feel my claims conflict, you might be correct, can you show me where you see a conflict?

There's no doubt that intuitive judgments often can't be explained. But it's highly unlikely that an intuitive judgment, which originated in the reasoning function of the brain, would resist a reasonable explanation.

I'll take this argument one step further: When you claim that the Chess Master's intuition is based on reason, you have jumped to a conclusion unsupported by evidence. The problem is that we don't really know much of what's going on in the unconscious. There might be the capacity to learn Chess or whatever that is independent of the conscious reasoning faculty.

 

[icehorse]

There's no doubt that intuitive judgments often can't be explained. But it's highly unlikely that an intuitive judgment, which originated in the reasoning function of the brain, would resist a reasonable explanation.

I'll take this argument one step further: When you claim that the Chess Master's intuition is based on reason, you have jumped to a conclusion unsupported by evidence. The problem is that we don't really know much of what's going on in the unconscious. There might be the capacity to learn Chess or whatever that is independent of the conscious reasoning faculty.

There are cognitive scientists who focus on expertise. Their definition of expertise is something like: an expert performs reliably in his domain. Reliability is a key idea.

Now, you've just added a wrinkle when you say "conscious reasoning faculty". Are you limiting conscious reasoning to "that which can be explained" by the performer? If so, I think that most cognitive scientists would push back on that definition.

 

[joe1776]

There are cognitive scientists who focus on expertise. Their definition of expertise is something like: an expert performs reliably in his domain. Reliability is a key idea.

Now, you've just added a wrinkle when you say "conscious reasoning faculty". Are you limiting conscious reasoning to "that which can be explained" by the performer? If so, I think that most cognitive scientists would push back on that definition.

Yes, the output of conscious reasoning can be explained. If it can't be explained, it's unreasonable.

If it's intuition, it emerges from the unconscious and it may or may not have a reasonable explanation.

If cognitive scientists define these ideas differently as you say, why? Are they engaged in philosophy or science?

 

[icehorse]

Yes, the output of conscious reasoning can be explained. If it can't be explained, it's unreasonable.

If it's intuition, it emerges from the unconscious and it may or may not have a reasonable explanation.

If cognitive scientists define these ideas differently as you say, why? Are they engaged in philosophy or science?

Okay, so you're using more traditional definitions, and the ones I'm using are more cutting edge cognitive science definitions.

Cognitive scientists want to understand how our brains and minds work. Expert intuition and tacit knowledge are two ideas that help cognitive scientists understand brains and minds better. For example, we know that people can learn how to consistently hit fast moving tennis balls back across the net and into the other side of the court. Cognitive scientists are interested in understanding how it is a human can learn that skill. If they can gain a deeper understanding of those mechanisms, they will be closer - for example - to helping folks who are paralyzed learn to walk again. They will be able to help all students learn more efficiently. And so on.

There is nothing nefarious going on, this doesn't have to venture into the realm of philosophy. What it might be doing however is making incursions into realms that religious thinking would like to defend as "in the domain of religion". We see this a lot - science forces religion to recede.

 

[joe1776]

Okay, so you're using more traditional definitions, and the ones I'm using are more cutting edge cognitive science definitions.

I have a high regard for Science, the discipline, but not so much for the people who call themselves scientists. Nevertheless, I'd be interested in those definitions if you have them handy.

For example, we know that people can learn how to consistently hit fast moving tennis balls back across the net and into the other side of the court. Cognitive scientists are interested in understanding how it is a human can learn that skill.

It's not hard. I could explain it to them. There are two tricks involved. I doubt they would have application to any endeavor other than reaction sports.

One trick is to shut off the reasoning mind which operates deliberately and interferes with quick reaction. It's OK to think about how to hit the ball during practice sessions and its OK to think about strategy between points. But when the action begins, the thinking has to stop to allow the unconscious mind to control unrestricted reaction.

The other trick is not to care about winning. Playing with a don't-give-a-damn-about-results attitude frees the body. It sounds counter-intuitive but trying hard to win is the worst thing one can do.