I am of the alarming opinion that -- while philosophy is most often the wrong tool to use when attempting to answer questions about the physical world -- it is most often an essential tool to use when figuring out the right questions to ask. My view was insightfully expressed by Albert Einstein when he stated that figuring out the right question to ask was the hardest part of physics -- "The rest is easy". With that in mind, please allow me to tell you the scandalous and shocking tale of how it came about that today the world is by and large asking the wrong question about the nature of consciousness.
[Personally, I recommend you now take a moment to get some popcorn before proceeding.]
Our story begins with David J. Chalmers, an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist. In 1995, Chalmers -- inspired by Rene Descartes' division of reality into two categories (mind and matter) -- posited that there were two kinds of problems regarding consciousness that humanity had to solve before it could claim bragging rights to having understood what consciousness is. The single "hard problem", and the many "easy problems".
Perhaps you have heard of the hard problem of consciousness, and the easy problems of consciousness? The easy problems are things like, "How does the brain (and body) give rise to perception, cognition, learning, and behavior." These easy problems are basically scientific problems. That is, they can be studied and answered via scientific methods and procedures. Of that, the world agrees.
On the other hand, the hard problem is a philosophical problem that -- according to Chalmers (and most of today's accepted wisdom) simply cannot be answered via the sciences. It is the problem of why there are qualia associated with consciousness. For instance, why is it that I do not merely see the color green, but also have an experience or feeling (qualia) that I am seeing the color green? Put differently, why are we not just robots or (in Chalmers' language) "zombies" who have no inner universe, no consciousness, at all? (DISCLAIMER: I am simplifying the issue to an appalling degree in order to make this OP easier to follow.)
Most significantly, Chalmers argues that we could solve every last easy problem and still not have a solution to the hard problem. That is, there is something special about consciousness that cannot be wholly explained in terms of physical brain mechanisms.
As you might have guessed by now, Chalmers' 1995 distinction between the easy and hard problems of consciousness is today largely accepted by both philosophers and scientists as the starting point for any and all further investigations of consciousness. It is asserted to be the right question to ask. In short, you would have a darn hard time convincing most people in the field of consciousness studies that the question was a meaningless poofle-sneeze-snucker that did not actually need to be answered at all. There are dissenters, of course, but they are in the minority.
Naturally, I myself am to be ranked among the dissenters since I am far too dumb to figure out why the majority is right. I simply do not buy into the notion that the hard problem of consciousness is an actual problem. Or, to put it differently, I believe that consciousness -- including the qualia of consciousness -- can almost certainly be wholly and entirely explained in terms of physical brain (and body) mechanisms. (Eventually. We ain't there yet.) I do not hold my position on faith in science, but rather on the grounds that the distinction between hard and easy problems makes no sense to me, or even to my goldfish, who is brighter than me. But rather than go into any detail about my reasoning at this point, I am going to turn this thread over to you good and worthy people.
So, do you accept or reject the notion that consciousness cannot be wholly and entirely explained in terms of physical mechanisms? Why or why not? And is there any popcorn left?
Cheers.
___________________________
[Personally, I recommend you now take a moment to get some popcorn before proceeding.]
Our story begins with David J. Chalmers, an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist. In 1995, Chalmers -- inspired by Rene Descartes' division of reality into two categories (mind and matter) -- posited that there were two kinds of problems regarding consciousness that humanity had to solve before it could claim bragging rights to having understood what consciousness is. The single "hard problem", and the many "easy problems".
Perhaps you have heard of the hard problem of consciousness, and the easy problems of consciousness? The easy problems are things like, "How does the brain (and body) give rise to perception, cognition, learning, and behavior." These easy problems are basically scientific problems. That is, they can be studied and answered via scientific methods and procedures. Of that, the world agrees.
On the other hand, the hard problem is a philosophical problem that -- according to Chalmers (and most of today's accepted wisdom) simply cannot be answered via the sciences. It is the problem of why there are qualia associated with consciousness. For instance, why is it that I do not merely see the color green, but also have an experience or feeling (qualia) that I am seeing the color green? Put differently, why are we not just robots or (in Chalmers' language) "zombies" who have no inner universe, no consciousness, at all? (DISCLAIMER: I am simplifying the issue to an appalling degree in order to make this OP easier to follow.)
Most significantly, Chalmers argues that we could solve every last easy problem and still not have a solution to the hard problem. That is, there is something special about consciousness that cannot be wholly explained in terms of physical brain mechanisms.
As you might have guessed by now, Chalmers' 1995 distinction between the easy and hard problems of consciousness is today largely accepted by both philosophers and scientists as the starting point for any and all further investigations of consciousness. It is asserted to be the right question to ask. In short, you would have a darn hard time convincing most people in the field of consciousness studies that the question was a meaningless poofle-sneeze-snucker that did not actually need to be answered at all. There are dissenters, of course, but they are in the minority.
Naturally, I myself am to be ranked among the dissenters since I am far too dumb to figure out why the majority is right. I simply do not buy into the notion that the hard problem of consciousness is an actual problem. Or, to put it differently, I believe that consciousness -- including the qualia of consciousness -- can almost certainly be wholly and entirely explained in terms of physical brain (and body) mechanisms. (Eventually. We ain't there yet.) I do not hold my position on faith in science, but rather on the grounds that the distinction between hard and easy problems makes no sense to me, or even to my goldfish, who is brighter than me. But rather than go into any detail about my reasoning at this point, I am going to turn this thread over to you good and worthy people.
So, do you accept or reject the notion that consciousness cannot be wholly and entirely explained in terms of physical mechanisms? Why or why not? And is there any popcorn left?
Cheers.
___________________________
