Place of Rational Inquiry in Dharmic Worldviews

[atanu]

Unseen things can be part of empirical inquiry as well. Indeed they regularly are, and can be inferred from what is observable. Nyaya believed that the soul/self can be inferred from the observable properties of consciousness. That is where their disputation with Buddhists were.
Expert testimony is accepted in science and any branch of empirical inquiry as well. What makes someone an expert is under contention though. You are confusing empirical inquiry with atheism for some reason. Atheism may be or may not be the conclusion from empirical inquiry, its the methodology of inquiry that makes it empirical, not the conclusion. Nyaya philosophy follows an empirical and rational mode of inquiry in the same sense as Aristotle does in his philosophy and epistemology even though both schools do believe in God/Gods based on reasoning and inference.

No. I am not conflating atheism and empirical enquiry and atheism.

1. My response regarding atheism was to Shiva's patent assertion that Gautama muni did not accept Ishwara.

The Nyaya Sutra says:
BOOK IV,
“21. Since fruits are awarded by God, man's acts, we conclude, are not the sole cause thereof.—21”

So, it is obvious that Gautama muni takes Ishwara as axiomatic. How else is karma phala attributed?

2. Regarding empiricism

Nyaya accepts an intelligent atman. There are two implications of this.

a) Since mind is dependent upon atman and is a product, it cannot know/see atman. Any Hindu of any school will understand this. Nyaya teaches as below:

“106. The knowledge of truth is rendered habitual by & special practice of meditation.—38.”

“110. We are instructed to practise meditation in such places as a forest, a cave or a sand-bank.—42.

“113. And there is absence of a body in our release

“114. For that purpose there should be a purifying of our soul by abstinence from evil and observance of certain duties as well as by following the spiritual injunctions gleaned from the Yoga institute.—46.”

115. To secure release, it is necessary to study and follow this treatise on knowledge as well as to hold discussions”

b) Implication of a conscious Atman
Hinduism works with the concept of a 'whole' that is intelligent and distinct from the particulars. Shankara's advaita uses this in its basic premise of 'Adhyasa', the concept where a particular is mistaken for the whole and whole is attributed the property of a particular. Shankara employs an example of a heated iron ball to demonstrate this effect. In case, of a heated iron ball, some may think that heat has property of hardness (which comes from iron) and that the property of the ball is being 'hot'. Shankara called this Adhyasa.

Now, a knower of this intelligent whole (Atman-Brahman), is well nigh God. This is not acceptable to monotheists and even Buddha did not clarify it. This was brought into picture by Gaudapada in Mandukya Karika.

99 The Knowledge of the wise man, who is all light, is never related to any object. All the jivas, as well as Knowledge, are ever unrelated to objects. This is not the view of Buddha.

 

[atanu]

I will summarise the above post in two points:

a) Nyaya accepts axiomatically Ishwara as distributor of karmaphala (fruits of our actions):

21. Since fruits are awarded by God, man's acts, we conclude, are not the sole cause thereof.—21

b) Nyaya enumerates the objects of knowledge as below:

“9. Soul, body, senses, objects of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain and release-— are the objects of right knowledge.”

Regarding knowledge of objects, it holds:

“106. The knowledge of truth is rendered habitual by & special practice of meditation.—38.”
“114. For that purpose there should be a purifying of our soul by abstinence from evil and observance of certain duties as well as by following the spiritual injunctions gleaned from the Yoga institute.—46.”
115. To secure release, it is necessary to study and follow this treatise on knowledge as well as to hold discussions”. -- 47
.........

Spoiler: More

Nyaya does not say that knowledge of Atman, which is the source of mind, can be obtained alone through mental-empirical knowledge.

It, through vey precise empirical-logical method, demonstrates that the final moksha (correct Jnana) can be had only through following the teachings of Yoga school.

Nyaya also demolishes the false teachings of a particular brand of Buddhism that says "There is no abiding truth in any category of this world".

Then how these Buddhists come to preach the truth?

Nyaya says:
“76. The means of right knowledge cannot, therefore, be denied. They are established in the manner that a drum is proved by its sound.—15”

The means of knowledge (Jnana) constitutes our core nature, the Atman, and it can be attained through Yoga.

 

[atanu]

To me the essence of Nyaya is:

The means of knowledge (Jnana) constitutes our core nature, the Atman, and it can be attained through Yoga.

And the above is not in consonance with absurd teaching of a particular brand of Buddhism that there is no absolute essence of knowledge.

 

[sayak83]

No. I am not conflating atheism and empirical enquiry and atheism.

1. My response regarding atheism was to Shiva's patent assertion that Gautama muni did not accept Ishwara.

The Nyaya Sutra says:
BOOK IV,
“21. Since fruits are awarded by God, man's acts, we conclude, are not the sole cause thereof.—21”

So, it is obvious that Gautama muni takes Ishwara as axiomatic. How else is karma phala attributed?

Ok. You were replying to me, which confused me. While I believe that early Nyaya had little role for God in its philosophy, I do consider Nyaya to have a theistic background presumption (unlike Vaisesika). I won't argue this point apart from saying that theism does not play much of a role in the development and support of Nyaya epistemology.

2. Regarding empiricism

Nyaya accepts an intelligent atman. There are two implications of this.

a) Since mind is dependent upon atman and is a product, it cannot know/see atman. Any Hindu of any school will understand this. Nyaya teaches as below:

“106. The knowledge of truth is rendered habitual by & special practice of meditation.—38.”

“110. We are instructed to practise meditation in such places as a forest, a cave or a sand-bank.—42.

“113. And there is absence of a body in our release

“114. For that purpose there should be a purifying of our soul by abstinence from evil and observance of certain duties as well as by following the spiritual injunctions gleaned from the Yoga institute.—46.”

115. To secure release, it is necessary to study and follow this treatise on knowledge as well as to hold discussions”

b) Implication of a conscious Atman
Hinduism works with the concept of a 'whole' that is intelligent and distinct from the particulars. Shankara's advaita uses this in its basic premise of 'Adhyasa', the concept where a particular is mistaken for the whole and whole is attributed the property of a particular. Shankara employs an example of a heated iron ball to demonstrate this effect. In case, of a heated iron ball, some may think that heat has property of hardness (which comes from iron) and that the property of the ball is being 'hot'. Shankara called this Adhyasa.

Now, a knower of this intelligent whole (Atman-Brahman), is well nigh God. This is not acceptable to monotheists and even Buddha did not clarify it. This was brought into picture by Gaudapada in Mandukya Karika.

99 The Knowledge of the wise man, who is all light, is never related to any object. All the jivas, as well as Knowledge, are ever unrelated to objects. This is not the view of Buddha.

I know with great certainty that Nyaya rejected the Advaitic premise and considered the world to really existent as is. Nyaya also considered that the self as a substance behind the mind can be inferred by observing the nature of the mind through meditative reflection and from arguments made from such observation. Nyaya theory of the world and the selves is different from both Advaita and Buddhists, and this in equal measure.

 

[atanu]

I know with great certainty that Nyaya rejected the Advaitic premise and considered the world to really existent as is. Nyaya also considered that the self as a substance behind the mind can be inferred by observing the nature of the mind through meditative reflection and from arguments made from such observation. Nyaya theory of the world and the selves is different from both Advaita and Buddhists, and this in equal measure.

I will not enter into argumentation. Nyaya does point to Yoga institution for the final answer. And advaita and Buddha also do that.

That is all I have to say.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

And the above is not in consonance with absurd teaching of a particular brand of Buddhism that there is no absolute essence of knowledge.

What is absurd is your inability to understand that Buddhism teaches something quite different to Hinduism. You seem incapable of thinking outside the Atman/Brahman box, and incapable of understanding the real meaning of Buddhist teachings.

You are so attached to the notion of a reality behind appearances that you cannot conceive of mere appearances - but that is precisely what sunyata implies. You are so attached to the notion of one who knows that you cannot conceive of mere knowing - but that is precisely what anatta implies.


Bahiya Sutta: About Bahiya

"Herein, Bahiya, you should train yourself thus: 'In the seen will be merely what is seen; in the heard will be merely what is heard; in the sensed will be merely what is sensed; in the cognized will be merely what is cognized.' In this way you should train yourself, Bahiya.
"When, Bahiya, for you in the seen is merely what is seen... in the cognized is merely what is cognized, then, Bahiya, you will not be 'with that.' When, Bahiya, you are not 'with that,' then, Bahiya, you will not be 'in that.' When, Bahiya, you are not 'in that,' then, Bahiya, you will be neither here nor beyond nor in between the two. Just this is the end of suffering."


Sabba Sutta: The All

"The Blessed One said, "What is the All? Simply the eye & forms, ear & sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, intellect & ideas. This, monks, is called the All. Anyone who would say, 'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies beyond range."


Phena Sutta: Foam

"Form is like a glob of foam;
feeling, a bubble;
perception, a mirage;
fabrications, a banana tree;
consciousness, a magic trick —
this has been taught
by the Kinsman of the Sun.
However you observe them,
appropriately examine them,
they're empty, void
to whoever sees them
appropriately."

 

[Aupmanyav]

The Nyaya Sutra says:
BOOK IV,
“21. Since fruits are awarded by God, man's acts, we conclude, are not the sole cause thereof.—21”

Don't know what Gautama said and what was interpolated later. I hope Gautama proved the existence of God/Gods/Goddesses conclusively. Because, here we debate the question unceasingly.

I know with great certainty that Nyaya rejected the Advaitic premise and considered the world to really existent as is.

When and where does 'Advaita' rejects it. That is the Vyavaharika Satya, unescapable.

"Form is like a glob of foam; feeling, a bubble; perception, a mirage; ..

Create foam without water. Homage to my guru, Lord Buddha.
Did Buddha say 'sunyata' and nihilism are same?

 

[Rick O'Shez]

Did Buddha say 'sunyata' and nihilism are same?

Nihilism isn't relevant here. Sunyata means no inherent existence, things not existing from their own side. That means no noumena or essence, just characteristics or properties.

So for example applying sunyata to an "apple", we actually just have roundness and greeness and hardness. There is no "apple" behind those characteristics.

This is also pointed to in the suttas, where the elements of form are really properties or characteristics, not actual elements. So for example the air element actually represents motion, not the physical air that we breathe.

 

[3d2e1f]

So for example applying sunyata to an "apple", we actually just have roundness and greeness and hardness. There is no "apple" behind those characteristics.

The realist has many responses available at this point.

The realist will point out that if there is no underlying entity/substance that possesses these qualities, how does one make statements like "I touch what I see"? Greenness is seen while hardness is felt. If there were *just* greenness and hardness, there would be no reason why we should be able to make such statements given that each sense organ is capable of perceiving only qualities that are specific to it.

A more generalized argument also would be how the Buddhist is able to apply terms like "greenness" and "hardness". The ability to recognize two different things as hard and to combine them into a class called "hardness" requires the existence of enduring universals independent of the specific (possibly momentary) particulars.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

The realist will point out that if there is no underlying entity/substance that possesses these qualities, how does one make statements like "I touch what I see"? Greenness is seen while hardness is felt. If there were *just* greenness and hardness, there would be no reason why we should be able to make such statements given that each sense organ is capable of perceiving only qualities that are specific to it.

What we actually experience are phenomena, not noumena. What we actually experience are characteristics or properties, not some imagined underlying essence or thing. We then combine these experiences to form a perception of an "object".

There is no need for enduring universals, these are assumed or imagined. All we actually do is distinguish between relative characteristics. That is exactly what sunyata describes.
Sunyata makes Atman and Brahman redundant and irrelevant.

 

[sayak83]

What we actually experience are phenomena, not noumena. What we actually experience are characteristics or properties, not some imagined underlying essence or thing. We then combine these experiences to form a perception of an "object".

There is no need for enduring universals, these are assumed or imagined. All we actually do is distinguish between relative characteristics. That is exactly what sunyata describes.
Sunyata makes Atman and Brahman redundant and irrelevant.

I think the Buddhist philosophy needs to explain why, given the essenceless individuated property particulars are all that "exist" in an evanescent manner, there is such immense amounts of structural coherency in the phenomenal manifestation of these individuated particulars that much (if not all) of the experiential field is so easily described and understood in terms of enduring substance talk. There is no apriori reason as to why one expects such regularity of conjunction that makes substance talk intelligible, given the Buddhist worldview. Why don't pieces of "individuated hard" or "individuated empty shapes" or other "free property particulars" float in and out of existence everywhere instead of how they appear in reality?

 

[Rick O'Shez]

I think the Buddhist philosophy needs to explain why, given the essenceless individuated property particulars are all that "exist" in an evanescent manner, there is such immense amounts of structural coherency in the phenomenal manifestation of these individuated particulars that much (if not all) of the experiential field is so easily described and understood in terms of enduring substance talk. There is no apriori reason as to why one expects such regularity of conjunction that makes substance talk intelligible, given the Buddhist worldview. Why don't pieces of "individuated hard" or "individuated empty shapes" or other "free property particulars" float in and out of existence everywhere instead of how they appear in reality?

If you're asking about why phenomena appear, then the Buddhist answer would be to say that they arise and cease in dependence on conditions, which is another way of talking about sunyata.

So for example you could say an "apple" arises in dependence on "apples tree", which in turn arises in dependence on "seed", "sunlight", "water", "soil" and so on.

It's all about conditionality and relativity, rather than essences and absolutes.

 

[sayak83]

If you're asking about why phenomena appear, then the Buddhist answer would be to say that they arise and cease in dependence on conditions, which is another way of talking about sunyata.

So for example you could say an "apple" arises in dependence on "apples tree", which in turn arises in dependence on "seed", "sunlight", "water", "soil" and so on.

It's all about conditionality and relativity, rather than essences and absolutes.

No. I am asking about why the dharmas appear cojointly in a regular manner in a way to make object talk intelligible. Why doesn't a free shape dharma or a free color dharma or a free solidity dharma or a pure number or a pure motion appear disconnected with all other dharmas? Why are all the phenomenal particulars appear tightly bound to each other "as if" they joined at the hip via a substance?

 

[shivsomashekhar]

So, it is obvious that Gautama muni takes Ishwara as axiomatic. How else is karma phala attributed?

You are assuming (without basis) that it has to be attributed to someone. You have to look at all three sutras to see what Gautama is saying. That is, 4.1.19 - 21. I am reproducing them below (Interpreted according to Vatsyayana and translated into english by SCV) -

God, says someone, is the sole cause of fruits, because man's acts are found occasionally to be unattended by them (fruits) - 4.1.19

This is, some are afraid, not so, because in the absence of man's acts there is no production of fruits - 4.1.20

Since, fruits are awarded by God, man's acts, we conclude are not the sole cause, thereof - 4.1.21

In 4.1.19, he notes one view which believes that everything is controlled by God because man's actions do not always produce fruit. Hence, there must be some other force delivering results, regardless of man's effort.

In 4.1.20, he notes another view which says there is no fruit without action and therefore, there is no God who produces results.

In 4.1.21, a conclusion is drawn from the above two. The reasoning (hetu) is that the reality must be a combination of both. It is man's actions that produce results, but combined with God's grace. That is, man's action produce results, but do not guarantee results. Only some of his actions produce results and therefore, that must be because of God's grace. It also follows that God cannot produce results by himself, without human effort. (This is Vatsyayana's reading of the sutra and it can be interpreted very differently. For instance, it can simply be taken to mean that results are not tied to actions and we do not know why some actions succeed and some do not).

Commenting on 4.1.21, Vatsyayana makes an odd, atheistic statement. He says "who can demonstrate the existence of him who is above perception, inference and scripture?". In other words, he is claiming that there is no way to know God, which makes one wonder how he knows about God in the first place? It is also clear that he is not accepting the Veda as a valid source for his conception of Ishvara.

The means of knowledge (Jnana) constitutes our core nature, the Atman, and it can be attained through Yoga.

If Nyaya simply redirects people to Yoga, how is it a Darshana by itself?

From Vatsyayana - The sutras says that one has to understand the sixteen categories. Meditation (turning the mind inwards to the point where there is no external perception) makes this understanding habitual (sutras 4.2.38 and onwards). But meditation is not easy owing to distractions and in this context, one should abstain from evil, perform duties and meditate according to yogic practices such as penance, breath control and mental focus. However, yogic practices do not help without prior knowledge of the categories. Discussions with learned people and study of the Nyaya shastra can be very helpful in understanding the categories.

Don't know what Gautama said and what was interpolated later. I hope Gautama proved the existence of God/Gods/Goddesses conclusively.

He did not.

Nyaya does attempt extensive proof for God, but that is much later - during polemics with Buddhists - at least, a thousand years after the time of Gautama /Akshapada (possibly more).

Note that, in this chapter (4.1) Gautama criticizes rival schools (including madhyamaka, yogachara, kshanikavada and others) and establishes his own view on the subject. It has nothing to do with his actual doctrine. Since, the general consensus is that Gautama predates Nagarjuna (2nd Century CE) and yet, we have sutras displaying awareness of later Buddhist views, these sutras are seen as later interpolations. Satis Chandra thinks Vatsyayana himself may have been the interpolator. But I am not playing the interpolation card. For purposes of this thread, we can assume that there are no interpolations and all the sutras were authored by Gautama.

 

[Osal]

I hope Gautama proved the existence of God/Gods/Goddesses conclusively. Because, here we debate the question unceasingly.

He did not. I feel wierd having to tell you what your guru teaches.

Anyway .....

Taken in the whole, the Buddha seems almost apathetic in regards to the extence of Gods. Even thouh a God suplicated the Buddha to turn the Wheel of Dharma, and Gods are said to have attended the Buddha's teaching (as in the Prajnaparamita suras, et al).

A Buddha's concern is with the suffering of beings. Gods did not create the suffering of beings, only their own, so cannot affect the cessation of suffring of beings. The Buddha taught the path to the cessation of suffering. Of what need are Gods? If Gods did not matter to the Buddha there was no need for a definitive staement on the existence of Gods.

 

[atanu]

You are assuming (without basis) that it has to be attributed to someone. You have to look at all three sutras to see what Gautama is saying. That is, 4.1.19 - 21. I am reproducing them below (Interpreted according to Vatsyayana and translated into english by SCV) -

God, says someone, is the sole cause of fruits, because man's acts are found occasionally to be unattended by them (fruits) - 4.1.19

This is, some are afraid, not so, because in the absence of man's acts there is no production of fruits - 4.1.20

Since, fruits are awarded by God, man's acts, we conclude are not the sole cause, thereof - 4.1.21

In 4.1.19, he notes one view which believes that everything is controlled by God because man's actions do not always produce fruit. Hence, there must be some other force delivering results, regardless of man's effort.

In 4.1.20, he notes another view which says there is no fruit without action and therefore, there is no God who produces results.

In 4.1.21, a conclusion is drawn from the above two. The reasoning (hetu) is that the reality must be a combination of both. It is man's actions that produce results, but combined with God's grace. That is, man's action produce results, but do not guarantee results. Only some of his actions produce results and therefore, that must be because of God's grace. It also follows that God cannot produce results by himself, without human effort. (This is Vatsyayana's reading of the sutra and it can be interpreted very differently. For instance, it can simply be taken to mean that results are not tied to actions and we do not know why some actions succeed and some do not).

Commenting on 4.1.21, Vatsyayana makes an odd, atheistic statement. He says "who can demonstrate the existence of him who is above perception, inference and scripture?". In other words, he is claiming that there is no way to know God, which makes one wonder how he knows about God in the first place? It is also clear that he is not accepting the Veda as a valid source for his conception of Ishvara.



If Nyaya simply redirects people to Yoga, how is it a Darshana by itself?

From Vatsyayana - The sutras says that one has to understand the sixteen categories. Meditation (turning the mind inwards to the point where there is no external perception) makes this understanding habitual (sutras 4.2.38 and onwards). But meditation is not easy owing to distractions and in this context, one should abstain from evil, perform duties and meditate according to yogic practices such as penance, breath control and mental focus. However, yogic practices do not help without prior knowledge of the categories. Discussions with learned people and study of the Nyaya shastra can be very helpful in understanding the categories.



He did not.

Nyaya does attempt extensive proof for God, but that is much later - during polemics with Buddhists - at least, a thousand years after the time of Gautama /Akshapada (possibly more).

Note that, in this chapter (4.1) Gautama criticizes rival schools (including madhyamaka, yogachara, kshanikavada and others) and establishes his own view on the subject. It has nothing to do with his actual doctrine. Since, the general consensus is that Gautama predates Nagarjuna (2nd Century CE) and yet, we have sutras displaying awareness of later Buddhist views, these sutras are seen as later interpolations. Satis Chandra thinks Vatsyayana himself may have been the interpolator. But I am not playing the interpolation card. For purposes of this thread, we can assume that there are no interpolations and all the sutras were authored by Gautama.

So, Gautama did ascribe to the Vedic teaching that Ishwara plays a role of distributing karma phala. That is not same as what you said that Gautama did not believe in Ishwara.
...

 

[shivsomashekhar]

So, Gautama did ascribe to the Vedic teaching that Ishwara plays a role in distributing karma phala.

That is not same as what you said that Gautama did not believe in Ishwara.
...

Atanu, are you even reading my posts?

I rephrased "did not accept Ishwara" to "Ishwara plays no role in Nyaya'.

I have stated multiple times that Ishwara plays no role in his doctrine. I also repeated twice that Gautama's single isolated statement on Ishvara has no bearing on his doctrine. That sutra only exists to disagree with a rival school and does not contribute in anyway to the doctrine.

 

[3d2e1f]

I feel wierd having to tell you what your guru teaches.

Taken in the whole, the Buddha seems almost apathetic in regards to the extence of Gods.

A common enough mistake but this thread is about Gotama Aksapada, the compiler of Nyayasutras. Not about Gautama Buddha.

 

[Aupmanyav]

Sunyata means no inherent existence, .. That means no noumena or essence, .. So for example the air element actually represents motion, not the physical air that we breathe.

But the physical air is there. I do not think Buddha denied that. I have no problem with 'Sunyata', no essence. Hindus term it 'maya'. So, Indra's net is based on something more than just dependent origination. That Hindus term as Brahman. Not Guatama the Buddha (he was not into speculation), but later Buddhists talk about Bodhikaya, Buddhadhatu, Tathagatagarbha and Dhammakaya.

 

[Osal]

A common enough mistake but this thread is about Gotama Aksapada, the compiler of Nyayasutras. Not about Gautama Buddha.

Now if Aup would have spelled it right, ......