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Philosophy and Science

MikeF

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
Nope. I believe that we can only currently investigate and demonstrate the existence of the natural world, but that says nothing about what else could exist, if anything. I just don't know. I'm comfortable not accepting either side of the metaphysical claim. P or not P. Supernatural exists or does not exist. We just have no way to evaluate either side of the argument with our current knowledge. So, you got the 1. and 2. statements right.

What I CAN do, is use induction to provisionally expect what sort of explanations will we find in the future to describe phenomena we don't understand yet. Looking at prior discoveries, the full explanation has always been natural. Lightning, mental illness, droughts, plagues, etc, were all previously attributed to the supernatural until we discovered natural explanations. For this reason, I can use induction to tentatively presume that if we eventually discover an explanation for the beginning of our universe, the nature of time and space, etc, these will also be natural explanations.

Does this mean I can justify ruling out supernatural discoveries in the future? Nope. Not at all, because the natural world and universe and its cause could still have an underlying supernatural foundation one step beyond our future understanding, despite an endless procession of prior natural explanations. Or I might not. Does this mean I "provisionally believe that ontological naturalism is indeed warranted"? No. I hope you can see the distinction.

My "tempted, but" point was because I've had a lot of people say "Well, you're just agnostic," when I refuse to defend the metaphysical opposite of whatever they're claiming.
I'm going to weigh in on this. Isn't the whole concept of supernatural silly? Either things exist and are real, our they don't. Just because there may be things or conditions in the cosmos that we currently cannot perceive, does that make them supernatural? No. There is only reality, that which exists. If gods exist, then that is part of reality, or nature.

Why must everything not in evidence be kept on the table? Why tip toe around and say, "One cannot be an Ontological Naturalist, because to do so would be an Argument From Ignorance." I'm not buying into this convention. We don't have to treat the infinite number of things that can be imagined as possible or probable. There is simply what is known and that which is yet unknown. We can speculate, guess, and imagine what may still lie beyond our current understanding, but that is all it will be until it is empirically documented.

I cannot see a reason why Ontological Naturalism(or Metaphysical Naturalism) should not be embraced.

And this extends to atheism and agnosticism. For the longest time I was of the opinion that one could only be an agnostic, for we don't know what we don't know, how can we make any definitive declaration. But does that mean we have to entertain anything and everything? No, we do not. I say we do not have to accommodate, or allow for, anything that is not in evidence. All we can do is work with what we currently know and and strive to increase and improve that knowledge.

And I have no idea what philosophical label should apply to that opinion.

(Disclaimer: This rant has been fueled by 4 shots of tequila.)
 

MikeF

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
Buddy, we gonna be friends over this. :joycat:

Though I'm a whiskey girl.
For some reason, in my middle age, wheat/gluten is a problem. I've lost beer and have instead embraced tequila. Bourbon is also in rotation, as it is primarily corn based. :)
 
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AlexanderG

Active Member
I'm going to weigh in on this. Isn't the whole concept of supernatural silly? Either things exist and are real, our they don't. Just because there may be things or conditions in the cosmos that we currently cannot perceive, does that make them supernatural? No. There is only reality, that which exists. If gods exist, then that is part of reality, or nature.

Why must everything not in evidence be kept on the table? Why tip toe around and say, "One cannot be an Ontological Naturalist, because to do so would be an Argument From Ignorance." I'm not buying into this convention. We don't have to treat the infinite number of things that can be imagined as possible or probable. There is simply what is known and that which is yet unknown. We can speculate, guess, and imagine what may still lie beyond our current understanding, but that is all it will be until it is empirically documented.

I cannot see a reason why Ontological Naturalism(or Metaphysical Naturalism) should not be embraced.

And this extends to atheism and agnosticism. For the longest time I was of the opinion that one could only be an agnostic, for we don't know what we don't know, how can we make any definitive declaration. But does that mean we have to entertain anything and everything? No, we do not. I say we do not have to accommodate, or allow for, anything that is not in evidence. All we can do is work with what we currently know and and strive to increase and improve that knowledge.

And I have no idea what philosophical label should apply to that opinion.

(Disclaimer: This rant has been fueled by 4 shots of tequila.)

I like it, haha! Since there is no actual clear definition of supernatural, and no one can verify it, you could also just apply the null hypothesis and assume it's an imaginary semantic concept until demonstrated otherwise. Arguably, supernaturalism is unverifiable by definition, making it an incoherent exercise to believe it is part of reality. It may just come down to semantics. Personally, I don't like making metaphysical claims for which there's no evidence, but that's me.
 

MikeF

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
I think this may be bias ^.^
Yes, bias, predjudice ... guilty as charged. As I said earlier, I have developed a growing disdain for the label 'Philosophy', and all the historical baggage that comes with it. Intellectually, I know the label 'Philosophy' will never be given up or abandoned, but emotionally, I want all the 'good' parts of 'Philosophy' transferred over to the banner of 'Science' and get on with the business of figuring out the general and fundamental questions of reality. :)

I am not suggesting that we can power through the limits of physics with philosophy and still call it science, if I'm understanding you correctly.
Then we are all good. :)

I'm saying that we do philosophy when we ask things like "what is good justification" and "what is the scope of what we're doing?" We have to be good at these things to do good science.
And for me, perhaps naively, those questions have always been integral to the endeavor of Science.

A way I phrased it in a response to Polymath is this: would a science student benefit from taking classes or independently researching things like epistemology, ontology, logic, and other realms of metaphysics? I find it hard to see how anyone would answer "no." Maybe they would, I don't know. But I think that if we think students would benefit from learning philosophy, then we must answer the question "is philosophy still important for science?" with a yes.
And for me, this would be all part of my fantasy to transfer the 'good'' parts of Philosophy to the banner of Science. :)

Edit: I am reminded by discussions amongst my peers in the research group where sometimes you get a collection of data, and inevitably someone basically rubs their chin and says, "but what does it mean?" We've moved to philosophy at that point. Knowing that correlation does not imply causation for instance is philosophical. And so on.
I find this fascinating. I know of the mantra "correlation does not imply causation" through Medicine. As a result, my assumption/bias is that this is a scientific observation/realization. For a student of Philosophy it is philosophical.
 

Jayhawker Soule

-- untitled --
Premium Member
But the Laws of Chess weren't broken: they just never fully understood them. ...
This is a particularly interesting analogy if one views the movement of pieces through the lens of Shogi (or vice versa).

I just do not think "supernatural" is a useful word, and therefore I do not think a word in direct opposition to it is useful either.

Actually, I prefer the term preternatural, but I also know that most words get very fuzzy around the edges when intensely interrogated. So, for example, here is the caveat offered by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Naturalism:

The term “naturalism” has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. Its current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. The self-proclaimed “naturalists” from that period included John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook and Roy Wood Sellars. These philosophers aimed to ally philosophy more closely with science. They urged that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing “supernatural”, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the “human spirit” (Krikorian 1944, Kim 2003).

So understood, “naturalism” is not a particularly informative term as applied to contemporary philosophers. The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily accept naturalism as just characterized—that is, they would both reject “supernatural” entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the “human spirit”.

Even so, this entry will not aim to pin down any more informative definition of “naturalism”. It would be fruitless to try to adjudicate some official way of understanding the term. Different contemporary philosophers interpret “naturalism” differently. This disagreement about usage is no accident. For better or worse, “naturalism” is widely viewed as a positive term in philosophical circles—only a minority of philosophers nowadays are happy to announce themselves as “non-naturalists”. This inevitably leads to a divergence in understanding the requirements of “naturalism”. Those philosophers with relatively weak naturalist commitments are inclined to understand “naturalism” in a unrestrictive way, in order not to disqualify themselves as “naturalists”, while those who uphold stronger naturalist doctrines are happy to set the bar for “naturalism” higher.​

I welcome your definition of naturalism. It what also be interesting to hear your view of the word "universe" and your thoughts on its opposite.

Meanwhile, Stanford's discussion of


might prove interesting. Think of it as shogi-naturalism.

My sole point in this thread is that, unlike @AlexanderG. I would not characterize ontological naturalism as an unwarranted belief if only because I view "beliefs" as inferrences rather than truths.
 

Meow Mix

Chatte Féministe
This is a particularly interesting analogy if one views the movement of pieces through the lens of Shogi (or vice versa).

I'd never actually heard of Shogi before (thanks for the link). The point is well made, too.

I welcome your definition of naturalism. It what also be interesting to hear your view of the word "universe" and your thoughts on its opposite.

I can't think of a good one for naturalism, I just avoid it. I did consider one schema that takes long enough to explain that I would never do so in a discussion (I would just skip the term). That idea is this: perhaps we can consider there is some hypothetical being like a deity that created the universe and set that universe in motion with some defined set of rules. "Natural" would be what occurs in that set of rules without divine intervention, and "supernatural" would be when the being intervenes. But there are serious problems even with this schema: epistemically limited beings like humans would still not be able to tell the difference unless they had a perfect understanding of the "natural laws," things like leprechauns would still ostensibly be "natural" and not "supernatural" under that schema, and finally, there is the fact that the creator being also obeys some laws (notably at least logical self-identity, and any personality or character traits it has are beyond its own control, so are its interventions really not just consequences of higher "natural law?")

That beast of a paragraph is why I just don't use it: my best attempt is riddled with problems, could never work, and takes too long to explain (and opens too many tangents. I'd have to get into aseity-sovereignty paradox to explain what I mean about the being not being able to choose its own personality for instance.)

As for "universe," when I'm very careful about this, I use "universe" to mean "everything that exists," and I use "cosmos" to mean "the visible part of the universe and everything connected to it beyond the horizon." So for instance if eternal inflation is true and our "universe" is a bubble in an inflaton field, and there are other bubbles elsewhere, then "the cosmos" is our bubble, and "visible universe" is the visible portion of the cosmos.

Meanwhile, Stanford's discussion of


might prove interesting. Think of it as shogi-naturalism.

My sole point in this thread is that, unlike @AlexanderG. I would not characterize ontological naturalism as an unwarranted belief if only because I view "beliefs" as inferrences rather than truths.

This was an interesting read, and I scrolled up and read the first portion of the page as well. I don't think I would adopt this sort of ontology as it makes some strong claims I don't agree with (such as in the linked section), but it is neat to read about a thing I wasn't even aware existed.
 

Heyo

Veteran Member
As for "universe," when I'm very careful about this, I use "universe" to mean "everything that exists," and I use "cosmos" to mean "the visible part of the universe and everything connected to it beyond the horizon." So for instance if eternal inflation is true and our "universe" is a bubble in an inflaton field, and there are other bubbles elsewhere, then "the cosmos" is our bubble, and "visible universe" is the visible portion of the cosmos.
I have seen physicists (who care about a difference) use the terms just the other way around. I just can't find any authoritative source on that right now. The only source I have is: Difference Between Cosmos and Universe | Difference Between which states: "4.“Universe” may connote a much smaller scope while “cosmos” implies a larger scope."

Do you have sources for your use?
 

Meow Mix

Chatte Féministe
I have seen physicists (who care about a difference) use the terms just the other way around. I just can't find any authoritative source on that right now. The only source I have is: Difference Between Cosmos and Universe | Difference Between which states: "4.“Universe” may connote a much smaller scope while “cosmos” implies a larger scope."

Do you have sources for your use?

My source is my own idiosyncrasy. This is the second time I've heard that it's reversed from how some physicists use it, so I may consider flipping mine around to avoid confusion. I came up with the schema on my own. Seemed to me that "universe" should be "one verse," all of it. But shrug!

Edit: I go to a lot of colloquia and conferences and such, and have yet to hear the distinction made by speakers. I could just ask.
 

Jayhawker Soule

-- untitled --
Premium Member
... finally, there is the fact that the creator being also obeys some laws (notably at least logical self-identity, ...
I've never thought of principles of logic as a subset (floor?) of natural law. Interesting. Thanks.

This was an interesting read, and I scrolled up and read the first portion of the page as well. I don't think I would adopt this sort of ontology as it makes some strong claims I don't agree with (such as in the linked section), but it is neat to read about a thing I wasn't even aware existed.
I guess the question I would ponder is not "do I agree" but "is belief in it unwarranted?"
 
I also see Philosophy used as a crutch for those who need or want there to be something beyond our physical reality, and Philosophy in the classic sense seems to provide that crutch. For this and other reasons I lean towards chucking Philosophy in the bin, or at least relegating it to the history section of the library.

Alternatively you could see scientistic thinking as crutch for people who want the our experience of the world to be explainable purely in terms of a rational, empirical enquiry into our physical reality.

We all require 'crutches' of one kind or another as a world without myths and illusions is pretty unpalatable. There is nothing wrong with this, it's just part of the human condition.

The idea that science has 'replaced' philosophy is really a relic of positivistic thinkers like Auguste Comte who saw history in teleological terms progressing through stages from theological, to metaphysical to scientific. I'd say this mode of thought should be what we consign to the history books.

Compare this to Einstein:

I fully agree with you about the significance and educational value of methodology as well as history and philosophy of science. So many people today—and even professional scientists—seem to me like somebody who has seen thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering. This independence created by philosophical insight is—in my opinion—the mark of distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real seeker after truth. (Einstein to Thornton, 7 December 1944, EA 61-574)

Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve such an authority over us that we forget their earthly origins and accept them as unalterable givens. Thus they come to be stamped as “necessities of thought,” “a priori givens,” etc. The path of scientific advance is often made impassable for a long time through such errors. For that reason, it is by no means an idle game if we become practiced in analyzing the long commonplace concepts and exhibiting those circumstances upon which their justification and usefulness depend, how they have grown up, individually, out of the givens of experience. By this means, their all-too-great authority will be broken. They will be removed if they cannot be properly legitimated, corrected if their correlation with given things be far too superfluous, replaced by others if a new system can be established that we prefer for whatever reason. (Einstein 1916, 102)

In your response above, you seemed to characterize Science as merely data collection. I would strongly disagree with this. Science is both the data collection and the interpretation of that data. And based on the definition of Philosophy, I am arguing that Science is Philosophy, different only in its improved methodology and standards that address, and therefore mitigate, the primary weakness to getting good answers to the general and fundamental question, that weakness being we human beings ourselves.

Rather than seeing science as an improvement on philosophy, I think it is better to see it as a part of philosophy that cannot be abstracted from its philosophical context. For that reason, a term like natural philosophy seems preferable as it emphasises that they are not competing methodologies, as many people seem to believe these days, which may lead to problems caused by scientism.

If we look at the early days of Covid, organisations like the WHO were wrong on basically everything: nothing to worry about, keep borders open, don't wear masks, etc. This was based on a naive empiricism, where there was 'no evidence' it was a threat, 'no evidence' masks work, etc.

The science here could not be separated from philosophical issues regarding decision making under uncertainty and ethics though.

With many things, such as novel pandemics, if you wait for sufficient empirical evidence to become available, you will act too late. In which situations you favour precaution and act to mitigate the risk prior to sufficient evidence and which situations you 'wait and see' is philosophical and ethical rather than scientific though.

If we simply 'trust the science', we'd have been anti-lockdown, pro-lockdown, anti-mask, pro-mask, etc. at various points, sometimes being right and other times being wrong (even without the benefit of hindsight).

In contrast, with vaccines then it was certainly wise to 'trust the science', but in which domains and situations 'the science' is sufficient on its own is a philosophical issue.
 

MikeF

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
Alternatively you could see scientistic thinking as crutch for people who want the our experience of the world to be explainable purely in terms of a rational, empirical enquiry into our physical reality.
I realize using terms like ‘crutch’ is a sure way to get people's hackles up. It is rarely useful to use such terms and I should avoid using it.

We all require 'crutches' of one kind or another as a world without myths and illusions is pretty unpalatable. There is nothing wrong with this, it's just part of the human condition.
I would disagree with the sentiment that myths and illusions are required. There is a lot of socialization and indoctrination that goes into forming our personalities into adulthood. There are those who do not require myth and illusion to find the world palatable, and of those that do, the nature and coverage of the myths and illusions are not uniform and consistent between individuals. What role does training our children to rely on myth and illusion play in its necessity?

If myth and illusion are not required, are there disadvantages to insisting on their use? I would argue that there are. If one creates an artificial construct of reality, and claims that an essential property of this artificial construct is that its existence cannot be verified or tested in any way, then any entity or condition you could imagine can be placed in this artificial construct. And whatever entity or entities you want to place in this construct, with specific traits and attributes, every other person can project their own attributes onto the entities, or create their own from scratch. An entity that can require one to love one's neighbor can just as easily require that those who do not profess allegiance to the entity be put to death. There is no recourse or means of verification that can penetrate this artificial construct to evaluate any claim.

Additionally, if one of the purposes of the artificial construct is to answer all the unanswerable questions, to give satisfying answers to all that lies beyond our realm of experience, it has the potential to stagnate our growth and development, especially if to seek beyond the answers given is forbidden.

Rather than seeing science as an improvement on philosophy, I think it is better to see it as a part of philosophy that cannot be abstracted from its philosophical context. For that reason, a term like natural philosophy seems preferable as it emphasises that they are not competing methodologies, as many people seem to believe these days, which may lead to problems caused by scientism.
If Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental questions, such as those about existence, reason, knowledge, values, mind, and language, are these not the same questions of Science? What is the difference? Science is Philosophy, only practiced by adherence to principles and standards that help mitigate the greatest weakness in any philosophical endeavor, the flawed and fallible Philosopher. By placing all of what is considered Philosophy under the banner of Science, we signal that there is an improved way to approach these fundamental questions, and that improved way should apply to the whole endeavor.


If we look at the early days of Covid, organisations like the WHO were wrong on basically everything: nothing to worry about, keep borders open, don't wear masks, etc. This was based on a naive empiricism, where there was 'no evidence' it was a threat, 'no evidence' masks work, etc.

The science here could not be separated from philosophical issues regarding decision making under uncertainty and ethics though.

With many things, such as novel pandemics, if you wait for sufficient empirical evidence to become available, you will act too late. In which situations you favour precaution and act to mitigate the risk prior to sufficient evidence and which situations you 'wait and see' is philosophical and ethical rather than scientific though.

If we simply 'trust the science', we'd have been anti-lockdown, pro-lockdown, anti-mask, pro-mask, etc. at various points, sometimes being right and other times being wrong (even without the benefit of hindsight).

In contrast, with vaccines then it was certainly wise to 'trust the science', but in which domains and situations 'the science' is sufficient on its own is a philosophical issue.
As you describe, there are multiple issues at play, including competing interests between the health of individuals, and the effects that any measures taken might have socially and economically.

I would agree that the setting of values and ethics are outside the scope of empirical evaluation. Why, because we are not dealing with yes/no, true/false aspects in choosing a particular value or ethic. It is all subjective and any value or ethic that is to be set is dependent on intersubjective agreement. However, once the value judgement is made, empiricism can come back into play as it is human beings that are having to make these decisions, decisions without complete information and that requires balancing competing interests. Human behavior, psychology, and sociology, probability and statistics are all fields that can play a role in building understanding on how best to achieve whatever value or ethic is set, and especially how to balance competing values.

Since understanding why and how we make or hold a particular value is essentially the science of how we work, I would not carve out ethics from under the banner of Science. For me, Science is merely a label that says we are taking the best approach to answering all fundamental questions.
 
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I realize using terms like ‘crutch’ is a sure way to get people's hackles up. It is rarely useful to use such terms and I should avoid using it...

I would disagree with the sentiment that myths and illusions are required.

I'm quite ok with terms like crutch, myths and illusions and think they shouldn't have the negative connotations often ascribed to them.

They are only a problem if people are under the illusion that they 'see the world as it really is'.

Humans seem to be the only animals who can't live with the world on its own terms, and have to create sources of artificial meaning via religions and ideologies. I'm an atheist, but have no problem accepting that this is simply an inescapable part of human nature.

Myths, in the broad sense, are just narratives that are not objectively true that we use to make sense of the world and make meaning, create values and priorities, and formulate the ideologies we think we ought to live by.

Secular humanist type beliefs are no less reliant on myths than the religions they evolved from. The philosopher John Gray:

Humanists today, who claim to take a wholly secular view of things, scoff at mysticism and religion. But the unique status of humans is hard to defend, and even to understand, when it is cut off from any idea of transcendence. In a strictly naturalistic view – one in which the world is taken on its own terms, without reference to a creator or any spiritual realm – there is no hierarchy of value with humans at the top. There are simply multifarious animals, each with their own needs. Human uniqueness is a myth inherited from religion, which humanists have recycled into science...

When contemporary humanists invoke the idea of progress they are mixing together two different myths: a Socratic myth of reason and a Christian myth of salvation. If the resulting body of ideas is incoherent, that is the source of its appeal. Humanists believe that humanity improves along with the growth of knowledge, but the belief that the increase of knowledge goes with advances in civilization is an act of faith. They see the realization of human potential as the goal of history, when rational inquiry shows history to have no goal. They exalt nature, while insisting that humankind – an accident of nature – can overcome the natural limits that shape the lives of other animals. Plainly absurd, this nonsense gives meaning to the lives of people who believe they have left all myths behind. To expect humanists to give up their myths would be unreasonable. Like cheap music, the myth of progress lifts the spirits as it numbs the brain. The fact that rational humanity shows no sign of ever arriving only makes humanists cling more fervently to the conviction that humankind will someday be redeemed from unreason. Like believers in flying saucers, they interpret the non-event as confirming their faith...

Science is a solvent of illusion, and among the illusions it dissolves are those of humanism. Human knowledge increases, while human irrationality stays the same. Scientific inquiry may be an embodiment of reason, but what such inquiry demonstrates is that humans are not rational animals...

Modern myths are myths of salvation stated in secular terms. What both kinds of myths have in common is that they answer to a need for meaning that cannot be denied. In order to survive, humans have invented science. Pursued consistently, scientific inquiry acts to undermine myth. But life without myth is impossible, so science has become a channel for myths – chief among them, a myth of salvation through science. When truth is at odds with meaning, it is meaning that wins. Why this should be so is a delicate question. Why is meaning so important? Why do humans need a reason to live? Is it because they could not endure life if they did not believe it contained hidden significance?
The silence of animals: On progress and other modern myths


If myth and illusion are not required, are there disadvantages to insisting on their use? I would argue that there are. If one creates an artificial construct of reality, and claims that an essential property of this artificial construct is that its existence cannot be verified or tested in any way, then any entity or condition you could imagine can be placed in this artificial construct. And whatever entity or entities you want to place in this construct, with specific traits and attributes, every other person can project their own attributes onto the entities, or create their own from scratch. An entity that can require one to love one's neighbor can just as easily require that those who do not profess allegiance to the entity be put to death. There is no recourse or means of verification that can penetrate this artificial construct to evaluate any claim.

We create all kinds of artificial constructs that offer benefits (and often potential harms too).

Human Rights developed out of Medieval and Early Modern theology, before being refined and secularised in modernity.

The secularised version is no less made up than the theological version, but we accept them as real as it is convenient.

Humans are just animals, but we create systems of meaning based on human exceptionalism which is justified via myth rather than science.


Additionally, if one of the purposes of the artificial construct is to answer all the unanswerable questions, to give satisfying answers to all that lies beyond our realm of experience, it has the potential to stagnate our growth and development, especially if to seek beyond the answers given is forbidden.

What constitutes 'growth and development' is a product of culture though, and whatever we choose rests on providing 'satisfying answers to unanswerable questions'.

It's also quite possible that technological advancement will ultimately be the death of our species (and its definitely has been the death of many other species).

If survival of the species is the ultimate 'good', then it is certainly debatable that modernity has made this more rather than less likely.

If 'the well being of conscious creatures' constitutes 'growth and development', we were more advanced prior to the point we started the mass extinction.


If Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental questions, such as those about existence, reason, knowledge, values, mind, and language, are these not the same questions of Science? What is the difference? Science is Philosophy, only practiced by adherence to principles and standards that help mitigate the greatest weakness in any philosophical endeavor, the flawed and fallible Philosopher. By placing all of what is considered Philosophy under the banner of Science, we signal that there is an improved way to approach these fundamental questions, and that improved way should apply to the whole endeavor.

A common weakness in the sciences though is the need for empirical evidence, and thus things which cannot easily be measured empirically must be avoid (or, often worse, turned into some metric that aims to approximate but ends up distorting the thing it aims to measure, IQ for example).

Social sciences, while they can be valuable, are also one of the greatest sources of false beliefs as they are, by nature, unreliable as they deal with domains often too complex to be dealt with via a reductionist methodology.

Insight, intuition and particularly experience (often multigenerational) can sometimes provide better explanations of aspects of human activities, human nature, human society and human well being than science can for this reason (of course they can also be wrong and harmful). Sometimes rough heuristics are better than 'precise' scientific knowledge as this often turns out to be incorrect.

I would agree that the setting of values and ethics are outside the scope of empirical evaluation. Why, because we are not dealing with yes/no, true/false aspects in choosing a particular value or ethic. It is all subjective and any value or ethic that is to be set is dependent on intersubjective agreement. However, once the value judgement is made, empiricism can come back into play as it is human beings that are having to make these decisions, decisions without complete information and that requires balancing competing interests. Human behavior, psychology, and sociology, probability and statistics are all fields that can play a role in building understanding on how best to achieve whatever value or ethic is set, and especially how to balance competing values.

Since understanding why and how we make or hold a particular value is essentially the science of how we work, I would not carve out ethics from under the banner of Science. For me, Science is merely a label that says we are taking the best approach to answering all fundamental questions.


In general though, we seem to have a similar idea, but the opposite way of implementing it.

You think we should consider all the 'useful parts' of philosophy to be science, whereas I think we should put science back more clearly into its philosophical context.

I don't see the difference as being merely semantic though. Elevating everything to 'science' makes us overestimate our own rationality and the extent to which our world can be explained in purely rationalistic terms. As such it has a distorting effect on what we see as useful.

Michael Oakeshott:

Technical knowledge can be learned from a book; it can be
learned in a correspondence course. Moreover, much of it can be
learned by heart, repeated by rote, and applied mechanically: the
logic of the syllogism is a technique of this kind. Technical knowledge,
in short, can be both taught and learned in the simplest meanings
of these words.

On the other hand, practical knowledge can
neither be taught nor learned, but only imparted and acquired. It
exists only in practice, and the only way to acquire it is by apprenticeship
to a master - not because the master can teach it (he cannot),
but because it can be acquired only by continuous contact with one
who is perpetually practising it. In the arts and in natural science what
normally happens is that the pupil, in being taught and in learning
the technique from his master, discovers himself to have acquired
also another sort of knowledge than merely technical knowledge,
without it ever having been precisely imparted and often without
being able to say precisely what it is. Thus a pianist acquires artistry
as well as technique, a chess-player style and insight into the
game as well as a knowledge of the moves, and a scientist acquires
(among other things) the sort of judgement which tells him when
his technique is leading him astray and the connoisseurship which
enables him to distinguish the profitable from the unprofitable
directions to explore.

Now, as I understand it, Rationalism is the assertion that what I
have called practical knowledge is not knowledge at all, the assertion
that, properly speaking, there is no knowledge which is not technical
knowledge. The Rationalist holds that the only element of
knowledge involved in any human activity is technical knowledge,
and that what I have called practical knowledge is really only a sort
of nescience which would be negligible if it were not positively mischievous.
The sovereignty of 'reason', for the Rationalist, means the
sovereignty of technique.
 
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MikeF

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
I'm quite ok with terms like crutch, myths and illusions and think they shouldn't have the negative connotations often ascribed to them.
They are only a problem if people are under the illusion that they 'see the world as it really is'.
Humans seem to be the only animals who can't live with the world on its own terms, and have to create sources of artificial meaning via religions and ideologies. I'm an atheist, but have no problem accepting that this is simply an inescapable part of human nature.
Myths, in the broad sense, are just narratives that are not objectively true that we use to make sense of the world and make meaning, create values and priorities, and formulate the ideologies we think we ought to live by.

Here you are re-asserting the assumption that myth and illusion are “simply an inescapable part of human nature”, and again, I say we cannot make that definitive assumption. Absent a controlled experiment, whereby we raise a statistically significant number of children in an environment that models behaviors that are comfortable handling un-answerable questions, that models a clear boundary between what is real and what is imaginary(certainly doesn’t indoctrinate belief in the reality of Santa Claus and Tooth Fairy, etc), and then see what happens, whether they are just fine without myth, or it becomes apparent that myth is required for a healthy psyche, until that experiment is run, your assertion has not value. And as all behavior expresses itself in a spectrum across a population, there may be some percentage, that from birth, do require reassuring myth. But if that percentage is small, must we condemn the whole to share that need?

Now, I might agree that on average, once someone is raised and indoctrinated to rely on myth and illusion, it would be very difficult to change that reliance. But that is certainly different than myth and illusion being a biological imperative.

I have illustrated in a previous post the negative consequences of creating an artificial construct of reality. It seems to me, the goal should be to work towards a society free from artificial constructs instead of resigning ourselves to them.

Secular humanist type beliefs are no less reliant on myths than the religions they evolved from. The philosopher John Gray:
Science is a solvent of illusion, and among the illusions it dissolves are those of humanism. Human knowledge increases, while human irrationality stays the same. Scientific inquiry may be an embodiment of reason, but what such inquiry demonstrates is that humans are not rational animals...
Modern myths are myths of salvation stated in secular terms. What both kinds of myths have in common is that they answer to a need for meaning that cannot be denied.
In order to survive, humans have invented science. Pursued consistently, scientific inquiry acts to undermine myth. But life without myth is impossible, so science has become a channel for myths – chief among them, a myth of salvation through science. When truth is at odds with meaning, it is meaning that wins. Why this should be so is a delicate question. Why is meaning so important? Why do humans need a reason to live? Is it because they could not endure life if they did not believe it contained hidden significance?
The silence of animals: On progress and other modern myths

And this is exactly why we need Science over Philosophy. Why should I accept John Gray’s portrayal of Secular Humanism? Why should I accept the premise that if one is to reject religious myth, John Gray’s Secular Humanism is the only other option? Where is the evidence that “life without myth” is impossible? I believe that I live without myth, so I start with that anecdotal contradiction. Philosophy without scientific rigor is simply the opinion of a flawed, biased Philosopher, without any quality control mechanism.

All investigators, scientists (scientific philosophers) and philosophers, are all just flawed and fallible human beings, all equally susceptible to error and bias. It is scientific principles and standards that provide the quality control for any investigation, by any investigator.

We create all kinds of artificial constructs that offer benefits (and often potential harms too).
And I say we learn to live in Reality, to live in the world as it actually is. It is a better approach in the long-run and definitely more adaptable.
Human Rights developed out of Medieval and Early Modern theology, before being refined and secularised in modernity.
‘Religion’ whether it started with Animism or Shamanism, was born in ignorance. Once created, however, it became integrated into culture, passed down through indoctrination to subsequent generations. Modern human rights became necessary as the size of our societies grew. That social needs become codified in religious doctrine is not new. Suffice it to say that it is a complex symbiosis. Absent a literal god sitting in judgement, we human beings ourselves have been compelled to create the rules and social morays that allow us to exist in larger and larger groups. That this is done under the auspices of religion is understandable but not a requirement.
The secularised version is no less made up than the theological version, but we accept them as real as it is convenient.
We would have to explore further what you consider a secular myth.
Humans are just animals, but we create systems of meaning based on human exceptionalism which is justified via myth rather than science.
But we do not have to teach our children human exceptionalism. This is learned, socialized behavior. Perhaps it is natural, in a primitive state, in ignorance, for man to have initially assumed human exceptionalism, however, we are well beyond that now. Now we just have to break the cycle of our mythical inheritance.
What constitutes 'growth and development' is a product of culture though, and whatever we choose rests on providing 'satisfying answers to unanswerable questions'.
Unless we educate each generation on how to accept the unanswerable, unknowable questions.
It's also quite possible that technological advancement will ultimately be the death of our species (and its definitely has been the death of many other species).
That there may be future generations that will have to suffer in misery, especially in relation to our current standards, may indeed be inevitable. But the conditions of early man could also be seen as equally dire compared to our current conditions. To say that humanity is incapable of coming to an eventual point of satisfactory equilibrium on this planet, seems extreme.
If survival of the species is the ultimate 'good', then it is certainly debatable that modernity has made this more rather than less likely.
Again, you underestimate our resilience. And survival of the species is neither good nor bad, it just is. Billions of years without life on this planet, billions without humanity, and an asteroid could wipe us all out tomorrow and the cosmos will continue to hum along.
If 'the well being of conscious creatures' constitutes 'growth and development', we were more advanced prior to the point we started the mass extinction.
This is an expression of a subjective value statement. All may not share this sentiment.
A common weakness in the sciences though is the need for empirical evidence, and thus things which cannot easily be measured empirically must be avoid (or, often worse, turned into some metric that aims to approximate but ends up distorting the thing it aims to measure, IQ for example).
Empirical evidence isn't the problem, human beings are the problem. That human beings are different in innumerable ways is a fact. We have to accept that reality and come to intersubjective agreement on how best to accommodate this fact.
Social sciences, while they can be valuable, are also one of the greatest sources of false beliefs as they are, by nature, unreliable as they deal with domains often too complex to be dealt with via a reductionist methodology.
I would posit that historically, the social sciences were hobbled from a resistance to transition from a traditional philosophical approach to a modern scientific approach to investigation. This has changed dramatically. Social Sciences, like all disciplines, have their unique challenges. We do not throw up our hands and say the problem is too hard, too complex, instead we keep plugging away. You cannot abandon quality control in the face of complexity. You seem to have a bias that science can only work in a very narrow range of methodology. This could not be further from the truth. Scientific method is about adaptability and discovery, finding the methodology that will overcome the complexity. This does not happen overnight. Science is a process that focuses on the long game. And all the while it subjects itself to re-evaluation and quality control. This is not how traditional philosophy conducts itself.
Insight, intuition and particularly experience (often multigenerational) can sometimes provide better explanations of aspects of human activities, human nature, human society and human well being than science can for this reason (of course they can also be wrong and harmful). Sometimes rough heuristics are better than 'precise' scientific knowledge as this often turns out to be incorrect.
Please … insight, intuition and particularly experience are part of the scientific process. Science simply tests and verifies. Infinitely better than simply plodding along with unchecked inherited generational ignorance.

In general though, we seem to have a similar idea, but the opposite way of implementing it.
You think we should consider all the 'useful parts' of philosophy to be science, whereas I think we should put science back more clearly into its philosophical context.
I don't see the difference as being merely semantic though. Elevating everything to 'science' makes us overestimate our own rationality and the extent to which our world can be explained in purely rationalistic terms. As such it has a distorting effect on what we see as useful.

To say “elevating everything to 'science' makes us overestimate our own rationality”, I find incredible. It is Classic Philosophy that relies solely on conceptual rationalism, derived from the egotism and arrogance of a lone Philosopher. Scientific inquiry humbly acknowledges the fallibility of the investigator and takes necessary steps to mitigate it. I think you have things quite reversed.

Michael Oakeshott:
...
The sovereignty of 'reason', for the Rationalist, means the
sovereignty of technique.
Why include this quote? Are you saying that Science = Rationalism? Or more specifically, Science = Michael Oakeshott’s Rationalism?
Rationalism, whatever it may be, is simply the belief, opinion, of Rationalist Philosophers. Rationalism is not Science.
 
I believe that I live without myth, so I start with that anecdotal contradiction.

Myths, in the broad sense, are simply subjective narratives that underpin our cultures, value systems and that explain why things are the the way they are and what future outcomes are desirable.

You seem to be advocating some form of scientistic meliorism, a version of the core Enlightenment myth of The Idea of Progress.

How would you describe your worldview though?

‘Religion’ whether it started with Animism or Shamanism, was born in ignorance. Once created, however, it became integrated into culture, passed down through indoctrination to subsequent generations. Modern human rights became necessary as the size of our societies grew. That social needs become codified in religious doctrine is not new. Suffice it to say that it is a complex symbiosis. Absent a literal god sitting in judgement, we human beings ourselves have been compelled to create the rules and social morays that allow us to exist in larger and larger groups. That this is done under the auspices of religion is understandable but not a requirement.

It was born in the human need to make meaning, and secularising the world doesn't remove this human need.

We would have to explore further what you consider a secular myth.

Any secular ideology.

Even basic things like the idea we belong to something called 'Humanity' the members of which have 'inalienable rights' and who we have some kind of obligation towards.

But we do not have to teach our children human exceptionalism. This is learned, socialized behavior. Perhaps it is natural, in a primitive state, in ignorance, for man to have initially assumed human exceptionalism, however, we are well beyond that now. Now we just have to break the cycle of our mythical inheritance.

Without human exceptionalism, you can't even sustain the idea that killing a human is worse than killing some other sentient being.

I'm not even sure it is possible to build a civilisation that doesn't accept this axiom.

Here you are re-asserting the assumption that myth and illusion are “simply an inescapable part of human nature”, and again, I say we cannot make that definitive assumption. Absent a controlled experiment, whereby we raise a statistically significant number of children in an environment that models behaviors that are comfortable handling un-answerable questions, that models a clear boundary between what is real and what is imaginary(certainly doesn’t indoctrinate belief in the reality of Santa Claus and Tooth Fairy, etc), and then see what happens, whether they are just fine without myth, or it becomes apparent that myth is required for a healthy psyche, until that experiment is run, your assertion has not value. And as all behavior expresses itself in a spectrum across a population, there may be some percentage, that from birth, do require reassuring myth. But if that percentage is small, must we condemn the whole to share that need?

Humans don't think in terms of isolated, objective facts empirically validated and a purely transactional approach to interpersonal relations.

Human cognition is based around narrative as we have to 'make sense' of things, these narratives are necessarily subjective and biased as that is the way our brains work.

We have to organise societies based around building coalitions, that requires us to communicate with others and bring around to our way of thinking. We do this via narrative: explaining the kind of world we want to live in and why it is preferable to something else.

Beyond small coalitions founded on personal relationships, we need to create bonds of fictive kinship (nationality, religion, race, political ideology, Humanity, etc.) which unite members of the in-group and separate us from out-groups. Our sense of identity derives from both what we think we are and also what we think we are not and we develop an emotional attachment to our coalitions and thus desire to signal to others that we are 'good' coalition members.

These coalitions gain origin and historical myths, myths of superiority, etc. which are continually developed and expanded upon over time.

Coalitions that are unable to produce strong internal bonds tend not to last in the long term as they lose out to competing groups who can.

The problem about thinking we can build coalitions around 'facts' is explained by the evolutionary psychologist John Tooby:

Coalition-mindedness makes everyone, including scientists, far stupider in coalitional collectivities than as individuals. Paradoxically, a political party united by supernatural beliefs can revise its beliefs about economics or climate without revisers being bad coalition members. But people whose coalitional membership is constituted by their shared adherence to “rational,” scientific propositions have a problem when—as is generally the case—new information arises which requires belief revision. To question or disagree with coalitional precepts, even for rational reasons, makes one a bad and immoral coalition member—at risk of losing job offers, one's friends, and one's cherished group identity. This freezes belief revision.

Forming coalitions around scientific or factual questions is disastrous, because it pits our urge for scientific truth-seeking against the nearly insuperable human appetite to be a good coalition member. Once scientific propositions are moralized, the scientific process is wounded, often fatally.
Edge.org


Empirical evidence isn't the problem, human beings are the problem. That human beings are different in innumerable ways is a fact. We have to accept that reality and come to intersubjective agreement on how best to accommodate this fact.

I agree human beings are the problem, as their hardwired cognition means that while they can be rational at times, they are necessarily emotional, irrational and biased at other times.

There is endless scientific evidence that demonstrates this.

Moreover, human society will necessarily be fragmented into different coalitions with competing experiences, interests, desires, beliefs and ideologies.

As such the degree to which intersubjective agreement is possible will always be limited, and competition and conflict will always be present on both the personal and group level.

This is a consequence of our biological makeup, not simply 'learned behaviour'.

Why include this quote? Are you saying that Science = Rationalism? Or more specifically, Science = Michael Oakeshott’s Rationalism?
Rationalism, whatever it may be, is simply the belief, opinion, of Rationalist Philosophers. Rationalism is not Science.

The point was about the importance of 'practical knowledge' in many activities, and how this form of knowledge is not really possible to test scientifically as it is largely beyond verbal explanation and relies on experience, insight and intuition.

You seem to be arguing that unless it is science, then it is not knowledge and should be chucked in the bin.

We do not throw up our hands and say the problem is too hard, too complex, instead we keep plugging away. You cannot abandon quality control in the face of complexity. You seem to have a bias that science can only work in a very narrow range of methodology. This could not be further from the truth. Scientific method is about adaptability and discovery, finding the methodology that will overcome the complexity.

It can work with many, but there are still many areas of existence in which scientific methods do not produce reliable knowledge (or cannot tell us anything).

If we ever find these methodologies then great, but until then 'scientific knowledge' that is wrong is often worse than no knowledge at all, let alone our preexisting ideas gained from experience.

Please … insight, intuition and particularly experience are part of the scientific process. Science simply tests and verifies. Infinitely better than simply plodding along with unchecked inherited generational ignorance.

That scientists may use intuition, insight and experience doesn't make the use of intuition, insight and experience science though.

Also the idea that anything 'not science' must be 'ignorance' seems quite hubristic to me.

While it is not always the case, discarding things that have worked effectively over centuries for whatever the latest contemporary fad is does not have a great track record. Time, while not necessarily filtering for what is 'true', is certainly a great filter of what does not work in practice, so we should at least be wary about replacing that which has stood the test of time.

Much of science is necessarily faddish as findings are often wrong and 'best practice' are updated all of the time. In the meantime, they are not necessarily doing good in the world, scientific racialism, eugenics, etc.

To say “elevating everything to 'science' makes us overestimate our own rationality”, I find incredible. It is Classic Philosophy that relies solely on conceptual rationalism, derived from the egotism and arrogance of a lone Philosopher. Scientific inquiry humbly acknowledges the fallibility of the investigator and takes necessary steps to mitigate it. I think you have things quite reversed.

Philosophy is not limited to the ancient Greeks though.

And even if normative science 'humbly acknowledges' fallibility, scientistic ideologies that reject the value of the totality of human knowledge outside that which can be empirically validated via the experiments of contemporary scientists are certainly not.

Humans have always overestimated their ability to understand and control the wold around them, but we never learn from experience. That is one thing the ancient Greeks got right in the myths at least.

Unless we educate each generation on how to accept the unanswerable, unknowable questions.

We are more threatened by questions we can (mostly) answer than those we can't.

We are a bunch of atoms that became sentient by chance and live a meaningless existence in an uncaring universe. Our world and species will be destroyed in the end so everting we do is ultimately futile.

That's not a great basis on which to run a complex civilisation with a long term focus which requires many people to sacrifice parts of their own good for the benefit of other people they have no tangible connection to.

Fortunately, it's pretty easy for us to get around this by creating our own sources of meaning which make the world a much richer and vibrant place. These are the myths you insist we can live without though.
 

MikeF

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
First, let me apologize for the delayed response. I wanted to wait for a time when I could give it some thought.
MikeF said: ↑
“I believe that I live without myth, so I start with that anecdotal contradiction.”​
You seem to be advocating some form of scientistic meliorism ...
How would you describe your worldview though?

I had to look up meliorism. Thanks for the new vocabulary word. :)
Yes, meliorism can be applied to my views. I find the adjective 'scientistic' interesting. My impression is that its usage is similar to those who use the word ‘scientism’. My impression of ‘scientism’ is that it is used pejoratively. I don’t know if that is your intent here.

I was going to go point-by-point, but in the interest of clarity and efficiency I will state the following:

1. Yes, culture today is imbued with secular and religious myth, and I agree with your examples.
2. I think we agree that we have evolved with instinctual behaviors which are still quite active and affect the way we think and behave. I think we also agree that our instincts are idealized for small family/tribe groups with an instinctual drive to categorize others as in-group or other.
3. Coalition-building is one social dynamic that is heavily influenced by instinct. Potential negative impacts from this affect all aspects of society.

I think what is different for me, is a belief that we can continue to progress beyond our core instinctual behaviors. In terms of myth, you and I both seem to recognize that these stories and narratives are not based on objective truth. And yet presumably, we are both functioning well in that knowledge. Are we better or superior in some way, that we can peer beyond the veil? Are we part of a small minority, with the vast majority needing to live in ignorant bliss, through some lack or deficiency?

For me, the coalition-building example is a real problem for all aspects of society. However, I do think the quote from John Tooby displayed bias in its portrayal. If you read carefully, it claims that a political coalition centered around supernatural belief has the capacity to revise its opinions on climate and economics. Notice he did not say “‘rational’, scientific propositions.” Why? Because it is well documented that coalitions around strong supernatural belief are very resistant to revise or even accept rational, scientific propositions. But even still, to suggest that the religious right is open to revise opinion on climate is laughable in today’s political environment. Additionally, why put quotations around the word ‘rational’ in association with science? He did not seem it worthwhile to mention how negative aspects of supernatural myth can be damaging to society, and that those who hold them are also resistant to change. It works all ways. It is something to recognize and work to mitigate in all aspects of society.

For the remainder of your post, I’ve paired it down to some core ideas:
And even if normative science 'humbly acknowledges' fallibility, scientistic ideologies that reject the value of the totality of human knowledge outside that which can be empirically validated via the experiments of contemporary scientists are certainly not.
Humans have always overestimated their ability to understand and control the wold around them, but we never learn from experience. That is one thing the ancient Greeks got right in the myths at least.
We are more threatened by questions we can (mostly) answer than those we can't.
We are a bunch of atoms that became sentient by chance and live a meaningless existence in an uncaring universe. Our world and species will be destroyed in the end so everting we do is ultimately futile.
That's not a great basis on which to run a complex civilisation with a long term focus which requires many people to sacrifice parts of their own good for the benefit of other people they have no tangible connection to.
Fortunately, it's pretty easy for us to get around this by creating our own sources of meaning which make the world a much richer and vibrant place. These are the myths you insist we can live without though.

So to paraphrase Jack Nicholson, you are saying “We can’t handle the truth!”

I have seen this argument from others, that the fact that the cosmos is indifferent to us and there is no external purpose or meaning to all of this, it must mean that our current life is futile. But this attitude that life is to be considered futile with this realization is what is being indoctrinated to promote acceptance of the myth.

Yes, we do create our own source of meaning, and we can do it despite knowing the full score. We can understand the facts and make reasoned decisions on how best to live together. Why? Because we still have the instinctual drive to live, to be happy, and to avoid risk.

For me, and people like me, the world is still a rich and vibrant place, full of joys and wonder. And none of it myth.

As a final note, I do not want to downplay your real concern with the role of group identity as it relates to nationality, religion, race, political ideology, Humanity, etc. However, maintaining the status quo does nothing to resolve the conflict around separate identities, it perpetuates it. How to resolve this is extremely difficult, but perpetuating conflicting religious myths will never solve it.
 

rational experiences

Veteran Member
Philosophy was a subjective relative enquiry relating machine conditions chosen as an artificial subject to observations in medical social and mental human change.

So it's topic discussed a basic concept of good or evil by human choice.

By self denoted man wisdom as an elder male.

Rationally good or evil is a lived human experience as natural is not denoted to be any condition other than balanced.

Why philosophy was not predictive machine reactive science notated as a branch of occult evils.

As the causes in nature to remove balances were witnessed.

A man in science belief is to be an inventor creator and be successful.

Hence design was direct and relative to machine want only.

As he is only a human living inside a heavens standing upon a planet.

Philosophy of science the subject brought the advice to a scientist that his subjective reasoning to force change natural was not any creator thesis.

As inference to forces of change owned one law only to force change and corrupt what previously did exist or had existed.

Philosophy then stated man in science sought to destroy the creator....presence.

A simple modern example of philosophy would state men thinking of finding what binds all things is a man who wants all things unbound.
 
Yes, meliorism can be applied to my views. I find the adjective 'scientistic' interesting. My impression is that its usage is similar to those who use the word ‘scientism’. My impression of ‘scientism’ is that it is used pejoratively. I don’t know if that is your intent here.

It can be pejorative, but doesn't have to be.

For example:

The belief that the methods of modern science form the only proper elements in any philosophical or other inquiry. The view that science is the only reliable source of knowledge.

As I read it, this seems to be what you are advocating is it not?

As a critique:

Scientism frequently implies a critique of the more extreme expressions of logical positivism... [and]

The improper usage of science or scientific claims.[10] This usage applies equally in contexts where science might not apply,[11] such as when the topic is perceived as beyond the scope of scientific inquiry, and in contexts where there is insufficient empirical evidence to justify a scientific conclusion. It includes an excessive deference to the claims of scientists or an uncritical eagerness to accept any result described as scientific. This can be a counterargument to appeals to scientific authority. It can also address the attempt to apply "hard science" methodology and claims of certainty to the social sciences, which Friedrich Hayek described in The Counter-Revolution of Science (1952) as being impossible, because that methodology involves attempting to eliminate the "human factor", while social sciences (including his own field of economics) center almost purely on human action.



I think what is different for me, is a belief that we can continue to progress beyond our core instinctual behaviors. In terms of myth, you and I both seem to recognize that these stories and narratives are not based on objective truth. And yet presumably, we are both functioning well in that knowledge. Are we better or superior in some way, that we can peer beyond the veil? Are we part of a small minority, with the vast majority needing to live in ignorant bliss, through some lack or deficiency?

I don't think we do peer beyond the veil though. Like an infinite onion, we remove one layer and there is another underneath

However, I do think the quote from John Tooby displayed bias in its portrayal. If you read carefully, it claims that a political coalition centered around supernatural belief has the capacity to revise its opinions on climate and economics. Notice he did not say “‘rational’, scientific propositions.” Why? Because it is well documented that coalitions around strong supernatural belief are very resistant to revise or even accept rational, scientific propositions. But even still, to suggest that the religious right is open to revise opinion on climate is laughable in today’s political environment. Additionally, why put quotations around the word ‘rational’ in association with science? He did not seem it worthwhile to mention how negative aspects of supernatural myth can be damaging to society, and that those who hold them are also resistant to change. It works all ways. It is something to recognize and work to mitigate in all aspects of society.

Coalitions need some kind of 'roof' under which all members reside. This can be a religion, a nation, a political ideology, etc.

The coalition you are describing is really a political unit, both parties in the US are basically coalitions of opposing the other side. For many loyalty to Trump became the coalition 'roof'.

I honestly believe that if Trump had come out in favour of climate change his fans would have gone along with it. Look how quickly the religious right learned to ignore their moralistic positions on sex and marital fidelity and became hostile to the FBI and CIA (and how many Dems suddenly started to support these organisations).

As a final note, I do not want to downplay your real concern with the role of group identity as it relates to nationality, religion, race, political ideology, Humanity, etc. However, maintaining the status quo does nothing to resolve the conflict around separate identities, it perpetuates it. How to resolve this is extremely difficult, but perpetuating conflicting religious myths will never solve it.

Coalition building is essential for society though. It drives altruistic behaviour as well as conflict.

As you note, we evolved to live in small groups bound by personal, and mostly genetic relations. The natural state for humans is to be infinitely divided.

It's myths/ideologies/religions that enable us to be less divided into larger fictive kinship groups. But there are always limits on how large groups can grow before they fracture.

How would you say we could organise ourselves into cohesive social units simply with 'the facts'?

A mistake I think many people make is that they think "I'm rational, therefore other people can be rational, therefore society can be rational".

But society is a complex system and is not simply the sum of its parts. Things that may hold true on an individual or small group level do not necessarily survive being scaled upwards.

JM Keynes, who came to view faith in human rationality as a naive fantasy, provided the most concise rebuttal of those clinging to the idea that reason will save us:

“Bertie [Bertrand Russell] held two ludicrously incompatible beliefs: on the one hand he believed that all the problems of the world stemmed from conducting human affairs in a most irrational way; on the other hand that the solution was simple, since all we had to do was to behave rationally.”

Humans are, at best, intermittently rational, and large scale societies are even less so.



Yes, we do create our own source of meaning, and we can do it despite knowing the full score. We can understand the facts and make reasoned decisions on how best to live together. Why? Because we still have the instinctual drive to live, to be happy, and to avoid risk.

For me, and people like me, the world is still a rich and vibrant place, full of joys and wonder. And none of it myth.

These sources of meaning we create are just alternative myths though.

Meliorism is just a form of the Idea of Progress which was an offshoot of Christian theology secularised during the Enlightenment. It didn't stop being a myth just because the god stuff was removed though.

In Turgot's "Universal History" we are given an account of the progress of mankind which, in comprehensiveness and ordering of materials, would not be equalled until Turgot's ardent admirer, Condorcet wrote his Outline of an Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind during the French Revolution...

Before leaving Turgot, it is important to stress once again the historical importance of Christianity in the formation of the secular modern conception of progress in Western Europe. In the first place, Turgot began his career as a reasonably devout student of theology at the Sorbonne, his aspiration then linked to a future in the Church. Second, just six months before the discourse on "The Successive Advances of the Human Mind" was given in 1750, he had presented another public discourse, this one on the crucial importance of Christianity to the progress of mankind. And third, it was Bossuet's Universal History, which I have already referred to, that Turgot acknowledged to be his inspiration for the writing, or the preparation of a plan of his own "Universal History." Bossuet, proud and convinced Christian that he was, constructed his history in terms of a succession of epochs, all designed and given effect by God. Turgot allowed God to disappear (he had lost his faith by 1751 when he wrote his "Universal History") and replaced Bossuet's "epochs" by "stages": stages of social and cultural progress, each emerging from its predecessor through human rather than divine causes. But Turgot's alterations notwithstanding, it is unlikely that his own secular work on progress would have been written apart from the inspiration derived from Bishop Bossuet and other Christian philosophers of history. He is an epitome, in this respect, of the whole history of the modern idea of progress.


Idea of Progress: A Bibliographical Essay by Robert Nisbet
Idea of Progress: A Bibliographical Essay by Robert Nisbet - Online Library of Liberty

I assume you believe in human rights, our duty to future generations, that seeking knowledge is a good in itself, that we shouldn't believe in comforting illusions too.

Not of these are justified by scientific facts, it's just a made up story we tell ourselves to give life meaning. And there's nothing wrong with that.

Another way of thinking of them is 'metaphorical truths' which are things that are not actually true, but we operate under the tacit assumption that they are as it is convenient for us to do so.
 

MikeF

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
I'm going to tackle the previous quote in independent sections. I'll start with the following:

Scientism frequently implies a critique of the more extreme expressions of logical positivism... [and]

The improper usage of science or scientific claims.[10] This usage applies equally in contexts where science might not apply,[11] such as when the topic is perceived as beyond the scope of scientific inquiry, and in contexts where there is insufficient empirical evidence to justify a scientific conclusion. It includes an excessive deference to the claims of scientists or an uncritical eagerness to accept any result described as scientific. This can be a counterargument to appeals to scientific authority. It can also address the attempt to apply "hard science" methodology and claims of certainty to the social sciences, which Friedrich Hayek described in The Counter-Revolution of Science (1952) as being impossible, because that methodology involves attempting to eliminate the "human factor", while social sciences (including his own field of economics) center almost purely on human action.

I find this critique fascinating. What if we replace the words 'science' and 'scientific' with the words 'philosophy' and 'philosophic'? The difference is that in traditional philosophy there are no mechanisms with which to identify errors and rectify them.

The improper use and misapplication of anything can be an issue. Science is a long game, with positive steps taken to mitigate human fallibility. Errors will out with science. What exactly is the critique here? Proper science is all about avoiding uncritical eagerness. It is all about maintaining vigilant reasoned skepticism. Everything can be questioned and reevaluated. Is it that non-scientist, lay people, jump the gun and draw premature conclusions on preliminary investigations? That is not the fault of science.

This idea that science tries to eliminate the (undefined) human factor is absurd. It is all about understanding human behavior in all its nuanced complexity. And since human action is based on human behavior, I fail to see how this is immune from a scientific approach.

I think there is confusion as to what science really is. The reality is that every single human being, from the moment one is born, is born an amateur scientist. Our mission from the very start is to gather information about our surrounding environment, recognize patterns, and build a picture of reality that enables us to survive, find resources, avoid danger, and reproduce.

Science simply professionalizes this knowledge acquisition process, utilizing tools to expand on our biological senses, formalizing the information gathering, adding quality control measures, and using intersubjective corroboration to help mitigate the fallibility of human investigators.

I fail to see what is wrong with adding quality control to all human inquiry.

What topics in philosophy would you perceive as beyond the scope of scientific inquiry?
 
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