Philosophy and Science

[Polymath257]

Sorry to flood with responses, I'm a little scatterbrained tonight (I'm reading a 48 page road plan for my thesis through the night... it's... special).

Going back to quantum woo: when we make a dumb assertion like "maybe consciousness itself is collapsing the wave function," and someone asks skeptically "okay, er, what's the mechanism for that?"

I feel like this is a philosophical question. The idea that there should probably be some mechanism is a philosophical idea.

A couple of comments.

Suppose someone with bad metaphysics supports quantum woo. But suppose they are able to make a model that is testable and makes predictions that are verified. Suppose it also manages to unify QM and GR.

At that point I would say they have a perfectly valid theory and we need to take it seriously. Even if the metaphysics is bad, it is a working theory. And it might even incline me to take the metaphysics seriously.

Just think about Bohr's metaphysics compared to classical ideas. Whether his metaphysics is right or wrong, his ideas needed to be dealt with.

But yes, the idea that everything has a mechanism is a philosophical bias. Again, Bohr never gave a mechanism for the collapse of the wave function. But the simple fact that he got predictions that were verified meant his ideas were taken seriously.

And, maybe it is the bias that there needs to be a mechanism that has wasted time and energy?

 

[Polymath257]

I have little to add to this except possibly this: you note that models are equivalent until we zoom out to broader theory (where they may continue to be equivalent or not). This is true. But there are philosophical differences in models. I'll bring up realism vs. instrumentalism again: you can have a realist model that gives correct answers and an instrumentalist model that gives correct answers about the same thing.

In science we don't care about this, as you note. Which one's easier to do? Let's do that one. Done.

But we might philosophically care, if anything to sate our philosophical curiosity. We're human, we like to ask "but what does it mean?" I wouldn't call that useless. And I would submit again that depending on your metaphysics, they will color your next proposed model. It eventually does seep back into the science in an influential way. If you have an instrumentalist model for instance, but you approach it in a realist way, you might make wrong assumptions about reality and color your next proposal that way. Now of course, reality will often sort you out. But you just wasted your time finding out the hard way rather than just bothering to do good metaphysics in the first place.
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And I fully expect people to waste time going down rabbit holes. That is partly what research is, after all. I do think it is important to explore the different options just to make sure they really do or don't have anything more to offer.

And because we *don't* know which is the 'correct' metaphysics (or even if it makes sense to call one correct), I think we *should* have people 'wasting time' exploring.

I keep going back to Bohr and Einstein. Did Einstein have the wrong metaphysics when he developed SR and GR? Or did he have the wrong metaphysics when he opposed QM?

 

[MikeF]

But I also think that the philosophical desire to 'prove' everything beyond any doubt has to be abandoned (even in math and logic). Instead, philosophy does best when it is looking at the various logical possibilities and investigating them. it is at its worst when it claims things 'must be' a particular way. The real world often seems to find another way to be.

I strongly agree with this statement. What we know is simply reasoned expectation based on experience. We must become comfortable with degrees of certainty as opposed to proof beyond any doubt.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

If philosophy and scientific findings ever conflict, then science wins.

OK.

If no science currently supports a philosophical conclusion about reality, then that conclusion is unjustified and does not warrant belief.

A quick question: by "supports" do you mean "evidences" or "allows for," and, if the former, how does science currently support ontological naturalism?

 

[AlexanderG]

OK.


A quick question: by "supports" do you mean "evidences" or "allows for," and, if the former, how does science currently support ontological naturalism?

Right, by "supports" I mean "supports with positive empirical evidence for that claim." Philosophy offers only conceptual evidence, and so it can only support conceptual ideas/claims. It cannot justify empirical or metaphysical claims about reality.

Science does not currently support ontological naturalism, because that is a metaphysical claim of ultimate truth. Empirical evidence cannot support or justify any metaphysical claims. I hear a lot of theists characterize atheism or science as embracing ontological naturalism ("the natural world is all that exists"). In fact, virtually no atheists take this position, and this sort of claim is outside the discipline of science. Instead, we take the position of methodological naturalism ("the natural world is all that we can currently observe and test"), which is an empirical idea and is justifiable. Methodological naturalism does not exclude the possibility of the supernatural, it simply recognizes that no one has reliably demonstrated its existence so far. Proposing supernatural hypothesis as explanations is not currently useful.

This is not a "gotcha" for scientists. It's a distinction we've always acknowledged.

 

[Polymath257]

Right, by "supports" I mean "supports with positive empirical evidence for that claim." Philosophy offers only conceptual evidence, and so it can only support conceptual ideas/claims. It cannot justify empirical or metaphysical claims about reality.

Science does not currently support ontological naturalism, because that is a metaphysical claim of ultimate truth. Empirical evidence cannot support or justify any metaphysical claims. I hear a lot of theists characterize atheism or science as embracing ontological naturalism ("the natural world is all that exists"). In fact, virtually no atheists take this position, and this sort of claim is outside the discipline of science. Instead, we take the position of methodological naturalism ("the natural world is all that we can currently observe and test"), which is an empirical idea and is justifiable. Methodological naturalism does not exclude the possibility of the supernatural, it simply recognized that no one has demonstrated its existence so far.

This is not a "gotcha" for scientists. It's a distinction we've always acknowledged.

I've frequently said that when a testable theory of a supernatural is found, we can test it and determine if it is a better explanation than what we have now. Until then, I feel comfortable ignoring the supernatural.

On the other hand, it could be said that anything that is testable is a material theory simply because it is testable. In that case, it makes no sense to have a testable theory of the supernatural. And, in that case, I feel comfortable ignoring it.

 

[AlexanderG]

I've frequently said that when a testable theory of a supernatural is found, we can test it and determine if it is a better explanation than what we have now. Until then, I feel comfortable ignoring the supernatural.

On the other hand, it could be said that anything that is testable is a material theory simply because it is testable. In that case, it makes no sense to have a testable theory of the supernatural. And, in that case, I feel comfortable ignoring it.

This is a great way to describe the issue with supernatural claims. Since empirical evidence seems to be all we currently have to describe what is real, you'd need empirical data to indicate that some supernatural cause was affecting the world around us. That would then place it into the realm of methodological naturalism and it would no longer be supernatural. Alternatively, come up with a "methodological supernaturalism," whatever that could be.

It really shines a light on the central problem of theism. They can't demonstrate their claims correspond to reality. Instead, they have to plead a special category of reality that cannot be confirmed, falsified, or observed in any way. They can only use philosophy to do this because they're only working with concepts, speculation, imagination, semantic definitions, etc.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

Science does not currently support ontological naturalism, because that is a metaphysical claim of ultimate truth.

So, in your opinion, ontological naturalism does not warrant belief, correct?

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

@AlexanderG? Hello?

 

[AlexanderG]

So, in your opinion, ontological naturalism does not warrant belief, correct?

I'm an atheist but I also follow Skepticism, which means I apportion my confidence about the truth of a claim in proportion to the evidence that supports it.

Ontological naturalism, the claim that the natural world is all that there is, is not supported by any evidence I'm aware of. So yes, you're correct. I hope you can also recognize that in terms of warranted belief, ontological naturalism is equivalent to the claim that there is a supernatural aspect to reality. Both claims have no evidence, and currently it seems we have no way to confirm, falsify, or test these claims. You might be tempted to call me an agnostic, but I still don't believe in any gods or in anything supernatural.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

I'm an atheist but I also follow Skepticism, which means I apportion my confidence about the truth of a claim in proportion to the evidence that supports it.

Well, actually, I asked :

So, in your opinion, ontological naturalism does not warrant belief, correct?

I had hoped for a yes or no answer as unambiguous as your initial assertion.

Ontological naturalism, the claim that the natural world is all that there is, is not supported by any evidence I'm aware of. So yes, you're correct.

I am also mildly familiar with ontological naturalism. In fact, I have cited Barbara Forrest's article on any number of occasions since 2004. I still find it to be excellent.

I hope you can also recognize that in terms of warranted belief, ontological naturalism is equivalent to the claim that there is a supernatural aspect to reality. Both claims have no evidence, and currently it seems we have no way to confirm, falsify, or test these claims. You might be tempted to call me an agnostic, but I still don't believe in any gods or in anything supernatural.

I understand at least some of what you don't believe. What I am trying to determine (with your help) is whether you view ontological naturalism - "the claim that the natural world is all that there is" - as an unwarranted belief. It seems like a pretty straight forward question.

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BTW: like the avatar!

 

[AlexanderG]

Well, actually, I asked :

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I had hoped for a yes or no answer as unambiguous as your initial assertion.


I am also mildly familiar with ontological naturalism. In fact, I have cited Barbara Forrest's article on any number of occasions since 2004. I still find it to be excellent.


I understand at least some of what you don't believe. What I am trying to determine (with your help) is whether you view ontological naturalism - "the claim that the natural world is all that there is" - is an unwarranted belief. It seems like a pretty straight forward question.

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BTW: like the avatar!

Sorry, I thought I was pretty clear when I said "Ontological naturalism, the claim that the natural world is all that there is, is not supported by any evidence I'm aware of." Yes. I think it's not a warranted belief, just like virtually every other metaphysical claim.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

Sorry, I thought I was pretty clear when I said "Ontological naturalism, the claim that the natural world is all that there is, is not supported by any evidence I'm aware of." Yes. I think it's not a warranted belief, just like virtually every other metaphysical claim.

Thanks - appreciated. It's just that you seem to hold

1. that any appeal to the preternatural is unwarranted, and
2. that the denial of the preternatural is unwarranted.

But then you state: "You might be tempted to call me an agnostic, but ..."

Why "tempted, but"? Is there any conceivable reason why someone (including you) should not characterize you as an unmitigated agnostic? Allow me to suggest one possibility.

Perhaps in fact, you provisionally believe that ontological naturalism is indeed warranted, and therefore hold that any provisional appeal to the preternatural is qualitatively less warranted no matter how provisionally held. In other words, yours is not an undifferentiated agnosticism but, rather, an exercise in Inference to the Best Explanation.

 

[AlexanderG]

Thanks - appreciated. It's just that you seem to hold

1. that any appeal to the preternatural is unwarranted, and
2. that the denial of the preternatural is unwarranted.

But then you state: "You might be tempted to call me an agnostic, but ..."

Why "tempted, but"? Is there any conceivable reason why someone (including you) should not characterize you as an unmitigated agnostic? Allow me to suggest one possibility.

Perhaps in fact, you provisionally believe that ontological naturalism is indeed warranted, and therefore hold that any provisional appeal to the preternatural is qualitatively less warranted no matter how provisionally held. In other words, yours is not an undifferentiated agnosticism but, rather, an exercise in Inference to the Best Explanation.

Nope. I believe that we can only currently investigate and demonstrate the existence of the natural world, but that says nothing about what else could exist, if anything. I just don't know. I'm comfortable not accepting either side of the metaphysical claim. P or not P. Supernatural exists or does not exist. We just have no way to evaluate either side of the argument with our current knowledge. So, you got the 1. and 2. statements right.

What I CAN do, is use induction to provisionally expect what sort of explanations will we find in the future to describe phenomena we don't understand yet. Looking at prior discoveries, the full explanation has always been natural. Lightning, mental illness, droughts, plagues, etc, were all previously attributed to the supernatural until we discovered natural explanations. For this reason, I can use induction to tentatively presume that if we eventually discover an explanation for the beginning of our universe, the nature of time and space, etc, these will also be natural explanations.

Does this mean I can justify ruling out supernatural discoveries in the future? Nope. Not at all, because the natural world and universe and its cause could still have an underlying supernatural foundation one step beyond our future understanding, despite an endless procession of prior natural explanations. Or I might not. Does this mean I "provisionally believe that ontological naturalism is indeed warranted"? No. I hope you can see the distinction.

My "tempted, but" point was because I've had a lot of people say "Well, you're just agnostic," when I refuse to defend the metaphysical opposite of whatever they're claiming.

 

[Meow Mix]

A couple of comments.

Suppose someone with bad metaphysics supports quantum woo. But suppose they are able to make a model that is testable and makes predictions that are verified. Suppose it also manages to unify QM and GR.

At that point I would say they have a perfectly valid theory and we need to take it seriously. Even if the metaphysics is bad, it is a working theory. And it might even incline me to take the metaphysics seriously.

I don't disagree here; but the question we're discussing is "is philosophy important anymore now that we have science?"

I don't disagree that bad metaphysics can get lucky with a model that works for some reasons (or, a person can arrive to something metaphysically correct for wrong reasons: still technically bad metaphysics).

But I answer the question "is philosophy still important" with "yes, because we're going to want to use good metaphysics when we can. We are more likely to produce good models." I'm not saying throw out models founded on bad metaphysics, just that it's reasonable to conclude that we should still be concerned with metaphysics to better our chances of good models. In other words, philosophy is still important; not that philosophy is a cheat code to instant and guaranteed success.

Just think about Bohr's metaphysics compared to classical ideas. Whether his metaphysics is right or wrong, his ideas needed to be dealt with.

But yes, the idea that everything has a mechanism is a philosophical bias. Again, Bohr never gave a mechanism for the collapse of the wave function. But the simple fact that he got predictions that were verified meant his ideas were taken seriously.

And, maybe it is the bias that there needs to be a mechanism that has wasted time and energy?

I disagree that attempting to understand a mechanism is wasted time and energy. If you have an instrumentalist theory that works, then chances are when you zoom out to grander theory, you're probably going to be doing that by understanding or proposing mechanisms (Newton -> relativity is an example).

While I think Einstein was a bit of a curmudgeon in his stubborn insistence on realism, I don't think his heart was in the wrong place: we should strive for realism; though we shouldn't outright reject instrumentalism as he was wont to. I say this for the same point that I made above that often broadening theory is exactly the result of considering mechanism; and mechanism is at its heart a realist pursuit. (There are probably exceptions and microcosms here; such as an instrumentalist theory broadening into another one. But I will argue that we always get to the most broad, most encompassing when we consider mechanism and at least approach realism).

 

[Meow Mix]

And I fully expect people to waste time going down rabbit holes. That is partly what research is, after all. I do think it is important to explore the different options just to make sure they really do or don't have anything more to offer.

And because we *don't* know which is the 'correct' metaphysics (or even if it makes sense to call one correct), I think we *should* have people 'wasting time' exploring.

I keep going back to Bohr and Einstein. Did Einstein have the wrong metaphysics when he developed SR and GR? Or did he have the wrong metaphysics when he opposed QM?

"Wrong metaphysics" doesn't mean "idea that later turned out to be incomplete or wrong." It can mean "idea that isn't self-consistent" (such as ideas that superposition is real, and truly breaks Aristotlian self-identity/excluded middle/noncontradiction in reality). It can mean bad epistemology: considering weak justification strong or vice versa, or considering something justification that is not justification at all. "Bad metaphysics" is just another way to say bad thinking; not arriving to ideas that will eventually need updating (so long as the reasoning leading there is sound).

If I flip a coin and say, "if this coin lands heads up, then Jefferson City is the capitol of Missouri, if it lands tails up then St. Louis is the capitol of Missouri," and it lands heads up, then I've arrived to a true belief, but not a justified true belief. I have a correct idea but bad epistemology, bad metaphysics. This will lead to trouble down the line.

I'm trying to think of an example of the reverse (having a good reason to suppose something that later turns out wrong or need to be updated), but I have to get some things in order for work; I think you can just imagine this scenario from the description. This is not bad metaphysics, and not what I'm talking about.

Bad metaphysics, bad epistemology will always lead to sorrow eventually. Using good reasoning to arrive to an idea we're not sure about is not the same thing as that.

At the end of the day, again, we're just trying to answer the question, "is philosophy still important?"

As long as we agree that students would benefit from courses on epistemology, ontology, and interconnected metaphysics to do better science, then I think we must agree that it is still important.

 

[Meow Mix]

I understand at least some of what you don't believe. What I am trying to determine (with your help) is whether you view ontological naturalism - "the claim that the natural world is all that there is" - as an unwarranted belief. It seems like a pretty straight forward question.

I actually struggle with this question because I'm not convinced "naturalism" is a very meaningful word.

It's posed in opposition to this word, "supernatural." But what's that? Dictionaries usually define it as something that is beyond scientific understanding or "against the laws of nature." But for instance, seems like anything that just isn't presently known would fit that definition. If I went back in time and showed some ancient human basically any technology, it'd be beyond their understanding and certainly against what they perceive as the laws of nature. Are night vision goggles supernatural? I shouldn't think so.

I'm reminded by Feynman's discussion about discovering new physics being like people playing chess in the park: two people play while a third watches. The observer can pick up the rules of chess by watching many games, and they may infer for themselves "The Laws of Chess." Bishops move diagonally, rooks move in straight lines, and so on.

But occasionally, something strange like en passant or castling might happen: "but that violates the Laws of Chess," they might think! "You can't move two pieces at once," or "pawns don't move like that," any number of apparent violations.

But the Laws of Chess weren't broken: they just never fully understood them.

So consider something like a ghost, or whatever. Is it really against the "laws of nature?" A ghost would still have limitations (it can do some things presumably, and not able to do other things). This is "following laws." So wouldn't it just be that, like our chess observer, we just never fully understood the "laws of nature" if it turns out ghosts are real?

I just do not think "supernatural" is a useful word, and therefore I do not think a word in direct opposition to it is useful either.

 

[Meow Mix]

I somehow missed this one earlier when responding, sorry!

Perhaps it is simply definitional preference and semantics. I suppose for me, I see disadvantage to separating empirical data collection under the banner Science, and analysis and interpretation of that data under the banner Philosophy, primarily because doing so drags in all the baggage of antiquated and obsolete philosophical terms and ideas into science. Perhaps it is my bias, but it seems that Philosophy never lets go of an idea once it has been put forward, regardless of what comes after.

I think this may be bias ^.^ Philosophical terms can be helpful (though they can be a hindrance if someone gets all wrapped up in sesquipedalian loquaciousness). They're helpful because philosophers are often concerned with exhaustiveness of terms: they should cover all possibilities where capable, which reduces exceptions to nomenclature and nebulousness. Not a problem if we just take our time specifying what we're talking about, so this is preferential; but still, brevity is the point of having terms.

I have only a general layperson familiarity with modern Physics. As a result, I can't speak directly to your examples, but will try and express my concern toward your statement, "I think that it's useful to treat these questions as more metaphysics than pure science."

When I think of scientific disciplines outside of Physics, such as the Life Sciences, for the most part, the whole of their area of inquiry lies within their empirical grasps. That the main obstacle in these inquiries lies in interconnected complexity, and not necessarily a limit on empirical observation.

Physics, to me, is different. Physics seems to be hamstrung in its ability to empirically reach the entirety of the subject matter. The distances involved are either too great or too small, the speeds too great, and the energies too great, for us to be able to evaluate empirically in the foreseeable future.

If science is philosophy with empirical verification, then this would seem to indicate that scientific inquiry in Physics has a boundary, an empirical limitation.

I am wondering if you are arguing that Physics can soldier on, to continue beyond its empirical limitations by relying solely on Philosophy without empirical verification. That the 1/3 Philosophy portion of Physics is this extension beyond empirical limitations.

For me, based on the historical track record of classic or traditional Philosophy, I am skeptical that Physics can proceed in a meaningful way on Philosophy alone, absent empirical verification.

If you are not arguing that Physics can soldier on in a meaningful way relying solely on classic Philosophy, then any apparent difference to our attitudes on Science and Philosophy really is all down to semantics.

I am not suggesting that we can power through the limits of physics with philosophy and still call it science, if I'm understanding you correctly.

I'm saying that we do philosophy when we ask things like "what is good justification" and "what is the scope of what we're doing?" We have to be good at these things to do good science.

A way I phrased it in a response to Polymath is this: would a science student benefit from taking classes or independently researching things like epistemology, ontology, logic, and other realms of metaphysics? I find it hard to see how anyone would answer "no." Maybe they would, I don't know. But I think that if we think students would benefit from learning philosophy, then we must answer the question "is philosophy still important for science?" with a yes.

Edit: I am reminded by discussions amongst my peers in the research group where sometimes you get a collection of data, and inevitably someone basically rubs their chin and says, "but what does it mean?" We've moved to philosophy at that point. Knowing that correlation does not imply causation for instance is philosophical. And so on.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

My "tempted, but" point was because I've had a lot of people say "Well, you're just agnostic," when I refuse to defend the metaphysical opposite of whatever they're claiming.

Rest assure that I'm not one of those folk likely to say such a thing precisely because I, perhaps far more than you, hold agnosticism in rather high regard.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

I actually struggle with this question because I'm not convinced "naturalism" is a very meaningful word.

"The map is not the territory." That said, I rather prefer the term preternatural, but that's a different discussion.

Thank you for the rest of your commentary. I hope to get back to it soon ...

Goodnight!