Moral realism.

[mikkel_the_dane]

Here is how close I can get.
A moral rule/norm/fact can be true, real and subjective, but work universally. That it is universal, is the closed it can get to be objective. It is still subjective, but applied without claiming that any given one person is a special positive and the another a special negative.

Now it is abstract and I know that, because theory is one thing and practice another. But here is how I was taught that. It is a ongoing never ending dialectical process between theories and practices, then informs each other in both directions.
So no practice without theory and no theory without practice.

Now if anybody got any insight to any of those, fire away. Or ask me to be specific about my theories and practice.

 

[Ella S.]

I'm interested in what you mean by a moral rule/norm/fact working universally.

Personally, I am a moral rationalist. Ordinarily, that would entail "moral realism," but for me it's more of a form of moral constructivism, like mathematics. When we define our fundamental moral terms, we can extrapolate true moral statements, but this is mostly an exercise in technical language. We aren't really describing "reality" when we do this.

My indirect realism is similarly semantic. I'm aware that the sensations that I experience are external to my control, and they consist of a a self-consistent data set, which in modal logic we refer to as the "actual world." So I'm okay with describing that as an external world and that's what I call "reality." I would never use "real" to refer to abstract constructs like morality.

Nonetheless, I do regard some moral facts to be objectively true and knowable a priori by the intellect. Part of this is because I view morality as dealing with normative statements, which have an inherent drive to them. Rationality itself has an inherent drive to its process.

This means that I am opposed to moral sentimentalists, who instead rely on emotions like empathy, love, or compassion (and sometimes disgust, anger, shame, guilt, etc.) as the main drives behind morality. This is mostly due to the fact that I'm alexithymic and struggle with dissociation, so I'm completely out of touch with my emotions and I can't build a philosophy from them. I have to default to rationalism.

We've discussed in the past how objectives are subjective, but rationality itself is subjective. It's something subjective agents experience; we all have our own rational drives and rational intuition. It's "universal" in the sense that everyone has these drives and intuitions to some degree, although it takes study and practice to refine them. You can have rational approaches to your own subjective, internal states.

You can theoretically live a life of pure rationality. It's difficult in practice. I know that I fall short sometimes, but I'm a lot further along in cultivating the discipline and understanding necessary to do this than I was a few years ago. To me, this quest takes on a moral connotation regarding the integrity of my character.

All of this said, I recognize that there are other definitions of morality that extrapolate from different sources. You could say that which one we choose is subjective. I wouldn't go that far. I don't think I can demonstrate that any other axiomatic definition of morality is necessarily false, but I can demonstrate that my morality is a consequence of rationality. In that sense, it is true in the same sense that logical conclusions are true, because formal logic is just a formalization of the rational intuition. "Logic" in its broadest sense just referred to rationality and reason in general before we formalized it.

So my moral position is logical. Other positions might be, too, and they might even be equally logical, but that is subjectively not important to me. I'm okay with there being numerous different meanings for "morality" depending on the context. All words have that

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

I'm interested in what you mean by a moral rule/norm/fact working universally.

Personally, I am a moral rationalist. Ordinarily, that would entail "moral realism," but for me it's more of a form of moral constructivism, like mathematics. When we define our fundamental moral terms, we can extrapolate true moral statements, but this is mostly an exercise in technical language. We aren't really describing "reality" when we do this.

My indirect realism is similarly semantic. I'm aware that the sensations that I experience are external to my control, and they consist of a a self-consistent data set, which in modal logic we refer to as the "actual world." So I'm okay with describing that as an external world and that's what I call "reality." I would never use "real" to refer to abstract constructs like morality.

Nonetheless, I do regard some moral facts to be objectively true and knowable a priori by the intellect. Part of this is because I view morality as dealing with normative statements, which have an inherent drive to them. Rationality itself has an inherent drive to its process.

This means that I am opposed to moral sentimentalists, who instead rely on emotions like empathy, love, or compassion (and sometimes disgust, anger, shame, guilt, etc.) as the main drives behind morality. This is mostly due to the fact that I'm alexithymic and struggle with dissociation, so I'm completely out of touch with my emotions and I can't build a philosophy from them. I have to default to rationalism.

We've discussed in the past how objectives are subjective, but rationality itself is subjective. It's something subjective agents experience; we all have our own rational drives and rational intuition. It's "universal" in the sense that everyone has these drives and intuitions to some degree, although it takes study and practice to refine them. You can have rational approaches to your own subjective, internal states.

You can theoretically live a life of pure rationality. It's difficult in practice. I know that I fall short sometimes, but I'm a lot further along in cultivating the discipline and understanding necessary to do this than I was a few years ago. To me, this is quest takes on a moral connotations regarding the integrity of my character.

All of this said, I recognize that there are other definitions of morality that extrapolate from different sources. You could say that which one we choose is subjective. I wouldn't go that far. I don't think I can demonstrate that any other axiomatic definition of morality is necessarily false, but I can demonstrate that my morality is a consequence of rationality. In that sense, it is true in the same sense that logical conclusions are true, because formal logic is just a formalization of the rational intuition. "Logic" in its broadest sense just referred to rationality and reason in general before we formalized it.

So my moral position is logical. Other positions might be, too, and they might even be equally logical, but that is subjectively not important to me.

That is a good post. But here is something I look for in any text about this subject. It is described by David Hume as in effect this.
A lot of texts describe in effect objective terms what is going on and then comes a subjective first person evaluation of a qualitative nature.
Now I will tell where I found that in your text and then you can consider if you find it relevant or ignore it:
"... but that is subjectively not important to me."
That is neither right or wrong other than to you. But it can be a start to do it in general if we simply make it general. Moral realism as universal is to balance different understandings of importance.

But that is the general trick of all these debates. Now you are you and you do you. I am not going to tell you how you ought to that.
So you do you and answer as you. But my advice is that you continue what you are doing. It makes sense to me.

 

[Ella S.]

That is a good post. But here is something I look for in any text about this subject. It is described by David Hume as in effect this.
A lot of texts describe in effect objective terms what is going on and then comes a subjective first person evaluation of a qualitative nature.
Now I will tell where I found that in your text and then you can consider if you find it relevant or ignore it:
"... but that is subjectively not important to me."
That is neither right or wrong other than to you.

That is indeed a subjective evaluation on my part. However, I think you're mistaken to focus on it.

My point is that morality can be defined objectively, just as any concept can be. It's a linguistic construct. Other people can use the word in different ways, but in my opinion that doesn't make my use of the word any less accurate.

For instance, take the sentence, "The alarm went off so I turned it off." The word "off" is used in two different ways there, but they are both correct uses of the word. So my use of moral language is objectively correct, even if other contradictory uses of it can be, too.

But it can be a start to do it in general if we simply make it general. Moral realism as universal is to balance different understandings of importance.

But that is the general trick of all these debates. Now you are you and you do you. I am not going to tell you how you ought to that.
So you do you and answer as you. But my advice is that you continue what you are doing. It makes sense to me.

I think that's generally considered to be the most sensible approach to philosophy. Philosophy is a tool to be handled pragmatically.

It can be weaponized against other people. I certainly weaponize philosophical methods to attack ideas that I think are harmful or that I think should be dispensed with or opposed. That's definitely subjective.

Yet I am still neither a moral subjectivist nor relativist. From my experience, most philosophically educated moral realists are the same way. I think there's a general misunderstanding of what they mean when they say that morality is objective. "Objectivity" is too often taken to be some sort of unachievable gold standard in ontology or reason, but it's a lot simpler than that.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

That is indeed a subjective evaluation on my part. However, I think you're mistaken to focus on it.

My point is that morality can be defined objectively, just as any concept can be. It's a linguistic construct. Other people can use the word in different ways, but in my opinion that doesn't make my use of the word any less accurate.

For instance, take the sentence, "The alarm went off so I turned it off." The word "off" is used in two different ways there, but they are both correct uses of the word. So my use of moral language is objectively correct, even if other contradictory uses of it can be, too.

I think that's generally considered to be the most sensible approach to philosophy. Philosophy is a tool to be handled pragmatically.

It can be weaponized against other people. I certainly weaponize philosophical methods to attack ideas that I think are harmful or that I think should be dispensed with or opposed. That's definitely subjective.

Yet I am still neither a moral subjectivist nor relativist. From my experience, most philosophically educated moral realists are the same way. I think there's a general misunderstanding of what they mean when they say that morality is objective. "Objectivity" is too often taken to be some sort of unachievable gold standard in ontology or reason, but it's a lot simpler than that.

I have to reread your posts and will get back to you.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

@Ella S.
First off. I have to force my brain to calibrate it to your thinking. Then I had to check once I did that, if it makes sense. It does. Then I compared to how I do it and consider the implication of what that means.
Well, we could properly if we both try to bend our individual thinking get to a compromise. But why bother? I can tell your system works for you and mine works for me.
So it has been great because it actually confirmed to me, what I already knew. And it in a sense it is that the way forward is to accept diversity in some sense. Hope it makes sense.

 

[Ella S.]

@Ella S.
First off. I have to force my brain to calibrate it to your thinking. Then I had to check once I did that, if it makes sense. It does. Then I compared to how I do it and consider the implication of what that means.
Well, we could properly if we both try to bend our individual thinking get to a compromise. But why bother? I can tell your system works for you and mine works for me.
So it has been great because it actually confirmed to me, what I already knew. And it in a sense it is that the way forward is to accept diversity in some sense. Hope it makes sense.

It does. I'm glad we could reach an understanding, because I had suspected that this would be the case for awhile.

 

[Balthazzar]

If morals are based on right behaviors as opposed to wrong behaviors, then doesn't this imply the difference between truthful and erroneous? Right/wrong based on personal tastes and preferences seem to be more relevant than viewing these as universal in application. It's a subject-ive reality - individually speaking as a unique individual with personal preferences. People enjoy different things, we find enjoyment in different things, and we find different things to be unpleasant or unwanted as individuals. We're unique and I think this is a great thing. It helps gravitate us into more accommodating environments as individuals with others who are similar to ourselves.

 

[Balthazzar]

I'm interested in what you mean by a moral rule/norm/fact working universally.

Personally, I am a moral rationalist. Ordinarily, that would entail "moral realism," but for me it's more of a form of moral constructivism, like mathematics. When we define our fundamental moral terms, we can extrapolate true moral statements, but this is mostly an exercise in technical language. We aren't really describing "reality" when we do this.

My indirect realism is similarly semantic. I'm aware that the sensations that I experience are external to my control, and they consist of a a self-consistent data set, which in modal logic we refer to as the "actual world." So I'm okay with describing that as an external world and that's what I call "reality." I would never use "real" to refer to abstract constructs like morality.

Nonetheless, I do regard some moral facts to be objectively true and knowable a priori by the intellect. Part of this is because I view morality as dealing with normative statements, which have an inherent drive to them. Rationality itself has an inherent drive to its process.

This means that I am opposed to moral sentimentalists, who instead rely on emotions like empathy, love, or compassion (and sometimes disgust, anger, shame, guilt, etc.) as the main drives behind morality. This is mostly due to the fact that I'm alexithymic and struggle with dissociation, so I'm completely out of touch with my emotions and I can't build a philosophy from them. I have to default to rationalism.

We've discussed in the past how objectives are subjective, but rationality itself is subjective. It's something subjective agents experience; we all have our own rational drives and rational intuition. It's "universal" in the sense that everyone has these drives and intuitions to some degree, although it takes study and practice to refine them. You can have rational approaches to your own subjective, internal states.

You can theoretically live a life of pure rationality. It's difficult in practice. I know that I fall short sometimes, but I'm a lot further along in cultivating the discipline and understanding necessary to do this than I was a few years ago. To me, this quest takes on a moral connotation regarding the integrity of my character.

All of this said, I recognize that there are other definitions of morality that extrapolate from different sources. You could say that which one we choose is subjective. I wouldn't go that far. I don't think I can demonstrate that any other axiomatic definition of morality is necessarily false, but I can demonstrate that my morality is a consequence of rationality. In that sense, it is true in the same sense that logical conclusions are true, because formal logic is just a formalization of the rational intuition. "Logic" in its broadest sense just referred to rationality and reason in general before we formalized it.

So my moral position is logical. Other positions might be, too, and they might even be equally logical, but that is subjectively not important to me. I'm okay with there being numerous different meanings for "morality" depending on the context. All words have that

I gather your philosophical stance is based on personal values. Mine is also. In that diverse field of human psychology, personal values dictate our rational attributes and what becomes logical to ourselves. You mentioned that emotions aren't what drive your actions. I wouldn't fault this, but I myself am or rather can be the opposite in this respect. Discipline would seem beneficial to help counter emotional drive. On the other hand, I don't think denial is all that beneficial. I am human after all, and my spiritual (emotional) self is an important aspect of who I am as an individual. I suppose logic and reason and rationale come into play along with my spiritual self for the guidance towards more beneficial life realities and experiences.

 

[Yerda]

I believe that moral statements can be true or false. Does that make me a moral realist?

 

[Curious George]

Here is how close I can get.
A moral rule/norm/fact can be true, real and subjective, but work universally. That it is universal, is the closed it can get to be objective. It is still subjective, but applied without claiming that any given one person is a special positive and the another a special negative.

Now it is abstract and I know that, because theory is one thing and practice another. But here is how I was taught that. It is a ongoing never ending dialectical process between theories and practices, then informs each other in both directions.
So no practice without theory and no theory without practice.

Now if anybody got any insight to any of those, fire away. Or ask me to be specific about my theories and practice.

I think you may be mistaken. If something is universally true and real, it would by this nature be objective.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

I think you may be mistaken. If something is universally true and real, it would by this nature be objective.

Yeah, I know what you mean.

 

[icehorse]

An open question to @mikkel_the_dane , @Ella S. @Balthazzar, @Curious George , @Yerda , and everyone..

Do you have any explicit philosophical axioms?

Mine is something like: "It's good to improve the aggregate well being of conscious creatures (WBCC)." I understand that a moral relativist can poke holes in this axiom and defend that there is no universal "good". I find relativism completely unsatisfying and depressing, so I don't pursue discussions with relativists

So as I read threads like this I always ask myself, are the posters relying on any axioms and are they similar to mine?

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

An open question to @mikkel_the_dane , @Ella S. @Balthazzar, @Curious George , @Yerda , and everyone..

Do you have any explicit philosophical axioms?

Mine is something like: "It's good to improve the aggregate well being of conscious creatures (WBCC)." I understand that a moral relativist can poke holes in this axiom and defend that there is no universal "good". I find relativism completely unsatisfying and depressing, so I don't pursue discussions with relativists

So as I read threads like this I always ask myself, are the posters relying on any axioms and are they similar to mine?

Even if the other human is different than you try to minimize harm and if lucky try to maximize good for any one context and don't overgeneralize for general shortcuts as to how to do that.

 

[icehorse]

Even if the other human is different than you try to minimize harm and if lucky try to maximize good for any one context and don't overgeneralize for general shortcuts as to how to do that.

I'm basically agreeing with you here. Of course that raises a few questions like "what's harm?" and "what's good?".

But setting that aside for now, do you think there are universal good things and universal harmful things?

For example, I think Maslov's hierarchy does a decent job of mapping out universal good things.

 

[Balthazzar]

An open question to @mikkel_the_dane , @Ella S. @Balthazzar, @Curious George , @Yerda , and everyone..

Do you have any explicit philosophical axioms?

Mine is something like: "It's good to improve the aggregate well being of conscious creatures (WBCC)." I understand that a moral relativist can poke holes in this axiom and defend that there is no universal "good". I find relativism completely unsatisfying and depressing, so I don't pursue discussions with relativists

So as I read threads like this I always ask myself, are the posters relying on any axioms and are they similar to mine?

None in-particular. I do think the better we understand life, others, ourselves, and having respect for others is beneficial to a sense of peace, wellbeing, and that it can help us coexist with much less hostility. Morals would seem to be intimately attached to the laws of physics and survival. From what I understand about them, they are about correctness in action as opposed to being erroneous in actions. Getting things right as opposed to getting things wrong, so when we apply respect in the mix, it requires an appeal to empathy, which I think is often needed to help us be more correct in our choices and how we interact with other living things.

 

[Yerda]

Do you have any explicit philosophical axioms?

Mine is something like: "It's good to improve the aggregate well being of conscious creatures (WBCC)."

If I was to have a go at a single sentence summation of moral action I doubt I could do better than this.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

I'm basically agreeing with you here. Of course that raises a few questions like "what's harm?" and "what's good?".

But setting that aside for now, do you think there are universal good things and universal harmful things?

For example, I think Maslov's hierarchy does a decent job of mapping out universal good things.

In short it is a moral rule for the work my wife does.
For which you are supposed to read and learn a lot of different methods and aspects of what is to be a human, how there are different ways to help a human and how to combine all that under different laws and sometimes competing narratives for what a good, healthy and productive life is.

In short there is no short cut like the scientific law of gravity. And even Maslow is limited in what you can do based in it.
Maslow breaks down for how it works when you add it for 2 more humans in a group context for how to combine needs if resources are limited and/or for conflicting needs.

Let me be honest with you. You are trying to do something for which for all of humanity since that writing was invented have a lot a books on and for which today there are special jobs that require certification to do.
And there are in the sum of the those books no simple universal rule for how to do it.
In short the problem is that for some contexts what is good for you is bad for me and so in reverse. So you can't make a universal rule for good, because it is not universal in all cases, only some and if you go for universal you can end up harming another human.

Years ago I was in a debate with a professional philosopher about that and the problem was this. Everything he made an universal example, I could find an exception. He concluded that he didn't care for that, because for him, the important thing was the overall it works and the outliers were not relevant to him.
That is what you do in effect and for which I am trained differently. All humans count as per principle and outliners count, because that is also humans. Now practice is something else.
But here is your rule, the group as the group counts in effect. My rule is that the individual counts.

And I am sorry, but both positions are subjective and different kinds of bias. You just don't like that, because you as a product of nature and nurture have internalized objective, rational, universal, lawful as combine to a general good and so on. I am just a different product of nature and nurture.

 

[icehorse]

@mikkel_the_dane - you're assuming too much about what I think, so this will be a better conversation if you back off with that approach, thanks.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the way I'm reading your posts, it seems that you think that holding to an axiom means that we have to end up with detailed universal laws or rules? I don't think that's the case. I think we can agree to axioms and still allow for human diversity.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

@mikkel_the_dane - you're assuming too much about what I think, so this will be a better conversation if you back off with that approach, thanks.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the way I'm reading your posts, it seems that you think that holding to an axiom means that we have to end up with detailed universal laws or rules? I don't think that's the case. I think we can agree to axioms and still allow for human diversity.

No, only that some axioms are universal and others are not.
I hold at least one axiom, but it is not universal for how to treat all humans for all cases according to one methodology. That is the point.
So your axioms are just that axioms, I agree.