Is There a Cure for Metaphysical Dogma?

[Nous]

And since there is no thesis that meets your criteria then you mean that it is worthy of objection to hold any metaphysical thesis as true. Is that correct ?

Unless you can find some other way to logically deduce the truth of a metaphysical thesis while ruling out all others.

 

[Koldo]

Unless you can find some other way to logically deduce the truth of a metaphysical thesis while ruling out all others.

I don't see the need to be absolutely certain that a given thesis is true to hold it as true.
Your position is rather unusual, I must say.

 

[shunyadragon]

So it's enough to quote your claims and show be false. Got it.

No, I already responded in terms of real science, and you are playing the three stooges, Duck, Bob and Weave to justify a religious agenda.

 

[shunyadragon]

Unless you can find some other way to logically deduce the truth of a metaphysical thesis while ruling out all others.

From the fallible human perspective this is unbelievably unrealistic.

 

[Nous]

I don't see the need to be absolutely certain that a given thesis is true to hold it as true.

Why do you need a religion that you can't deduce from the evidence?

 

[Nous]

No, I already responded in terms of real science, and you are playing the three stooges, Duck, Bob and Weave to justify a religious agenda.

Once again, energy, momentum, wave functions are not tangible. You're in the 18th century.

 

[Nous]

From the fallible human perspective this is unbelievably unrealistic.

Logic isn't fallible. You should try using it.

 

[shunyadragon]

Logic isn't fallible. You should try using it.

Humans are fallible when using logic. Logic is logic neither fallible nor infallible.

 

[Koldo]

Why do you need a religion that you can't deduce from the evidence?

It is not about whether I 'need' it.
It's just about how I perceive the world.
Notice how I chose to express myself. I said 'the world'. By that you probably know that I, at the very least, subscribe to some form of philosophical realism. As I see it, there is an objective reality surrounding me, which I am a part of.

Since you appear to value the sciences, I ask you: What value do you see in them if you don't hold any metaphysical thesis as true ?

 

[shunyadragon]

Once again, energy, momentum, wave functions are not tangible. You're in the 18th century.

Again, energy. momentum, wave functions are measurable and part of the tangible science of physics. Your in the 12th century, and stuck

 

[siti]

These are the statements in the article that I accurrately represented:

The term “naturalism” has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. Its current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. The self-proclaimed “naturalists” from that period included John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook and Roy Wood Sellars.

[. . . ]

So understood, “naturalism” is not a particularly informative term as applied to contemporary philosophers​

Naturalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The big difference is that, unlike "naturalism," general relativity and QM have not become recognized as vacuous ideas that no one can argue are true.

When you give your argument for "naturalism," be sure to define "supernatural entities" and cite the evidence about the "important truths about the 'human spirit'."

When you give your argument for the thesis of "physicalism," be sure to define "physical" and cite the evidence where a hypothesis about only "physical" things existing has been tested.

Be sure to explain what to do about nonlocal collapse of the wavefunction.

So you would - again - prefer to argue about definitions and draw conclusions from ignorance. Most philosophers probably prefer not to do that. Most philosophers, as indicated by the actual data I quoted and you ignored, prefer their philosophy to proceed in a naturalistic, physicalistic and scientifically realistic way. I don't think they should change to supernaturalism, non-physicalism and ad ignoratiumism just because you don't understand the definitions of "naturalism" and "physicalism" or because they cannot, at present, provide a satisfactory explanation of the "non-local" collapse of a wavefunction that may not even be a truly real part of the world anyway. (In any case, I have already answered this "non-local collapse" question in another thread - as you well know).

In any case, you are proving that you are as much infected by the "metaphysical dogma" you complain about by insisting that because there is, as yet, no satisfactory naturalistic explanation of this or that observation, then naturalism should be abandoned. And before you say that's not what you said, you are clearly persisting in your attempt to discredit naturalism by selective out-of-context quotations that seem to imply that it has failed from an article that is clearly equivocal on that matter and honestly admits that whilst the writer is obviously skeptical, most philosophers would not share the negative view that you are promoting.

 

[shunyadragon]

No, that's one of the big problems. There is no way to test hypotheses about "everything that exists" by the scientific method.

Science does not attempt to test "everything that exists." That is too broad and ambiguous. Science proposes specific theories and hypothesis based on existing scientific knowledge objective verifiable evidence.

 

[shunyadragon]

I do, too, although it's hard to define "scientific method." I just pretend like that's not a problem. But mainly I defend scientific realism because it implies mathematical realism: Scientific Realism Begets Mathematical Realism

Does not make sense.Math is tool box for science and everyday life. There is no such thing as Mathematical Realism.

 

[Nous]

It is not about whether I 'need' it.
It's just about how I perceive the world.
Notice how I chose to express myself. I said 'the world'. By that you probably know that I, at the very least, subscribe to some form of philosophical realism. As I see it, there is an objective reality surrounding me, which I am a part of.

Since you appear to value the sciences, I ask you: What value do you see in them if you don't hold any metaphysical thesis as true ?

As I noted in the OP, the scientific method can help to rule out metaphysical theses or tenents of such thesis (by way of the scientific method, we are able to reject the phlogiston thesis; likewise the thesis of determinism is apparently dead). But the scientific method can hardly be used to test hypotheses about which (if any) thesis regarding the nature of "everything that exists" is correct. We can't test a hypothesis about "everything that exists," for one reason, because we don't have a method to determine what is "everything that exists".

 

[Nous]

Does not make sense.Math is tool box for science and everyday life. There is no such thing as Mathematical Realism.

Was the OP of that thread too difficult for you to understand? All I did was state various premises and versions of the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument. For example:

Thus, taking my cue from some of the characteristic claims of scientific realism--

“The entities described by the scientific theory exist objectively and mind-independently.” Scientific realism - Wikipedia “The central terms of the best current theories are genuinely referential.” http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~delittle/Encyclopedia entries/scientific realism.htm

--I wish to state an argument such as:

P1: All central terms of fundamental scientific laws are genuinely referential.
P2: All central terms of fundamental scientific laws are quantities (/mathematical relations).
C: Therefore, some quantities (/mathematical relations) are genuinely referential.
(AAI-3)

or

P1: All entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.
P2: Some mathematical relations are entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method.
C: Therefore, some mathematical relations are objectively existing.
(AII-1)​

 

[Nous]

Again, energy. momentum, wave functions are measurable and part of the tangible science of physics.

I dare you to prove this ignorant claim that energy, momentum and wave functions are tangible.

 

[Nous]

So you would - again - prefer to argue about definitions and draw conclusions from ignorance. Most philosophers probably prefer not to do that. Most philosophers, as indicated by the actual data I quoted and you ignored, prefer their philosophy to proceed in a naturalistic, physicalistic and scientifically realistic way.

But you can't define any of those ideas, can you?

(In any case, I have already answered this "non-local collapse" question in another thread - as you well know).

On "another thread," you failed to account for nonlocality as an effect of "matter/energy"? Correct?

In any case, you are proving that you are as much infected by the "metaphysical dogma" you complain about by insisting that because there is, as yet, no satisfactory naturalistic explanation of this or that observation, then naturalism should be abandoned. And before you say that's not what you said, you are clearly persisting in your attempt to discredit naturalism by selective out-of-context quotations that seem to imply that it has failed from an article that is clearly equivocal on that matter and honestly admits that whilst the writer is obviously skeptical, most philosophers would not share the negative view that you are promoting.

So you still can't articulate any argument for any of your airy-fairy ideas of "physicalism" or "naturalism"?

 

[Nous]

Science does not attempt to test "everything that exists."

Thank you for repeating what I already said. It's precisely how we know that the scientific method cannot reveal which, if any, metaphysical thesis is true.

 

[Koldo]

As I noted in the OP, the scientific method can help to rule out metaphysical theses or tenents of such thesis (by way of the scientific method, we are able to reject the phlogiston thesis; likewise the thesis of determinism is apparently dead). But the scientific method can hardly be used to test hypotheses about which (if any) thesis regarding the nature of "everything that exists" is correct. We can't test a hypothesis about "everything that exists," for one reason, because we don't have a method to determine what is "everything that exists".

If you accept the scientific method as a proper method to rule out certain metaphysical theses, then you hold some metaphysical theses as true yourself. How else would you find the scientific method as a proper tool to rule out certain metaphysical theses ? And in that case, what justification do you have to hold the ones that you do as true ?

 

[shunyadragon]

As I noted in the OP, the scientific method can help to rule out metaphysical theses or tenents of such thesis .

Methodological Naturalism cannot rule out nor help rule out any metaphysical theses nor tenants of such theses beyond our physical existence.