Is There a Cure for Metaphysical Dogma?

[LukeS]

If there is a cure, then it exists.

 

[Kilgore Trout]

Metaphysical speculations are generally distasteful to me.

Nor useful. Unless, one needs more fuel for navel-gazing.

 

[Nous]

The entire history of physics demonstrates that the physical is testable in the form of energy and matter. Your canards, obfuscations, red herrings and selective citations out of context based on a religious agenda do not represent anything close to science.

So what assertions were you making about "the tangible natural world"? Were you able to understand that energy is not tangible? Nor are momentum or wavefunctions tangible.

Anyway, you have given a sterling example of what I described in the OP as metaphysical dogma. I didn't really expect anyone to come and display him/herself as an example. I do realize that it makes people who are dedicated to their dogma upset when presented with facts contrary to it. Some people similarly lash out when one questions their belief that Mary was a virgin.

But really you shouldn't take it so personally, as it's just my job to cast doubt on people's religion. I am paid well for it.

 

[Nous]

Sure, but further elaborate on that. Why there must be a way to tell which one is true to hold one as true ?

Go back and read the OP. I definitely didn't suggest that there is or ought to be a way to determine which metaphysical thesis of "the true one". Just the contrary.

 

[Nous]

In discussion I will staunchly defend 'naturalism'

How do you defend "naturalism"? The SEP article on “naturalism” notes up front that it was an idea among a few philosophers in the early part of the 20th century, and has no precise or informative meaning. Apparently it is a rejection of all things "supernatural"--but that is a difficult word to define. I just googled "supernatural" and discovered it's a TV show.

In discussion I will staunchly defend . . . 'physicalism'

How do you define and defend "physicalism"? What does one do with "spooky action at a distance"? I think that's supernatural.

In discussion I will staunchly defend . . . 'scientific realism'

I do, too, although it's hard to define "scientific method." I just pretend like that's not a problem. But mainly I defend scientific realism because it implies mathematical realism: Scientific Realism Begets Mathematical Realism

 

[Nous]

If there is a cure, then it exists.

I am less confident now than I was a couple of days ago that there is a cure.

 

[Nous]

Nor useful. Unless, one needs more fuel for navel-gazing.

Arguing metaphysical theses is surely a healthy exercise, good for the muscles in your brain.

 

[Koldo]

Go back and read the OP. I definitely didn't suggest that there is or ought to be a way to determine which metaphysical thesis of "the true one". Just the contrary.

I thought you meant that even though there is no way to determine the true one, that there should be one for people to hold it as true. If that isn't the case, then I am afraid I have indeed misunderstood you.

What do you consider sufficient justification to hold a metaphysical thesis tenaciously ?

 

[siti]

How do you defend "naturalism"? The SEP article on “naturalism” notes up front that it was an idea among a few philosophers in the early part of the 20th century, and has no precise or informative meaning.

That's a complete misrepresentation of what the article says. Even if it was an idea held by only one philosopher in the early 20th century, would you really dismiss John Dewey's ideas with the wave of hand? And one could easily say much the same thing about General Relativity or Quantum Mechanics - that they were scientific ideas held by only a handful of physicists in the 1910s-1920s. In any case, if you'd even bothered to read past the first paragraph you would note...well - here's the second paragraph verbatim (with my bold):

<<So understood, “naturalism” is not a particularly informative term as applied to contemporary philosophers. The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily accept naturalism as just characterized—that is, they would both reject “supernatural” entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the “human spirit”.>> ​

Of course the article then goes on to discuss the various ways in which modern philosophers commit to a stronger or weaker version of naturalistic thinking. Ontological naturalism is, of course, very closely allied to physicalism - as the SEP article demonstrates. And according to a 2009 PhilPapers survey amongst contemporary philosophers about 50% accept or lean towards metaphilosophical naturalism (essentially the idea that philosophy should proceed in 'tandem gait', as it were, with science) as opposed to non-naturalism (about 25%). The rest either didn't understand the question, felt it was not sufficiently clear or were agnostic/undecided.

How do you define and defend "physicalism"? What does one do with "spooky action at a distance"? I think that's supernatural.

Interestingly, for you I should think, a later paragraph in the SEP article has a note about the same survey that showed that "a majority of contemporary philosophers probably hold that physicalism can resist these arguments [about the "rejection of physicalism about conscious properties"] - the results of that survey showed - well, let me quote:

<<Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
Physicalism 56.5+/-1.5% Accept (34.6%), Lean toward (21.9%)
Non-physicalism 27.1+/-1.1% Accept (14.2%), Lean toward (12.9%)
Other 16.4+/-0.8% The question is too unclear to answer (6.3%),
Agnostic/undecided (2.5%), Accept an intermediate view (2.4%)>>
​

I do, too, although it's hard to define "scientific method." I just pretend like that's not a problem. But mainly I defend scientific realism because it implies mathematical realism

On this one, about 75% of the philosophers in the survey agree with you (and me) on scientific realism but on abstract objects 39% accepted or leaned towards Platonism and 37% towards nominalism. I don't know how the answers to the two questions correlated but there are clearly a large proportion of scientific realists who would not agree that scientific realism implies mathematical realism.

So it seems, if credibility is to be based on popularity among contemporary philosophers, that I have backed three winners.

 

[shunyadragon]

So what assertions were you making about "the tangible natural world"? Were you able to understand that energy is not tangible? Nor are momentum or wavefunctions tangible.

Anyway, you have given a sterling example of what I described in the OP as metaphysical dogma. I didn't really expect anyone to come and display him/herself as an example. I do realize that it makes people who are dedicated to their dogma upset when presented with facts contrary to it. Some people similarly lash out when one questions their belief that Mary was a virgin.

But really you shouldn't take it so personally, as it's just my job to cast doubt on people's religion. I am paid well for it.

Nothing here worth responding to. If you are paid well, Who ever is paying you is part of the problem and a waste of money.

 

[Kilgore Trout]

Arguing metaphysical theses is surely a healthy exercise, good for the muscles in your brain.

Indeed. Like lifting weights builds your muscles, but the act of it doesn't accomplish anything useful in and of itself.

 

[Nous]

I thought you meant that even though there is no way to determine the true one, that there should be one for people to hold it as true. If that isn't the case, then I am afraid I have indeed misunderstood you.

Yes, you have misunderstood what I said.

What do you consider sufficient justification to hold a metaphysical thesis tenaciously ?

At the very least, one will have to rule out all other metaphysical theses. I don't think that can be done by way of the scientific method.

 

[Nous]

That's a complete misrepresentation of what the article says.

These are the statements in the article that I accurrately represented:

The term “naturalism” has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. Its current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. The self-proclaimed “naturalists” from that period included John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook and Roy Wood Sellars.

[. . . ]

So understood, “naturalism” is not a particularly informative term as applied to contemporary philosophers​

Naturalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Even if it was an idea held by only one philosopher in the early 20th century, would you really dismiss John Dewey's ideas with the wave of hand? And one could easily say much the same thing about General Relativity or Quantum Mechanics - that they were scientific ideas held by only a handful of physicists in the 1910s-1920s.

The big difference is that, unlike "naturalism," general relativity and QM have not become recognized as vacuous ideas that no one can argue are true.

. The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily accept naturalism as just characterized—that is, they would both reject “supernatural” entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the “human spirit”.>> ​

When you give your argument for "naturalism," be sure to define "supernatural entities" and cite the evidence about the "important truths about the 'human spirit'."

Of course the article then goes on to discuss the various ways in which modern philosophers commit to a stronger or weaker version of naturalistic thinking. Ontological naturalism is, of course, very closely allied to physicalism - as the SEP article demonstrates. And according to a 2009 PhilPapers survey amongst contemporary philosophers about 50% accept or lean towards metaphilosophical naturalism (essentially the idea that philosophy should proceed in 'tandem gait', as it were, with science) as opposed to non-naturalism (about 25%). The rest either didn't understand the question, felt it was not sufficiently clear or were agnostic/undecided.

Interestingly, for you I should think, a later paragraph in the SEP article has a note about the same survey that showed that "a majority of contemporary philosophers probably hold that physicalism can resist these arguments [about the "rejection of physicalism about conscious properties"] - the results of that survey showed - well, let me quote:

<<Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
Physicalism 56.5+/-1.5% Accept (34.6%), Lean toward (21.9%)
Non-physicalism 27.1+/-1.1% Accept (14.2%), Lean toward (12.9%)
Other 16.4+/-0.8% The question is too unclear to answer (6.3%),
Agnostic/undecided (2.5%), Accept an intermediate view (2.4%)>>
​

On this one, about 75% of the philosophers in the survey agree with you (and me) on scientific realism but on abstract objects 39% accepted or leaned towards Platonism and 37% towards nominalism. I don't know how the answers to the two questions correlated but there are clearly a large proportion of scientific realists who would not agree that scientific realism implies mathematical realism.

So it seems, if credibility is to be based on popularity among contemporary philosophers, that I have backed three winners.

When you give your argument for the thesis of "physicalism," be sure to define "physical" and cite the evidence where a hypothesis about only "physical" things existing has been tested.

Be sure to explain what to do about nonlocal collapse of the wavefunction.

 

[Nous]

Indeed. Like lifting weights builds your muscles, but the act of it doesn't accomplish anything useful in and of itself.

Yes, true.

 

[Nous]

Nothing here worth responding to.

So it's enough to quote your claims and show be false. Got it.

 

[Koldo]

Yes, you have misunderstood what I said.

At the very least, one will have to rule out all other metaphysical theses. I don't think that can be done by way of the scientific method.

So it appears that it is 'holding tenaciously' rather than 'holding as true' that requires ruling out all others.
In that case, what do you understand by 'tenaciously' ? What does that mean to you in practice ?
For instance, if I have a particular preference towards any given metaphysical thesis and argue in favor of it, am I holding it 'tenaciously' ? More specifically, what would be the difference in behavior between holding true and holding 'tenaciously' ?

 

[Nous]

So it appears that it is 'holding tenaciously' rather than 'holding as true' that requires ruling out all others.
In that case, what do you understand by 'tenaciously' ? What does that mean to you in practice ?
For instance, if I have a particular preference towards any given metaphysical thesis and argue in favor of it, am I holding it 'tenaciously' ? More specifically, what would be the difference in behavior between holding true and holding 'tenaciously' ?

This is what I said:

"Further, my impression is that it isn't uncommon people to hold their metaphysical beliefs tenaciously, even when presented evidence contrary to the thesis, or on the basis of clearly invalid reasoning. In other words, the belief takes on the characteristics of a dogma, in which there is an intellectual or emotional allegiance to it, possibly motivated by identification with a group."

Perhaps I shouldn't have put a comma after "tenaciously". Nevertheless, it seems to me worthy of objection to hold a metaphysical thesis as true when one cannot deduce it from the evidence and when one cannot rule out all other such theses No?

 

[Koldo]

This is what I said:

"Further, my impression is that it isn't uncommon people to hold their metaphysical beliefs tenaciously, even when presented evidence contrary to the thesis, or on the basis of clearly invalid reasoning. In other words, the belief takes on the characteristics of a dogma, in which there is an intellectual or emotional allegiance to it, possibly motivated by identification with a group."

Perhaps I shouldn't have put a comma after "tenaciously". Nevertheless, it seems to me worthy of objection to hold a metaphysical thesis as true when one cannot deduce it from the evidence and when one cannot rule out all other such theses No?

That sounds like a problematic objection as far as metaphysics go.
Can you provide an example of a metaphysical thesis that can be deduced from evidence ?

 

[Nous]

Can you provide an example of a metaphysical thesis that can be deduced from evidence ?

No, that's one of the big problems. There is no way to test hypotheses about "everything that exists" by the scientific method.

 

[Koldo]

No, that's one of the big problems. There is no way to test hypotheses about "everything that exists" by the scientific method.

And since there is no thesis that meets your criteria then you mean that it is worthy of objection to hold any metaphysical thesis as true. Is that correct ?