Do qualia (feelings) exist?

[raw_thought]

So what is this non-physical thing that emerges out of the physical?

 

[raw_thought]

Epiphenomenalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) is the position that you are referring to. Epiphenomenalists believe in qualia, but say that they supervene on the physical. Dennet flatly says that qualia do not exist.
Eliminative materialism is obviously silly. That is why I asked many posts ago to go onto a debate about epiphenomenalism.

 

[idav]

So what is this non-physical thing that emerges out of the physical?

Like a computer showing us a picture of an apple on our monitor screen. The computer is physical yet the apple on the screen does not really exist, it is a non-material representation.

 

[raw_thought]

Dennet says that private experiences do not exist. It does not matter if they are physical or not!
Physical private experiences , according to Dennet, do not exist.
Non-physical private experiences do not exist, according to Dennet.

 

[raw_thought]

Like a computer showing us a picture of an apple on our monitor screen. The computer is physical yet the apple on the screen does not really exist, it is a non-material representation.

The apple on the screen is physical! It is the pattern of photons, the glass etc. And it looks like an apple. The visualized triangle in your mind does not manifest a physical image of itself in the brain, like your apple does on the screen.

 

[idav]

The apple on the screen is physical! It is the pattern of photons, the glass etc. And it looks like an apple. The visualized triangle in your mind does not manifest a physical image of itself in the brain, like your apple does on the screen.

The representation exists but there is no physical apple in the brain or computer. There are merely pieces of an object that a computer or brain puts together to give us the full representation. In a computer the apple is just 1's and 0's and it takes language translation and understanding in order for us to get anything out of Binary.

 

[MD]

The computer emits a series of diodes in a certain pattern which our brains translate into an apple. The computer is simply emitting light in a certain pattern, the apple itself is formed in our minds. If the apple has color etc, then our minds have formed it, not the computer.

 

[raw_thought]

The representation exists but there is no physical apple in the brain or computer. There are merely pieces of an object that a computer or brain puts together to give us the full representation. In a computer the apple is just 1's and 0's and it takes language translation and understanding in order for us to get anything out of Binary.

The fact remains that the representation is physical. The image of the visualized triangle is not physical.

 

[raw_thought]

"Like a computer showing us a picture of an apple on our monitor screen. The computer is physical yet the apple on the screen does not really exist, it is a non-material representation."
idav

The apple on the screen is physical! It is the pattern of photons, the glass etc. And it looks like an apple. The visualized triangle in your mind does not manifest a physical image of itself in the brain, like your apple does on the screen.

Seriously, can anyone give me an example of something immaterial that is consistent with saying that only the physical exists? The only other option is to say that the visualized triangle is physical.

 

[raw_thought]

So, Dennet contradicts himself because his arguments don't agree with your faulty logic and conclusions?

Interesting tactic.

1. Only the physical exists.
2. Visualized triangles exist.
3. Therefore, visualized triangles are physical.
So, you are saying that 3 does not necessarily follow from 1 and 2? *
Dennet agrees with 1 and 2. However, he disagrees with 3, therefore, he is being illogical.
* Do I really have to explain the difference between validity and truth again? Well OK!
Here is an argument that is valid but not true.
1. All Martians eat snakes.
2. Bob is a Martian.
3. Therefore, Bob eats snakes.
Here is an argument that is invalid but true.
1. Obama is president of the USA.
2. Nixon was president of the USA.
3. Therefore, Bush was president of the USA.
All I get are statements such as “your logic is faulty” etc. OK, the original syllogism about triangles is not true because 1 is false. However, show me how it is invalid!

 

[raw_thought]

“"Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia.”
FROM
http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm
In other words “qualia” are what something feels like.
“My claim, then, is not just that the various technical or theoretical concepts of qualia are vague or equivocal, but that the source concept, the "pretheoretical" notion of which the former are presumed to be refinements, is so thoroughly confused that even if we undertook to salvage some "lowest common denominator" from the theoreticians' proposals, any acceptable version would have to be so radically unlike the ill-formed notions that are commonly appealed to that it would be tactically obtuse--not to say Pickwickian--to cling to the term. Far better, tactically, to declare that there simply are no qualia at all.”
FROM
http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm

In other words, the concept “qualia” (what something feels like) is nonsense and gives us no useful information.
[youtube]qM-gZintWDc[/youtube]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qM-gZintWDc
An eliminative materialist would say that the Robin Williams character is not giving any useful knowledge (Knowledge argument - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)
I say the opposite. If I know that I love (qualia) my wife that information will influence my behavior more than knowing that particular neurons are firing!

 

[raw_thought]

The computer emits a series of diodes in a certain pattern which our brains translate into an apple. The computer is simply emitting light in a certain pattern, the apple itself is formed in our minds. If the apple has color etc, then our minds have formed it, not the computer.

I have no problem with that. But it is unrelated to the question," do qualia exist?"

 

[raw_thought]

The representation exists but there is no physical apple in the brain or computer. There are merely pieces of an object that a computer or brain puts together to give us the full representation. In a computer the apple is just 1's and 0's and it takes language translation and understanding in order for us to get anything out of Binary.

Note, if one says that the visualized triangle= neurons firing because the neurons firing convey the same information, that is like saying that a CD of Mozart’s music= the sound of Mozart’s music.
Similarly, a computer’s Os and 1’s ( 011001100) is not the same as seeing a triangle.

 

[raw_thought]

“. In a computer the apple is just 1's and 0's and it takes language translation and understanding in order for us to get anything out of Binary.”
idav

An interesting related problem for eliminative materialists is Symbol grounding - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Physical objects cannot refer to other physical objects. For example, the definition of an on light is not a switch in the “on” position. The ink pattern “dog” does not refer to the species dog. That requires abstractions (dog refers to the abstraction “4 legged mammal that barks.”). Simply pointing at a dog does not reveal the definition of dog. Besides, even a physical arrow points at nothing. It might be a convention that the non-pointed side is the direction to look at.
Words require abstractions. Physical objects cannot point at abstractions. Therefore, if only the physical exists, words are meaningless. If Dennet is correct, then everything he says is meaningless!

 

[idav]

“. In a computer the apple is just 1's and 0's and it takes language translation and understanding in order for us to get anything out of Binary.”
idav

An interesting related problem for eliminative materialists is Symbol grounding - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Physical objects cannot refer to other physical objects. For example, the definition of an on light is not a switch in the “on” position. The ink pattern “dog” does not refer to the species dog. That requires abstractions (dog refers to the abstraction “4 legged mammal that barks.”). Simply pointing at a dog does not reveal the definition of dog. Besides, even a physical arrow points at nothing. It might be a convention that the non-pointed side is the direction to look at.
Words require abstractions. Physical objects cannot point at abstractions. Therefore, if only the physical exists, words are meaningless. If Dennet is correct, then everything he says is meaningless!

To say words are meaningless is nonsensical. The apple still physically exists as various on off switches. Translation is key, meaning is only useful for us in order to convey ideas. To anything else just a bunch of on off switches would be meaningless without a translation or language to convey it as something useful.

 

[raw_thought]

Right; it's valid, but trivially so, just like the following argument is valid-

If God exists, then God exists.
God exists.
Therefore God exists.

This is a valid argument, but it clearly won't help us in any discussion of the existence of God. Similarly with (all of) raw thought's arguments- in each case he has smuggled in a point that is in contention, and so while valid, his arguments are all question-begging and impertinent.

???????????
So,
1. Only the physical exists
2. Visualized triangles exist
3. Therefore, visualized triangles are physical
is a tautology?

 

[raw_thought]

Note, if one says that the visualized triangle= neurons firing because the neurons firing convey the same information, that is like saying that a CD of Mozart’s music= the sound of Mozart’s music.
Similarly, a computer’s Os and 1’s ( 011001100) is not the same as seeing a triangle.

Would you say that understanding Einstein’s brain (how it works, which neurons are firing etc.) is the same thing as understanding Relativity?
Are you saying that physicalism is not the belief that only the physical exists? A physicalist can believe in concepts ect (see post 394)? OK, define “concept” in exclusively physical terms (mass, volume etc.) * See post 369
Are you saying that Dennet says that private experiences exist but not in a physical sense? How does that differ from the pro-qualia side?
* Without qualia ( the experience provided by our senses ) all empirical data is impossible. Matter is implied by qualia. However, matter is a speculation ( tho a very certain one). Ironically, the eliminative’s definition of matter is not current. Quantum mechanics shows that matter violates the law of the excluded middle! Paraconsistent Logic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
The universe begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine.
James Jeans

 

[raw_thought]

Response to post 355
(Which as usual are only accusations without any evidence)
“Folk psychology” is a derogatory euphemism for common sense psychology. For example, “I left my wife because she no longer loves me” is an example of folk psychology. I addressed this before. Finding out that my wife no longer loves me is more useful info than that particular neurons are firing.
Why do you lie and say that I have not addressed the properties of qualia?
1. Publicity ( that private experiences are impossible) As I have repeatedly pointed out that means that experiences are public. In other words other people can see the triangle in my mind, which is obviously absurd.
2. Ineffability (see post 394)
3. Immediacy (see last part of post 305, smashing fingers) So you are saying that saying after smashing one’s fingers with a hammer, “ I think I am in agony. But I might be mistaken” makes sense?
305 also shows that Quining Qualia does not address the subject of this thread, the existence or non-existence of qualia.

 

[raw_thought]

To say words are meaningless is nonsensical. The apple still physically exists as various on off switches. Translation is key, meaning is only useful for us in order to convey ideas. To anything else just a bunch of on off switches would be meaningless without a translation or language to convey it as something useful.

Yes, to say that words are meaningless is nonsensical but that is the absurd conclusion an eliminative must reach.

 

[idav]

Yes, to say that words are meaningless is nonsensical but that is the absurd conclusion an eliminative must reach.

Meaning is a matter of perspective so it isn't really absurd. Words only have meaning because it was learned. Any pattern can be learned and translated as something meaningful.