Do qualia (feelings) exist?

[raw_thought]

Meaning is not absurd because qualia exist.* The physical can never be abstract and so therefore, concepts cannot be physical.
I agree! For meaning to exist there must be consciousness.
* Unfortunately, for the eliminative the abstract cannot exist and so therefore there can be no definitions for words.
Important see post 394

 

[Willamena]

Yes, to say that words are meaningless is nonsensical but that is the absurd conclusion an eliminative must reach.

But they don't, so your conclusion must be absurd.

 

[idav]

Meaning is not absurd because qualia exist.* The physical can never be abstract and so therefore, concepts cannot be physical.
I agree! For meaning to exist there must be consciousness.
* Unfortunately, for the eliminative the abstract cannot exist and so therefore there can be no definitions for words.
Important see post 394

Meaning matters very little to qualia.

You keep ignoring the fact that physicalism does account for non-material.

Qualia does exist but not in concrete form so I can say it doesn't exist at the same time. The question is how it exists, as non-material or physical? Well qualia is material and fleeting at that. Qualia is the result of a physical brain sensing physical things. When I feel cold it is because the brain is sensing something physically cold and further the feeling is a physical sensation.

 

[MD]

Meaning matters very little to qualia.

You keep ignoring the fact that physicalism does account for non-material.

Qualia does exist but not in concrete form so I can say it doesn't exist at the same time. The question is how it exists, as non-material or physical? Well qualia is material and fleeting at that. Qualia is the result of a physical brain sensing physical things. When I feel cold it is because the brain is sensing something physically cold and further the feeling is a physical sensation.

You tend to repeat your ridiculous assertions that qualia are physical 'processes' for years yet provide no real solution to how they can exist physically. Your explanation shines no light nor furthers the physicalist argument, it just shows that you are an incredibly stubborn person.

 

[idav]

You tend to repeat your ridiculous assertions that qualia are physical 'processes' for years yet provide no real solution to how they can exist physically. Your explanation shines no light nor furthers the physicalist argument, it just shows that you are an incredibly stubborn person.

The OP is stubborn as well and I am trying to make head or tails of the arguments. I don't agree completely with dennet but the OP is misrepresenting arguments from the material aspects.

Regardless, whenever I see proof that we can have feelings with no brain I will change my mind. Until then it is all physical processes due to a physical body.

And I am more than willing admit what is opininion vs what is fact as my theology is a matter of faith at the end of the day, I never say otherwise despite the fact that I debate certain opinions.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

An eliminative materialist would say that the Robin Williams character is not giving any useful knowledge...I say the opposite.

This is basically raw_thought's dispute with eliminativism in a nutshell-

"Nuh uh! Because... Well... Nuh uh!"

love (qualia)

No. Love is not necessarily an instance of qualia. Love is particular cognitive and behavioral patterns; even the dualist admits there is a physical basis to love, just as there is to any cognitive state or behavior. But maybe you think that, above and beyond these physical aspects which constitute love, there is some ineffable, magical aspect, floating around in QualiaLand, that adds some information over and above the physical... but simply thinking that, or appealing to how obvious it seems to you, doesn't constitute an argument. Here we are, how many pages into the thread, and the best argument for qualia we have is basically "I believe they exist, its just so obvious!".

 

[MD]

No. Love is not necessarily an instance of qualia. Love is particular cognitive and behavioral patterns; even the dualist admits there is a physical basis to love, just as there is to any cognitive state or behavior. But maybe you think that, above and beyond these physical aspects which constitute love, there is some ineffable, magical aspect, floating around in QualiaLand, that adds some information over and above the physical... but simply thinking that, or appealing to how obvious it seems to you, doesn't constitute an argument. Here we are, how many pages into the thread, and the best argument for qualia we have is basically "I believe they exist, its just so obvious!".

Love is qualia. There is a physical correlation to all qualia, but there are no such things as 'feelings' in physicalism. That's something you qualia deniers try to explain away, it's just a 'process'. How neurochemicals, which are just particles, produce FEELINGS or any perceptions whatsoever is something that is beyond physicalism completely. Accept it, when Christof Koch and VS Ramachandran admit that consciousness is not purely physical, when Pinker is a new mysterian, when Nagel writes each book denying physicalism, Dennett and Churchland fanboys should accept that they lost.

 

[MD]

The OP is stubborn as well and I am trying to make head or tails of the arguments. I don't agree completely with dennet but the OP is misrepresenting arguments from the material aspects.

Regardless, whenever I see proof that we can have feelings with no brain I will change my mind. Until then it is all physical processes due to a physical body.

And I am more than willing admit what is opininion vs what is fact as my theology is a matter of faith at the end of the day, I never say otherwise despite the fact that I debate certain opinions.

What a ridiculous argument. Making the claim that qualia are simply physical processes somehow spontaneously creating them is equal to saying that it exists on another plane. Both are unfalsifiable and both entail magic. That's why neutral monism exists. If you don't get that which you obviously haven't even after all this time it simply shows you have no idea what qualia really are.

 

[Willamena]

Love is qualia.

What it feels like to love is qualia, but "what love feels like" isn't all love is.

 

[idav]

Making the claim that qualia are simply physical processes somehow spontaneously creating them is equal to saying that it exists on another plane.

No absolutely not. Nowhere did I say it somehow spontaneously creates it. It is simply, as you stated, a physical process. You take the physical process away and no feeling will occur.

That's why neutral monism exists.

Yes I'm aware, not a bad idea.

I know what qualia are. BTW, Ramachandran said something to the effect that qualia is only in humans, doesn't exist except for our brains being highly evolved. He even named the parts of the brain responsible for human qualia and said bugs don't have qualia. So he is saying it is a result of the difference in our physical brain. I never heard him mention our brains being antennae for metaphysical realms.

 

[MD]

No absolutely not. Nowhere did I say it somehow spontaneously creates it. It is simply, as you stated, a physical process. You take the physical process away and no feeling will occur.


Yes I'm aware, not a bad idea.

I know what qualia are. BTW, Ramachandran said something to the effect that qualia is only in humans, doesn't exist except for our brains being highly evolved. He even named the parts of the brain responsible for human qualia and said bugs don't have qualia. So he is saying it is a result of the difference in our physical brain. I never heard him mention our brains being antennae for metaphysical realms.

Sigh we've had this debate before a few yrs ago and I even provided you with links showing that Ramachandran is a neutral monist . Saying something physically spontaneously arises is called strong emergence, it's how physicalism explains qualia. Strong emergence is garbage magic .

Here to again prove what I said to you in 2012

http://www.religiousforums.com/forum/philosophy/137615-can-physicalism-explain-qualia-5.html

Post #42

'VS Ramachandran
Probably one of the coolest and most famous neuroscientists. One of the best of the best. Noted in Time 2011 as one of the most influential people.

The Human Brain and Cosmic Mind | The Costa Rican Times

"V.S. Ramachandran, a brain scientist at the University of San Diego, says there may be a soul in the sense of “the universal spirit of the cosmos,” but the notion of “an immaterial spirit that occupies individual brains and that only evolved in humans is complete nonsense.” That sounds right."

From Times Higher Education - Astute critic or just a philistine caricature?

"Ramachandran is no professional philosopher. He accepts that his position on the mind-brain relation has not been thought through, just taken off the shelf as a pragmatic working model. The fascinating thing is his choice of model. Not the functionalism or physicalism normally associated with reductionist science, but Russell's "neutral monism", another link from Rama to Spinoza." '


I hate repeating myself to the same person.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Love is qualia.

Only if we ignore what qualia is defined as. Love is only qualia if love is nothing more than a subjective, private experiential quality. But even for someone who believes in qualia, it is clearly not only that, as Willemena points out, and as you even concede in your next sentence. Oops.

There is a physical correlation to all qualia, but there are no such things as 'feelings' in physicalism.

That completely depends on how one defines feelings. Do we have different cognitive states like love, fear, and so on? Sure. But are these states characterized by some non-material aspect such as qualia? That is what is in dispute.

That's something you qualia deniers try to explain away, it's just a 'process'. How neurochemicals, which are just particles, produce FEELINGS or any perceptions whatsoever is something that is beyond physicalism completely.

If you were trying to beg the question in the largest and most obvious possible way, you just did it. Congratulations, I guess? :clap

Accept it, when Christof Koch and VS Ramachandran admit that consciousness is not purely physical, when Pinker is a new mysterian, when Nagel writes each book denying physicalism, Dennett and Churchland fanboys should accept that they lost.

Yeah, because this is how philosophical and scientific controversies are decided. Are you just raw_thought's sock puppet account, or what?

 

[idav]

Sigh we've had this debate before a few yrs ago and I even provided you with links showing that Ramachandran is a neutral monist . Saying something physically spontaneously arises is called strong emergence, it's how physicalism explains qualia. Strong emergence is garbage magic .

No it isn't magic, far from it. Monists go by one substance and makes no difference to me if it is viewed as material or non-material.

http://www.religiousforums.com/forum/philosophy/137615-can-physicalism-explain-qualia-5.html

Post #42

Ramachandran is a monist as well which means there is only one substance to account for physics and consciousness.

Really with monism I don't have preference for material or non-material as I'm not really sure what "substance" virtual particles are made of.

Whats this all to do with qualia? Is qualia the fundamental consciousness of existence?

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Strong emergence is garbage magic

Wow. This guy isn't for real, he's clearly putting us on.

Good one, though.

 

[MD]

Wow. This guy isn't for real, he's clearly putting us on.

Good one, though.

For something to just POOF into existence like the experiences of color, emotions and peceptions from physical substrates is nothing short of magic. You can continue to live in your fantasy physicalist land with Dennett and Churchland.

 

[MD]

Only if we ignore what qualia is defined as. Love is only qualia if love is nothing more than a subjective, private experiential quality. But even for someone who believes in qualia, it is clearly not only that, as Willemena points out, and as you even concede in your next sentence. Oops.

Qualia is the experience of a physical sensation. It is perception.

That completely depends on how one defines feelings. Do we have different cognitive states like love, fear, and so on? Sure. But are these states characterized by some non-material aspect such as qualia? That is what is in dispute.

It's only in dispute by people like you, many others fully accept qualia as a valid separate aspect of cognitive states.

Yeah, because this is how philosophical and scientific controversies are decided. Are you just raw_thought's sock puppet account, or what?

Ad homs don't really work when your position is losing a debate, it just further weakens it.

 

[MD]

No it isn't magic, far from it. Monists go by one substance and makes no difference to me if it is viewed as material or non-material.

Ramachandran is a monist as well which means there is only one substance to account for physics and consciousness.

Really with monism I don't have preference for material or non-material as I'm not really sure what "substance" virtual particles are made of.

Whats this all to do with qualia? Is qualia the fundamental consciousness of existence?

There are physical monists and then tehre are neutral monists. Neutral monists don't ascribe to physicalism. You are a phsyicalist.

Qualia are a product of the mind, which is a separate property of the universe.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

For something to just POOF into existence like the experiences of color, emotions and peceptions from physical substrates is nothing short of magic.

Yeah, that's not just a slight strawman or anything.

You can continue to live in your fantasy physicalist land with Dennett and Churchland.

Oh, the irony... Someone who believes in inexplicable, unverifiable, immaterial, and, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable from fictional, entities is pointing the finger at other people for believing in magic or living in a fantasy world.

You are either completely shameless and without ANY sense of irony or self-awareness, or this is just a fairly elaborate joke.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Qualia is the experience of a physical sensation. It is perception.

You just can't make up your mind, can you? Which is it?

It's only in dispute by people like you

Physicalists? Yeah, that's generally who disputes the existence of non-physical entities. Very insightful.

many others fully accept qualia as a valid separate aspect of cognitive states.

Ok, we've now established that some people dispute that qualia exist, and others accept that they do. Glad we got that covered.

Ad homs don't really work when your position is losing a debate, it just further weakens it.

Given your obvious lack of ANY objectivity (or any desire for it) on this topic, your assessment of the state of the debate is rather worthless. Also, considering your posting habits, I'm genuinely curious whether you aren't actually raw_thought. I also notice that you didn't answer the question- are we to take your silence as confirmation? Why create the sock puppet account?

 

[Willamena]

Qualia is the experience of a physical sensation. It is perception.

It's only in dispute by people like you, many others fully accept qualia as a valid separate aspect of cognitive states.

Perception has been around for ages--why did we need a new word for it?