Divine Command Theory Defeated?

[Meow Mix]

One of the horns of Euthyphro's Dilemma often championed by theists is Divine Command Theory (DCT), which is described in brief as the notion that God is the sole arbiter of morality. A proponent of DCT would reply to the question, "Does God do good because it's good, or is it good because God does it?" with "It's good because God does it." In other words, there is no transcendental morality [to God]; only God's command to determine "good" from "evil."

This immediately implies that if God were to strike someone dead on the street then this act is "good," since God does it -- assuming DCT is true. Normally theists could draw from classical theodicies and say that God striking someone dead in the street could serve some ultimate good purpose even if we can't see it, so let me clarify a little further.

If God were to torture someone for the sake of torture -- purely to cause pain and suffering, with no ultimate purpose other than the person suffering and experiencing pain -- this would register as "good" if DCT is true. If I stopped my argument here, then I would be falling prey to the fallacy of arguing from adverse consequences, so bear with me while I get to my point.

We humans are arguably endowed with a sense of what's "good or evil" according to many theists and nontheists alike. With the semantics of what "good or evil" are left aside for some other discussion, many of us can agree that we have this sense or rational function, which I will henceforth call our "moral compass," even if our compasses don't always agree.

My moral compass tells me that anyone torturing for torture's sake -- even if God does it -- is not "good" whatsoever. Even if DCT were true, I could never subjectively agree that torture for torture's sake is "good."

I run into a conundrum then: if DCT is true, and my "moral compass" comes from God, then God has supplied me with at least one sense/rational function that isn't aimed at generating true beliefs. Assuming DCT is true, my "moral compass" is faulty since I mistakenly believe that God torturing for torture's sake would be "evil."

If God has endowed me with at least one rational function that isn't aimed at forming true beliefs, how can I be assured that ANY of my rational functions are aimed at forming true beliefs -- including arriving to the belief that DCT is true?

Using this Bayesian argument I aim to show that anyone who believes the following self-contradicts:
1) DCT is true
2) Our "moral compass" comes from God
3) God torturing for torture's sake is subjectively perceived as wrong or evil

If each of these beliefs is held by a person, they self-contradict because the person is admitting they have at least one rational function given by God which isn't aimed at generating true beliefs, and the question arises whether or not they can trust any of their rational functions.

Given that k is the notion that our mental faculties are aimed at generating true beliefs, and p is the notion that our mental faculties were given to us entirely by God, and q is the notion that at least one of our mental faculties (from p) is faulty in that it consistently generates at least one false belief (such as "God torturing for torture's sake is evil"), then we can make a Bayesian argument that Pr(k|p&q) is some low or inscrutable number. That is, the probability that k given p&q is some low or inscrutable number.*

What do you think?

(* - Avid readers of theological debates will recognize this line of argumentation from Alvin Plantinga's [in]famous argument against k given that "naturalism" is true and the human species evolved. He argues that Pr(k|E&N) is also some low or inscrutable number. While interesting, his argument would I suppose be better discussed in another thread.)

 

[YmirGF]

Fortunately though, divine command theory is drivel.

 

[Meow Mix]

Fortunately though, divine command theory is drivel.

I guess everyone else thinks so too, judging from the crickets chirping around here...

 

[YmirGF]

I guess everyone else thinks so too, judging from the crickets chirping around here...

I guess what puzzles me is why bother debunking something that would never be accepted by those who believe in it? Um, what's the point?

 

[Meow Mix]

I guess what puzzles me is why bother debunking something that would never be accepted by those who believe in it? Um, what's the point?

Because people believe things all the time without realizing it's self-contradictory. For instance the logical positivism movement in philosophy had loads of people thinking logical positivism was the way to go, blissfully unaware that it contained a fatal self-contradiction.

Likewise when Frege published his book on the logical foundations of mathematics and Russell cut the feet out from under it by revealing a paradox in its foundations, now famously called Russell's Paradox.

 

[YmirGF]

Because people believe things all the time without realizing it's self-contradictory. For instance the logical positivism movement in philosophy had loads of people thinking logical positivism was the way to go, blissfully unaware that it contained a fatal self-contradiction.

Likewise when Frege published his book on the logical foundations of mathematics and Russell cut the feet out from under it by revealing a paradox in its foundations, now famously called Russell's Paradox.

Hehe... One of my first posts on RF was about sorting through contradictory beliefs. It is a subject that is near and dear to my heart.

If you are interested, this was the post. The mind of a child

 

[Fatihah]

One of the horns of Euthyphro's Dilemma often championed by theists is Divine Command Theory (DCT), which is described in brief as the notion that God is the sole arbiter of morality. A proponent of DCT would reply to the question, "Does God do good because it's good, or is it good because God does it?" with "It's good because God does it." In other words, there is no transcendental morality [to God]; only God's command to determine "good" from "evil."

This immediately implies that if God were to strike someone dead on the street then this act is "good," since God does it -- assuming DCT is true. Normally theists could draw from classical theodicies and say that God striking someone dead in the street could serve some ultimate good purpose even if we can't see it, so let me clarify a little further.

If God were to torture someone for the sake of torture -- purely to cause pain and suffering, with no ultimate purpose other than the person suffering and experiencing pain -- this would register as "good" if DCT is true. If I stopped my argument here, then I would be falling prey to the fallacy of arguing from adverse consequences, so bear with me while I get to my point.

We humans are arguably endowed with a sense of what's "good or evil" according to many theists and nontheists alike. With the semantics of what "good or evil" are left aside for some other discussion, many of us can agree that we have this sense or rational function, which I will henceforth call our "moral compass," even if our compasses don't always agree.

My moral compass tells me that anyone torturing for torture's sake -- even if God does it -- is not "good" whatsoever. Even if DCT were true, I could never subjectively agree that torture for torture's sake is "good."

I run into a conundrum then: if DCT is true, and my "moral compass" comes from God, then God has supplied me with at least one sense/rational function that isn't aimed at generating true beliefs. Assuming DCT is true, my "moral compass" is faulty since I mistakenly believe that God torturing for torture's sake would be "evil."

If God has endowed me with at least one rational function that isn't aimed at forming true beliefs, how can I be assured that ANY of my rational functions are aimed at forming true beliefs -- including arriving to the belief that DCT is true?

Using this Bayesian argument I aim to show that anyone who believes the following self-contradicts:
1) DCT is true
2) Our "moral compass" comes from God
3) God torturing for torture's sake is subjectively perceived as wrong or evil

If each of these beliefs is held by a person, they self-contradict because the person is admitting they have at least one rational function given by God which isn't aimed at generating true beliefs, and the question arises whether or not they can trust any of their rational functions.

Given that k is the notion that our mental faculties are aimed at generating true beliefs, and p is the notion that our mental faculties were given to us entirely by God, and q is the notion that at least one of our mental faculties (from p) is faulty in that it consistently generates at least one false belief (such as "God torturing for torture's sake is evil"), then we can make a Bayesian argument that Pr(k|p&q) is some low or inscrutable number. That is, the probability that k given p&q is some low or inscrutable number.*

What do you think?

(* - Avid readers of theological debates will recognize this line of argumentation from Alvin Plantinga's [in]famous argument against k given that "naturalism" is true and the human species evolved. He argues that Pr(k|E&N) is also some low or inscrutable number. While interesting, his argument would I suppose be better discussed in another thread.)

Response: I can not speak for other religions, but in islam, since Allah(swt) is the originator of creation, then naturally, what is good and what is evil is originated by Allah. Then from this, nature and logic is created. Thus mankind did not have the authority as to what is good or bad, but rather there understanding of what's good and bad is naturally embedded into the souls of every human, to which our nature acts in accordance.

 

[Meow Mix]

Response: I can not speak for other religions, but in islam, since Allah(swt) is the originator of creation, then naturally, what is good and what is evil is originated by Allah. Then from this, nature and logic is created. Thus mankind did not have the authority as to what is good or bad, but rather there understanding of what's good and bad is naturally embedded into the souls of every human, to which our nature acts in accordance.

That seems to imply that my argument affects this conception of Islam then, since you are essentially saying that according to this standpoint all the premises of my argument apply. DCT appears to be true according to this and our moral compasses are God-given.

In that case, do you subjectively believe that God torturing for torture's sake would be "good," or would it be "evil?"

If you would have a subjective problem with it then my argument immediately applies.

 

[Fatihah]

That seems to imply that my argument affects this conception of Islam then, since you are essentially saying that according to this standpoint all the premises of my argument apply. DCT appears to be true according to this and our moral compasses are God-given.

In that case, do you subjectively believe that God torturing for torture's sake would be "good," or would it be "evil?"

If you would have a subjective problem with it then my argument immediately applies.

Response: If torturing for torture's sake means to torture for the fun of it with no other purpose, then yes it is evil.

 

[Copernicus]

That seems to imply that my argument affects this conception of Islam then, since you are essentially saying that according to this standpoint all the premises of my argument apply. DCT appears to be true according to this and our moral compasses are God-given.

Well, there certainly are Muslims who believe that mass murder is good if done to further Allah's purposes. George Tiller certainly believed that his act of murder was a good thing. It seems to me that DCT underlies a lot of the evil that has been committed in the name of God's authority.

Response: If torturing for torture's sake means to torture for the fun of it with no other purpose, then yes it is evil.

But not if that is what God wants. The only way around this is to have faith that God does not want what we consider to be evil, yet those who commit evil may believe that they are doing a good thing it in God's name.

 

[MSizer]

Yeah, I've discussed weak vs. strong DCT vs. natural law before, and there are as many interpretations as there are members. The interesting thing is that people who study philosophy of religion often know far more about religious moral theories than religious people do themselves, and you only end up talking in circles with them.

Some theologians try to address the euthyphro dialogue by saying it is a false dilemma—perfect goodness is an essential part of His character, not something outside Him. God indeed commands things which are good, but the reason they are good is because they reflect God’s own nature. So the goodness does not come ultimately from God’s commandments, but from His nature, which then results in good commandments.

They're reducing god to something undefinable by stretching his traits this way and that, but of course, they only see this as part of his almightieness.

As I always say, theology is like tennis without a net.

 

[Fatihah]

But not if that is what God wants. The only way around this is to have faith that God does not want what we consider to be evil, yet those who commit evil may believe that they are doing a good thing it in God's name.

Response: If God wants to torture for the fun of it, then it is evil. If you say it's not, then exactly what is your definition of evil?

 

[MSizer]

Response: If God wants to torture for the fun of it, then it is evil. If you say it's not, then exactly what is your definition of evil?

So god has the capacity to commit evil?

 

[Fatihah]

So god has the capacity to commit evil?

Response: God has the ability to create evil, yet God is incapable of performing the ability. An example would be you and the idea of killing your mother. You have the ability to do so, yet your compassion won't allow you to.

 

[Meow Mix]

Yeah, I've discussed weak vs. strong DCT vs. natural law before, and there are as many interpretations as there are members. The interesting thing is that people who study philosophy of religion often know far more about religious moral theories than religious people do themselves, and you only end up talking in circles with them.

Some theologians try to address the euthyphro dialogue by saying it is a false dilemma—perfect goodness is an essential part of His character, not something outside Him. God indeed commands things which are good, but the reason they are good is because they reflect God’s own nature. So the goodness does not come ultimately from God’s commandments, but from His nature, which then results in good commandments.

They're reducing god to something undefinable by stretching his traits this way and that, but of course, they only see this as part of his almightieness.

As I always say, theology is like tennis without a net.

[Emphasis added by me]

Have you read my Transcendental Argument Against the Existence of God? I believe it addresses the underlined theistic response. I know my article discusses identity rather than a transcendental morality, but it's easy to see how the underlined theistic response fails in the same respect.

And LOL @ theology being like tennis without a net.

Someone, I don't know who, said: "Theology is like looking in a dark basement for a black cat that isn't even there."

 

[Copernicus]

Response: If God wants to torture for the fun of it, then it is evil. If you say it's not, then exactly what is your definition of evil?

I say nothing of the sort. Religious morality assumes that moral behavior cannot be defined independently of God's will. Therefore, God can command the faithful to commit acts that they might find subjectively repugnant but which must be good if God commands them. Because people of strong religious faith accept the DCT, and some of strong faith will suffer the delusion that God commands acts that others--perhaps the majority of humanity--consider evil, religion can actually be used to undermine human morality. Hence, you get terrorists piloting airliners into skyscrapers full of people. That is, they can be induced to commit mass murder because of the DCT, which underpins religious morality.

Response: God has the ability to create evil, yet God is incapable of performing the ability. An example would be you and the idea of killing your mother. You have the ability to do so, yet your compassion won't allow you to.

You keep confusing God with ordinary human beings. You cannot claim to understand the motives of God, who is supposed to be beyond your understanding. So, if you believe that God wants you to override your compassion--whether to commit acts of mass murder or individual torture--you will do it, right? Just the same, you believe that God will not choose to make you behave that way, because you claim to understand God's nature well enough to know otherwise.

 

[Fatihah]

You keep confusing God with ordinary human beings. You cannot claim to understand the motives of God, who is supposed to be beyond your understanding. So, if you believe that God wants you to override your compassion--whether to commit acts of mass murder or individual torture--you will do it, right? Just the same, you believe that God will not choose to make you behave that way, because you claim to understand God's nature well enough to know otherwise.

Response: To the contrary, I can claim the motives of God. Evidence to that is the fact that I just did. Sorry, but you don't possess any authority to enforce what I can and can't do.

I also never stated that I believe that God wants me to override my compassion, thus your question has no relevance.

 

[Copernicus]

Response: To the contrary, I can claim the motives of God. Evidence to that is the fact that I just did. Sorry, but you don't possess any authority to enforce what I can and can't do.

OK, you claim to understand God's motives. Most theists I've met usually don't go that far, but perhaps they lack the ego for it. Let's take another look at what triggered my comment:

God has the ability to create evil, yet God is incapable of performing the ability. An example would be you and the idea of killing your mother. You have the ability to do so, yet your compassion won't allow you to.

First of all, you contradict yourself. Either God has the ability to create evil, or he doesn't. If his nature prevents him from creating it, then he has no such ability. Nevertheless, he created everything that exists. Evil exists. Therefore, he created evil in spite of his alleged inability to do so. You keep jumping back and forth between God the all-powerful and God the limited being, and that leads you into these contradictory positions.

I also never stated that I believe that God wants me to override my compassion, thus your question has no relevance.

You have completely missed the point. This is a hypothetical question. In principle, God could order you to commit any kind of atrocity, and you would do it if you believed that to be God's command. Now, you personally do not believe that God wants you to do such a thing. Not at this time anyway. However, there are other people who do believe that God wants them to do such things, and history is full of cases where every kind of atrocity has been committed in God's name. That is because religious zealots believe in DCT. The belief that God alone defines good and bad is what ultimately allows religious morality to undermine human morality.

 

[Fatihah]

OK, you claim to understand God's motives. Most theists I've met usually don't go that far, but perhaps they lack the ego for it. Let's take another look at what triggered my comment:

First of all, you contradict yourself. Either God has the ability to create evil, or he doesn't. If his nature prevents him from creating it, then he has no such ability. Nevertheless, he created everything that exists. Evil exists. Therefore, he created evil in spite of his alleged inability to do so. You keep jumping back and forth between God the all-powerful and God the limited being, and that leads you into these contradictory positions.



You have completely missed the point. This is a hypothetical question. In principle, God could order you to commit any kind of atrocity, and you would do it if you believed that to be God's command. Now, you personally do not believe that God wants you to do such a thing. Not at this time anyway. However, there are other people who do believe that God wants them to do such things, and history is full of cases where every kind of atrocity has been committed in God's name. That is because religious zealots believe in DCT. The belief that God alone defines good and bad is what ultimately allows religious morality to undermine human morality.

Response: First off, there is no contradiction, but rather a misreading on your part. I clearly stated that God has the ability. It's written in black and white. When someone says "have" or "has", it means posession. Thus I am saying that Allah(swt) posseses an ability to create evil, yet Allah's(swt) mercy and compassion prevents Him from using his ability. That's not a contradiction. A contradiction would be if I said that he does posses an ability then said that he doesn't. I rather said that Allah posses an ability in which He can not perform. If a person has the ability to drive and yet they posses no car, does that mean that they no longer posses the ability to drive? No. They still posses the ability, but without a car, they can not perform their ability. The same is for Allah, who has the ability to create evil, but his mercy and compassion prevents Him from performing his ability. Again, there is no contradiction.

Secondly, if your point is hypothetical, this is the first time you've said so, which is why it was never tooken to be hypothetical.

 

[McBell]

Response: God has the ability to create evil, yet God is incapable of performing the ability. An example would be you and the idea of killing your mother. You have the ability to do so, yet your compassion won't allow you to.

So Allah is not all powerful then?