Discussion Thread for Tarasan & Meow on TD

[Meow Mix]

Yep, here's where everyone can comment and ask questions and whatnot.

 

[LuisDantas]

I agree that Plantinga's argument is circular. From what I understand of a Christian perspective, the classic claim is that humans have free will and therefore, unlike angels, are capable of evil.

I don't think this explains anything, however. Free Will is ultimately a meaningless concept, defined itself as being the reason why evil is a possible choice for humans. It slips of the tongue of many people, but I have yet to see anyone who seems to have an idea of what it means. Nor is it at all obvious why beings of free will must exist, or how angels can fall despite lacking free will.

 

[Willamena]

why is Plantinga's "significant freedom" as he's so defined it -- the capacity to commit suffering-causing actions -- benevolent? It's only assumed that "significant freedom" is benevolent without argument and without considerations for other states of affairs in which beings can be free without allowing for negative states of suffering such as, for instance, innocent victims.

It’s not the capacity to commit suffering-causing actions that is “significant freedom” —that avoids the argument with a particular (a form of unspecial pleading, perhaps?) —it is the capacity to commit actions that is “significant freedom”. That “significant freedom” is benevolent contrasts to God’s control of our choices, which would be malevolent, and rests on the pride of ego that we all possess. It’s not assumed in a vacuum, it is philosophically grounded in “personal identity” and arguments of “agency,” and psychologically grounded in the “integrity of self.”

Now, pride cometh before a fall, but that’s another story.

Do you see the inherent assumption that "significant freedom" is the state of being capable of performing evil actions?

Any actions. That this must include evil actions in order for us to be wholly free is Plantinga’s argument. If the big guy’s preventing any action, then by definition he isn’t giving “these creatures” freedom.

 

[Meow Mix]

I agree that Plantinga's argument is circular. From what I understand of a Christian perspective, the classic claim is that humans have free will and therefore, unlike angels, are capable of evil.

I don't think this explains anything, however. Free Will is ultimately a meaningless concept, defined itself as being the reason why evil is a possible choice for humans. It slips of the tongue of many people, but I have yet to see anyone who seems to have an idea of what it means. Nor is it at all obvious why beings of free will must exist, or how angels can fall despite lacking free will.

The point, though, is that free will is prima facie possible without the capacity to commit evil. If you were to attempt to stab your neighbor and your knife turned to silly putty, are you less free than being unable to physically walk on your ceiling?

 

[Meow Mix]

Any actions. That this must include evil actions in order for us to be wholly free is Plantinga’s argument. If the big guy’s preventing any action, then by definition he isn’t giving “these creatures” freedom.

Why does the possibility of God preventing (through physics) the capacity to stab someone infringe our free will more than God preventing (through physics) the capacity to walk on the ceiling?

 

[Willamena]

Why does the possibility of God preventing (through physics) the capacity to stab someone infringe our free will more than God preventing (through physics) the capacity to walk on the ceiling?

For one thing, if it's physics preventing then it's not God preventing, but that's another story, too.

If God prevents the existence of freedom, then he is not allowing the existence of freedom (that's true of any of us). "The possibility that God can prevent" means the possibility of prevention happening, and that means the possibility of no freedom. It's that simple.

 

[Meow Mix]

I agree that Plantinga's argument is circular. From what I understand of a Christian perspective, the classic claim is that humans have free will and therefore, unlike angels, are capable of evil.

I don't think this explains anything, however. Free Will is ultimately a meaningless concept, defined itself as being the reason why evil is a possible choice for humans. It slips of the tongue of many people, but I have yet to see anyone who seems to have an idea of what it means. Nor is it at all obvious why beings of free will must exist, or how angels can fall despite lacking free will.

It's assumed prima facie that having free will is better than not. The PoE works even if the skeptic doesn't believe free will makes any sense, though, since all they're doing is taking the opponent's presuppositions and showing therein lies a contradiction somewhere.

Edit: Also I just noticed I already responded. Must have been drunk

 

[Meow Mix]

For one thing, if it's physics preventing then it's not God preventing, but that's another story, too.

Physics are contingent, which would mean the creator God set them up to be the way they are. Thus God is culpable for suffering that arises through physics in the same sense that an electrician is culpable for knowing negligence that leads to a fire.

If God prevents the existence of freedom, then he is not allowing the existence of freedom (that's true of any of us). "The possibility that God can prevent" means the possibility of prevention happening, and that means the possibility of no freedom. It's that simple.

I'm really not sure what you're saying here. I'm not talking about God directly infringing our free will. Does God making physics such that we can't walk on the ceiling a direct infringement of our free will? Are we not free agents because we can't pass through walls at will? Both of these things could have been the case, but ostensibly God set up the world such that we couldn't.

Now, why would God setting up the world such that knives turned to silly putty when they're attempted to be stabbed through someone's kidney somehow be an infringement on our free wills more so than God setting up the world such that we can't walk on the underside of clouds?

This is Plantinga's not-so-hidden assumption: that somehow, moral ramifications are required for free will. Or, we can look at it like this: he's making two claims rather than one when he says God wanted to create "significant freedom."

One, that beings have free will; and two, that beings can create innocent victims of one another so moral culpability exists.

But I think it's a false idea that innocent victims must exist for moral culpability, and I think it's pretty circular to attempt to explain that innocent victims are compatible with omnibenevolence by presupposing God wanted the capacity for innocent victims is good. No such argument is made that shows why this is a good thing. The existence of free will is supposedly good, though I'm sure there are some who'd argue against that (that isn't my interest), I'm pointing out a spot where Plantinga makes a bad assumption and never defends it.

 

[Sunstone]

I agree that Plantinga's argument is circular. From what I understand of a Christian perspective, the classic claim is that humans have free will and therefore, unlike angels, are capable of evil.

I don't think this explains anything, however. Free Will is ultimately a meaningless concept, defined itself as being the reason why evil is a possible choice for humans. It slips of the tongue of many people, but I have yet to see anyone who seems to have an idea of what it means. Nor is it at all obvious why beings of free will must exist, or how angels can fall despite lacking free will.

Jeebers! I completely agree with you here, Luis. Specifically, I have yet to see an adequate description of free will. Ever.

 

[Willamena]

Physics are contingent, which would mean the creator God set them up to be the way they are. Thus God is culpable for suffering that arises through physics in the same sense that an electrician is culpable for knowing negligence that leads to a fire.



I'm really not sure what you're saying here. I'm not talking about God directly infringing our free will. Does God making physics such that we can't walk on the ceiling a direct infringement of our free will? Are we not free agents because we can't pass through walls at will? Both of these things could have been the case, but ostensibly God set up the world such that we couldn't.

Now, why would God setting up the world such that knives turned to silly putty when they're attempted to be stabbed through someone's kidney somehow be an infringement on our free wills more so than God setting up the world such that we can't walk on the underside of clouds?

This is Plantinga's not-so-hidden assumption: that somehow, moral ramifications are required for free will. Or, we can look at it like this: he's making two claims rather than one when he says God wanted to create "significant freedom."

One, that beings have free will; and two, that beings can create innocent victims of one another so moral culpability exists.

But I think it's a false idea that innocent victims must exist for moral culpability, and I think it's pretty circular to attempt to explain that innocent victims are compatible with omnibenevolence by presupposing God wanted the capacity for innocent victims is good. No such argument is made that shows why this is a good thing. The existence of free will is supposedly good, though I'm sure there are some who'd argue against that (that isn't my interest), I'm pointing out a spot where Plantinga makes a bad assumption and never defends it.

I'm talking about definition, which is informed by identity. This is what I see Plantinga's argument hinging on.

 

[Meow Mix]

I'm talking about definition, which is informed by identity. This is what I see Plantinga's argument hinging on.

Well, going back to your original objection about Plantinga harping on any prohibition of action through physics, the point is though that even if this is Plantinga's point (that it would be malevolent for God to limit our choices through physics) then he loses anyway since this is already the case.

We can't walk on the ceiling, we can't walk through walls. But we can stab someone.

What if we could walk on ceilings but not stab someone?

 

[Willamena]

Well, going back to your original objection about Plantinga harping on any prohibition of action through physics, the point is though that even if this is Plantinga's point (that it would be malevolent for God to limit our choices through physics) then he loses anyway since this is already the case.

Um, what? I wasn't representing Platinga in anything like that.

I think I'll just shut up now.

We can't walk on the ceiling, we can't walk through walls. But we can stab someone.

What if we could walk on ceilings but not stab someone?

Perhaps the difference is that Platinga's argument address the real (i.e. possible) world?

 

[Songbird]

I agree that Plantinga's argument is circular. From what I understand of a Christian perspective, the classic claim is that humans have free will and therefore, unlike angels, are capable of evil.

I don't think this explains anything, however. Free Will is ultimately a meaningless concept, defined itself as being the reason why evil is a possible choice for humans. It slips of the tongue of many people, but I have yet to see anyone who seems to have an idea of what it means. Nor is it at all obvious why beings of free will must exist, or how angels can fall despite lacking free will.

Do you know of any philosophers who take on Plantinga's free will arguments? I'm new to this area.

 

[Meow Mix]

Do you know of any philosophers who take on Plantinga's free will arguments? I'm new to this area.

Sadly, not many. A lot of opponents of TD simply bring up the evidential problem of evil rather than attempting to refute TD. That isn't to say that others haven't tried, but I don't follow it too much since it seems obvious enough to me why TD fails.

I'm sure it's probably because he's a busy guy and the subject is complex enough to require a lot of typing and thought, but Plantinga will respond to me on a lot of other things when I email him but when I bring up my objection to TD I never get a response, or I'd be taking this up with the man himself.

I'm not implying he's purposely ignoring it as if he has something to hide -- I've brought up other debates to him that he hasn't responded to, and I notice the chance that he'll respond is inversely proportional to the amount of time he'd have to invest in it. I wish he would take the time to respond to it though because I feel it's an important objection that other philosophers who have a name for themselves (and whom Plantinga would probably consider "worth his time") aren't raising my objection.

 

[Songbird]

Sadly, not many. A lot of opponents of TD simply bring up the evidential problem of evil rather than attempting to refute TD. That isn't to say that others haven't tried, but I don't follow it too much since it seems obvious enough to me why TD fails.

I'm sure it's probably because he's a busy guy and the subject is complex enough to require a lot of typing and thought, but Plantinga will respond to me on a lot of other things when I email him but when I bring up my objection to TD I never get a response, or I'd be taking this up with the man himself.

I'm not implying he's purposely ignoring it as if he has something to hide -- I've brought up other debates to him that he hasn't responded to, and I notice the chance that he'll respond is inversely proportional to the amount of time he'd have to invest in it. I wish he would take the time to respond to it though because I feel it's an important objection that other philosophers who have a name for themselves (and whom Plantinga would probably consider "worth his time") aren't raising my objection.

I sense a book in your future....? The dearth of lesbolicious philosophers who counter TD is a niche in the making. Seriously, it would be nice to hear exhaustive arguments against it.

And sadly I have the same inverse ratio of replying to people.

 

[Meow Mix]

Um, what? I wasn't representing Platinga in anything like that.

I think I'll just shut up now.

That's what your first post looked like... you were talking about God infringing freedoms at all, which in the context of my post would be via physics. What did you mean by your first post then? I wasn't sure what you meant by definition and Plantinga's argument hinging on it, so I was just confused in general by what you meant.

Perhaps the difference is that Platinga's argument address the real (i.e. possible) world?

Plantinga's argument is couched in possible world terms though, and so isn't only addressing the actual world. The idea of TD is that Leibniz made a mistake in asserting that God can create the best possible world and that this is it; Plantinga's argument is that God is unable to create the best possible world and that this is as close as God could get thanks to free agency mucking it up.

 

[Meow Mix]

I sense a book in your future....? The dearth of lesbolicious philosophers who counter TD is a niche in the making. Seriously, it would be nice to hear exhaustive arguments against it.

And sadly I have the same inverse ratio of replying to people.

Haha. I would so make that my signature.

"The dearth of lesbolicious philosophers who counter TD is a niche in the making." -- Songbird.

Yeah. That's music to my eyes

 

[Willamena]

Plantinga's argument is couched in possible world terms though, and so isn't only addressing the actual world. The idea of TD is that Leibniz made a mistake in asserting that God can create the best possible world and that this is it; Plantinga's argument is that God is unable to create the best possible world and that this is as close as God could get thanks to free agency mucking it up.

There cannot be a possible world that differs radically from the actual world. Part of the definition of possible is that it cannot preclude fact. If we preclude fact, it's an impossible world.

 

[Meow Mix]

There cannot be a possible world that differs radically from the actual world. Part of the definition of possible is that it cannot preclude fact. If we preclude fact, it's an impossible world.

This is ignoring the point of possible world modality/semantics, also it's simply false. Nothing logically precludes the actual existence of a possible world in which gravity falls up or in which my keyboard is pink -- but that's not what's being argued here, nor does it have to be in order for possible world semantics to be useful. It's just a way of differentiating necessity from possibility and contingency: "necessary" means true in every possible world, possibly means it's possibly true or false in some possible world.

 

[Willamena]

This is ignoring the point of possible world modality/semantics, also it's simply false. Nothing logically precludes the actual existence of a possible world in which gravity falls up or in which my keyboard is pink -- but that's not what's being argued here, nor does it have to be in order for possible world semantics to be useful. It's just a way of differentiating necessity from possibility and contingency: "necessary" means true in every possible world, possibly means it's possibly true or false in some possible world.

Hey, *raises hands* ... If you want to include anything as possible, okay, but that's not a conversation I'm going to participate in.

Carry on.