Determinism

[Kungfuzed]

Perhaps someone could give us an example of a choice that was not the result of previous causes.

 

[Willamena]

Perhaps someone could give us an example of a choice that was not the result of previous causes.

The choice that is made is irrelevant; it is the act of choosing that matters, and that has no known cause although it does have influences. This is why we are called "irrational beings," and is even a quality admired by some (like Dr. McCoy on Star Trek).

It is the act that matters. That is, what is wilful: wilful action. Subjective activity. Previous acts are irrelevant to the singular act that happens in this moment.

When we describe the causes and effects of actions we look at things that cause other things. This is an objective view.

When we talk about wilful acts, we mean that a subject intended for something to happen. We look at it from one person's view. This is a subjective view.

 

[Willamena]

I am saying that in stating "we are in control of our actions" you are admitting a causal link between ourselves and our actions (in other words cause and effect).

Only if you put the emphasis on "control" instead of on "we."

If we are in control of our actions, which subjectively means "we do things," then the line between cause and effect is blurred, because there is effectively no division between us and the things we do; between us and the activity of our minds.

Godlike, are you listening? If the subject/object divide is the divide between us and them (it's not), then the fallacy of it casts doubt on everything we do. It really is something else.

I am saying that since we cause our actions, there must be something that causes us to cause our action and therefore we cannot be in control of anything. If you say that we are caused to cause our action yet we are in control then I would argue that this would have to apply to any cause so all causes control their effects regardless of human input.

There are things that influence us in our actions, but that's not the same. There are things that drive us towards certain outcomes, but that's not the same. Self determination is the thing. It means a) that we take responsibility for what happens as a result of what we consciously participate in, and b) more importantly, that we take responsibility for what happens as a result of what we consciously participate in.

The beauty of it is, if you insist on looking at it objectively, then there is no hope of understanding it.

 

[Ozzie]

Only if you put the emphasis on "control" instead of on "we."

If we are in control of our actions, which subjectively means "we do things," then the line between cause and effect is blurred, because there is effectively no division between us and the things we do; between us and the activity of our minds.

Godlike, are you listening? If the subject/object divide is the divide between us and them (it's not), then the fallacy of it casts doubt on everything we do. It really is something else.

There are things that influence us in our actions, but that's not the same. There are things that drive us towards certain outcomes, but that's not the same. Self determination is the thing. It means a) that we take responsibility for what happens as a result of what we consciously participate in, and b) more importantly, that we take responsibility for what happens as a result of what we consciously participate in.

The beauty of it is, if you insist on looking at it objectively, then there is no hope of understanding it.

Free will and determinism are opposed right? But this is conflict of ideas occurring in your head. Subjectivity demands free will or so it seems. As events unfold your notion of free will unfolds, unless you adopt a predictive stance and attempt to (falsely) determine events in order to justify your personally held construct of a subjective life.

 

[Willamena]

Free will and determinism are opposed right? But this is conflict of ideas occurring in your head. Subjectivity demands free will or so it seems. As events unfold your notion of free will unfolds, unless you adopt a predictive stance and attempt to (falsely) determine events in order to justify your personally held construct of a subjective life.

Free will and determinism are not as opposed as people would like to believe. One (determinism) is an objective view that describes the flow of causes and effects, the other (free will) is "us, doing things"; it is only when you try to look at free will objectively that it loses all meaning, as it no longer fits into the scheme of things.

It's like trying to explain a crescent moon by getting up on the moon's surface and describing what you see around you. It simply isn't there.

 

[Ozzie]

Free will and determinism are not as opposed as people would like to believe. One (determinism) is an objective view that describes the flow of causes and effects, the other (free will) is "us, doing things"; it is only when you try to look at free will objectively that it loses all meaning, as it no longer fits into the scheme of things.

It's like trying to explain a crescent moon by getting up on the moon's surface and describing what you see around you. It simply isn't there.

Your position assumes the free will as a subjective reality. Determinism is more than an "objective" view. Rather it can be construed as a mechanism whereby a subjective free will with appropriately determined qualities ( omniscience, omnipotence) might have constructed the world as it is perceived and the universe as it is known.

There is a clash between free will and determinism both objectively examined.

 

[Quiddity]

I am saying that in stating "we are in control of our actions" you are admitting a causal link between ourselves and our actions (in other words cause and effect).

I am saying that since we cause our actions, there must be something that causes us to cause our action and therefore we cannot be in control of anything. If you say that we are caused to cause our action yet we are in control then I would argue that this would have to apply to any cause so all causes control their effects regardless of human input.

"Us" is who causes the action. We are the initiators. Nothing causes us, we cause things.

Are we in tune now? Or are we still talking about different things?

 

[Willamena]

Your position assumes the free will as a subjective reality. Determinism is more than an "objective" view. Rather it can be construed as a mechanism whereby a subjective free will with appropriately determined qualities ( omniscience, omnipotence) might have constructed the world as it is perceived and the universe as it is known.

There is a clash between free will and determinism both objectively examined.

Free will objectively examined effectively vanishes; it becomes the flow of cause and effect. It becomes determinism: a phone rings, a person picks it up, the ringing phone caused the person to pick it up. Let's insert an objective "free will" into that flow: a phone rings, free will is triggered, a person picks it up, free will caused the person to pick it up. Free will viewed objectively is a thing in the flow of cause and effect.

Subjectively, it is not a thing separate from the person, me --it is me, doing things: The phone rings, I pick it up. My will is done; my will is me, doing things. That is why it is impossible to examine free will objectively, do you see? Objectively, it is determinism.

The term "subjective reality" is kind of meaningless. Reality is objective; as such, it can be viewed either objectively or subjectively, often at the same time. Some things in reality are only apparent when viewed subjectively, but that's a different thing. Subjectively, the objective "reality" becomes the realness that we participate in, present tense.

 

[Fluffy]

Only if you put the emphasis on "control" instead of on "we."

I do not understand why the emphasis is pertinent to my claim that "we are in control of our actions" admits a causal link between ourselves and actions. It seems as if regardless of where the emphasis is placed, the link is still evident.

If we are in control of our actions, which subjectively means "we do things," then the line between cause and effect is blurred, because there is effectively no division between us and the things we do; between us and the activity of our minds.

That there is division between the activity of our mind and our "self" is not something I disagree with. In fact, my rebuttal applies regardless of whether this is the case. If it is not the case, the "self" simply takes the part of another event in the chain. If it is then the "self" is simply the mental activity that we have already admitted to be part of the chain.

The chain looks like one of the following:
External influences --> The "self" --> mental processes --> action
External influences --> mental processes aka the "self" --> action

I have skipped several steps in the chain for simplicity but you get the general idea. I am not arguing that any of these specific steps are necessary parts of my rebuttal but if my opponent appears to believe in the "self", a concept to which I am fairly sure I would disagree with, then I am hardly going to derail the debate by contending this seperate point when it is irrelevant.

There are things that influence us in our actions, but that's not the same. There are things that drive us towards certain outcomes, but that's not the same.

You haven't yet shown why these influences are different from our influence on our actions. Or to put it more simply, you haven't shown why our position in the chain is free to decide the next event in the chain whilst any other event is not.

Self determination is the thing. It means a) that we take responsibility for what happens as a result of what we consciously participate in, and b) more importantly, that we take responsibility for what happens as a result of what we consciously participate in.

Taking responsibility has got nothing to do with free will. I can take responsibility regardless of whether I have free will or not. It is not indicative of self determination and self determination would represent an oddity requiring explanation in a chain otherwise devoid of such a phenomena. Why not argue, for example, and since we do not observe it, that cause and effect is an illusion and the actions of our bodies are self determined, only coincidentally cohering with our thoughts?

The beauty of it is, if you insist on looking at it objectively, then there is no hope of understanding it.

I do not deny that a person can feel as if he has free will even though he does not. This subjective sensation does not constitute free will.

Regardless I do not understand what you mean by looking at something objectively.

"Us" is who causes the action. We are the initiators. Nothing causes us, we cause things.

Are we in tune now? Or are we still talking about different things?

The dialogue is difficult because you and I mean different things by "self" (I think) but it shouldn't matter too much because I am arguing that free will is not coherent and so regardless of the definition of self, it will still fail to hold.

Lets say you have the choice between A and B and you chose A. I ask you "what caused you to choose A?". You might respond, as you have done above, and say "nothing caused me to choose A" to which I would reply "then your choice between A and B was random and so you had no control over that choice".

Perhaps it might illustrate it better to consider the following: A rock is on the top of a hill and one day tumbles down the slope to the bottom. I ask "What caused the rock to tumble to the bottom of the slope?" and you might reply "Nothing caused the rock to tumble to the bottom of the slope". In this hypothetical scenario, the rock's fall must therefore be random since it was uncaused.

 

[Valjean]

An atom of a radioactive element will always eject an atomic particle and become a different isotope or element. In a mass of decillions of atoms the rate of this dcay is constant and predictable,but the time of this inevitable occurrence in a single atom cannot be predicted.

The fate of any specific molecule, in the long run, is absolutely clear and predetermined. The action of a specific atom at a specific time is absolutely indeterminate.

Is this Free Will? Predestination? or Chaos?

 

[Fluffy]

An atom of a radioactive element will always eject an atomic particle and become a different isotope or element. In a mass of decillions of atoms the rate of this dcay is constant and predictable,but the time of this inevitable occurrence in a single atom cannot be predicted.

The fate of any specific molecule, in the long run, is absolutely clear and predetermined. The action of a specific atom at a specific time is absolutely indeterminate.

I have often heard this and I get the feeling I am not understanding the concept since it does not appear to be particularly significant to me.

For example, at this moment I cannot calculate all the billions of variables that are causing this pen to balance on my finger rather than fall off and therefore I cannot predict with certainty what will happen to it 5 minutes from now. Now it appears that the calculation of these variables, given sensitive enough equipment and a powerful enough computer, is a possibility. However, if it were impossible, the outcome would still be predetermined, I would just not be able to predetermine the outcome.

The scenario you provide gives us such a situation: an incalculatable variable. I don't understand why this should impact at all on whether the outcome is predetermined or not.

 

[Valjean]

A radioactive atom will always eject an atomic particle at some point and become a different isotope or element. In a mass of decillions of atoms this decay is constant and predictable. In a single atom the specific instant a proton or neutron is ejected is completely unpredictable.

Determinism? Free Will? Chaos?

Does determinism = millions of unperceived, indeterminate chance actions?

Is free will the perceived result of millions of tiny, random, chance events?

 

[d.]

i'm not sure if the fact that an outcome is predictable is the same as it being predetermined.

 

[Willamena]

I do not understand why the emphasis is pertinent to my claim that "we are in control of our actions" admits a causal link between ourselves and actions. It seems as if regardless of where the emphasis is placed, the link is still evident.

By emphasis I mean to point at "what it's about"; the wording stays the same, and the difference is entirely cosmetic. When it's about control, it's about causal actions, the flow of cause and effect; when it's about me, it's about ...me, doing things, regardless that it's worded objectively. It all depends on how you want to look at it.

That there is division between the activity of our mind and our "self" is not something I disagree with. In fact, my rebuttal applies regardless of whether this is the case. If it is not the case, the "self" simply takes the part of another event in the chain. If it is then the "self" is simply the mental activity that we have already admitted to be part of the chain.

The chain looks like one of the following:
External influences --> The "self" --> mental processes --> action
External influences --> mental processes aka the "self" --> action

Looking at it as a "chain" is the objective view; from the subjective view, though (me, looking out from my mind, here, now, experiencing) the difference between "me" and what I do vanishes; it becomes "me, doing things" (like thinking and experiencing).

I have skipped several steps in the chain for simplicity but you get the general idea. I am not arguing that any of these specific steps are necessary parts of my rebuttal but if my opponent appears to believe in the "self", a concept to which I am fairly sure I would disagree with, then I am hardly going to derail the debate by contending this seperate point when it is irrelevant.

Fair enough.

You haven't yet shown why these influences are different from our influence on our actions. Or to put it more simply, you haven't shown why our position in the chain is free to decide the next event in the chain whilst any other event is not.

They're not different; influences are influences, they affect things, objectively. The subjective version would be me, doing things. Our position in the chain is not free; that is the objective view of determinism. But from the subjective perspective, we are not in a chain. We are here, and now, our conscious minds surfing the wave of time in what we call the present. That is freedom, and the next move is ours.

What I'm saying is that there is no way to look at, or even properly describe, free will objectively (which is why these debates usually end in head banging).

Taking responsibility has got nothing to do with free will. I can take responsibility regardless of whether I have free will or not. It is not indicative of self determination and self determination would represent an oddity requiring explanation in a chain otherwise devoid of such a phenomena. Why not argue, for example, and since we do not observe it, that cause and effect is an illusion and the actions of our bodies are self determined, only coincidentally cohering with our thoughts?

Without the concept of free will, there is no such thing as responsibility, at all. If we do not perceive ourselves as the cause of our actions, then we can take or bear no blame or responsibility for those actions. Why should I take responsibility for something that was actually something done to me by causes beyond my control?

Self-determination is the self in control, determining the things it does and is, and it necessarily does that from the subjective perspective.

I do not deny that a person can feel as if he has free will even though he does not. This subjective sensation does not constitute free will.

Objectively, he does not have control because he is a part of the flow of cause and effect. Subjectively, he perceives that he is in control. My will is only freely done if I do it.

 

[Willamena]

Lets say you have the choice between A and B and you chose A. I ask you "what caused you to choose A?". You might respond, as you have done above, and say "nothing caused me to choose A" to which I would reply "then your choice between A and B was random and so you had no control over that choice".

Whatever influenced him to choose one or the other is not free will; free will is him choosing one or the other.

 

[Willamena]

For example, at this moment I cannot calculate all the billions of variables that are causing this pen to balance on my finger rather than fall off and therefore I cannot predict with certainty what will happen to it 5 minutes from now. Now it appears that the calculation of these variables, given sensitive enough equipment and a powerful enough computer, is a possibility. However, if it were impossible, the outcome would still be predetermined, I would just not be able to predetermine the outcome.

Such a computer can never be built, for the simple reason that if we cannot account for all the variables, we cannot program it to account for them.

 

[Fluffy]

By emphasis I mean to point at "what it's about"; the wording stays the same, and the difference is entirely cosmetic. When it's about control, it's about causal actions, the flow of cause and effect; when it's about me, it's about ...me, doing things, regardless that it's worded objectively. It all depends on how you want to look at it.

By emphasis I mean to point at "what it's about"; the wording stays the same, and the difference is entirely cosmetic. When it's about control, it's about causal actions, the flow of cause and effect; when it's about me, it's about ...me, doing things, regardless that it's worded objectively. It all depends on how you want to look at it.

Okay I think I see what you are saying. You are saying that the important part of our actions being ours is that they are ours and not that we are in control of them (I think).

I do not disagree with this assessment but I think that having control is integral to the concept of free will and therefore without control, you cannot have free will.

They're not different; influences are influences, they affect things, objectively. The subjective version would be me, doing things. Our position in the chain is not free; that is the objective view of determinism. But from the subjective perspective, we are not in a chain. We are here, and now, our conscious minds surfing the wave of time in what we call the present. That is freedom, and the next move is ours.

It is apparent freedom born out of our lack of knowledge of the variables. Just because it appears that we are free to choose does not mean that the choice was still predetermined.

Just because the subjective reality is on the surface nicer does not mean it is correct or coherent.

Without the concept of free will, there is no such thing as responsibility, at all. If we do not perceive ourselves as the cause of our actions, then we can take or bear no blame or responsibility for those actions. Why should I take responsibility for something that was actually something done to me by causes beyond my control?

It does not make sense that just because your action was predetermined that you aren't fully responsible for that action since you are the immediate event prior to that action. To say that you aren't responsible would be to deny this link in the chain. Its not a case of you can't affect the future, its a case of you can't control the future.

Objectively, he does not have control because he is a part of the flow of cause and effect. Subjectively, he perceives that he is in control. My will is only freely done if I do it.

But we know that the perception is false. The objective and subjective cannot both be simultaneously true if they contradict each other.

Whatever influenced him to choose one or the other is not free will; free will is him choosing one or the other.

I agree. I am saying that the fact that something influenced him means that his will is not free. If you wish to say that inspite of this influence, he still has free will then fair enough but his action is still predetermined regardless.

Such a computer can never be built, for the simple reason that if we cannot account for all the variables, we cannot program it to account for them.

That was essentially my point. Seyorni produced an example which, if I have understood correctly, is evidence of a situation in which there is an uncalculatable variable. I argue that since there are already many variables that are uncalculatable due to human limitation, a further variable that is uncalculatable due to physical law doesn't seem any different with regards to predetermination.

 

[Willamena]

Okay I think I see what you are saying. You are saying that the important part of our actions being ours is that they are ours and not that we are in control of them (I think).

I do not disagree with this assessment but I think that having control is integral to the concept of free will and therefore without control, you cannot have free will.

I think that being control is integral to the concept of free will. We are the control. We are the decision and the motive force of action. We are free will.

It is apparent freedom born out of our lack of knowledge of the variables. Just because it appears that we are free to choose does not mean that the choice was still predetermined.

Just because the subjective reality is on the surface nicer does not mean it is correct or coherent.

No argument, there. Having a limited capacity for knowledge of the world around us is A Good Thing --otherwise, we would be aware of Chaos. Instead, we are able to order and organize the world through interpretation; a nice, safe world that we can live in.

I'm not sure what you mean by coherent (for some reason, i keep defaulting to "cohesive" and that's a sticky subject ). The order we bring to the interpreted world is real, as is the interpretation. Appearances are real, even the incorrect ones. Isn't real enough?

It does not make sense that just because your action was predetermined that you aren't fully responsible for that action since you are the immediate event prior to that action. To say that you aren't responsible would be to deny this link in the chain. Its not a case of you can't affect the future, its a case of you can't control the future.

I am not an event in the deterministic view, I am a thing. As a thing, I am buffeted left and right by events, and in turn I cause other things to happen --someone once said, like bowling pins knocking each other around. That is an objective "me", not a subjective one. The flow of cause and effect belongs to the objective view: I am no more responsible for doing things than the bowling pin is for tipping over.

The subjective view reverses that. From the subjective view, there are things that happen that I cause. The direction of effect flows from me outward, with no apparent external cause. There are things that influence my decision --'knowledge' and 'feeling' things-- but in the end, the moment of making the decision or that action is me, doing things.

The link doesn't have to be denied, it is there. It is the objective view. But there is also, ever-present for the conscious human, the subjective perspective.

But we know that the perception is false. The objective and subjective cannot both be simultaneously true if they contradict each other.

Perception is not false --it is what it is. Perception may not correctly reflect reality, but it can only be "false" in that sense if it is not a perception.

But you probably meant that it is expected that it must reflect reality. Must it? (Hint: perceptions are not reality.) If I perceive through clues that my friend is angry, even though she seems outwardly calm, is that necessarily a "false" impression? No. If it's true, then it does reflect reality; if it's not, it is still my impression.

"Illusions are real, or magicians would be out of a job."

"Whatever influenced him to choose one or the other is not free will; free will is him choosing one or the other."
I agree. I am saying that the fact that something influenced him means that his will is not free. If you wish to say that inspite of this influence, he still has free will then fair enough but his action is still predetermined regardless.

No, it just means that objectively he has no free will at all, because when we utilize that view we are not privy to it; like standing on the moon and looking for its crescent. We can stick a label in there, call it free will, and try to squeeze it into the picture, but it just doesn't fit --it's made redundant by becoming part of the deterministic flow of events. But then there's the subjective view, which somehow gets ignored (not by you in particular, but in these discussions in general). In the statement I made, the first part of the sentence, the influences themselves as things buffeting each other, is the objective view; the second part, me doing things, is subjective.

 

[Quiddity]

The dialogue is difficult because you and I mean different things by "self" (I think) but it shouldn't matter too much because I am arguing that free will is not coherent and so regardless of the definition of self, it will still fail to hold.

Lets say you have the choice between A and B and you chose A. I ask you "what caused you to choose A?". You might respond, as you have done above, and say "nothing caused me to choose A" to which I would reply "then your choice between A and B was random and so you had no control over that choice".

Perhaps it might illustrate it better to consider the following: A rock is on the top of a hill and one day tumbles down the slope to the bottom. I ask "What caused the rock to tumble to the bottom of the slope?" and you might reply "Nothing caused the rock to tumble to the bottom of the slope". In this hypothetical scenario, the rock's fall must therefore be random since it was uncaused.

I believe free will is coherent. Unless we come to agree about this, we won’t get far.

 

[Random]

I believe free will is coherent. Unless we come to agree about this, we won’t get far.

A coherent concept it is, but unless you can say for certain that there is no deterministic factor that it counters, you can't assert its conherence in actuality.