Seems like a pretty standard discussion of the history of Western society combined with a promotion of his worldview. His flowery language, rhetoric flourishes and hyperbole seem to be somewhat of an affectation to seem more 'profound' than he really is.
Agreed. But there is also the matter of how unnecessarily arbitrary his perspective is, and how little responsibility he takes for that.
Basically, he complains that people do not understand that he is right and those who disagree with him are wrong. Just because.
Peterson's main focus seems to be on protecting a conservative notion of the classically liberal Western society. I'd view his comments much more in this regard than any specifically religious agenda. He views Christianity as the foundations of such worldview as opposed to something which needs to be 'true' in a religious sense.
Pretty much. Which has the twin defects of being both arbitrary and unsupported while also being a very questionable presentation of the very subject matter that he claims to be misunderstood and deserving of more respect.
How I would interpret his arguments:
He sees it as a mistake that New Atheists treat religion like a scientific proposition, and believe its value comes from whether it is true or false.
The considerable number of people who make that mistake - which is serious, indeed - tends to not be atheists, "new" or of any other flavor.
Instead, it is a narrative that draws it's value from utility in creating social cohesion.
Which is why it must accept and deal with questions about that value.
Peterson is trying to claim that it is unfair to make that questioning. That just won't fly.
A common problem of modernity, the belief we can transcend our human limitations to solve out problems. The hubristic faith in Reason.
That would carry some weight if presented in itself. Not so much when appeal to a supernaturalist Logos is presented as a better alternative.
If anything, that refuge in Logos has every single downside of the presumed "faith in Reason" and many more of its own.
This can take many forms, from 'extreme' utopian examples like Marxism (a kind of eschatology), or more moderate, gradual examples like melioristic progress (a kind of Divine Providence).
Or, far more often, claims of a perfect monotheistic revelation that promises Salvation in exchange to unquestioning submission.
The primacy of the individual as a moral agent, the foundation of liberalism. Most societies throughout history have operated on a collectivist moral foundation.
[He is right that this owes a great debt to (Pauline) Christianity though. Paul is really the grandfather of liberalism.]
That is a lot of claim for anyone to make.
It is hardly believable that Paul would make much of a difference in the overall ability of humanity to realize that individual people can be legitimate contributors to the overall good.
On the contrary, such a realization was just about unavoidable. Paul and the New Testament in general may or may not have been early proponents, but that is of very little consequence even if true.
Again relating to the liberal Western order, the open society.
Appeal to truth as a necessary value is really not very deep a realization. It borders on platitude, at least without some attempt at explaining its consequences and relevance, which I don't think he really tried to give.
He could learn from Sam Harris, who is a passionate and insightful proponent of truth as a moral value.
He believed that when you removed the foundation of Western civilisation (Christianity), then the whole thing will eventually collapse due to fragmentation and infighting between competing ideological narratives.
From Robespierre's Cult of the Supreme Being, the Hebertists Cult of Reason, Comte's Religion of Humanity, many who believed we had outgrown traditional religions believed they must be replaced in order to maintain social cohesion. Alternatively you have Romantic notions of Blood and Soil (Nazism being the extreme example), or Marxists' class solidarity and providential beliefs in the triumph of the proletariat, you have societies organised around a replacement for religion.
Fair enough, but the interesting question to ask is not whether people will attempt to maintain or replace "religion" in that sense (or perhaps more accurately, ideologies based on monotheism and passive obedience to God's will or some other variety of abstract higher imperative).
Instead, a more relevant question to ask is whether we should strive to care for the forms that such efforts take, or instead pursue some better alternative (or more than one).
Peterson seems to want to purposefully neglect that question, as if he saw it as somehow illegitimate. That is a very glaring flaw of his attempts at argumentation. Yet he refuses to address it, instead declaring dogmatically there there is a vaguely theistic and mysteriously trustworthy "logos" that somehow is unfairly opposed by atheists.
That is a very misguided claim, and a remarkably unsupported one.
His belief is that we can't simply create 'pick and mix' ideologies where we dispassionately use reason to choose that which is good and expect society to adhere to this. This presupposes that we are rational creatures who will act in accordance to collective well being. As we are not individually or collectively rational though, we can't expect reason to save us.
As is self-evident, it's much easier to say 'I believe in world peace' than it is to achieve this.
That is somewhat correct... but his advice is then to make things even worse by adhering to appreciation of the ill-defined, elusive, vaguely theistic and apparently authoritarism-loving "logos" simply because unity, even under such circunstances and with such caveats, is to be presumed better than the supposedly chaotic (and only?) alternative.
If we can't live without myths of some form, it's better the devil you know as if something has stood the test of time, it likely has value.[/quote]
Arguable at best. Including the part about it having stood the test of time. People criticize those traditions for a reason.
Like
Chesterton's fence:
In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox. There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, "I don't see the use of this; let us clear it away." To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: "If you don't see the use of it, I certainly won't let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it."
He believes New Atheists don't really understand what they are trying to destroy.
One serious flaw in that argument is that it presumes that what exists must have a discernible reason. An even more serious one is that it decrees, for no obvious reason and with no apparent support, that it is always best to refuse to substitute or improve on things that we do not really understand.