This is a rough draft of some thoughts I’ve been having…
Let’s assume, for the sake of this discussion, that someone tells you, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”. By that, they mean that whether or not the principle is moral is NOT determined by individual preference, but rather by some standard that is independent of any individual.
Now, if someone were to tell you that, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, would it not be logically relevant to ask, “How do you know that to be true?”
I have heard someone say that it would not be logically relevant to ask how we can know that such propositions are true.
They (correctly) argued that whether or not a moral principle exists objectively has nothing to do with whether or not we can know that it exists objectively.
But then they went a step further and (incorrectly) argued that because the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with our knowledge that it exists, whether or not we can know that a principle objectively exists is of no relevance or consequence at all.
On the contrary, whether or not we can know that a moral principle objectively exists has great relevance and consequence to any propositions (i.e. truth claims) we make about it.
After all, if I claim to know that the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true, but I also claim there is no method, procedure, or means for knowing that the proposition is true, then I contradict myself. Then how can I know the proposition is true?
Moreover, if I cannot know whether the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true or false, then I cannot know whether the proposition, “Wear diamonds is an objective moral principle” is true or false. I am left with no rational basis for asserting either claim.
Hence, it might be the case that the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with whether we can know of its existence, but whether we can know of its existence has everything to do with the meaningfulness of any propositions or truth claims we make about it. A proposition that cannot be known to be true or false is empty, meaningless, and of no use to us at all.
Now, so far as I can see, there is no effective method, procedure, or means for determining the truth value of the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”.
The problem lies in the fact that our epistemic point of view is ultimately – and inescapably – subjective. That is, we ultimately have just one – and only one – point of view, and that point of view is our own. We simply do not have the ability to stand outside of our own subjectivity and confirm that there exists anything independent of us – and that very much includes an inability to stand outside our own subjectivity and know that “the moral principle that diamonds should not be worn exists objectively”.
Even if we posit (1) that there exists a god who (2) has established the ontological existence of certain moral principles, and (3) wishes us to abide by them, we cannot stand outside our own subjectivity and know with certainty that any of those three propositions is true.
What can be said here about the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, can be said about any claim that something is or isn’t an objective moral principle. That is, it can be said about any purely moral claim that there is no effective means of determining if it exists objectively. All such moral claims are in epistemic terms meaningless, empty phrases that cannot be demonstrated to refer to any reality.
Now, that’s not to say that moral claims don’t have meaning as statements of value, but only that they are epistemologically meaningless. If they could be demonstrated to refer to some reality, then they would not be meaningless. But our subjectivity prevents that from happening. Hence, we cannot know that our morals are objective.
And this means that the person who says, “Morals are objective”, and the person who says, “Morals are simply a matter of individual preference”, are in the very same epistemic boat. Neither one of them can escape their own subjectivity. Neither one of them can claim to know with certainty that their proposition is true.
Just my two cents.
Let’s assume, for the sake of this discussion, that someone tells you, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”. By that, they mean that whether or not the principle is moral is NOT determined by individual preference, but rather by some standard that is independent of any individual.
Now, if someone were to tell you that, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, would it not be logically relevant to ask, “How do you know that to be true?”
I have heard someone say that it would not be logically relevant to ask how we can know that such propositions are true.
They (correctly) argued that whether or not a moral principle exists objectively has nothing to do with whether or not we can know that it exists objectively.
But then they went a step further and (incorrectly) argued that because the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with our knowledge that it exists, whether or not we can know that a principle objectively exists is of no relevance or consequence at all.
On the contrary, whether or not we can know that a moral principle objectively exists has great relevance and consequence to any propositions (i.e. truth claims) we make about it.
After all, if I claim to know that the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true, but I also claim there is no method, procedure, or means for knowing that the proposition is true, then I contradict myself. Then how can I know the proposition is true?
Moreover, if I cannot know whether the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true or false, then I cannot know whether the proposition, “Wear diamonds is an objective moral principle” is true or false. I am left with no rational basis for asserting either claim.
Hence, it might be the case that the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with whether we can know of its existence, but whether we can know of its existence has everything to do with the meaningfulness of any propositions or truth claims we make about it. A proposition that cannot be known to be true or false is empty, meaningless, and of no use to us at all.
Now, so far as I can see, there is no effective method, procedure, or means for determining the truth value of the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”.
The problem lies in the fact that our epistemic point of view is ultimately – and inescapably – subjective. That is, we ultimately have just one – and only one – point of view, and that point of view is our own. We simply do not have the ability to stand outside of our own subjectivity and confirm that there exists anything independent of us – and that very much includes an inability to stand outside our own subjectivity and know that “the moral principle that diamonds should not be worn exists objectively”.
Even if we posit (1) that there exists a god who (2) has established the ontological existence of certain moral principles, and (3) wishes us to abide by them, we cannot stand outside our own subjectivity and know with certainty that any of those three propositions is true.
What can be said here about the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, can be said about any claim that something is or isn’t an objective moral principle. That is, it can be said about any purely moral claim that there is no effective means of determining if it exists objectively. All such moral claims are in epistemic terms meaningless, empty phrases that cannot be demonstrated to refer to any reality.
Now, that’s not to say that moral claims don’t have meaning as statements of value, but only that they are epistemologically meaningless. If they could be demonstrated to refer to some reality, then they would not be meaningless. But our subjectivity prevents that from happening. Hence, we cannot know that our morals are objective.
And this means that the person who says, “Morals are objective”, and the person who says, “Morals are simply a matter of individual preference”, are in the very same epistemic boat. Neither one of them can escape their own subjectivity. Neither one of them can claim to know with certainty that their proposition is true.
Just my two cents.