Why We Cannot Know That Our Morals are Objective

[Sunstone]

This is a rough draft of some thoughts I’ve been having…

Let’s assume, for the sake of this discussion, that someone tells you, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”. By that, they mean that whether or not the principle is moral is NOT determined by individual preference, but rather by some standard that is independent of any individual.

Now, if someone were to tell you that, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, would it not be logically relevant to ask, “How do you know that to be true?”

I have heard someone say that it would not be logically relevant to ask how we can know that such propositions are true.

They (correctly) argued that whether or not a moral principle exists objectively has nothing to do with whether or not we can know that it exists objectively.

But then they went a step further and (incorrectly) argued that because the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with our knowledge that it exists, whether or not we can know that a principle objectively exists is of no relevance or consequence at all.

On the contrary, whether or not we can know that a moral principle objectively exists has great relevance and consequence to any propositions (i.e. truth claims) we make about it.

After all, if I claim to know that the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true, but I also claim there is no method, procedure, or means for knowing that the proposition is true, then I contradict myself. Then how can I know the proposition is true?

Moreover, if I cannot know whether the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true or false, then I cannot know whether the proposition, “Wear diamonds is an objective moral principle” is true or false. I am left with no rational basis for asserting either claim.

Hence, it might be the case that the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with whether we can know of its existence, but whether we can know of its existence has everything to do with the meaningfulness of any propositions or truth claims we make about it. A proposition that cannot be known to be true or false is empty, meaningless, and of no use to us at all.

Now, so far as I can see, there is no effective method, procedure, or means for determining the truth value of the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”.

The problem lies in the fact that our epistemic point of view is ultimately – and inescapably – subjective. That is, we ultimately have just one – and only one – point of view, and that point of view is our own. We simply do not have the ability to stand outside of our own subjectivity and confirm that there exists anything independent of us – and that very much includes an inability to stand outside our own subjectivity and know that “the moral principle that diamonds should not be worn exists objectively”.

Even if we posit (1) that there exists a god who (2) has established the ontological existence of certain moral principles, and (3) wishes us to abide by them, we cannot stand outside our own subjectivity and know with certainty that any of those three propositions is true.

What can be said here about the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, can be said about any claim that something is or isn’t an objective moral principle. That is, it can be said about any purely moral claim that there is no effective means of determining if it exists objectively. All such moral claims are in epistemic terms meaningless, empty phrases that cannot be demonstrated to refer to any reality.

Now, that’s not to say that moral claims don’t have meaning as statements of value, but only that they are epistemologically meaningless. If they could be demonstrated to refer to some reality, then they would not be meaningless. But our subjectivity prevents that from happening. Hence, we cannot know that our morals are objective.

And this means that the person who says, “Morals are objective”, and the person who says, “Morals are simply a matter of individual preference”, are in the very same epistemic boat. Neither one of them can escape their own subjectivity. Neither one of them can claim to know with certainty that their proposition is true.

Just my two cents.

 

[lewisnotmiller]

Interesting post, but (unsurprisingly!) I'm definitely NOT in the 'objective morality' boat, so not too much there for me to disagree with or seek clarification on.
I did find this very small point interesting though, and think it might be important to flesh out a little...

A proposition that cannot be known to be true or false is empty, meaningless, and of no use to us at all.

I'm not convinced that is true. A proposition can have utility regardless of truth, and whilst I personally may be aware that any claim of absolute truth is unproveable, my ability to convince others that it is indeed true leaves it able to meet that utilization.

Taking your example in the OP, imagine I'm an emerald seller, and manage to convince someone that wearing diamonds is objectively bad in a moral sense. When that person gets married (let's just assume white wedding for convenience) there is an increased chance that person purchases an emerald ring.

That's a cynical example, of course. Substitute 'pacifism' for a less cynical example.

 

[savagewind]

I read the whole post and I think it gets easier to understand near the end.
My first thought was to rate it funny, but it really isn't funny.

I think I agree that both are in the same epistemic boat.

I could feel my brain, and usually, I can't (unless I have a headache.).

 

[allfoak]

Everything is moral.

 

[Sunstone]

Interesting post, but (unsurprisingly!) I'm definitely NOT in the 'objective morality' boat, so not too much there for me to disagree with or seek clarification on.
I did find this very small point interesting though, and think it might be important to flesh out a little...



I'm not convinced that is true. A proposition can have utility regardless of truth, and whilst I personally may be aware that any claim of absolute truth is unproveable, my ability to convince others that it is indeed true leaves it able to meet that utilization.

Taking your example in the OP, imagine I'm an emerald seller, and manage to convince someone that wearing diamonds is objectively bad in a moral sense. When that person gets married (let's just assume white wedding for convenience) there is an increased chance that person purchases an emerald ring.

That's a cynical example, of course. Substitute 'pacifism' for a less cynical example.

Perhaps I need to spell things out a little bit better. A proposition that cannot be known to be true or false, is empty, meaningless, and of no use to us at all in terms of knowing what is or isn't the case. I had just assumed the part in italics was understood. My bad.

 

[lewisnotmiller]

Perhaps I need to spell things out a little bit better. A proposition that cannot be known to be true or false, is empty, meaningless, and of no use to us at all in terms of knowing what is or isn't the case. I had just assumed the part in italics was understood. My bad.

To be honest, I knew that was what you meant.
But I think it's important to keep in mind that propositions that are useless to us in terms of knowing 'Truth' can still hold utility, and often do. It speaks to motivation in making them. Though of course the motivations are commonly more internal and harder to ring-fence, rather than simple material reward that I used in my example.

I tend to think about a lot of things in terms of motivation and cognitive dissonance, so hopefully I haven't side-tracked this. Other than that, the OP sat fine with me.

 

[lewisnotmiller]

Everything is moral.

I have no idea what that means. I just chewed on my pen. Moral?

 

[allfoak]

I have no idea what that means. I just chewed on my pen. Moral?

That's for you to decide.
I cannot determine for you what is moral and what is not.
I can only decide what morality is for myself.

 

[Geoff-Allen]

Interesting thread!

For me, the question of being "moral" doesn't really arise.

I have discovered that if I cultivate kindness & unconditional compassion towards my fellow beings then I enjoy peace-of-mind.

I don't do it because it is morally "right" or because it will get me into "Heaven". It merely forms the basis for my thoughts & words & deeds.

All the best!

 

[lewisnotmiller]

That's for you to decide.
I cannot determine for you what is moral and what is not.
I can only decide what morality is for myself.

You asserted that all things are moral. I'm asking for your opinion on how chewing a pen is moral. Or immoral.

 

[allfoak]

You asserted that all things are moral. I'm asking for your opinion on how chewing a pen is moral. Or immoral.

You are smart enough to figure it out for yourself, if not then you will have to ask someone else to decide what you should or shouldn't do.
I would suggest the latter.
My point of course is that i must decide for myself what is and isn't moral.
If i let someone else do it then i have given up control of my own life.
That being the case, all things are lawful but not necessarily expedient.

 

[lewisnotmiller]

You are smart enough to figure it out for yourself, if not then you will have to ask someone else to decide what you should or shouldn't do.
I would suggest the latter.

Kudos on the subtle slap.

My point of course is that i must decide for myself what is and isn't moral.
If i let someone else do it then i have given up control of my own life.
That being the case, all things are lawful but not necessarily expedient.

Ultimately we probably agree, then. Personal responsibility is required for morality.
Statements like 'all things are moral' and 'all things are lawful' are way too black and white for me, but I think you're talking more about mindfulness of morality than actual moral conundrums, and in that context I can understand what you mean.

 

[idav]

This is a rough draft of some thoughts I’ve been having…

Let’s assume, for the sake of this discussion, that someone tells you, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”. By that, they mean that whether or not the principle is moral is NOT determined by individual preference, but rather by some standard that is independent of any individual.

Now, if someone were to tell you that, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, would it not be logically relevant to ask, “How do you know that to be true?”

I have heard someone say that it would not be logically relevant to ask how we can know that such propositions are true.

They (correctly) argued that whether or not a moral principle exists objectively has nothing to do with whether or not we can know that it exists objectively.

But then they went a step further and (incorrectly) argued that because the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with our knowledge that it exists, whether or not we can know that a principle objectively exists is of no relevance or consequence at all.

On the contrary, whether or not we can know that a moral principle objectively exists has great relevance and consequence to any propositions (i.e. truth claims) we make about it.

After all, if I claim to know that the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true, but I also claim there is no method, procedure, or means for knowing that the proposition is true, then I contradict myself. Then how can I know the proposition is true?

Moreover, if I cannot know whether the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true or false, then I cannot know whether the proposition, “Wear diamonds is an objective moral principle” is true or false. I am left with no rational basis for asserting either claim.

Hence, it might be the case that the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with whether we can know of its existence, but whether we can know of its existence has everything to do with the meaningfulness of any propositions or truth claims we make about it. A proposition that cannot be known to be true or false is empty, meaningless, and of no use to us at all.

Now, so far as I can see, there is no effective method, procedure, or means for determining the truth value of the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”.

The problem lies in the fact that our epistemic point of view is ultimately – and inescapably – subjective. That is, we ultimately have just one – and only one – point of view, and that point of view is our own. We simply do not have the ability to stand outside of our own subjectivity and confirm that there exists anything independent of us – and that very much includes an inability to stand outside our own subjectivity and know that “the moral principle that diamonds should not be worn exists objectively”.

Even if we posit (1) that there exists a god who (2) has established the ontological existence of certain moral principles, and (3) wishes us to abide by them, we cannot stand outside our own subjectivity and know with certainty that any of those three propositions is true.

What can be said here about the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, can be said about any claim that something is or isn’t an objective moral principle. That is, it can be said about any purely moral claim that there is no effective means of determining if it exists objectively. All such moral claims are in epistemic terms meaningless, empty phrases that cannot be demonstrated to refer to any reality.

Now, that’s not to say that moral claims don’t have meaning as statements of value, but only that they are epistemologically meaningless. If they could be demonstrated to refer to some reality, then they would not be meaningless. But our subjectivity prevents that from happening. Hence, we cannot know that our morals are objective.

And this means that the person who says, “Morals are objective”, and the person who says, “Morals are simply a matter of individual preference”, are in the very same epistemic boat. Neither one of them can escape their own subjectivity. Neither one of them can claim to know with certainty that their proposition is true.

Just my two cents.

I think it's important to show the authority behind a proposed truth value. Saying it's objectively wrong based on some godlike authority isn't necessarily wrong though but we need better ways on determining why god should be followed as an authority on wearing diamonds, for example. Whether god has authority to make those decision is what makes gods morals objectively true. So agreeing on objectivity depends on the authority agreed upon.

 

[Curious George]

Everything is moral.

This is an interesting argument to the OP. As it must not be true in order for the OP to be true. Therefore, the OP must argue that the proposition "everything is moral" is objectively false. Thereby, falsifying the OP.

 

[Curious George]

This is a rough draft of some thoughts I’ve been having…

Let’s assume, for the sake of this discussion, that someone tells you, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”. By that, they mean that whether or not the principle is moral is NOT determined by individual preference, but rather by some standard that is independent of any individual.

Now, if someone were to tell you that, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, would it not be logically relevant to ask, “How do you know that to be true?”

I have heard someone say that it would not be logically relevant to ask how we can know that such propositions are true.

They (correctly) argued that whether or not a moral principle exists objectively has nothing to do with whether or not we can know that it exists objectively.

But then they went a step further and (incorrectly) argued that because the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with our knowledge that it exists, whether or not we can know that a principle objectively exists is of no relevance or consequence at all.

On the contrary, whether or not we can know that a moral principle objectively exists has great relevance and consequence to any propositions (i.e. truth claims) we make about it.

After all, if I claim to know that the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true, but I also claim there is no method, procedure, or means for knowing that the proposition is true, then I contradict myself. Then how can I know the proposition is true?

Moreover, if I cannot know whether the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true or false, then I cannot know whether the proposition, “Wear diamonds is an objective moral principle” is true or false. I am left with no rational basis for asserting either claim.

Hence, it might be the case that the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with whether we can know of its existence, but whether we can know of its existence has everything to do with the meaningfulness of any propositions or truth claims we make about it. A proposition that cannot be known to be true or false is empty, meaningless, and of no use to us at all.

Now, so far as I can see, there is no effective method, procedure, or means for determining the truth value of the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”.

The problem lies in the fact that our epistemic point of view is ultimately – and inescapably – subjective. That is, we ultimately have just one – and only one – point of view, and that point of view is our own. We simply do not have the ability to stand outside of our own subjectivity and confirm that there exists anything independent of us – and that very much includes an inability to stand outside our own subjectivity and know that “the moral principle that diamonds should not be worn exists objectively”.

Even if we posit (1) that there exists a god who (2) has established the ontological existence of certain moral principles, and (3) wishes us to abide by them, we cannot stand outside our own subjectivity and know with certainty that any of those three propositions is true.

What can be said here about the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, can be said about any claim that something is or isn’t an objective moral principle. That is, it can be said about any purely moral claim that there is no effective means of determining if it exists objectively. All such moral claims are in epistemic terms meaningless, empty phrases that cannot be demonstrated to refer to any reality.

Now, that’s not to say that moral claims don’t have meaning as statements of value, but only that they are epistemologically meaningless. If they could be demonstrated to refer to some reality, then they would not be meaningless. But our subjectivity prevents that from happening. Hence, we cannot know that our morals are objective.

And this means that the person who says, “Morals are objective”, and the person who says, “Morals are simply a matter of individual preference”, are in the very same epistemic boat. Neither one of them can escape their own subjectivity. Neither one of them can claim to know with certainty that their proposition is true.

Just my two cents.

Sounds like a journey into solipsism.

 

[Jeremiahcp]

Sounds like a journey into solipsism.

That is what I was thinking as well.

 

[1robin]

This is a rough draft of some thoughts I’ve been having…

Let’s assume, for the sake of this discussion, that someone tells you, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”. By that, they mean that whether or not the principle is moral is NOT determined by individual preference, but rather by some standard that is independent of any individual.

Now, if someone were to tell you that, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, would it not be logically relevant to ask, “How do you know that to be true?”

I have heard someone say that it would not be logically relevant to ask how we can know that such propositions are true.

They (correctly) argued that whether or not a moral principle exists objectively has nothing to do with whether or not we can know that it exists objectively.

But then they went a step further and (incorrectly) argued that because the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with our knowledge that it exists, whether or not we can know that a principle objectively exists is of no relevance or consequence at all.

On the contrary, whether or not we can know that a moral principle objectively exists has great relevance and consequence to any propositions (i.e. truth claims) we make about it.

After all, if I claim to know that the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true, but I also claim there is no method, procedure, or means for knowing that the proposition is true, then I contradict myself. Then how can I know the proposition is true?

Moreover, if I cannot know whether the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true or false, then I cannot know whether the proposition, “Wear diamonds is an objective moral principle” is true or false. I am left with no rational basis for asserting either claim.

Hence, it might be the case that the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with whether we can know of its existence, but whether we can know of its existence has everything to do with the meaningfulness of any propositions or truth claims we make about it. A proposition that cannot be known to be true or false is empty, meaningless, and of no use to us at all.

Now, so far as I can see, there is no effective method, procedure, or means for determining the truth value of the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”.

The problem lies in the fact that our epistemic point of view is ultimately – and inescapably – subjective. That is, we ultimately have just one – and only one – point of view, and that point of view is our own. We simply do not have the ability to stand outside of our own subjectivity and confirm that there exists anything independent of us – and that very much includes an inability to stand outside our own subjectivity and know that “the moral principle that diamonds should not be worn exists objectively”.

Even if we posit (1) that there exists a god who (2) has established the ontological existence of certain moral principles, and (3) wishes us to abide by them, we cannot stand outside our own subjectivity and know with certainty that any of those three propositions is true.

What can be said here about the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, can be said about any claim that something is or isn’t an objective moral principle. That is, it can be said about any purely moral claim that there is no effective means of determining if it exists objectively. All such moral claims are in epistemic terms meaningless, empty phrases that cannot be demonstrated to refer to any reality.

Now, that’s not to say that moral claims don’t have meaning as statements of value, but only that they are epistemologically meaningless. If they could be demonstrated to refer to some reality, then they would not be meaningless. But our subjectivity prevents that from happening. Hence, we cannot know that our morals are objective.

And this means that the person who says, “Morals are objective”, and the person who says, “Morals are simply a matter of individual preference”, are in the very same epistemic boat. Neither one of them can escape their own subjectivity. Neither one of them can claim to know with certainty that their proposition is true.

Just my two cents.

You really need to research DCT or theologians who are moral theorists. The ways you used epistemology, objective, and several others terms is simply incorrect.

Epistemology concerns how we come to know a certain thing. This issue has nothing what so ever to do with the nature (ontology) of morality.
Ontology in this context concerns what the actual nature of a thing is.
Objective in this context concerns something that is true even if no one believes it is.
Subjective in this context means that the conclusions about the nature of a thing are solely the product of (or subject to) merely our opinions.
Absolute means a simplistic rule that applies in all conditions. This is not what I claim.

The ontology of a thing has nothing what so ever to do with how anyone (epistemologically) comes to be aware of a thing. The fact that I think is ontologically and objectively true even if I come to find out about by reading the back of a lucky charms box. If my God exists his moral values are more objectively (independent of our opinions, even if I have no way what so ever to (epistemologically) know what any of his moral values are. However if my God exists I can have every reason to believe he can communicate easily communicate his moral commands to me, and you do not have the slightest reason to claim otherwise.

What you keep doing is what most non-theists attempt despite it's being an unsound and invalid argument. Theists see non-theists do this so much it is a private joke amongst our selves. I used to even state that it should not be done and why in all my initial posts about morality until I found out non-theists will do it anyway.

1. I post two simplistic arguments that concern the ontology (nature) of morality, and that is instantly confused with whether I can know what those objective moral values and duties are (epistemology).
2. I am not sure if you have yet but another inevitability is for your side to respond to arguments about the nature of morality with an argument about that meaning atheists cannot do good, which has nothing what so ever to do with what we are saying.
3. Most of you do not get that our two "if - then" arguments are conditional but inescapable because they cover all possibilities.
4. And you confuse the nature of whatever morality actually is, with others claiming things about a specific moral value or duty. We do not have to know of a single objective moral value and command to accurately state the two moral arguments I always post, but we in fact can know specific moral vales and duties if God exist.

You must be careful with terminology concerning moral issues, because you are stepping all over your self.

I do not know whether there are non-theist seminars where you are told certain things to say to attempt to escape inconvenient facts or not, but on this subject you guys seem to have a defective hive mind or swarm logic.

 

[oldbadger]

A primitive man, eating the flesh of his dead son so that the deceased may live on within himself, may see this act as the finest and moral thing to do

 

[Willamena]

This is a rough draft of some thoughts I’ve been having…

Let’s assume, for the sake of this discussion, that someone tells you, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”. By that, they mean that whether or not the principle is moral is NOT determined by individual preference, but rather by some standard that is independent of any individual.

Now, if someone were to tell you that, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, would it not be logically relevant to ask, “How do you know that to be true?”

I have heard someone say that it would not be logically relevant to ask how we can know that such propositions are true.

They (correctly) argued that whether or not a moral principle exists objectively has nothing to do with whether or not we can know that it exists objectively.

But then they went a step further and (incorrectly) argued that because the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with our knowledge that it exists, whether or not we can know that a principle objectively exists is of no relevance or consequence at all.

On the contrary, whether or not we can know that a moral principle objectively exists has great relevance and consequence to any propositions (i.e. truth claims) we make about it.

After all, if I claim to know that the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true, but I also claim there is no method, procedure, or means for knowing that the proposition is true, then I contradict myself. Then how can I know the proposition is true?

Moreover, if I cannot know whether the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, is true or false, then I cannot know whether the proposition, “Wear diamonds is an objective moral principle” is true or false. I am left with no rational basis for asserting either claim.

Hence, it might be the case that the objective existence of a moral principle has nothing to do with whether we can know of its existence, but whether we can know of its existence has everything to do with the meaningfulness of any propositions or truth claims we make about it. A proposition that cannot be known to be true or false is empty, meaningless, and of no use to us at all.

Now, so far as I can see, there is no effective method, procedure, or means for determining the truth value of the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”.

The problem lies in the fact that our epistemic point of view is ultimately – and inescapably – subjective. That is, we ultimately have just one – and only one – point of view, and that point of view is our own. We simply do not have the ability to stand outside of our own subjectivity and confirm that there exists anything independent of us – and that very much includes an inability to stand outside our own subjectivity and know that “the moral principle that diamonds should not be worn exists objectively”.

Even if we posit (1) that there exists a god who (2) has established the ontological existence of certain moral principles, and (3) wishes us to abide by them, we cannot stand outside our own subjectivity and know with certainty that any of those three propositions is true.

What can be said here about the proposition, “Do not wear diamonds is an objective moral principle”, can be said about any claim that something is or isn’t an objective moral principle. That is, it can be said about any purely moral claim that there is no effective means of determining if it exists objectively. All such moral claims are in epistemic terms meaningless, empty phrases that cannot be demonstrated to refer to any reality.

Now, that’s not to say that moral claims don’t have meaning as statements of value, but only that they are epistemologically meaningless. If they could be demonstrated to refer to some reality, then they would not be meaningless. But our subjectivity prevents that from happening. Hence, we cannot know that our morals are objective.

And this means that the person who says, “Morals are objective”, and the person who says, “Morals are simply a matter of individual preference”, are in the very same epistemic boat. Neither one of them can escape their own subjectivity. Neither one of them can claim to know with certainty that their proposition is true.

Just my two cents.

"Do not wear diamonds," is a moral principle, a normative command (with the implied claim that you should not wear diamonds). A principle is objective, as it is not determined by any individual but by its circumstance of being meaningfully foundational.

As it's true that it is a normative principle and objective, that alone makes, "'Do not wear diamonds' is an objective moral principle," a true statement.

 

[MonkeyFire]

Morality can be either objective, or subjective.